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abstract
This thesis is a study of the four main confrontations 
between workers and the Party-state in China which have 
occurred since 1949. These confrontations occurred in the 
years immediately after liberation (1949-1951); during the 
Hundred Flowers period (1956-7); during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1969), and during the April Fifth and 
Democracy Wall movements (1976-1981).
Each of these periods is usually regarded as a time when 
intellectuals and students came into conflict with the Party 
and expressed dissenting views in protest movements of varying 
severity and extent. It is not well known that the same four^ 
periods were also times of crisis in the relationship between > 
workers and the Party. This study aims to examine workers' > 
activities in each of these four confrontations, analysing the 
issues about which workers were concerned, identifying the 
political content of campaigns and demands, and in particular, 
looking at the evidence of workers' attempts to form their own 
independent organizations.
Having traced the development of workers' discontent and 
protest over a period of forty-five years, it becomes apparent 
that in fact the issues of greatest concern to workers, the 
issues which have been at the heart of every major 
confrontation since 1949, have remained essentially the same. 
However, workers' protests have developed over the years 
organizationally. The formation of ad hoc strike committees 
within a single enterprise in the 1950s developed into the 
organization of large-scale workers' groups which crossed 
industrial and geographical boundaries during the Cultural 
Revolution, and then in the early 1980s independent unions 
were formed modelled on Poland's Solidarity.
This study thus provides the context in which workers' 
involvement in the Democracy Movement of 1989 can be properly 
understood, not as an entirely unprecedented event, but as the 
latest and most severe of a series of crises stemming from the 
nature of workers' position in China under the CCP.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the six years since the suppression of the Chinese 
pro-democracy movement, the initial view of most observers - 
that the involvement of autonomous workers' groups in that 
movement was merely an epiphenomenon - has shifted somewhat. 
The publication of accounts such as Gongren Qllaile1 and the 
possibility of talking to exiled participants has helped to 
reveal the true significance of workers' activities and 
organizations in the spring and early summer of 1989. But the 
seriousness with which the Chinese leadership, right from the 
beginning, regarded the threat posed by the workers should 
perhaps have alerted more observers to the significance of 
workers' activities. Leaders had good reason for their
concern, as Anita Chan has recently reminded us:
Whereas most Chinese, above all the younger 
generation, generally assumed that 1989 was the 
first time that Chinese workers had turned upon the 
Party in protest, the Party elite was painfully 
aware that this in fact was the fifth time that a 
portion of the Chinese working class (at times led 
by the official trade unions) had asserted itself 
politically.2
In view of this statement that politically-charged
confrontations between workers and the Party had in fact 
occurred before, the question arises as to whether workers'
1 Gongren Qilaile (The Workers Have Risen), Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong Trade Union Education Centre, 1990; English 
edition (pub. Asia Monitor Resource Centre Ltd.) A 
Moment of Truth.
2 Anita Chan, "Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and 
Trade Unions in Post-Mao China", Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs, 29 (Jan. 1993), 32.
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activities in 1989 were really unprecedented, as is often 
claimed.
In the light of the recent re-assessment of the 
significance of workers' Democracy Movement activities, it now 
seems appropriate to look back at the four previous instances 
of workers' protest mentioned by Anita Chan, and to examine 
them afresh to find out whether or not they offer any sort of 
precedent for the events of 1989. In particular, this study 
will look for pre-1989 precedents for the formation of 
independent workers' organizations. It is of course possible 
that the circumstances of workers' political activities in 
1989 were unique, since the progress of the economic reforms 
had by then created a China quite different in some respects 
to the one which existed before 1978. But given that the 
political significance of the Workers' Autonomous Federations 
has now been recognized, there is also the possibility that in 
the past, outside observers were too easily convinced by the 
Chinese authorities' line that the vast majority of workers 
were loyal and politically reliable, that only a small 
minority had anything to do with anti-Party protests, and that 
where workers had become involved in protests, their motives 
and grievances were selfish and narrowly economic, and 
represented opportunistic demands rather than any deep-seated 
disagreement with the policies or line of the regime.
Part of the problem in weighing the arguments regarding 
workers' relationship with the Party is that the divisions 
between different groups of workers have not always been 
recognized (with the partial exception of the Cultural 
Revolution, where research has revealed the importance of 
socio-economic background and status in determining factional 
allegiance). However, the common picture of Chinese workers 
as basically supporting the Party, and even intervening on its 
behalf against other groups involved in anti-Party protest, is 
not at all convincing when applied to the whole range of 
workers in all types of enterprise across the country. It
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only holds true to any extent, and even then not entirely, 
when applied to the relatively privileged group of permanent 
workers employed in the largest state enterprises, a minority 
of the industrial workforce as a whole. The worl^^f Elizabeth 
Perry and Francois Gipouloux on the Hundred Flowers is very 
welcome in this respect, since it shifts attention to 
disadvantaged groups within the workforce who have been 
prepared to confront the Party and to take their protests onto 
the streets.
It is not the claim of this study that all workers, or 
even a majority of them, have regularly been involved in 
confrontations with Party-state authorities which had a 
political aspect to them. But it is my contention that 
conflict, often originating from economic grievances, but 
quickly developing into a political dispute as a result of the 
dominance of the Party within enterprises, has been a far more 
common feature of industrial life in China than is generally 
recognized. This background of conflict and discontent within 
enterprises provides the context in which workers' involvement 
in movements such as the Hundred Flowers, the Cultural 
Revolution, April Fifth and Democracy Wall can be properly 
understood. If workers' activities at these times had merely 
represented economically-motivated opportunism, it is hard to 
see why the regime should have been greatly concerned about 
them. But in fact, protesting workers have consistently been 
treated more harshly than any other social group in the 
repression of such protest movements, and there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that the Party regards 
workers' involvement as its cue to bring protests to an end by 
whatever means necessary. This has been the case in 
particular since the emergence of Solidarity in 1980, but even 
before this spectre of the working-class overthrow of a ruling 
Communist Party began to haunt the socialist world, the CCP on 
several occasions demonstrated that workers' protests were 
more disturbing to it and constituted a more serious problem 
than did student or intellectual activities.
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This study, then, is mainly concerned with the four 
earlier crises in the always strained relationship between the 
Chinese working class and its self-proclaimed vanguard, the 
CCP. These occurred in the early post-liberation period 
(1949-1952); during the Hundred Flowers movement (1956-7); 
during the Cultural Revolution; and in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, beginning with the Tian'anmen Incident of 1976 
and continuing through the subsequent Democracy Wall Movement. 
We will examine the attitudes and activities of workers in 
each of these confrontations with the authorities, and use 
this as the basis for a re-examination of the history of the 
working class in China under CCP rule, focusing mainly on the 
city of Guangzhou (Canton).
Secondary sources relevant to this study can be divided 
into three broad groups: those which relate to the movements 
mentioned above; those which focus on the Chinese working 
class since 1949; and those which deal with the position of 
workers under socialist rule in countries other than China. 
Starting with the first group, we find that most accounts of 
the Hundred Flowers movement, the Cultural Revolution and the 
Democracy Wall movement portray these as being primarily 
intellectual and/or student movements, with any involvement on 
the part of workers being of secondary importance. This is, 
of course, the attitude taken by many in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1989 Democracy Movement, hence the need for 
a critical re-examination of this assessment now.
Not only has workers' involvement in these movements been 
given little attention, but in fact, in many cases workers 
only appear in large numbers in these accounts after the 
backlash has already begun, when they are mobilized by the 
Party or the official unions to criticize and attack the 
original protestors; this is particularly true when the 
Hundred Flowers movement and the early stages of the Cultural 
Revolution are discussed. A notable exception to this 
tendency, as mentioned above, is Frangois Gipouloux's study of
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the confrontation between workers and the Party which 
developed towards the end of the First Five-Year Plan, Les 
Cent Fleura A L'Usine. The conclusions of this study are in 
keeping with my own findings (discussed in section two) that 
far from industrial unrest and protests by workers being an 
episode in the Hundred Flowers movement, the reverse may be 
closer to the truth.
But generally speaking, the significance of workers' 
involvement in these movements has been unduly neglected. 
Workers' initial reluctance to become active in such movements 
may be taken as a sign of satisfaction with the status quo 
rather than caution in the face of the serious risks involved, 
while the Chinese leadership's attribution of selfish and 
narrowly economic motives to protesting workers is too often 
accepted at face value. Why the Chinese leadership should be 
intent on 'down-playing and even obliterating any collective 
memory'3 of its confrontations with workers is not difficult 
to understand: desirable though the support of intellectuals 
and students might be, it is on its claim to be the vanguard 
of the most advanced class, the working class, that the 
legitimacy of the CCP regime rests. It is less obvious why 
outside observers should thus far have devoted relatively 
little attention to workers in this context, since sources 
dealing with workers are for the roost part no less accessible 
than those relating to other groups. However, it is hoped 
that this study will go some way towards redressing the 
balance and, in focusing exclusively on the role of workers, 
will shed some new light on the movements concerned.
The second group of sources includes studies of various 
aspects of the official trade unions in China (Lee Lai To, 
Paul Harper), as well as work on industrial organization, 
enterprise management, and industrial democracy (Andrew 
Walder, Steven Andors, Bill Brugger, Charles Bettelheim,
3 Ibid., 32.
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Martin Lockett). The latter topic is particularly important 
for our purposes, as the absence of democracy and of 
opportunities to participate in management has been a 
perennial cause of complaint amongst Chinese workers, as well 
as being one of the more obviously political causes of 
disputes at the enterprise level. The legitimacy of workers' 
complaints has been acknowledged by the Party, which has made 
its most strenuous efforts to establish satisfactory 
representative institutions for workers at precisely those 
moments when worker discontent has reached a peak (1950, 1956- 
7, 1967, 1980). Deborah Kaple has identified the
contradiction between the centralized, Stalinist system of 
industrial organization and management which the Chinese 
adopted after 1949, and the Chinese Communists' own earlier 
experiences of more democratic management, pointing out that 
the democratic institutions the CCP set up within factories 
were never going to be able to play their proper role in the 
rigidly hierarchical system of one-man management, adopted 
from the Soviet Union, which will be discussed in more detail 
in section one.4 Nevertheless, the Party continued to pay 
lip-service to the importance of democracy in factories, and 
it is possible that this very insistence on its desirability 
helped to inflame workers' resentment when reality failed to 
match rhetoric.
Although the works of Andors, Brugger, Bettelheim and 
Lockett5 deal with the development of various structures for 
workers' participation in management at some length, they give
4 Kaple, Dream of a red factory, .
5 Andors, China's industrial revolution: Politics,
planning and management, 1949 to the present;
Bettelheim, The Cultural Revolution and industrial 
organization in China; Brugger, Democracy and 
organization in the Chinese industrial enterprise, 
1949-1953} Lockett, Cultural Revolution and industrial 
organization in a Chinese enterprise: the Beijing
General Knitwear Mill, 1966-81, and "Enterprise 
management - moves towards democracy?", in Feuchtwang 
and Hussain (eds.), The Chinese economic reforms.
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very little indication of the role which workers' own demands 
and pressures from below have played in pushing the 
authorities towards these more democratic forms of management. 
Similarly, in describing the limitations and ultimate failure 
of all such structures or institutions, little attention is 
given to the possible reactions of disappointed workers, 
leaving the impression that when their aspirations have been 
thwarted, workers tend simply to accept the situation, whereas 
in fact, as leaders of the official trade unions in China have 
been aware since at least 1957, in certain circumstances 
workers with a grievance and no legitimate official channel 
for resolving it will resort to illegitimate methods, such as 
organizing themselves independently or taking unofficial 
industrial action. So the overall picture is one of workers 
as the passive recipients of top-down reforms, not as active 
proponents of changes in the direction of greater democracy.
There are similar problems with the picture of relations 
in a Chinese industrial enterprise which emerges from Andrew 
Walder's Communist Neotraditionalism. In emphasizing the 
successful working of the networks of patron-client 
relationships and organized dependency which the Party, 'under 
normal circumstances'6, can use to control workers in the 
enterprise, and in particular to prevent them from taking any 
sort of organized collective action outside official auspices, 
this study tends to go along with the official line that cases 
of this sort of action are extremely rare among Chinese 
workers, which as we will see in the following sections is not 
the case. In contrasting these Party methods with more overt 
forms of repression, Walder observes that
A state or elite which must use a large amount of
force to repress emerging or ongoing collective
action exercises less effective control than a state
or elite which is able regularly to prevent
6 Communist Neotraditionalism, 11.
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organized group action in the first place. The most 
brutal and violent regimes are not necessarily the 
most effective at imposing political control; their 
brutality and violence is often a mark of a poorly 
organized and ineffective effort to stem collective 
action.7
It is generally agreed that in the aftermath of the 1989 pro­
democracy protests it was workers who suffered the harshest 
and most violent repression, and in fact this is true of the 
Party's reaction to workers' involvement in earlier protest 
movements as well. As well as testifying to the Party's 
perception that independent action by workers poses the most 
serious threat to its rule, this would also seem to indicate 
that the Party has been much less successful at controlling 
workers, and conversely that workers have been a great deal 
more active on their own behalf, than Walder supposes.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, Walder's work to a 
great extent focuses on the relatively privileged group of 
permanent workers in large-scale state enterprises, and this 
means that his conclusions may not hold good for other groups. 
Some of the apparent disagreement about workers' political 
awareness and attitudes can be traced to the fact that 
different observers are talking about different groups within 
the working class, so clearly it is important to identify 
where possible which workers are under discussion. However, 
Walder's focus on the penetration of Party control right down 
to the workshop level within the enterprise is relevant to 
this study, since it illustrates the point that, with the 
official unions and enterprise management also ultimately 
deferring to Party authority, disputes even at this low level 
tend quickly to develop into a confrontation between workers 
and the Party.
7 Ibid., 18-19.
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As for the official trade unions, since membership among 
Chinese workers is the norm, although it is not actually 
compulsory, it might be assumed that an account of conflicts 
between the official unions and the Party would subsume any 
discussion of conflicts between workers and the Party. But it 
becomes clear on the most cursory reading of, for example, 
letters from workers in the Chinese press during the 1956-7 
period, that in most cases the official unions were definitely 
part of the problem as far as workers were concerned. It was 
in fact not at all unusual, as sections one and two will show, 
for enterprise unions to side with management against the 
workers when disputes arose, and even when unions were 
inclined to support their members, they usually lacked the 
power to do so in any effective way. More will be said about 
the precise role of the unions later; for now it will suffice 
to note that it is important, wherever possible, to 
distinguish between the attitudes and interests of workers 
themselves and those of their official representatives, since 
they by no means always coincide. Consequently, while 
accounts of confrontations between the official unions and the 
Party may be of interest to us particularly at those moments 
where the unions sided with the workers, e.g. 1951, all too 
often these accounts relegate workers themselves to a minor 
role. As with discussions of management reforms and changes 
in industrial organizations, the active role of workers in 
pushing for preferred options is largely left out of many of 
these accounts.
By drawing on the above two groups of sources it is 
possible to piece together a general account of how the 
position of workers in the enterprise and in wider society has 
developed in China since 1949. However, this tends to be a 
distorted account in which workers' independent activities - 
industrial action or unrest not backed by the official unions, 
or the formation of independent organizations of varying 
degrees of formality, up to and including independent unions - 
are consistently down-played or even ignored. There is an
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over-emphasis on higher-level, institutional conflicts between 
the official trade union organization and the Party, 
concentrating on the unions' periodic attempts to gain greater 
autonomy from the Party, with relatively little attention 
given to union members' own aspirations and demands and the 
ways in which these might influence the actions of higher- 
level union leadership.
In addition, the political content of workers' protests 
is given less prominence than economic causes of disputes, and 
workers' actions under official mobilization (such as 
organized criticism of intellectuals during the anti-rightist 
campaign in 1957, or the entry of worker-picket teams into 
universities and schools to restore order during the Cultural 
Revolution) tend to be regarded as more reliable indicators of 
working-class opinion (and support for the Party) than actions 
undertaken independently by workers on their own initiative, 
often at considerable personal risk. Thus workers emerge as 
a rather passive section of society which basically supports 
the Party, and which is only occasionally moved to protest in 
defence of its economic privileges when a relatively safe 
opportunity to do so appears; this might take the form of an 
intellectual- or student-led protest movement, or a shift in 
the attitude towards workers on the part of either the Party 
or the official unions.
What is missing from such an account, above all, is any 
sense of workers as active political players in their own 
right, responding to developments in their enterprises and in 
wider society not merely in accordance with their own narrow 
economic interests, but in the light of their political 
beliefs and aspirations; workers who, having undergone many 
hours of education as to their leading role in the state as 
well as in the factory, in which their status as management's 
political equals has been stressed, are prepared to defend 
their rights and protest against management authoritarianism 
and cadre privilege, in the first instance through officially
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sanctioned channels, such as the trade union or the workers' 
congress, but later, when these prove inadequate, by methods 
such as independent organization and strike action which, if 
not actually illegal, certainly lack official approval.
Since little evidence for this sort of portrayal of 
Chinese workers is offered in most existing accounts, is it 
safe to assume that their role in the major political 
movements in contemporary China has indeed been a minor one, 
and that those workers whose protests have become visible are 
an unrepresentative minority? Here it may be useful to refer 
to the third group of relevant secondary sources, studies of 
workers in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union. There are of course important 
differences between the PRC and these countries, but it would 
be unreasonable to exclude these sources from consideration 
altogether for that reason. We are, after all, considering 
workers' experiences under socialist rule and socialist 
management, and the fact of the various regimes' coming to 
power under different circumstances and developing in 
different directions should not be allowed to obscure the 
basic similarity in workers' situations. The Chinese 
leadership itself has always been keenly aware of possible 
parallels between events in Eastern Europe and in China, as 
will be shown in section two when we see how knowledge of the 
uprisings in Poland and Hungary in 1956 influenced the 
policies of the Hundred Flowers period in China, and in 
particular attitudes towards workers. In more recent years it 
is the example of Solidarity in Poland which seems to have 
preoccupied the Chinese authorities and informed their 
responses to workers' independent activities, especially 
attempts to form independent unions8, as we shall see in
8 See Jeanne Wilson, "'The Polish Lesson' - China and 
Poland 1980-1990”, Studies in Comparative Communism 
23, 3-4 (1990). The 'Solidarity-phobia' of the CCP is 
noted by many commentators as a factor in the rapid 
suppression of the Workers' Autonomous Federations in 
1989.
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section four.
From studies of workers in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union dealing with the issues which concern us in China 
(the functioning of official trade unions; participation, 
democracy and workers' councils; workers' involvement in 
popular protest movements; the causes and development of 
disputes; the question of independent unions), a consensus 
seems to emerge that there are certain basic problems inherent 
in the position of workers in a socialist state which are 
bound to emerge sooner or later.9 In general terms, the 
dilemma faced by workers in an avowedly socialist system is as 
follows. A ruling Communist Party usually defines itself as 
the vanguard of the working class, an elite organization of 
the most advanced elements of that class. But this does not 
mean that the Party represents the interests of the working 
class as opposed to those of other groups in society; as the 
highest national authority, it must act in the best interests 
of the country as a whole. It is an article of faith that the 
long-term interests of the working class are identical with 
those of the Party-state, but it is accepted that in the short 
term there may be discrepancies, and that in any case, workers 
need their own organization to protect their specific rights 
and interests against any violations of policy or law which 
enterprise management might commit. So official trade unions 
are organized, under the leadership of the Party.
All such trade unions are organized in accordance with 
the 'dual function' Soviet model, i.e. they have
9 Works under consideration here include Triska and Gati 
(eds.), Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe, in 
particular the chapters by Walter D Connor, J M 
Montias, Alex Pravda and Daniel Nelson; Blair Ruble, 
Soviet Trade Unions; Adolf Sturmthal, Workers' 
Councils - A study of workplace organization on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain; Paul E Z inner (ed.)r 
National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern 
Europe - A selection of documents on events in Poland 
and Hungary, February-November 1956.
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responsibilities towards management and the Party with regard 
to mobilizing workers for production as well as being 
responsible for protecting the rights and interests of their 
members/ rather than being solely the representatives of 
workers and (usually) the adversaries of management/ as has 
been more common outside the socialist world. They are 
commonly described as a 'transmission belt', passing on the 
Party's policies and instructions to the workers and also 
communicating the opinions and problems of the workers to the 
Party. Unions are also to act as 'schools of communism', 
responsible for ideological as well as technical and cultural 
education of workers. An additional feature intended to 
distinguish socialist enterprises from capitalist ones is 
their system of democratic management, involving workers' 
participation in management through either representation on 
managing bodies or the election of a workers' council or 
congress with specific rights and powers in the enterprise. 
Although the division of labour demanded by modern, large- 
scale industry means that workers mainly engage in physical 
labour while management mainly occupies itself with mental 
labour, this does not imply any inequality of social or 
political status; the position of workers in a socialist 
enterprise is fundamentally different from that of capitalist 
wage-labourers, as the means of production are owned not by a 
private individual but by the state, which is led by the 
working class.
That, then, is the theory. But in practice, conflicts 
quickly begin to emerge. A study of Eastern European and 
Soviet sources does not reveal any case where the official 
unions were able to perform their dual functions 
satisfactorily for any length of time; many union activists in 
China in the mid-1950s complained that their task was simply 
impossible, and they may well have been correct. What 
generally happens is that the unions have to side either with 
the Party and management or with the workers. If they support 
the workers, they lay themselves open to Party accusations of
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economism or syndicalism10; if they side with management and 
the Party, they risk losing the trust and allegiance of 
workers who come to regard them as little better than a tool 
of management or an arm of the state. They are in any case 
much less powerful than either the enterprise Party 
organization or its management, and therefore unable to offer 
much effective support to workers. Workers' councils (the 
workers' representative conference or workers' congress in 
China) fare little better, as they tend to require the 
goodwill and active cooperation of senior management, 
especially the factory director, to be able to function as 
intended. In fact, far from welcoming and supporting it, 
managers generally regard workers' participation in management 
as a time-consuming and unnecessary burden, and rank-and-file 
workers seem to have particular difficulty in using this sort 
of organ to bring their influence to bear on workplace 
decision-making.11
Given that these problems with official trade unions and 
workers' representative bodies seem to be universal in 
socialist states, it becomes apparent that workers can 
actually find themselves in a weaker position vis-&-vis 
managerial and political authorities in socialist enterprises 
than they would in capitalist ones. They are urged, or 
compelled, to give up such traditional methods of defending 
their interests as strikes, and indeed are assured that any 
such action would be pointless since they, as the leading 
class in society, would only be striking against themselves. 
Yet the democratic socialist management systems which are
10 'Economism' denotes an over-emphasis on securing 
material benefits for workers in excess of what can be 
afforded through improved productivity, at the expense 
both of other social groups and the state as a whole. 
Syndicalism indicates an attempt by the unions to 
supplant the Party and establish themselves as the 
highest organization of the working class.
11 In addition to Triska and Gati and Sturmthal, see also 
Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 
especially chapters 4 and 5.
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supposed to render this type of action unnecessary, and which 
are an essential foundation for workers' new status as the 
masters of the state and of the enterprise, seem to be fatally 
flawed. And as we shall see when we examine events in China 
in more detail, whereas workers' relationships with capitalist 
employers before 1949 had at least been unambiguously 
antagonistic, the shift to state ownership could leave workers 
in a very difficult position, where legitimate disagreements 
with enterprise management could be presented by the latter as 
an attack on the authority of the state organization which 
they represented, tantamount to an attempt to 'overthrow the 
leadership'.
The central contradiction faced by workers in socialist 
enterprises is thus that while the authorities insist that 
workers are the masters of the enterprise and stress the 
ownership of the means of production as the decisive factor, 
in reality workers often find that they are virtually 
powerless to exercise any control over their working lives or 
any influence over the officials who are supposed to be their 
political equals. One writer has described the likely result 
of this contradiction between rhetoric and reality thus:
No matter what political apathy or cynicism may 
prevail, the official values of the regime are a 
standing incitement to trouble. A regime basing its 
legitimacy on the power, if not the dictatorship, of 
the working class, and a regime which spreads the 
classics of Marxism-Leninism through its educational 
and propaganda work, is bound to face sharp, 
persistent and spontaneous tests of the reality 
versus the stated norms ... the official ideology 
makes claims on behalf of the industrial workers 
which the day to day reality contradicts.12
12 Bogdan Denitch, "Yugoslav Exceptionalism", in ibid., 
254.
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From the above sources it is clear that conflict between 
workers and the authorities in a socialist enterprise tends to 
become a regular feature of industrial life, since the 
mechanisms which are meant to avert open confrontation between 
workers and the enterprise leadership do not function as 
intended. One point which greatly exercises writers on 
industrial disputes and conflicts under socialism is the 
extent to which such disputes have political content and 
significance. A view commonly expressed in writings on 
workers in Eastern Europe is that conflicts between the 
working class, vthe professed mainstay of the political order 
in communist polities'13 and its 'erstwhile vanguard'14 are 
inherently political; as was indicated earlier, the opposition 
of even a section of the working class to a ruling Communist 
Party is uniquely damaging to that Party's legitimacy.
At first glance, specific disputes often seem to be based 
on purely economic grievances: the Polish strikes of 1970, for 
example, were sparked by meat price increases, and Solidarity 
was later formed as a result of a similar outcry over price 
increases. But closer examination of a dispute as it develops 
usually reveals much more profound concerns on the part of 
workers which centre on problems of social and political 
inequality. To return to the Polish example, the first demand 
of workers in the Szczecin shipyards in 1970 was not for the 
rescinding of the meat price increase, but for the abolition 
of the official unions in favour of independent unions 
organized by the workers themselves, and for rectification of 
the situation in which management and the state industrial 
bureaucracy (the ones who took decisions regarding the price 
of meat, wage levels and other questions of great importance 
to workers) were inflated in numbers, paid far too much in 
relation to workers, and provided with disproportionate
13 Triska and Gati, 'Introduction', Blue-Collar Workers 
in Eastern Europe, xi.
14 Ibid., xvi.
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material benefits and other privileges.15
In other words, the problems were that social 
inequalities existed between workers on the one hand and 
managers and officials on the other, while workers lacked the 
political power to remedy these inequalities as their official 
unions and structures for participation in management were 
ineffective. This is why demands for the formation of 
independent unions to protect workers' interests are such a 
common feature of the latter stages of such disputes, and why 
some workers eventually develop the view that Party and 
management officials constitute a new ruling class16, a class 
which does not and cannot represent the interests of workers 
since it is mainly concerned with perpetuating its own 
powerful and privileged position. Thus we see how a dispute 
triggered by a specific economic grievance can rapidly 
escalate into a serious political conflict; examples of this 
progression in China can be found in reports of industrial 
unrest during the Hundred Flowers period.
We now have two rather different portrayals of how 
workers fare under socialist government and management: one, 
drawn from studies of China, which depicts Chinese workers as 
basically loyal supporters of the Party who are politically 
passive and whose participation in popular protest movements 
is marginal; and the other, based on research on Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, which strongly suggests 
that sharp, persistent and escalating conflict between the 
working class on one side and management and the Party on the 
other is an inevitable product of the state socialist 
industrial system, and that workers will repeatedly be driven 
to take independent collective action including the formation 
of their own organizations. That the former portrayal is just
15 J M Montias, "Observations on strikes, riots, and 
other disturbances", Triska and Gati (eds.), Blue- 
Collar Workers in Eastern Europe, 181.
16 Ibid., 182.
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now beginning to be revised in favour of the latter is shown 
by Anita Chan's remarks in the article quoted above, and by 
other reassessments of the significance of the Workers' 
Autonomous Federations formed in 1989, and of workers' 
involvement in the Hundred Flowers movement.17 But in my view 
there is still a need to return to Chinese sources as the 
basis for a complete reappraisal of the experience of workers 
in China's cities since 1949.
This study is intended as such a reappraisal, focusing on 
workers themselves, as opposed to the official trade unions, 
and, bearing in mind the findings of studies of workers in 
other socialist countries, examining workers' responses to 
Party policies, their degree of satisfaction with the 
functioning of the official unions and the various bodies set 
up to represent them in the enterprise, the development of 
their relationship with political and managerial authorities, 
and the underlying causes, nature and possible political 
significance of any conflicts or disputes which might arise. 
Tracing the development of the four major crises in workers' 
relationship with the CCP regime up to 1984 will also lead to 
a reassessment of the significance of workers' involvement in 
the wider movements, such as the Hundred Flowers movement or 
the Cultural Revolution, with which these crises coincided. It 
is hoped that a more detailed picture of workers' attitudes 
and concerns, particularly in the very early stages of each of 
the periods of confrontation, will provide insights into the 
underlying causes of these confrontations and a fuller and 
more intelligible account of their development.
One question which will be raised is whether or not 
sufficiently copious and reliable material is available to 
permit this sort of exercise, given that the official Chinese 
press has an explicit propaganda function, and that workers 
are on the whole less likely to publish their views in the
17 In addition to Gipouloux's work mentioned earlier, a 
book by Anita Chan is also forthcoming.
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form of articles or books than are Party leaders or 
intellectuals. The answer is a qualified yes, qualified both 
because a certain amount of caution is needed in drawing 
conclusions from material which has been published for a 
particular political purpose, and because the sort of material 
we require may not be available in abundance from each of the 
periods under consideration. The earliest period, the years 
immediately following liberation in 1949, is, as might be 
expected, the most problematic in terms of availability of 
sources, but even here enough material can be found to make 
the exercise worthwhile, and given that illuminating 
precedents can be found in this period for many of the 
conflicts which were to come to the fore later in the 1950s 
during the Hundred Flowers movement, it would be a mistake to 
overlook it altogether because of occasional gaps in the 
available material.
It should be borne in mind that although it is generally 
true that all organs of the Chinese press are subject to 
official control, the strictness with which this control is or 
can be applied varies enormously according to the type of 
publication concerned and the atmosphere and policies of the 
time. Thus provincial or local newspapers such as the Nanfang 
Ribao or the Guangzhou Ribao may not always follow the Party 
line as expounded by the national leadership in Beijing in the 
editorial columns of the Remain Ribao, the CCP's main organ. 
At times when greater openness and frank criticism of Party 
shortcomings are being encouraged, as happened during the 
Hundred Flowers movement, such newspapers may even be fairly 
outspoken: in section two we will be referring to a series of 
investigative articles published by the Nanfang Ribao in 1956 
which exposed both the deplorable living and working 
conditions of many Guangzhou workers and the indifference of 
officials to this situation. Local newspapers are also more 
likely to publish letters and queries from readers, including 
workers, as was the case with the Guangzhou Ribao in 1957, 
when a letter from Guangzhou worker Wang Cai provoked such a
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flood of replies from other workers that they constituted a 
regular column in the paper for two months. There is also the 
point, obvious but sometimes overlooked, that although the 
leadership may from time to time attempt to rewrite history in 
the light of major policy changes, these attempts do not 
extend to recalling and destroying all evidence of heterodox 
points of view or of the sometimes lively debates which go on 
before a question of policy or ideology is definitively 
settled by the top leadership.
Since we are focusing on workers, there is also the 
extensive labour movement press to draw upon. These 
newspapers and periodicals, too, do not necessarily always 
stick to the Party line, and although they are periodically 
brought back into line when they are judged to have gone too 
far, they do provide a great deal of valuable material, 
especially in the form of letters and articles written by 
workers themselves. Both daily newspapers and periodicals 
publish trade union reports and surveys which, although 
intended for wide dissemination and therefore not as frank as 
purely internal documents, do provide evidence of often 
serious problems in union work and in workers' lives, and 
frequently include verbatim workers' criticisms of unions, 
management or the Party to back up the points they make.
For the later, post-Mao period, we will also be referring 
to a very limited amount of official union material intended 
for internal circulation only, which is a useful complement to 
the more widely available sources. And while for the period 
from 1949 until the eve of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 
this research is based mainly on the sorts of official 
publications described above, for the Cultural Revolution 
itself and the subsequent Democracy Wall movement, we also 
have the benefit of unofficial publications produced by 
participants in the movements themselves, including many 
workers, which provide an invaluable alternative view of 
events as well as a detailed exposition of participants'
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views. Finally, outside monitoring of the Chinese press18 can 
sometimes provide details of sensitive events such as strikes 
or demonstrations which the main official newspapers refer to 
euphemistically or not at all. Monitoring of local or 
regional radio broadcasts is particularly useful in this 
respect; perhaps because of the nature of the medium, radio 
stations seem prepared to report such events more frankly than 
is possible in the printed media, where the existence of a 
permanent and checkable record of what has been said may be an 
inhibiting factor.
The proximity of Guangzhou to Hong Kong is an advantage 
in this respect, as both official and unofficial sources 
relating to the city, not to mention exiled participants in 
the movements which concern us, tend to find their way out of 
the PRC via Hong Kong, and are thus more readily available 
than is the case for many other parts of China. However, this 
is not the only reason for choosing to focus on the city. It 
is because this study will cover a fairly long period of time 
that it is helpful to concentrate on a limited geographical 
area. Despite its reputation as more of a commercial, 
consumer city than an industrial, producer one, it will be 
seen from the following sections that the workers of Guangzhou 
have been as heavily involved in many of the events with which 
this study is concerned as those of any other urban centre. 
Guangzhou workers were highly critical of Party policies and 
the new official unions in 1950; they took industrial action, 
often in large numbers, during 1956-7, and filled the columns 
of local newspapers with detailed critiques of the leadership 
of their enterprises; their groups were involved in the 
violent confrontations of the Cultural Revolution, and the
18 I refer here to sources such as the Survey of World 
Broadcasts (SWB), the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS), Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), 
Extracts From China Mainland Magazines (ECMM), Survey 
of China Mainland Magazines (SCMM), Current Background 
(CB), Union Research Service (URS), News from Chinese 
Regional/Provincial Radio Stations (NCRRS/NCPRS).
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city was the site of the celebrated 'Li Yizhe' big-character 
poster in 1974; during the Democracy Wall movement/ 
unofficial publications written by and for workers flourished 
in the city.
Where Guangzhou does differ from some other modern 
Chinese industrial centres, the differences can actually make 
it a more rewarding object of study than it would otherwise 
be. The city was an important industrial and commercial 
centre in China before the Communist victory in 1949, and 
moreover was a flourishing centre of the Chinese labour 
movement in its early years (1917-1927); the labour movement 
continued as far as was possible underground after 1927, and 
reemerged at the end of the Anti-Japanese War to challenge the 
faltering Guomindang regime with increasing militancy. Thus 
in 1949 the existing workforce in Guangzhou brought with it 
not only high expectations of Communist policies, fuelled by 
what they had heard of earlier liberated areas, but also a 
certain history or tradition of militant action, which, as we 
shall see in section one, posed problems for the new regime as 
it attempted to win the workers over to its policy of 
temporary moderation. A related point is that far more 
capitalists and other staff from private enterprises were 
persuaded to stay on in the city after 1949 and keep their 
enterprises open than was the case in the earlier liberated 
areas. A fairly large private industrial sector therefore 
continued to exist for up to seven years, affording us an 
opportunity to compare the experiences of workers in private, 
state, and joint state-private enterprises under a socialist 
government, and to note the conclusions drawn from these same 
comparisons by the workers themselves as to the problems 
arising from the transition from private to state management.
In conclusion, the intention of this study is to draw on 
all of the above primary and secondary sources in constructing 
a detailed account of how the position of Chinese workers in
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the workplace and beyond has developed over the four decades 
since the founding of the PRC. This account will provide the 
context, which has hitherto been missing, in which the first 
four major confrontations between workers and the CCP can be 
understood not as aberrations, but as the most serious 
manifestations of fundamental contradictions which have always 
been present in their relationship. Looked at in isolation, 
and without detailed knowledge of the background in terms of 
workers' attitudes, living and working conditions, and their 
position within the socialist enterprise, it is possible to 
see why the view has gained ground that workers' activities in 
each case have been of only marginal importance. Yet if we 
consider these four 'aberrations' together, equipped both with 
our knowledge of Chinese workers' lives and with some 
understanding of workers' experiences in other socialist 
states, then a more accurate depiction of Chinese workers' 
experience of, and responses to, CCP rule will emerge. It is 
only by taking into account all four of the crises we have 
identified in workers' relations with the CCP that we can see 
both the similarities between them and the ways in which they 
have become progressively more acute and harder to resolve 
with each recurrence. We can also see how workers have 
progressed, gaining in organizational and political confidence 
through their experiences in these periodic confrontations.
For example, we will see how over the years the official 
trade unions were first criticized, then rejected in favour of 
independent, though informal and small-scale, organizations, 
and then ceased to exist altogether for much of the Cultural 
Revolution and the years up to 1976, as workers organized 
themselves into Red Guard and other groups. This experience 
of larger-scale collective political activity meant that after 
the Cultural Revolution, workers were quick to organize 
independent trade unions during the unrest surrounding the 
Democracy Wall movement, with some making explicit reference 
to similar movements in Eastern Europe by appropriating the 
'Solidarity' title. We will also see how criticism of cadres'
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bureaucratist and undemocratic attitudes after liberation gave 
rise during the Hundred Flowers period and after to the idea 
that the political power of the bureaucracy over workers might 
lead it to develop into a new class. This serious political 
division between the workers and their leaders meant that in 
the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, with workers' 
attitudes towards authority radically altered by their 
experiences, the confrontation between workers and the Party 
was expressed in terms of class conflict, i.e. a conflict 
between the workers and the new ruling class.
This study will show that conflict between Chinese 
workers and the leadership of their enterprises has been a 
much more common feature of industrial life in China than is 
generally realized, and, in investigating the underlying 
problems of social and political inequality^in the workplace 
(which seem to be of far greater significance in motivating 
workers to protest, and eventually to organize themselves, 
than the purely economic grievances usually stressed in 
official accounts), will demonstrate the wider political 
implications of apparently limited industrial disputes. It 
will pay particular attention to Chinese workers' attempts to 
organize themselves outside Party control, a subject given 
renewed importance by the widespread formation (and 
suppression) of Workers' Autonomous Federations in many 
Chinese cities in 1989. This fifth confrontation with 
workers, regarded by many at the time and since as of slight 
importance, a sideshow to the main student demonstrations, 
will thus be seen in its proper context, not as an 
unprecedented action on the part of Chinese workers, but as 
the latest, and most serious, in a series of crises in 
workers' troubled relationship with the CCP regime.
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SECTION ONE
GUANGZHOU: LIBERATION AND REFORM
The first major confrontation between the CCP and Chinese 
workers began to develop immediately after the Communist 
victory in 1949. The newly-organized official trade unions 
played an important part in it, so much so that accounts of 
the period often focus exclusively on the unions' struggle for 
greater autonomy from the Party at this time, a struggle which 
culminated in the removal of the veteran CCP leader Li Lisan 
as Chair of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 
in early 1952. This concentration on the higher levels of the 
union hierarchy has tended to obscure the activities of 
workers themselves at the grassroots level, and may perhaps 
explain why 'the incident went down in popular memory as 
simply a power struggle among the Party's top leaders.' 1 In 
fact, as we shall see in this section, the confrontation had 
its roots in the conflict between workers' expectations of 
their new role and status after liberation and the Party's 
more moderate policies towards the takeover of industry, 
particularly in later liberated cities such as Guangzhou.
Many elements of the ongoing conflict between workers and 
Party authorities in the early 1950s will become familiar as 
we examine later crises in this problematic relationship. 
They include the difficulties faced by basic-level trade 
unions in carrying out their dual functions, presented with 
the dilemma of either alienating their own members with their 
obedience to Party and managerial authorities in the 
enterprise, or supporting the workers and risking accusations
1 Chan, 'Revolution or corporatism?', 33.
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of economism, syndicalism, and attempting to usurp Party 
leadership over the working class. We will see how, beginning 
in late 1949, the new official unions shifted between these 
two positions in response to conflicting pressures from the 
workers below them and the Party above, apparently unable to 
find any viable 'middle way', and ultimately succumbed to 
absolute dominance by the Party at the Seventh ACFTU Congress 
in May 1953, thus incurring the disappointment, even disgust, 
of many workers, who complained that the unions had 'lost 
their guts' after the Congress. 2
Another familiar feature making its first appearance in 
this period is the promotion of management democratization in 
response to workers' demands for a greater say in the running 
of their enterprises, both state and private. The marked 
similarity between the problems encountered in the
establishment and operation of various workers' representative 
bodies at this early stage, and again in 1956-7 and the early 
1980s, supports the view that there are fundamental flaws in 
such organizations which ultimately undermine them all. 
Deborah Kaple's work has suggested that the Chinese attempted 
in the early post-liberation period to implement an idealized, 
and correspondingly harsh, version of the Stalinist industrial 
organization and management practices then prevalent in the 
Soviet Union, and that the attempt to graft onto this 
provisions for democratic management was always doomed. 3 
This is a persuasive view, since one so often has the 
impression that workers and grass-roots cadres alike in this 
period are struggling with systems which fundamentally do not 
work.
Workers' criticisms of cadres, whether union, 
administrative or Party, and indeed the self-criticisms of
2 Gongren Ribao 21.5.57, 'What is the fundamental cause
behind the trade union work HcrisisH?', in SCMP 1551, 19.
3 See Kaple, Dream of a red factory: The legacy of High
Stalinism in China, 58-69.
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these same officials, also return time after time to what seem 
to be the perennial problems in the attitudes and workstyle of 
leadership cadres: bureaucratism, isolation from the masses, 
a preference for coercive or commandist methods, failure to 
trust in the workers, arrogance and high-handedness, 
formalism, and a lack of democracy within enterprises and in 
the trade unions. In the early post-liberation period many 
such problems might be attributed to the difficult economic 
situation, the inexperience of large numbers of cadres, or 
workers' 'unduly high' 4 expectations of the new regime, were 
it not for the fact of their repeated recurrence during later 
confrontations between Party and workers. It is this which 
gives them added significance in the years under consideration 
in this chapter.
In order to understand why many workers, especially in 
later liberated areas, found the Party's moderate policies on 
the takeover of industry difficult to accept, we must first 
look at workers' earlier experiences of both economic and 
political struggle and how these shaped their attitudes and 
expectations of Communist rule. It has been noted in the 
introduction to this study that Guangzhou before 1949 was 
already a major industrial and commercial centre, and that the 
existing workforce brought with it into the new era a certain 
history of labour movement activity. Reporting the liberation 
of Guangzhou two days after the event on October 16 1949, the 
Gongren Ribao reminded readers of the 'glorious tradition' of 
the labour movement in the city during the Republican period, 
describing Guangzhou as 'a hotbed of the 1925-27 revolution', 
and recalling workers' role in the Guangzhou uprising and the 
establishment of the short-lived Guangzhou Commune, 'the first 
worker-peasant-soldier revolutionary regime in China', in 
December 1927. 5
4 Paul Harper, 'The Party and the Unions in Communist 
China', China Quarterly 37 (Jan-Mar.1969), 91.
5 Gongren Ribao 16.10.49, 1.
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In fact the labour movement in Guangzhou has an even 
longer history, dating back to the activities of the anarchist 
group founded by Liu Sifu (Shifu) in 1911, members of which 
'in 1917 ... were able to organize barbers and tea-house
clerks in Guangzhou into China's first modern labor unions, 
and in 1918 ... led the way in China's first May Day
celebrations in Guangzhou.' 6 Guangzhou was also the site of 
the first All-China Labour Congress, on May 1, 1922. As
communist influence over the labour movement grew, the city 
continued to be a centre of activity where workers could 
organize and take action without incurring the harsh 
repression by warlords or foreign powers which periodically 
brought the movement to a standstill in north and central 
China. The 16-month Guangzhou-Hong Kong strike, beginning in 
June 1925 in response to the May 30th Incident in Shanghai, 
was perhaps the high point of the 1920s labour movement in 
China, with the communist-run strike committee constituting 'a 
kind of workers' government' 7 in Guangzhou.
After the suppression of the Shanghai uprising in April 
1927, and of several subsequent rebellions in that year 
including the Guangzhou uprising mentioned above, the 'Red' 
(communist) trade unions were driven underground in Guangzhou 
as in other cities, but continued their activities as best 
they could alongside the 'Yellow' (Guomindang (GMD)) and 
'Grey' (neutral) trade unions. The restrictions on communist 
leadership of trade unions in this period apparently did not 
prevent workers from continuing their 'spontaneous economic 
struggle for existence' 8; according to one observer, such 
leadership had in any case been 'only a spark set to tinder, 
and it was almost spontaneous combustion ... the workers
6 Arif Dirlik, Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution, 15.
The anarchist leanings of these two groups are confirmed 
by Jean Chesneaux (The Chinese Labor Movement, 136).
7 Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement, 293.
8 Nym Wales, The Chinese Labor Movement, 63.
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organized themselves.' 9 Throughout the 1930s and during the
Anti-Japanese War, 'an " unorganized** labor movement 
seethed constantly below the surface and burst out in sporadic 
and spontaneous strikes and disputes, in which Chinese labor 
[showed] remarkable resourcefulness, tenacity and
courage.' 10 Workers in Guangzhou were 'monitored and
clamped down upon' under GMD rule, but continued and even 
intensified their activities 'precisely because of this', 
giving them the potential 'to become a powerful anti­
imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-bureaucratic capitalist 
force.' 11 With or without the leadership of underground 
communist activists, the labour movement continued in the 
cities and rose to new heights after the Japanese surrender, 
with more than three million workers taking part in strikes 
during 1947 alone. 12
Workers' linking of economic and political struggles in 
areas under GMD control drew praise and encouragement at 
labour movement congresses during the civil war years and 
after. A speaker at the 6th All-China Labour Congress in 1948 
noted with approval a rise in workers' political consciousness 
and an understanding that 'livelihood and starvation are not 
just economic questions, but also political ones.' 13 In 
similar vein, the 7th ACFTU Congress in 1953 recalled that in 
GMD-ruled areas,
9 Ibid., 11-12.
10 Ibid., 67.
11 Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 31.3.50, 'Summary of the Guangzhou
Labour movement since liberation and main tasks for the
future', 85.
12 Xinhua News Agency, 26.8.48,'On the labour movement in 
areas under GMD rule: a summary of Zhu Xuefan's report to 
the 6th All-China Labour Congress', in Selected Documents 
of the Chinese Labour Movement (hereafter Selected 
Documents), 57.
13 Ibid., 50.
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it was necessary for the trade unions to lead the 
workers to wage both legal and illegal economic 
struggles under every possible and favourable 
condition, and to link these struggles closely with 
the political struggle ... [before liberation] all 
economic struggles waged by the trade unions had 
political significance. 14
Thus the political aspects of the labour movement before 
liberation were regarded as not only acceptable, but 
absolutely necessary. This is in sharp contrast to the role 
mapped out for unions under the new communist government, and, 
as we shall see, the transition for unions and workers alike 
was not an easy one.
Within this militant and politicized labour movement, 
feelings seem to have run extremely high in the years 
immediately preceding liberation. Speeches at meetings were 
sprinkled with emotive references to workers' 'life-or-death 
struggle' 15 in the climate of economic collapse and 
political oppression which increasingly prevailed in GMD 
areas; roll-calls of fallen comrades were followed by a 
minute's silence, and then by declarations that 'the day will 
come when we demand that the murderers pay all these blood 
debts in full. ' 16
The question arises as to whether this sort of rhetoric 
was simply demagoguery on the part of labour movement leaders 
in the safety of the liberated areas, or whether it actually 
represented the mood of the workers involved in the struggle. 
The latter view finds some support in what we know about GMD
14 Xu Zhizhen, 'Report on the amendment to the constitution
of the trade unions of the People's Republic of China',
The Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions, 86.
15 Ibid., 51.
16 Ibid., 54.
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policies in this periods membership in GMD unions was 
compulsory, with the unions designed as a means of exercising 
control over workers 17, demonstrations were broken up, in 
Guangzhou as elsewhere, with armed force, and activists were 
subject to harassment, restriction, arrest, and even 
execution. Some GMD union leaders in Guangzhou held 
concurrent posts in the police department, and used their 
police powers to intimidate workers. 18 Workers had ample 
reason for hostility towards the GMD regime, and this 
hostility is in fact reflected in their attitudes towards 
anyone connected with the GMD and its unions, and especially 
towards former police or military police, when the time came 
to decide on criteria for union membership after liberations 
although it was general CCP policy only to exclude a small 
minority of those most 'tainted' by their GMD activities, 
workers tended to propose rather broader restrictions. 19 It 
is therefore quite possible that labour movement leaders were 
responding to the strength of feeling among workers when they 
made the sort of statements quoted above, and were obliged to 
do so if they themselves were not to become irrelevant.
Given this sort of militant atmosphere among workers in 
cities still under GMD control, it is clear that workers' 
expectations of their new position after the anticipated 
communist victory were likely to be high. It was noted in the 
second half of 1948 that workers were 'greatly encouraged' 20 
by what they heard about rural land reform in areas already 
liberated, and they looked forward to a similar process taking 
place after the liberation of the cities. That the takeover
17 Wales, The Chinese Labour Movement, 6.
18 'Summary of the Guangzhou Labour movement...', Guangzhou
Gongyun 1, 87.
19 See for example 'Summing up the work of setting up a
trade union in the China Textiles no.9 Textile Mill, 
Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 37.
20 'On the labour movement in areas under GMD rule',
Selected Documents, 51.
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of industry and commerce in cities such as Guangzhou would 
resemble land reform was an abiding fear among what were 
termed national capitalists or the national bourgeoisie. 
These people saw themselves as the next likely victims, after 
the landlords, of immediate and probably violent 
expropriation, and no amount of reassurance by the CCP that 
the Party's targets were imperialists, bureaucratic 
capitalists and a minority of reactionary or v feudal' elements 
ever really dispelled this fear. Its persistence among 
Guangzhou's remaining capitalists 21 may be explained by the 
considerable pressure from workers for precisely such a 
policy.
But from about the middle of 1948 it began to become 
apparent that workers' demands were not going to be met, or at 
least not immediately, as CCP policy on the takeover of 
industry shifted, and the idea that 'the ultra-egalitarianism 
of the "peasant socialist" period of land reform should be 
applied to the industrial sphere' 22 was supplanted by the 
more moderate policy of 'benefitting both labour and capital'. 
Briefly, under this new policy, as many capitalists and 
private enterprise managers as possible in cities like 
Guangzhou were to be encouraged to stay on under the new 
regime and to keep in operation any enterprise which was of 
benefit to the national economy and to the people as a whole. 
Expanding employment and alleviating shortages were the 
priorities, and the overriding need to restore and develop 
industrial production was the main motivation for pursuing a 
policy towards private industry which top Party leaders
21 It is still evident in, for example, Nan fang Ribao 
20.8.51, 'Decision to mobilize the working masses for 
democratic reform movement reached by South China Sub­
bureau of Central Committee', in Current Background 115, 
10-11; Nanfang Ribao 4.9.51, 'Continue the penetrative 
development of the democratic reform movement', in 
Current Background 128, 36-7.
22 William Brugger, Democracy and organization in the 
Chinese industrial enterprise, 1949-1953, 64.
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admitted was essentially 'reformist' 23 rather than 
revolutionary.
Given their preference for a radical, land reform-type 
takeover of industry and commerce, it comes as no surprise 
that many workers were highly suspicious of the Party's policy 
of 'benefitting both labour and capital' in private 
enterprises, which they viewed, not without reason as we shall 
see, as a cover for their continued exploitation by 
capitalists. The problem of the clash between workers' 
expectations and actual Party policy was addressed by Li 
Lisan in May 1949, when he discussed the differences between 
the situation in the countryside and in the cities as follows:
Some people say that the Communist Party's method of 
liberating the peasants was good and very simple: 
they took the landlords' property and distributed it 
equally to the peasants, so why can't they 
distribute the capitalists' property to the workers, 
instead of carrying out the development of 
production and only then being able to improve 
workers' lives? 24
In the countryside, he explained, the peasants worked harder 
and produced more once freed from the exploitation of 
landlords, 'so the result of the equal distribution of land 
was that we were able to increase agricultural 
production' 25, with consequent benefits for peasants' 
purchasing power, which in turn expanded markets and gave 
impetus to industrial production. But applying the rural 
policy to industry would mean that 'society would move
23 Li Lisan, 'Some points of explanation on the policy of 
developing production and benefitting both labour and 
capital', Selected Documents, 84.
24 Ibid., 73.
25 Ibid., 73.
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backyards and livelihoods would decline' 26, as a literal 
dividing up of capitalists' property - factories and machinery 
- would make it impossible for factories to go on producing. 
Workers, he insisted, 'certainly cannot divide up the
capitalists' factories; on the contrary, they must do their 
utmost to protect the factories and increase production, for
only that will be of benefit to the workers.' 27
In Li's analysis, of the three main causes of workers' 
hardship in the past (imperialist, bureaucratic capitalist and 
feudal oppression and exploitation; oppression and
exploitation in enterprises owned by the national bourgeoisie; 
and the under-development of Chinese industry), the first had 
already been eradicated and the second considerably restricted 
by the new people's government and the leading position of the 
working class, leaving just the third to be tackled by 
workers' own efforts in a 'production alliance' with 
capitalist employers. Their capital was vital to the
transformation of China's backward economy; increases in 
production brought about by workers' hard work would 
unavoidably benefit capitalists, and their increased profits 
from the surplus value produced by workers would be 
exploitative in nature, but this situation was historically 
necessary, and 'excessive exploitation' 28 could and would be 
prevented. The sole criterion on which private enterprises 
were judged was whether or not they were beneficial to the 
national economy. 29
Li' s point about the need to persuade the national 
bourgeoisie to stay on and keep investing in enterprises is a
26 Ibid., 74.
27 Ibid., 74.
28 Ibid., 74.
29 Xinhua News
of benefitting both labour and capital, Selected 
Documents of the Chinese Labour Movement. 70.
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reasonable one, but his overly literal interpretation of what 
workers were demanding when they called for capitalists' 
property to be distributed to them fails, perhaps 
deliberately, to address workers' real political aspirations. 
He is careful to concentrate on the impractical ity of 
physically taking factories apart and 'distributing' them to 
workers, but never mentions the possibility of workers' taking 
control of the (intact) enterprise in which they worked. That 
this possibility existed was shown by the experience of the 
north and northeast, the earliest industrialized areas to be 
liberated, where many private enterprises were in fact run by 
workers after being abandoned by their former owners and all 
or most of their management personnel.
This more radical, as well as often more violent, 
takeover of industry in the north and northeast illustrates 
the general principle that 'the earlier a particular city was 
liberated the more radical was the takeover of its industries 
likely to be.' 30 Hence the policies towards private 
industry implemented in Guangzhou, one of the last cities to 
be liberated by the CCP and its armies, and a place where 
large numbers of private enterprises remained in private hands 
for up to seven years after liberation 31, were very moderate 
when compared with those of earlier liberated areas; and 
workers in Guangzhou, with their history of labour movement 
militancy and high expectations for the new era under 
communist rule, found these policies correspondingly difficult 
to accept. That the new CCP city government never entertained 
the idea of allowing workers to take over and run their own 
enterprises did little to deter workers from pushing in this 
direction; nor did it prevent some 'overzealous union
30 Brugger, Democracy and organization, 67.
31 It was reported in Hong Kong's Wen Hui Bao that a total
of 4,727 industrial units were taken into joint state- 
private ownership in Guangzhou during 1956, i.e. they 
remained under private management until then. These
units employed a total of 60,000 workers (fifen Hui Bao
4.2.57, in SCMP 1468, 19).
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organizers who had interpreted Marxism-Leninism far too 
literally' from 'forcibly concentrating power in the hands of 
the workers' 32 in the early spring of 1950. Thus the scene 
was set for conflict between the CCP and workers as soon as 
the Party took power.
After liberations The new unions and management 
democratization in the 'last difficult year'
There is no doubt about the seriousness of the economic 
problems facing both the workers and the new government of 
Guangzhou at the beginning of 1950, the 'last difficult 
year' 33. The head of the Guangzhou General Trade Union 
(GTU) Preparatory Committee, Liao Sigiiang, reported in 
December 1949 that less than a quarter of the city's 
enterprises were operating at full capacity, while nearly a 
third of the entire workforce was unemployed. 34 The CCP's 
priorities in this situation were emphasized by speakers at 
the city's first Workers' Representative Conference, held in 
mid-December 1949 and attended by representatives elected from 
among the workers, staff and technicians of Guangzhou's 
enterprises. Ye Jianying, head of the Military Control 
Commission which governed the city Immediately after 
liberation, addressed delegates primarily on the 
responsibilities of workers as the leading class in the new 
society, and warned them of compromises which would have to be 
made. In order to consolidate the leading position of the 
working class, he said,
we must be good at uniting our own class, raising
32 Ezra Vogel, Canton under Communism, 76.
33 Renmin Ribao 6.2.50, 'Mastering enterprise management',
in Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 2.
34 'Summary of the Guangzhou labour movement...', Guangzhou
Gongyun 1, 85.
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our political consciousness, and distinguishing 
between immediate and long-term interests and 
between partial and overall interests, and must 
subordinate immediate and partial interests to long­
term and overall interests ... and so, under certain 
circumstances, it will sometimes be necessary to 
make some concessions to other classes. 35
But the moderate policy towards industry, with its 
emphasis on compromise for the sake of production, economic 
recovery and keeping enterprises in business, did not mean 
that workers' interests and aspirations were to be ignored 
altogether. They could not be, for it was recognized that the 
mood among workers was such that management democratization in 
state enterprises and an improvement in labour-capital 
relations in private enterprises were urgently required if 
this policy were to succeed, as was the rapid organization of 
workers into new, official trade unions. The demand for 
democratization and participation by workers in enterprise 
management was the other main feature of the Workers' 
Representative Conference, although, as would be the case with 
later campaigns for democratization, its importance for the 
restoration and development of production was the point most 
strongly emphasized: the Remain Ribao insisted that the
participation of workers in democratic enterprise management 
was vthe reason why labour productivity in New Democratic or 
socialist societies tends to be higher than in capitalist
35 'Speech of General Ye Jianying, Head of Guangzhou MCC', 
Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 79. It should be noted that
although Party officials habitually refer to themselves 
as belonging to the working class, this is more of a 
rhetorical device or a reflection of political ideals 
than a statement of fact. According to the Renmin Ribao 
25.4.53, there were 'only a handful' of worker Party 
members at liberation, increasing to 6.3% in 1951 and 
7.2% in 1952 (figures quoted in Harper, 'Party and 
Unions', 111.).
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countries'. 36
But in addition to its role in promoting production, 
democratization of enterprise management was also the main 
symbol of the changed status of workers after liberation. 
While the right to use the traditional weapons of labour, such 
as strikes, was not withdrawn from workers under the new 
regime, workers were told that they ' [ did not ] need to and 
should not use [these] methods of struggle which harm 
production.' 37 Whether disputes arose with state enterprise 
administrators or with capitalists in private enterprises, 
they could all be resolved by consultation and negotiation 
through workers' ' own trade unions and own government'; these 
methods were adequate because 'there could certainly be no 
circumstances where the government, led by the working class 
itself, would fail to protect the interests of the working 
class.' 38 The fact that workers were being asked to 
exchange their cherished weapons of struggle from the pre­
liberation labour movement for the new structures of 
democratic management, which would make them the partners, 
rather than the opponents, of management, demonstrates the 
importance of these structures' living up to expectations and 
giving workers some genuine role in enterprise management. We 
will now turn to a detailed examination of the nature of the 
management reforms undertaken in both private and state 
enterprises, and of the extent to which they provided workers 
with real influence in the enterprise, before looking at the 
new official unions and their changing relationship with both 
workers and management, and the influence this had on the 
progress of the reforms.
36 Remain Ribao 6.2.50, in Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 5.
37 Peng Qingzhao (ed.), A political textbook for workers, 
29-30.
38 Questions on the labour movement (third collection), 56.
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The labour-capital consultative conference
In all the CCP's efforts to improve labour-capital 
relations after liberation the emphasis was on compromise, 
with workers' wages and conditions being improved only to the 
extent that struggling enterprises could afford, and 
capitalists being allowed a reasonable level of profit. The 
labour-capital consultative conference (LCCC, laozi xieshang 
huiyi) was intended to be an institution where representatives 
of both labour and capital could discuss all matters relating 
to pay, conditions, profit, and production in an enterprise 
(or sometimes in a trade or industry), on the basis of 
equality, in a way which took into account the fundamental 
interests of both sides. The conclusion of an industry-wide 
labour-capital collective agreement in a particular city was 
often a first step towards this form of management. 39
Opinions differ as to the effectiveness of the LCCC as an 
institution for workers' participation in the management of 
private enterprises in this period. As we shall see in the 
next section, when management democratization and workers' 
participation returned to the top of the agenda in the second 
half of 1956, state and joint state-private enterprises were 
criticized for having 'neglected the democratic tradition 
allowing workers in private enterprises to participate in 
management' 40. This would seem to imply that management 
reforms in this direction had been fairly successful in the 
private sector, at least in comparison with state enterprises.
On the face of it, LCCCs seemed to be weighted in favour 
of the labour sides disputes which could not be resolved were
39 See for example 'The Guangzhou pedicab industry - 
summarizing the conclusion of a labour-capital collective 
agreement', Guangzhou Gongryun 1, 60-66.
40 Lai Ruoyu, 'The current tasks of trade unions in joint 
state-private enterprises', Xinhua News Agency (Beijing) 
23.11.56, in SCMP 1422, 3.
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to be referred to the local Labour Bureau, which in all 
probability would be staffed by officials with a union 
background who could be expected to come down on the side of 
labour in most cases . 'A capitalist was still a capitalist 
and the machinery worked against him. ' 41 Added to this, the 
two sides took turns in chairing the conference's meetings, 
and the secretary of the enterprise Party Committee was a 
labour representative, both of which militated against the 
institution being dominated by the factory director or manager 
(this was a major problem with the factory management 
committee in state enterprises, about which more will be said 
later.).
But it should be remembered that the LCCC was primarily 
'a potent instrument for use by the Party or union against the 
capitalists.' 42 Whether or not workers themselves could 
actually exercise any influence depended on the attitude of 
their union representatives, who would not necessarily share 
or support workers' views. Nor were capitalists always as 
constrained by their somewhat ambiguous status under the new 
regime as might be supposed: one writer finds that the LCCCs 
'did not function well, if at all' because managements' fears 
of 'unreasonable demands' from workers and 'infringements on 
their administrative authority' 43 led them to impede the 
operation of the conferences by their non-cooperation. In 
cases where the trade union was ineffective in defence of 
workers' rights, it was even possible for capitalists 'to 
achieve the goal of "benefitting only the capital side"' 44 
by means of the LCCC.
41 Harper, 'Workers' participation in management in 
Communist China', Studies in Comparative Communism IV 
(July-Oct. 1971), 121.
42 Ibid., 119. Emphasis added.
43 Lee Lai To, Trade Unions in China, 1949 -, 90.
44 'Achievements and current problems of LCCCs in Tianjin', 
Zhongguo Gongren 6, 15.7.50, 48.
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Guangzhou's earliest experiences with LCCCs illustrate 
some of the difficulties involved, including labour 
representatives' problems in dealing with uncooperative or 
opportunistic attitudes on the part of capitalists. At the 
same time as the GTU set out to mobilize workers for the 
signing of collective agreements and the establishment of 
LCCCs, it was also charged with organizing management 
democratization in state enterprises, and with the formation 
of basic-level trade unions as well as fifteen city-wide 
industrial trade unions, so it is hardly surprising that 
progress was patchy, with notable successes in some areas 
alongside almost complete failure in others. The Guangzhou 
GTU had the experience of earlier liberated areas to draw on: 
the first edition of Guangzhou Gongyun contained materials on 
LCCCs and collective agreements from Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao 
and Zhengzhou. The GTU work groups sought to apply lessons 
from these areas to the particular problems of Guangzhou, but 
they were hampered in this by their own lack of experience. 
Trade union cadres in Guangzhou shortly after liberation were 
a very mixed bag: it was observed at the time that 'some have 
come from Hong Kong, some were originally in the Guangzhou 
underground, some are newly recruited, and some have come from 
the north, and the majority of those who have come from the 
north only have rural experience, [all of] which shows that we 
lack knowledge of the city of Guangzhou, and in particular 
lack experience of working under our own regime.' 45 It is 
clear from this last point that the problem of the transition 
from all-out struggle, between labour and both capitalists and 
the government, to moderation and compromise was as acute for 
some trade union organizers as it was for many workers.
Although the GTU had originally intended to start with 
mobilizing workers in the large and long-established textile 
industry in Guangzhou to establish collective agreements and 
LCCCs, it eventually decided to concentrate on the pedicab
45 'Continue to study and take it a step higher', Guangzhou 
Gongyun 1, 56.
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industry, since this was where the most labour-capital 
disputes were occurring46 s more than four hundred were 
reported in the three months between liberation and the 
conclusion of a collective agreement. 47 Disputes had 
escalated to a point where workers were in imminent danger of 
losing their livelihood, and moreover 'some of the more 
conscious workers' had already begun to organize and take 
action on their own behalf, 'launching a petition movement and 
preparing to put various demands to the capital side'. 48
Despite this promising basis for the mobilizational 
efforts of the GTU work-group, they did experience some 
difficulty in their initial contacts with workers. Realizing 
that workers had been put off by their rather formal, official 
first approach, the work group tried a different tack.
Dressed like pedicab workers, we went to low-class 
tea-houses and places where the pedicabs stopped to 
talk to the workers, and in this way we gained quite 
a lot of accurate material about the pedicab 
industry and came to understand the workers' lives 
and demands. 49
Cadres' lack of experience showed in other ways as well. The 
capital side seems to have been much better prepared and more 
effective during negotiations than were the cadres and 
workers' representatives on the labour side, who, for 
example, found themselves unable to dispute capitalists' 
assertions about their finances and what constituted a 
reasonable level of profit as they had not worked out their
46 'Guangzhou GTU Preparatory Committee work report for 
February 1950', Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 28.
47 'The Guangzhou pedicab industry', Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 
60.
48 Ibid., 60.
49 Ibid., 61.
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own figures beforehand. This led to 'a lot of difficulties 
which could have been avoided' 50. From this experience we 
can see how it might have been possible for capitalists, who 
on occasion turned up for negotiations accompanied by their 
lawyers, to turn institutions such as the LCCC and collective 
agreements to their own advantage.
Although the agreement eventually negotiated in the 
pedicab industry was regarded as a success, the GTU was 
criticized for failing to mobilize workers to organize a trade 
union at the same time, and the GTU Preparatory Committee's 
work report for February 1950 acknowledged that their 
achievement in mobilizing the pedicab workers was an isolated 
one. Some progress had been made in the tobacco industry, 
where an agreement drafted by workers had been widely 
discussed and had the support of several thousand workers. 
The work of organizing a trade union preparatory committee had 
also basically been completed alongside the drafting of the 
agreement, but further progress had been halted because the 
capital side 'closed the doors' 51 and refused to discuss the 
draft. It transpired that at least one cigarette factory boss 
had heard that the draft contained an article obliging 
managers to go on paying workers if production had to be 
suspended because of lack of business, whereupon he 
immediately sacked 160 women workers. 52 GTU cadres 'pointed 
out that the draft agreement contained no such article, and 
moreover the agreement would only be concluded if both sides 
were willing, so if they had any objections, they should
50 Ibid., 66.
51 'Guangzhou GTU Preparatory Committee - work report for 
February 1950', Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 28. Immediately 
after liberation some capitalists had similarly prevented 
work groups from the GTU form entering their enterprises 
and talking to the workers. See 'Summary of the 
Guangzhou labour movement ...', in ibid., 85.
52 'GTU work report', in ibid., 21.
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discuss them with the workers.' 53 This reassurance resulted 
in the reinstatement of the 160 workers, but negotiations 
remained stalled.
Mass sackings by the remaining private employers had been 
expected in other industries in Guangzhou in February, as the 
Lunar New Year which fell in that month was the traditional 
time of year for settling debts and firing any workers surplus 
to requirements. Some capitalists attempted to preempt GTU 
action by sacking workers early, before the contents of a 
Labour Bureau order reminding employers and employees of the 
law had percolated down to workers, but the GTU was able to 
force the reinstatement of most of these, and by its own 
account was able to prevent any further sackings and 
consequent deterioration in labour-capital relations around 
the time of the New Year festival itself. 54 It can be seen 
from these early experiences, however, that capitalists were 
not as inhibited by the policies and regulations of the new 
regime as might be expected, and showed little hesitation in 
acting in defence of their own interests. It is equally clear 
that the apparent built-in advantage for the labour side in 
the new structures for the management of private enterprises 
did not always live up to expectations, even when workers had 
the full support of their union representatives.
Democratization in state enterprises: the factory management 
committee and workers' representative congress
If progress in the reform of labour-capital relations and 
the establishment of LCCCs was slow, management 
democratization in state enterprises fared little better in 
the first few months after liberation. At the same time as it 
was bemoaning its lack of progress in mobilizing workers to
53 Ibid., 21.
54 Ibid., 20.
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sign labour-capital collective agreements in private 
enterprises, the Guangzhou GTU also reported at the end of 
February 1950 that 'up until now, not a single FMC has been 
set up' 55 in enterprises taken over by the state, in spite 
of the first Workers' Representative Conference's endorsement 
of democratization as 'the most fundamental and most effective 
system' 56 for the restoration and improvement of production. 
At the Conference, Liao Siguang had urged workers to
[d]emand participation in enterprise management. 
According to regulations, all state-run factories 
and enterprises should organize a factory or 
enterprise management committee, and we workers 
should delegate representatives to take part in 
management. [We will] realize the democratization 
of enterprise management, and bring to an end the 
past state of confusion and corruption in enterprise 
management. 57
The regulations to which Liao referred provided for the 
establishment of a factory management committee (FMC) and a 
workers' representative conference (WRC) in every state 
enterprise. Workers in private enterprises were also 
encouraged to persuade management to adopt these forms, 
although in keeping with the policy of cooperation and 
equality between labour and capital, this could not be done by 
the workers alone without the agreement of the capital
55 Ibid., 10.
56 Summary of the Guangzhou labour movement since liberation 
and main tasks for the future, Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 
31.3.50, 91.
57 Summary of the Guangzhou labour movement since liberation 
and main tasks for the future, Guangzhou Gongyun 1,
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The FMC (gongchang guanli weiyuanhui) consisted of the 
factory director (as chairperson), the deputy director, the 
chief engineer and the chairperson of the trade union as ex 
officio members, plus other 'responsible production personnel, 
and a corresponding number of representatives of workers and 
staff' 59. This made a total of between five and seventeen 
members, with the participation of responsible personnel being 
decided by the factory director, and workers' representatives 
elected 'by a general meeting of all workers and staff, or by 
a representative conference, called by the trade union.' 60 
The FMC was to be 'an administrative organization for unified 
leadership of the factory or enterprise' 61, with the 
following duties:
on the basis of production plans and various 
directives laid down by higher-level enterprise 
management organs, and in accordance with actual 
circumstances in the enterprise, to discuss and 
decide upon all important questions to do with 
production and management. 62
These included production plans, management systems, the 
organization of production, appointment and dismissal of 
personnel, wages, welfare etc..
58 'Resolution on the present tasks of the Chinese labour 
movement (passed by the 6th National Labour Congress, 
August 1948)', Selected Documents, 10-11.
59 North China People's Government, 'Decision on the 
establishment of FMCs and WRCs in state and public 
enterprises and factories', in Selected Documents, 137-8.
60 Ibid., 138.
61 Ibid., 138.
62 Ibid., 138.
All the Committee's decisions were implemented by order 
of the factory director, and as chairperson, s/he had the 
power to take emergency decisions alone, subject only to 
seeking the Committee's retrospective approval, and to veto 
majority decisions which s/he judged to be "in conflict with 
the interests of the enterprise, or not in keeping with 
higher-level directives' 63, provided s/he sought immediate 
guidance on the matter from higher-level organs. In cases 
like this, the majority on the Committee could also report its 
divergent views to higher-level organs, but had to implement 
the factory director's decision pending further guidance. In 
large enterprises a standing committee consisting of the 
director, the trade union chairperson and one elected 
representative could be formed to take charge of day-to-day 
business and oversee implementation of the committee's 
decisions. In newly liberated cities such as Guangzhou, 
military representatives stationed in factories were also 
automatically members of the FMC and the standing committee.
The WRC (zhigong daibiao huiyi) was the forerunner of the 
workers' congress (zhigong daibiao dahui) which was promoted 
from 1956 as an antidote to the excesses of Soviet-style "one- 
man management' and a solution to workers' alienation from 
both management and the official trade unions. It was to 
consist of representatives directly elected by workers and 
staff from their own production small group or shift. These 
representatives were "directly responsible to the workers and 
staff electing them' 64, and if found to be unsatisfactory, 
they could be recalled and dismissed by their electors at any 
time. Barring such recalls, representatives were to be re­
elected annually. Meetings of the WRC were to be held once or 
twice a month, generally outside working hours, and were to 
last not more than half a day. 65 In enterprises with less
63 Ibid., 139.
64 Ibid., 140.
65 Ibid., 140-141.
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than two hundred workers, monthly or bimonthly meeting of the 
entire workforce would serve as the WRC. In large enterprises 
which consisted of more than one factory or production site, 
each constituent part was to elect its own, basic-level WRC 
which could then delegate representatives to a general WRC 
covering the whole enterprise, but the principle of direct 
election by all workers and staff of the basic-level WRC was 
strongly emphasized. 66
The WRC was essentially intended to be a forum for 
consultation and communication between management, in the 
guise of the FMC, and workers and staff. Its powers were 
limited to hearing and discussing FMC reports, checking on the 
committee's administrative management and leadership work- 
style, and making proposals or offering criticism. 67 The 
WRC's decisions would not come into force until ratified by 
the FMC and implemented by order of the factory director. The 
WRC also served as a representative conference of the 
factory's trade union organization, and the trade union 
committee was obliged to implement all its decisions on trade 
union business. 68
It is clear from the above description of the structure 
and workings of the FMC that early concerns about the 
'potentially undemocratic nature of the [factory director's] 
veto' 69, and about the dominant position of the director or 
manager in general, were not without foundation. Given the 
active cooperation of the director and other 'responsible 
personnel', it is possible that workers' own views, expressed
66 Ibid., 141.
67 Ibid., 141.
68 Ibid., 141. The trade union committee could only change
WRC decisions with the permission of higher-level trade 
union organs.
69 Brugger, Democracy and organization in the Chinese
industrial enterprise (19 4 8 - 1 9 5 3 220.
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by their union representatives on the committee, could carry 
some weight. Harper considers that since union cadres could 
be drawn from among political activists and outstanding 
producers in the workforce, the union presence on the 
committee 'did provide for some actual worker representation', 
particularly in the few months immediately after liberation 
when x[a]s enterprises were taken over by the state, the 
initial surge would be for some significant workers' 
role' 70, but concedes that both the FMC and WRC could 
equally easily be ignored, especially when the enterprise 
leadership was preoccupied with economic difficulties. In 
most circumstances, 'it is very likely that the manager, 
together with the chief engineer, could always play down the 
opinions of unions and workers' representatives.' 71
The WRC tended to act as 'a rubber-stamp body' 72 for 
decisions of the factory director and the FMC; since its own 
decisions were not binding on the FMC, it could have little 
real influence. Reports on the workings of the WRC in the 
first few months after liberation are scarce, especially in 
comparison with the LCCC. However, there are signs that 
workers initially attempted to turn the WRC into a rather more 
influential body than had been intended in the regulations. 
Given the almost total absence of press comment it is 
difficult to tell exactly what was happening in these early 
months, but for some reason, meetings of the WRC, rather than 
taking up only half a day as specified in the regulations, 
were going on for at least three or four days, and quite often 
for ten days or up to half a month, taking up production 
time. 73 Inadequate preparatory work and a failure to focus 
discussion on key issues were blamed for the excessive length
70 Harper, 'Workers' participation', 117.
71 Lee Lai To, Trade unions in China, 98.
72 Harper, 'Workers' participation', 115.
73 Gongren Ribao 9.3.50, 2.
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of meetings, but it seems likely that workers' eagerness to 
participate in discussions on all aspects of the enterprise's 
work in this, the only official forum for workers' views, was 
the cause of these prolonged discussions. They could also be 
taken as evidence of conflict between workers and unions on 
the one hand and the administration and Party on the other.
Guangzhou was by no means out of line with the rest of 
the country in its slow progress in the democratization of 
state enterprise management. A Renmin Ribao editorial in 
February 1950 mentioned progress in the northeast of China, 
but qualified this with the statement that 'we must frankly 
admit that we are still not managing all enterprises well, and 
indeed are managing some very badly.' 74 The absence of FMCs 
in some state enterprises was also noted in the Gongren Ribao 
the following month75, and even where structures for 
democratic management were set up, workers' problems in 
actually using them to exert influence over the running of the 
enterprise were still considerable. In order to understand 
what was happening in both state and private enterprises in 
this period, and to find the root causes of workers' problems 
with management democratization, it is necessary to examine 
the development of the official unions. Workers' ability to 
make use of the formal participatory structures available to 
them, with union cadres representing workers on the LCCC and 
FMC and being in overall charge of the WRC, depended on the 
unions' degree of support for workers' views and demands. 
This was the decisive factor in determining whether or not ^ 
workers could actually participate in the management of their *> 
own enterprises. The official unions had a duty to protect 
workers' democratic rights, and as we will see in the next 
section as well, whenever they were unable or unwilling to 
discharge this duty, workers lost any chance of exerting
74 Renmin Ribao 6.2.50, 'Mastering enterprise management', 
in Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 2.
75 Gongren Ribao 5.3.50, 1.
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V
/
influence through the formal channels of democratic 
management.
The trade unions after liberation
There is an obvious contrast between the proper role of 
the trade unions under a socialist government, as described in 
the introduction to this study, and the way in which unions 
and workers were operating in Chinese cities immediately 
before liberation, in the militant labour movement with strong 
political overtones which existed then. Such was workers' 
belief in the importance of unions that, in spite of the 
overwhelmingly negative picture of the GMD's 'fake' trade 
unions painted by CCP propaganda (which, it must be 
remembered, had considerable basis in fact), when it came to 
the dismantling of these organizations, there was a feeling 
among workers that 'they knew that the fake trade unions were 
bad, but in the end they were better than no trade unions at 
all, and if a labour-capital dispute arose, what then?' 76 
This strong support for the traditional, adversarial type of 
union created difficulties in the transition to a cooperative 
rather than a confrontational role for unions, one in which 
they would have responsibilities to management and the state 
as well as to their own members. It proved to be a transition 
which union organizers were not always immediately able, or 
willing, to make.
The first few months after October 1949 have been 
characterized as a period 'when workers struck at will and 
frightened capitalists closed their factories' 77, and given 
what we know about the mood among workers before liberation 
and their expectations of the new era, this is a credible 
description. The annual report of the All-China Federation of
76 'GTU work report', Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 30.
77 Harper, 'Party and unions', 91.
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Labour (forerunner of the ACFTU) published in May 1950 
confirms this impression, acknowledging as 'unavoidable' the 
fact that 'workers who have long been under capitalist 
exploitation and oppression become rather retaliative and show 
an extreme leftist tendency.' 78 What seems to have caused 
particular concern was the inclination of some unions to 
support these 'leftist' workers, and to attempt to use 
institutions like the LCCC, set up in support of the policy of 
'benefitting both labour and capital', to make gains for 
workers at the expense of private management. 79 The 
administration and even the factory director in some state 
enterprises seem also to have come up against union-led 
opposition from workers.
Union cadres were criticized in the press for continuing 
to regard the enterprise administration as an enemy after 
liberation, a^nd. it was reported from Tianjin that union 
officials ^there/were reluctant to hold discussions and 
consultations^ with the enterprise administration in the 
latter's offices, for fear of workers' branding them 'the 
running dogs of the administration'. 80 This sort of 
pressure and criticism from workers was not union cadres' only 
motive for their stand, although it must have been a powerful 
one, given that the new unions were anxious to differentiate 
themselves from the GMD's 'fake' trade unions, which they 
dismissed as having done nothing at all for the workers who 
were forced to join except control them on behalf of 
management and the state. 81 But in addition to this, some 
union cadres also seem to have thought that the proclaimed
78 Zhongguo Gongren 15.5.50, 'Annual report of the All-China 
Federation of Labor', in Current Background 24, 4.
79 Ibid., 5; 'Achievements and current problems of LCCCs in 
Tianjin, Zhongguo Gongren 6, 15.7.50, 48.
80 Gongren Ribao 13.10.49, 1.
81 'Summary of the Guangzhou labour movement', Guangzhou 
Gongyun 1, 86.
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policy of democratization in enterprises justified their 
attitude.
A series of articles by the paper's editor, Chen Yongwen, 
published in Gongren Ribao in early March 1950 dealt with 
various questions concerning enterprise democratization, and 
in particular attempted to clear up any confusion among union 
cadres as to the difference between democratization aimed 
ultimately at improving workers' work performance and 
increasing production, and what was termed 'extreme 
democratization', which was how workers' demands to take 
control of their own enterprises were characterized. 82 Chen 
observed that some union officials had forgotten about the 
production goals of democratization and were instead 
concentrating on mass mobilization and the launching of a 
'democratic movement'.
The result is that they intentionally or 
unintentionally 'mobilize the masses' and stir up 
opposition to and disputes with the administrative 
leadership; and they intentionally or 
unintentionally lead the masses in raising a lot of 
demands relating to purely economic interests which 
cannot all easily be resolved straight away. 
Problems thus cannot be solved, but on the contrary 
become a barrier between the leadership and the 
masses. 83
This sort of 'extreme democratization' was described as 'very 
harmful to production' and 'even worse than no democracy at 
all' 84. A later article in the same series revealed that 
some union officials saw the factory director's right to veto
82 See Gongren Ribao 3.3.50, 2, and 8.3.50, 2. There were 
seven articles in all, appearing on March 3-5 and 7-10.
83 Gongren Ribao 3.5.50,2.
84 Ibid., 2.
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FMC majority decisions as incompatible with management 
democratization and therefore opposed it, but this view too 
was condemned as likely to undermine state leadership over 
enterprises and lead to 'anarchist, syndicalist extreme 
democratization. ' 85
But union support for workers' apparent preference for 
'extreme democratization' was short-lived. As industry and 
commerce in China's cities slipped into a period of crisis 
between March and June 1950, the Party felt it necessary to 
intervene to curb the number of industrial disputes and 
enforce its policy of giving priority to economic recovery and 
stability. Pressure was brought to bear on the unions to 
concentrate on production and support the leadership of their 
enterprises, whether state or private, with the result that
during the spring months of 1950 the unions stressed 
compromise and ignored class struggle, often siding 
with the plant administration. In private 
enterprises, unions approved capitalists' 
suggestions for reducing wages and welfare benefits.
In state-run enterprises, the same conservative 
tendency appeared, with the unions and the 
management 'speaking the same phrases' and the 
unions behaving as no more than an arm of the 
administration. 86
Unions in Guangzhou and elsewhere took this line during the 
spring and early summer of 1950 not only because the 
government, alarmed at the prospect of union-backed leftism 
among workers, felt itself 'compelled to restrain some of its 
overzealous union organizers who ... were forcibly 
concentrating power in the hands of the workers.' 87 A
85 Gongren Ribao 8.5.50, 2.
86 Harper, 'Party and unions', 92.
87 Vogel, Canton Under Communism, 76.
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second reason which should also be noted is that at the 
beginning of March 1950, as pressure on unions to side with 
management for the sake of production was intensifying, union 
organization in later liberated areas was still proceeding 
rather erratically, with some union preparatory committees in 
Guangzhou yet to recruit a single member 88. The ideal that 
the new unions should be regarded by workers as 'their own' 
organizations through which they could run their own affairs 
was, as we shall see, far from being realized, and in the 
absence of strong, effective trade unions which were in touch 
with workers' views and demands and were prepared to support 
them, workers' ability to defend their interests in the 
enterprise could only be extremely limited.
A 1953 survey of the first three years of union work in 
Guangdong province concluded that union cadres had made 
serious errors in their top-down, undemocratic and formalistic 
approach to union organization 89, and the same criticisms 
were made by workers right at the beginning of the process in 
spring 1950. Early problems identified in Guangzhou's basic- 
level trade unions included cadres' failure to entrust any 
tasks to workers or activists. Workers complained that union 
cadres were 'ineffective [and] monopolize work that should be 
done by others' 90, and although these criticisms were not 
fully accepted by the GTU, they admitted that such accusations 
did 'reveal our weak points.' 91 Cadres were reminded that 
their job was 'to guide the masses to begin actively running 
their own trade union ... It is not to monopolize the masses'
88 'GTU work report', 11.
89 'Summary of Guangdong trade union work over the past
three years and future tasks', Nanfang Ribao 25.4.53, 2.
90 'Continue to study and take it a step higher', Guangzhou
Gongren 1, 57.
91 Ibid., 57.
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affairs and mistrust them.' 92
There was also a lack of democracy within unions in some 
important respects: the leaders of some union small groups in 
Guangzhou enterprises were found to be taking decisions and 
making plans on their own without any consultation, and simply 
giving orders to ensure their implementation, a work-style 
which was described as 'inadequate as far as being a leader is 
concerned' 93. Cases occurred where candidates for the chair 
of enterprise trade unions 'only had to put their names 
forward, and didn't allow workers to cast ballots to elect 
them. ' 94 In addition, the GTU had set up cadre training 
courses for union activists, with the intention of providing 
trainees with 'the qualifications to be elected to chair 
various trade unions.' 95 Problems sometimes arose in union 
elections when cadres did not trust the workers to vote for 
the activists who had been on this sort of training course and 
were thus the best qualified for the posts, and were tempted 
to apply 'official safeguards of correctness' 96 to ensure 
the election of the 'right' candidates. This sort of conduct 
was definitely not in keeping with the injunction that 
democracy should be 'the soul of the trade union' 97.
The main motive for union cadres' high-handed and 
mistrustful attitude towards workers, which led them into
92 'Work experience of the China Textiles trade union in
Qingdao over the past two months', Guangzhou Gongyun 1,
54.
93 'Continue to study ...', 57 .
94 Ibid., 58.
95 'GTU work report', Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 11.
96 Liu Zijiu, 'On the belated introduction of the lesson of
democratic reform in factories and mines', Gongren Ribao 
12.9.51, in Current Background 123, 5.
97 'Have close ties with the masses, consolidate and broaden 
trade union organization', Gongren Ribao 1.1.51, in 
Zhongguo Gongren 12, 2.
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'closed-doorism', i.e. setting excessively stringent 
conditions for union membership, was their view of the 
problems inherent in the social and political background of 
workers. Workers in Guangzhou had, until very recently, not 
only been under GMD rule, but had also belonged to GMD-run 
unions, membership of which was compulsory for all workers 
over sixteen years of age, as well as to numerous secret 
societies which had links both to organized crime and to GMD 
labour organizations. This emphasis on the 'complex nature of 
the working class' 98 was criticized as an overly simplistic 
view, likely to undermine the trust in and reliance on the 
working class which was supposed to exist by putting undue 
stress on the presence within its ranks of 'local ruffians, 
bandits, special agents, landlords, [and] mercenaries' 99, 
thus 'only looking at the dark side created and left behind by 
the old society' 100, and ignoring working class activism and 
the historical tradition of struggle and solidarity. There 
was a tendency for cadres, particularly from the earlier 
liberated areas, who had long been CCP members or who had 
fought in the Red Army, to consider workers inferior in the 
light of their revolutionary history, and in some cases to 
distrust workers who 'had made rifles for the enemy' 101.
It should be mentioned that the fear of infiltration of 
unions by reactionary elements or 'feudal remnants' (leaders 
of secret societies etc.) was not confined to those cadres who 
were responsible for the slow pace of recruitment into unions. 
Workers, too, were extremely wary of allowing undesirables 
with strong GMD connections into the new union organizations, 
and discussions as to the degree of involvement which should
98 'Some questions concerning the promotion and training of 
worker cadres', Zhongguo Gongren 11, 20.12.50, 7.
99 Ibid., 7.
100 Ibid., 7.
101 Brugger, Democracy and organization, 71.
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constitute a bar to membership were often prolonged. 102 
Aware that their own involvement in various organizations, 
however peripheral or unwilling, made them suspect in the eyes 
of cadres with impeccable revolutionary credentials, workers 
on the enterprise union preparatory committees were 
particularly anxious not to recommend for membership anyone 
who might subsequently be exposed as a special agent, for fear 
of inadvertently associating themselves with the Party's 
opponents.
Attempts to deal with these attitudes among cadres and 
workers which were hindering rapid expansion of union 
membership took the form of assurances regarding the real 
nature of the overwhelming majority of the working class and 
the purpose of the unions themselves. All were reminded that 
actual special agents, although they did exist, were a tiny 
minority, and that the best way to root them out was to bring 
all workers into the trade union, where they could be educated 
and have their political consciousness raised, after which it 
would be extremely difficult for any reactionary elements 
among them to pass unnoticed. Workers were assured that
there was no need to worry even if special agents 
did sneak in, as after they had been discovered they 
could then be expelled from the trade union as 
necessary, and this certainly couldn't implicate the 
person who recommended them. 103
A plan for union organization passed by the GTU on 14 March 
1950 stressed that the enrolment of members and the training 
of new union cadres was the 'main task' 104 of the enterprise
102 'Setting up a trade union in the China Textiles no.9 
Textile Mill', Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 40.
103 Ibid., 40.
104 'Latest plan for work of organizing trade unions in 
Guangzhou', Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 35.
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preparatory committees, and emphasized that recruitment should 
begin on the very first day of such committees' existence. 
This exhortation seems to have been heeded, as recruitment 
subsequently proceeded more rapidly, and in fact the presence 
of 'feudal elements' in the new unions did necessitate later 
campaigns, some prolonged, to expose and remove them.
But since difficulties with recruitment were rooted in 
some cadres' view that most workers were of such a low 
cultural and political level that they had no place at present 
in the trade union, simply insisting on rapid, mass 
recruitment of members did not necessarily solve the 
underlying problem. Once inside the trade union, many workers 
would still come up against strong resistance from cadres who 
were unwilling to allow workers to take over trade union work 
themselves, and who regarded the training and encouragement of 
union activists as at best a necessary evil. Thus both 
cadres' attitudes towards workers' suspect social and 
political background, and the pressures of Party policy in 
this period of economic crisis, militated against the new 
unions being able to fulfil their stated objective of becoming 
the workers' own democratic organizations, and furthermore 
undermined workers' role in democratic enterprise management, 
which as we saw above depended on effective representation and 
support for workers by union cadres.
Much criticism during 1950 was directed at union cadres' 
reluctance to do more than pay lip-service to the idea that 
workers could and should be entrusted with the running of 
'their own' trade union, with cadres simply providing 
assistance and education. This was particularly true of the 
second half of the year, as the extent of workers' discontent 
with 'their' unions, and the consequences for enterprise 
democratization which the unions' attitude entailed, became 
apparent. Cadres were frequently warned against high­
handedness and 'putting on official airs', and reminded that 
workers were their political equals, and, moreover, knew a
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great deal more about many aspects of the enterprise's 
operations than they did. The magnitude of union cadres' 
tasks and their lack of experience made it essential for them 
to be 'good at learning from the workers and consulting the 
workers' 105. Reminders to union cadres of the importance of 
internal democracy and of trusting in and relying on the 
workers abound in labour movement and other press articles 
from this time, but their very frequency (and their continual 
reappearance over the years) attests to the difficulties 
encountered in making the official trade unions truly 
democratic and representative organizations which workers 
would treat as their own.
Some of the early problems can probably be excused as 
teething troubles, although we should beware of making too 
great an allowance for cadres' lack of experience or heavy 
workload, since the latter was often caused by their own 
reluctance to delegate work to activists or ordinary union 
members. But year-end reports on the progress of trade union 
work during 1950 confirm that throughout the year, workers in 
all parts of the country were voicing the same sort of 
complaints about the unions as had workers in Guangzhou during 
the initial stage of union organization in early spring. 
These reports give the impression that the criticisms and 
complaints raised by many workers at this early stage in the 
new unions' development could not be so easily dismissed. In 
Shanghai, union cadres' emphasis on production tasks, at the 
expense of welfare, safety and hygiene work and the protection 
of workers' interests, meant that workers were entirely at the 
mercy of administrative cadres in their enterprises. These 
cadres were described as
lacking in the concept of relying on the working
class ... the workers' management committee is
treated as a cipher, very little attention is paid
105 'Continue to study Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 56.
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to workers' positive proposals , [and] workers' 
safety and problems which must and could be solved 
are often brushed aside. 106
This situation was exacerbated by the attitude of union 
cadres, with the result that
When the administration has no regard for workers' 
safety and hygiene and doesn't respect workers' 
opinions, and the trade union doesn't care either, 
this makes the workers see the trade union as merely 
the administration's union and not their own. 107
It is clear from this comment that workers had identified 
the role played by the new unions in this period, correctly, 
as that of an arm of the administration. The unions' adoption 
of this role demonstrates the difficulties inherent in their 
mandate to act in the interests of both workers and
management, particularly at this early stage where they were
under strong Party pressure to enforce stability and order in 
enterprises, while at the same time lacking the necessary 
integration with workers which could have balanced the
emphasis on industrial peace at all costs with a deeper 
understanding of workers' views and essential interests.
As had been the case in Guangzhou, workers everywhere 
made frequent criticisms as the year wore on of the lack of 
democracy in the unions, most of which 'concerned the fact 
that [union cadres] attach little importance to suggestions 
put forward by workers, or brush them aside.' 108 When 
cadres did take action, for example on welfare, it was
106 'Some questions concerning the work of basic-level trade 
union organization', Zhongguo Gongren 12, 20.1.51, 18.
107 Ibid., 18.
108 Ibid., 20.
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reported that
they don't consult the workers beforehand and give 
no explanation after the event. What is more 
serious, however, is that they ... don't have the
slightest scrap of fraternal class feeling or
affection for the workers and staff. 109
Decisions were made by higher-level trade union organs without 
regard to the actual situation on the factory floor, leading 
workers to accuse union cadres trying to implement these 
decisions of being 'the higher-level trade union's trade 
union, not a union for us workers.' 110
Union officials were also criticized for their treatment 
of the many trade union activists who had emerged during 
various movements, who felt that cadres 'only emphasize[d] 
making use of them and not training them; only require [d] them 
to be active and [gave] no consideration to their actual level 
and difficulties; criticize[d] a lot and [gave] little 
encouragement' 111, causing widespread demoralization. The 
basic problem with the official unions was that of 
responsibility without power, and this problem was most acute 
for union activists, the lowest level of the hierarchy and at 
the sharp end of workers' discontent while having the least
ability to do anything to meet their demands. We will find
these comments from demoralized union activists repeated 
almost verbatim during 1956, showing the persistence of the 
problem.
A Gongren Ribao article published around the same time as 
the report quoted above included some reference to the
achievements of the new trade unions during 1950, but also
109 Ibid., 20.
110 Ibid., 18.
111 Ibid., 21.
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featured a similar litany of complaints and criticisms. Union 
organization, particularly at the basic level, was described 
as 'not very sound', and the persistence among union cadres 
and in many unions of 'the serious phenomenon of separation 
from the masses' 112 was noted. The article went on to 
discuss the reasons behind this separation as follows:
[It] is primarily because some trade union cadres 
are still not good at showing consideration for the 
interests of the broad working masses. For example, 
in state-owned enterprises, the common task of the 
trade union and the administration is of course to 
guarantee the completion of state production plans, 
but because of this, some trade union cadres forget 
to give consideration to the interests of the 
working masses in their daily life, and turn a blind 
eye to their most urgent requirements. 113
The article repeated the charge that problems which could and 
should be solved were being neglected, and that unions were 
failing to exercise their legal right to represent workers' 
interests and to seek solutions to problems from the 
administration. Nor did it find the performance of trade 
unions in private enterprises to be without defects:
In private enterprises, there are a few trade union 
cadres who not only are not good at giving 
consideration to the interests of the working 
masses, but who even take the place of the 
capitalists in carrying out 'firing workers and 
lowering wages1, and who openly speak on the 
capitalists' behalf. Because of this, in some trade 
unions the phenomenon of the masses' not trusting
112 Gongren Ribao 1.1.51, 'Have close ties with the masses, 
consolidate and broaden trade union organization', in 
Zhongguo Gongren 12, 20.1.51, 2.
113 Ibid., 2.
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the trade union and the trade union being divorced
from the masses has appeared. 114
These observations confirm the unions' tendency to act 
exclusively in the interests of management, whether state or 
private, and of production and stability, thereby neglecting 
the interests of workers.
Problems with democracy within the unions were also noted 
in this article, with reports that some union cadres both at 
the higher and basic levels were still being appointed rather 
than elected, and showed some reluctance to promote worker 
activists to cadre status, rejecting these 'mass leaders who 
really are supported by the broad masses' 115 because of 
their lack of qualifications or seniority. This attitude was 
said to be ' fundamentally wrong ... All trade union 
organizations must come from the bottom up, democratically 
elected by the masses.' 116 Some unions were 'still lacking 
various systems of democratic life' 117, such as regular 
meetings, consultation with members and reporting back on 
decisions and progress, and opportunities for criticism and 
self-criticism. The article reported that 'work-styles of 
coercion, commandism, and monopolizing all work oneself' 118 
still existed, and gave the example of a factory where union 
cadres interfered in the running of a union election, 
insisting that workers voted for candidates who had returned 
from union training classes, 'incurring the masses' universal 
dissatisfaction. ' 119 We have already heard of similar cases 
in Guangzhou during 1950. Finally, there seems to have been
114 Ibid., 2.
115 Ibid., 2.
116 Ibid., 2.
117 Ibid., 2.
118 Ibid., 2.
119 Ibid., 2.
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a particular problem with union finances, with some union 
organizations collecting dues but failing to do anything for 
their members and not publishing accounts, and even cases of 
waste and corruption. In view of the main criticisms of the 
GMD's 'fake' trade unions, i.e. that their leaders were 
corrupt and simply pocketed members' dues with no intention of 
using the funds for the benefit of workers, the effect of this 
sort of conduct on workers' attitudes towards the new unions 
can be imagined.
It is clear from the above criticisms of unions that, 
after a brief initial period in which they sided with workers 
and sought to continue their traditional role as the 
representative of workers' interests first and foremost, they 
were soon pressed towards the other extreme of their remit, 
almost invariably siding with management and the Party against 
workers. This change was not only the result of the change in 
Party policy, which now leaned heavily towards subordinating 
workers' demands to economic recovery and stability. It also 
stemmed from the separation of union cadres from their worker 
members, as mentioned above: union cadres had slipped into the 
undemocratic workstyle of the old-style bureaucrat, and since 
they were not consulting with workers and seldom sought their 
opinions, they were unlikely to come under effective pressure 
from workers to support their preference for 'extreme' 
democratization of enterprise management.
The implications of the unions' shift from siding with 
workers to siding with management can be seen if we examine 
the way in which the policy of 'benefitting both labour and 
capital' developed in private enterprises during the first 
half of 1950, and in particular the way that union cadres' 
attitudes affected the functioning of the LCCC. The early 
post-liberation surge of union-supported leftism among workers 
must have confirmed many capitalists' fears about their likely 
fate under the new regime. In some places they were reported 
to be understandably nervous about how their workers, now
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officially the masters, would treat their former oppressors: 
in Zhengzhou there was said to be 'panic' amongst capitalists, 
some of whom 'did not even dare to show their faces and run 
their businesses' 120, and it was reported from Shanghai that
During the period of GMD rule, some 
unenlightened capitalists trampled on and 
humiliated the workers, and moreover practised 
extreme exploitation of workers, but since 
liberation the workers have stood up and 
resisted or retaliated, and so the capitalists 
are uneasy and worried, they adopt a negative 
attitude towards production, and a minority of 
them are even deliberately delaying the 
resumption of production, which further incurs 
the dissatisfaction and opposition of the 
workers. 121
This situation was said to be common in recently liberated 
cities. 122 But as we have already seen, there was scope 
within the LCCC system for the capital side to further its own 
interests at the expense of labour, and this became even 
easier once Party pressure on the unions to curb workers' 
'retaliative' tendencies in private enterprises began to take 
effect in March 1950.
Reviews of labour-capital relations after the Three- and 
Five-Anti movements 123 maintain that before these movements,
120 'Introducing the Zhengzhou traditional medicine 
industry's experience of signing a collective agreement', 
Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 70.
121 Xinhua News Agency, 6.9.48, 'The correct way to solve 
labour-capital disputes', Selected Documents, 86.
122 Ibid., 86.
123 The Three-Anti movement was launched in late 1951 to 
combat the problems of waste, corruption and 
bureaucratism in the state bureaucracy, including the
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it was commonplace for capitalists to use the LCCC to assert 
their managerial authority, insisting on the right to sack 
workers or reduce wages without consultation. 124 A report 
on unions in north China's private enterprises admitted that
Before the Five-Anti movement, because of 
deficiencies in trade union work the masses were not 
mobilized, and so in very many factories and shops 
the policy of benefitting both labour and capital 
was not genuinely implemented, and in a good number 
[the policy] was to 'benefit only the capital 
side'. 125
Since capitalists had come under sustained attack during the 
Five-Anti movement, with great efforts in the labour movement 
press in particular to whip up feeling against them, reports 
such as these are likely to take an especially negative, and 
possibly exaggerated, view of the extent to which LCCCs and 
the 'two benefits' policy in general were used against 
workers. Yet there is earlier evidence from several parts of 
China, including Guangzhou, which confirms this tendency: we 
have already seen how ready some private employers in 
Guangzhou were to sack workers as a way of saving money on 
wages and welfare expenditure immediately after liberation, 
despite the intervention of the GTU. So it seems probable 
that during 1950, the pressure on workers to moderate their 
demands and even accept pay cuts or dismissals to help
administration of state-run enterprises. This campaign 
was later extended to the private sector in the form of 
the Five-Anti movement, which was directed against the 
so-called 'five poisons' practised by some private 
capitalists: bribery, tax evasion, theft of state
property, cheating on government contracts, and theft of 
secret state economic data.
124 See for example 'Exposing the capitalists' criminal 
attacks on unions and workers', Gongren Ribao 7.4.52, 2.
125 'Trade union work in north China private enterprises', 
Gongren Ribao 20.9.52, 1.
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enterprises stay afloat was indeed exploited by some 
capitalists, who
lack[ed] sincerity and [were] always trying to 'use' 
the trade union and control the workers, or use 
overcoming difficulties and tiding [the enterprise] 
over a difficult time as a pretext to force workers 
to reduce their wages and standard of living, to 
achieve the goal of 'benefitting only the capital 
side'. 126
From the middle of 1950, capitalists were widely 
criticized for having sought advantage for themselves at 
workers' expense during the spring economic crisis, 'totally 
violating unity and the spirit of "all being in the same 
boat"'. 127 Warnings had been given to cadres in the earlier 
liberated areas about the
tendency ... of one-sidedly stressing the interests 
of the capital side, conniving at the capitalists' 
law-breaking and violation of discipline, and 
failing to intervene on encroachments on workers' 
legally established rights, so that we sacrifice the 
fundamental interests of the workers. 128
But despite this early awareness of the likely problems, this 
tendency soon came to the fore in later liberated areas such 
as Guangzhou, and was given additional impetus by CCP policy,
126 'Achievements and current problems of LCCCs in Tianjin, 
Zhongguo Gongren 6, 15.7.50, 48.
127 'Some mistaken viewpoints which cause the LCCC to 
degenerate into mere form', Shanghai Laodong Bao 24.5.50, 
in Zhongguo Gongren 6, 15.7.50, 51.
128 Xinhua News Agency 21.9.48, 'Correctly uphold the policy 
of benefitting both labour and capital', Selected 
Documents, 70.
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as unions in private enterprises were exhorted to concentrate 
on productivity and discipline, using the same methods as in 
state enterprises, e.g. labour emulation competitions, in an 
effort to persuade capitalists to stay in business. 129
It had earlier been maintained that the policy itself was 
not at fault, but that 'some private industrialists and 
commercial proprietors ... twist [ed] the meaning of government 
policy, wilfully behaving illegally in violating the proper 
rights of workers' 130. Later, however, there was some 
recognition that the policy of 'benefitting both labour and 
capital' had erred too far in the direction of benefitting the 
capital side; most of the blame was attributed to the unions 
for failing to protect workers from exploitation, which was 
slightly unfair as their line had been 'a correct 
interpretation by union leaders of CCP directives in those 
days of economic crisis' 131. But whether the fault lay with 
the policy itself, as framed by the Party, or with its 
implementation by the trade unions, there was a clear 
acknowledgement that workers' opposition to it was to some 
extent justified.
The reassessment of Party policy on private enterprises 
was paralleled by a reconsideration of whether moderate 
policies on the takeover of state enterprises had been 
entirely appropriate. From quite early in 1950 it began to be 
suggested that although slogans such as '"don't smash the old 
structure to pieces" and "preserve original positions, 
salaries and systems"' 132 had been correct at the time of 
liberation, the policy of maintaining the status quo had had
129 Gongren Ribao 23.6.50, 1.
130 Xinhua News Agency 21.9.48, 'Correctly uphold the policy
...', Selected Documents, 69.
131 Harper, 'Party and unions', 92.
132 Renmin Ribao 6.2.50, 'Mastering enterprise management',
in Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 2.
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the disadvantage that 'we could not help inheriting 
temporarily the many disruptive phenomena of disunity, 
irrationality, anarchism and disorganization, and some corrupt 
systems. ' 133 A union report in Hay of the same year went 
further, conceding that the decision to 'maintain the status 
quo at various national enterprises so as to keep them intact 
... was suitable for the taking-over stage, but not for stages 
when enterprises had been brought under control' 134, and 
that 'some of the cadres in managements and trade unions 
misapplied the policy of the taking-over stage to the control 
stage'. 135
This reluctance in many state enterprises to make the 
radical changes favoured by workers, it was now admitted, had 
hindered progress in management democratization. Once again, 
the trade unions were at fault for their failure adequately to 
represent and protect the interests of workers: union cadres 
could hardly defend workers' right to participate in 
management against the indifference or hostility of 
administrative cadres, who regarded workers as incapable of 
participating effectively, when they themselves, as we saw 
earlier, only paid lip-service to the idea that trusting and 
relying on the workers should be the heart of all work, 
including enterprise management.
The attitude of union cadres who monopolized all work 
themselves and merely gave instructions to workers in fact 
mirrored that of many administrative cadres, who saw measures 
for management democratization as an extra burden on top of 
their other work rather than a progressive reform, and who 
were keen to bypass the FMC as it took too long to convene and
133 Ibid., 3. See also Brugger, Democracy and organization, 
231.
t
134 'Annual report of the All-China Federation of Labour', 
Zhongguo Gongren 15.5.50, in Current Background 24, 
10.11.50, 4.
135 Ibid., 4.
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involved too many workers who were inexperienced in management 
and did not always express themselves well. That similar 
attitudes should exist, and often prevail, in an organization 
intended to be the workers' own, reveals the sort of obstacles 
workers faced when they tried actually to play their allotted 
role as 'masters of the enterprise', and gives a clue as to 
why dissatisfaction with their own mass organization appeared 
among workers at such an early stage of the new, official 
trade unions' development.
The unions' subordination to state enterprise management 
during much of the first half of 1950 left workers with no 
means of enforcing their right to participate in enterprise 
management, because, as we noted earlier, the mere existence 
of democratic structures such as the FMC and WRC was not 
enough to guarantee that workers' participation would become 
a reality. Despite the official insistence that
democratization was essential for the development of 
production, many cadres still regarded it as an optional extra 
on which, given their other pressing tasks, they should not 
waste too much time, and unless union officials were effective 
in insisting on workers' democratic rights in the enterprise, 
the dominant position of the factory director in the state 
enterprise management structure would allow management to 
brush workers' views aside.
This is in fact what seems to have happened in the first 
half of 1950, judging from subsequent criticisms of the slow 
progress of management democratization. It was reported that 
administrative cadres commonly regarded institutions like the 
FMC 'not ... as effective instruments, but as an extra burden, 
with the result that meetings are held purely for 
formalism.' 136 In some cases, administrative cadres agreed 
to the establishment of the FMC 'merely in order to "complete" 
the "task" of setting up the FMC decided upon at the higher
136 Ibid., 4.
74
level, and not because they genuinely want[ed] to implement 
democratic management. ' 137 This sort of Committee might 
either have a majority of cadre members, or might simply take 
no notice of worker members' views and not bother to assist 
them by explaining things or educating them for real 
participation, 'so when the time comes for an FMC meeting the 
worker members don't feel that it has any meaning . .. Some 
worker members say: "We've come to listen to the
meeting. " ' 138
Typical cadres' comments on the faults of FMCs reported 
in the press included the following: '"Holding a meeting of 
cadres will solve the problem just the same, so why do we have 
to hold FMC meetings? ... Workers only know what happens in 
one workshop, so how can they participate in democratic 
management of a whole factory?"' 139; '"the FMC has a lot of 
members, it's a bother to convene it, it drags on for ages and 
can't decide any issue","the workers don't understand the 
overall situation and can't make speeches."' 140 The factory 
director's right of veto seems to have undermined 
administrative cadres' respect for the FMC, as they tended to 
'set the factory director's right of final decision against 
the FMC', describing their respective functions thus: ' "You 
discuss, then at the end I make the decision."' 141 In this 
context, puns on the Chinese word for democracy, minzhu, 
abounded, as in 'workers are the min (people), and the factory 
director is the zhu (ruler).' Frequent exhortations to cadres
137 Remain Ribao 3.6.50, 'Do a good job of running FMCs and 
conscientiously implement democratic management', in 
Zhongguo Gongren 6, 15.7.50, 15.
138 Ibid., 16.
139 Ibid., 15.
140 Dongbei Ribao 9.6.50, 'What must be done in order to 
carry out the democratization of factory management?', in 
Zhongguo Gongren 6, 15.7.50, 17.
141 Ibid., 15.
to implement resolutions passed by the WRC in this period also 
seem to indicate that the workings of that body were being 
largely ignored.
Strong criticisms of these attitudes, and of cadres' 
bureaucratist and commandist work-styles in general, reminded 
cadres that management democratization was 'not merely a 
question of methods, but in fact a question of ideology. ' 142 
Proper operation of FMCs and WRCs was the 'key link' 143 in 
transforming old, bureaucratic capitalist enterprises into New 
Democratic enterprises, and it was emphasized that cadres must 
grasp 'the basic idea of relying on the assistance of the 
working masses in managing enterprises well' 144 if workers 
were to feel that they genuinely were masters of the 
enterprise and work accordingly. While it was conceded that 
worker delegates on FMCs, many of them with minimal education, 
were not always well equipped to play a prominent role in 
participatory structures, unions were reminded that it was 
their task, as 'schools of communism', to educate and assist 
workers so that they could participate effectively; it would 
be most unjust to keep workers in a subordinate position 
because of their lack of education, when this was a result of 
their low status in the old society.
Pressure for a change in policy grew as the results of 
the shift of unions' allegiance away from workers and towards 
enterprise management became apparent, and as serious and 
damaging criticism of the unions by workers mounted. Given 
its prominence both in official union reports and the main 
newspapers, there seems to be little doubt that it was mainly 
the volume and seriousness of workers' criticism and 
discontent which prompted the change. A union rectification
142 Ibid., 28.
143 Renmin Ribao 6.2.50, 'Mastering enterprise management',
in Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 6.
144 Ibid., 5.
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campaign began in August 1950 in which union cadres undertook 
self-criticism of the commandist and bureaucratist attitudes 
they had earlier displayed. There was no sudden switch to 
all-out support for workers' opinions and demands; in order to 
do this, union cadres would first have needed to know what 
precisely those opinions and demands were, and as we have 
seen, it was their alienation from the workers and ignorance 
of their views which brought about the crisis in the first 
place.
But all levels of the union hierarchy seem to have agreed 
that their previous neglect of workers' welfare and interests 
had allowed both capitalists in private and administrative 
cadres in state enterprises to ride roughshod over those 
interests, and that if workers' new status as 'masters of the 
enterprise' was to mean anything, this state of affairs had to 
be remedied forthwith. So while there was no immediate 
reversion to supporting workers' demands for 'extreme 
democratization', from the beginning of 1951 unions did place 
greater emphasis on their role as workers' representatives and 
advocates of workers' specific interests. This was soon to 
bring Party accusations of economism down upon basic-level 
unions, while at the higher, national level it was paralleled 
by moves towards increased union autonomy from the Party which 
were similarly unacceptable. In both cases, unions seemed 
much more inclined to position themselves on the side of the 
workers in their ongoing confrontation with the CCP, something 
which the Party could not be expected to tolerate.
The union 'crisis' of 1951 and democratic reform
When commentators discuss the early post-liberation 
crisis in relations between the official unions and the CCP, 
it is usually the events of 1951 to which they refer, although
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as we have just noted, unions' support for workers' leftist 
inclinations immediately after the CCP victory in 1949 was a 
major source of friction as well. Although the Party took 
action to curb the related trends of economism and syndicalism 
within the unions and the ACFTU hierarchy at the end of 1951, 
replacing Li Lisan as head of the ACFTU with Lai Ruoyu, it was 
not until early 1953 that any reports or analyses of these 
problems were made public. Belated attacks on both economism 
and syndicalism featured prominently in reports to the Seventh 
All-China Congress of Trade Unions in May of that year, but 
these criticisms were for the most part directed specifically 
at the top leadership of the ACFTU. The question thus arises 
as to how far this high-level conflict was reflected in events 
at the enterprise level, and how the confrontation which had 
unfolded after liberation between workers and the Party, 
centred on the latter's policies on industrial management, 
developed under these circumstances.
Following the outpouring of workers' criticism which they 
had faced in the second half of 1950, and much of which they 
accepted, the trade unions in 1951 seem to have given far more 
attention to their role as the advocates of workers' specific 
interests in the enterprise. It was this attitude, and in 
particular their attention to the immediate material interests 
of workers, which was condemned as economism in 1953: basic- 
level unions were criticized for seeing a contradiction 
between improvements in workers' welfare and the development 
of production and for failing to understand that the former 
was in fact dependent on the latter, and were accused of 
irresponsibility in failing to persuade workers not to raise 
excessively high demands which could not be met under present 
circumstances. 145 Party concern about these tendencies was 
increased by the fact that they coincided with an attempt by 
Li Lisan to win greater independence from the Party for the 
ACFTU and its affiliated unions; syndicalism thus appeared to
145 Lai Ruoyu, 'Report on the trade union work in China', The
Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions, 52, 66.
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the CCP leadership to have permeated the unions from the 
lowest level to the highest.
If the unions' previous tendency to operate as an arm of 
management had been completely unacceptable to workers, its 
new emphasis on workers' interests was to prove equally 
objectionable to the Party. The problems in private 
enterprises were not so serious, being mainly of a practical 
rather than an ideological nature. That is, despite their 
obligation to mobilize workers for the completion of 
production plans, there was no ideological obstacle to unions' 
taking an independent line in defence of workers' interests 
when these were threatened by the actions of private 
management. After all, opposing 'excessive' exploitation of 
workers by the remaining capitalists while continuing and 
developing production had long been the unions' proper role in 
private enterprises, and represented a much less drastic shift 
away from their traditional, pre-liberation function. The 
practical problems concern the ability of basic-level union 
organizations to fulfil this role, an ability which is brought 
into question by the apparent need to conduct repeated 
rectification and reform campaigns, including the Democratic 
Reform Movement and the Three- and Five-Anti movements, to put 
union organizations on a sound footing. More will be said 
about these campaigns later.
But in the case of state enterprises the proper role of 
the unions was less obvious, and was the subject of a debate 
within the labour movement during 1951. 146 This debate 
centred on whether or not the standpoint of the trade union in 
a state enterprise should differ in any way from that of the 
administration. The official Party view was that it should 
not: since the long-term, collective interests of the working 
class were identical with those of its vanguard, the CCP, and 
of the Party's representatives in state enterprises, the
146 See Harper, 'Party and unions', 92-6, for a detailed
discussion of this debate.
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administration, there was no possibility of antagonism between 
them. Under these circumstances, the unions were responsible 
for persuading the less advanced section of the working class 
of this identity of long-term, overall interests, while at the 
same time keeping the Party informed of workers' own immediate 
interests; the unions were definitely not to become advocates 
of workers' short-term or purely material interests, since 
this would amount to a syndicalist challenge to Party 
supremacy.
The opposing position, taken by some union officials, was 
that the division of labour between management and workers 
still existed in state as in private enterprises, 
necessitating a difference in standpoint if unions were 
genuinely to be the workers' own organization which defended 
their interests. Unions would thus on occasion be justified 
in opposing the administration where its actions infringed on 
workers' interests, even though this ultimately meant opposing 
the Party, which appointed and controlled the administration. 
It was this view which was criticized in 1953 as xa tendency 
in the trade unions of departing from the leadership of the 
Party. ' 147
It seems extremely unlikely that there is no connection 
whatever between the attempts of the top-level union 
leadership under Li Lisan to win greater independence from 
Party control for the entire trade union structure, and the 
increasing tendency of basic-level unions to take a more 
independent line in siding with workers in defence of their 
interests in the enterprise. But this should not lead us to 
assume that one was a direct result of the other. While Li 
Lisan's actions as ACFTU leader probably helped to create a 
climate in which basic-level unions were able to shift towards 
a stronger and more consistent advocacy of workers' interests, 
this shift did not necessarily represent a response to
147 Lai Ruoyu, 'Report on trade union work', 52.
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instructions or even direct influence from above; in fact/ the 
weakness of vertical control of basic-level unions by ACFTU 
organs at this point precluded this possibility. 148
What is more likely, given what we know about how the 
unions had operated during most of 1950, and about workers' 
reaction to their perceived deficiencies, is that unions at 
various levels, including the highest, were responding to the 
same pressures, having realized that unless they made a real 
effort to represent workers in the enterprise and uphold their 
demands, their position would be untenable as they would be 
rejected by the workers. The union 'crisis' which is usually 
referred to as having occurred in 1951 thus becomes, in this 
version of events, the third phase of the ongoing 
confrontation between workers and the Party, with the official 
unions now more inclined to side with workers. Looking at the 
'standpoint' debate in this context, it is evident that those 
union cadres who were insisting on a more independent stance 
for unions in state enterprises were responding to workers' 
earlier accusations that they were 'the administration's union 
and not [workers'] own.' 149 In opposition to this, the 
Party's formulation of the correct standpoint and role of the 
unions in state enterprises as described above would mean that 
unions were to continue to act as an arm of the 
administration, albeit the 'workers' own' administration.
It is difficult to gauge from contemporaneous press 
reports the actual extent of the economist and syndicalist 
leanings of basic-level unions during 1951, as all criticism 
of them seems to have been postponed until early 1953. 130
148 See Harper, 'Party and unions', 96.
149 'Some questions concerning the work of basic-level trade 
union organization', Zhongguo Gongren 12, 20.1.51, 18.
150 See for example Nanfang Ribao 19.5.53, 2, 'Guangzhou FTU, 
Railway Management Bureau and other units hold training 
classes to popularize the experience of the Wusan Factory 
in trade union work'.
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But it is safe to assume that the accusations made against 
union cadres at the Seventh ACFTU Congress did have some basis 
in facts we know that the union rectification campaign of late 
1950 was intended to move the unions away from unconditional 
support for the enterprise administration and towards stronger 
support for workers' views and interests, and that after their 
experiences of 'the administration's' unions, workers were 
likely to try to push the unions as far as possible in the 
opposite direction, with the likelihood that they would at 
times cross the boundary between acceptable reflection of 
workers' views to the Party and syndicalist advocacy of those 
views. However, flaws in the organization of the unions still 
remained, calling into question the degree to which unions 
even now were actually capable of pressing workers' demands 
and making 'economist' gains on their behalf.
Assuming that workers now had, in some cases at least, 
the support of their unions in upholding their interests and 
democratic rights in the enterprise, it might be expected that 
rapid progress would be made in the democratization of 
enterprise management, with a corresponding rise in workers' 
level of satisfaction with their new position under CCP rule 
and an easing of the conflict between them and the Party. But 
in fact the problems within union organizations seem to have 
undermined their inclination to support workers' demands for 
democratization. In the summer of 1951 we find that
enterprise democratization in the Central-South region of 
China, which included Guangzhou, was judged to have made very 
little progress, leading workers to complain that '"they 
[were] masters but [did] not have a say."' 151 It was 
admitted that most enterprises had 'not been able to solve 
their problems. Some of them did not go through any
fundamental changes; only a limited number have undergone
151 Quoted in Liu Zijiu, 'On the belated introduction.. . in 
Current Background 123, 9.
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comparatively thorough reform. ' 152 This meant that 'the
neglected lesson in democratic reform [had to] be made
up' 153 in the south. The problems which the Democratic
Reform Movement (DRM), as well as the subsequent Three- and 
Five-Anti movements, was intended to tackle were present not 
only in state organs and the management of both state and 
private enterprises, but, as we shall see, also within the 
trade unions, where they continued to provoke dissatisfaction 
and discontent among workers. The period during which these 
three movements were carried out in Guangzhou (mid-1951 to 
early 1953) constitutes the final phase of this first 
confrontation between workers and the Party, as the Party 
sought to promote enterprise democratization and the
purification and strengthening of the official unions without, 
however, unleashing the pent-up demand among workers for what 
it termed 'extreme democratization'. These campaigns were 
prompted by workers' protests and demands over the previous 
two years as well as by the tenets of the CCP's guiding 
ideology, but even as the Party implicitly acknowledged that 
many of these protests and criticisms had been justified, it 
still displayed a lingering mistrust of workers and a 
reluctance fully to mobilize them for democratization, and was 
quick to intervene whenever it feared that workers might be 
taking these movements to extremes.
The Democratic Reform Movement
The DRM was launched in the area under the jurisdiction of the 
Central-South Bureau of the CCP Central Committee in May 1951. 
It had already taken place immediately after liberation in the 
north-east of China and was subsequently implemented 
throughout the country, but the Central-South area 'bore the
152 Nanfang Ribao 10.7.51, 'Democratic reform in state 
enterprises', in Current Background 115, 3.
153 Ibid., 3.
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brunt of the 1951 movement.' 154 The reform, described as a 
historical phase 'which the workers must pass through in the 
process of emerging from the position of the ruled to that of 
the masters' 155, was intended to complete the transformation 
of enterprises, changing bureaucratic capitalist enterprises 
into socialist (state) enterprises, and changing old
democratic (private) enterprises into new democratic ones. As 
such, it seemed to promise the sort of radical reform of the 
old order in industrial enterprises which many workers had 
demanded immediately after liberation.
The fairly long delay in carrying out systematic reform 
in the south was defended as having been necessary in order to 
establish certain preconditions for successful democratic 
reform, such as workers' support for the CCP government, a 
rise in workers' political consciousness, gaining of 
experience by cadres, the suppression of counter­
revolutionaries, and the establishment of Party, Youth League 
and trade union organizations in enterprises. 156 It is 
interesting to note that although the DRM in south Chinese 
enterprises was supposed to be led by the FMC and the 
enterprise union, an exception was made in cases where the 
director or manager of the enterprise had been retained after 
liberation , or where 'the union was felt to be
"impure"' 157, because of the presence of former gang-
154 Brugger, Democracy and organization, 105.
155 Xinhua News Agency (Beijing) 20.8.51, 'Directive of the 
Central-South Bureau of the Central Committee on 
mobilization of the working masses in developing the 
Democratic Reform Movement', summarized in Current 
Background 115, 6.
156 Liu Zijiu, 'On the belated introduction of...', in 
Current Background 123, 3.
157 Brugger, Democracy and organization, 250. In such cases 
the DRM was to be led by a special committee under the 
leadership of the enterprise Party committee.
84
bosses 158 and other degenerate elements of the working 
class. The movement can thus be seen as an implicit criticism 
of the failure of management democratization and of the 
shortcomings of the new trade unions, especially in a city 
like Guangzhou where these exceptional cases probably 
constituted a large proportion of the total. The
'purification of the basic trade union organizations' 159 was 
included in the aims of the DRM.
The movement was mainly directed against remaining feudal 
or reactionary influences, and more specifically against the 
gang-boss system and secret societies:
The aim and purpose of democratic reform is to 
introduce a thorough reform of the gang labour 
system which imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic 
capitalism purposely established and cultivated in 
factories and mines to rule the masses of 
workers. 160
But as with earlier measures for workplace democratization, 
emphasis was also placed on the beneficial effect it would 
have on production. The official directive on the launching 
of the DRM in the south explained that
158 The gang-boss, or labour contractor, was responsible for 
recruiting unskilled or semi-skilled labour in some 
industries before 1949, particularly in the mining and 
transport sectors. The gang-boss had a great deal of 
power over the lives of the workers he recruited, being 
able to hire and fire as well as taking a portion, often 
substantial, of workers' wages in return for employing 
them. Gang-bosses often had links with secret societies. 
See Brugger, Democracy and organization, 42-47; 
Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour Movement, 54-64.
159 Nanfang Ribao 27.8.51, 'Delegates to Canton Conference 
support Democratic Reform Movement', in Current 
Background 128, 34.
160 Liu Zijiu, 'On the belated introduction...', Gongren 
Ribao 12.9.51, in Current Background 123, 4.
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the idea is to rely upon the working class to rid 
the enterprises of all feudal, reactionary elements, 
reactionary systems and bad styles of work, to 
thoroughly wipe out obstacles to production, and to 
establish an overall system of democratic management 
to lead the workers' enthusiasm into production 
efforts, so that a new labour attitude and 
discipline can be established and the workers be 
made into a strongly organized class. 161
The movement was to be carried out in three stages. The 
first, democratic struggle, would include mass meetings at 
which workers could identify and accuse gang-bosses and other 
'feudal remnants'. Those identified would be dealt with 
according to the nature of their offence, their production 
abilities, their attitude towards labour since liberation, and 
their degree of repentance for past crimes. Penalties 
mentioned included demotion, reduction in wages, transfer to 
another post, public surveillance, and suspension of trade 
union membership 162; at the culmination of the movement on 
the Guangzhou docks, some 'special agents, labour blacklegs, 
despotic foremen, underworld gangsters and their stooges' 163 
were sentenced to terms of imprisonment or to death. It was 
emphasized that the struggle was '"anti-feudal, not anti­
capital"' 164, at least in private enterprises. The aim of 
the second stage, democratic unity, was 'to solve ... problems 
concerning the relations between workers and [white-collar]
161 Xinhua News Agency, 'Directive of the Central-South
Bureau', Current Background 115, 7.
162 Liu Zijiu, 'On the belated introduction...', Current
Background 123, 4.
163 Nanfang Ribao 9.10.51, 'Democratic Reform Movement 
developed in twelve cities in south China', in Current 
Background 128, 43.
164 Deng Zihui, vice-chair of the Central-South Bureau's
Financial and Economic Committee, quoted in ibid., 4.
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employees, between the leadership and the masses, between old 
and new workers, between skilled and unskilled workers, and 
between different groups of workers.' 165 The main methods 
used would be criticism and self-criticism.
The third and final stage was democratic construction, 
which involved raising political awareness in enterprises, 
establishing a new labour attitude, reforming and 
strengthening mass organizations, including enterprise trade 
unions, and establishing a democratic management system. 166 
This stage was to include 'provision for the regular 
reelection of labour union committees' 167, a vital measure 
if unions were to be democratically controlled by their 
members. The inclusion of this measure can be taken, as a sign 
that criticism of those basic-level organizations which failed 
to hold regular elections the previous year had not resulted 
in any marked improvement in the situation. Re-election of 
FMCs was also to take place during the DRM168, indicating 
that the democratic operation of these institutions was not 
proceeding as planned either. In practice, progress through 
the three stages of the movement was often slow, with the 
first stage not being completed in some cases until December 
1951. The second stage did not take place in many enterprises 
until early 1953, while the third stage, the one intended 
finally to establish democratic management in all types of 
enterprise, was postponed in its entirety until after the 
Three- and Five-Anti movements had been completed. 169
The influence of the gang-boss system, traditionally very
165 'Directive of the Central-South Bureau...', in Current 
Background 115, 8.
166 Ibid., 8.
167 Brugger, Democracy and organization, 111.
168 Gongren Ribao 22.10.51, 2.
169 Ibid., 110.
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strong amongst transport workers, was a major problem in 
Guangzhou, especially on the docks. Early attempts led by the 
GTU to eradicate the system here where the problem was most 
acute were only partially successful 170, and when it was 
discussed as part of the DRM at the second session of the 
fourth Representative Conference of People from All Circles in 
Guangzhou in August 1951, it seemed that if anything, the 
situation had worsened since the GTU's early attempts at 
reform in 1950. A representative of the dock-workers at this 
Conference 'pointed out the extreme lengths to which wharf 
workers were [still] persecuted by remnant feudal 
influences' 171. According to him, a^ll^  dock-workers were 
members of at least one and up to eleven secret societies 
each, and were losing (70-90%/ of their pay to 'reactionary 
organizations and underworld bodies' 172. These 'feudal 
remnants' also 'extorted money from merchants and travellers, 
thus seriously hampering the flow of supplies between urban 
and rural areas.' 173
But it was not only on the docks that gang-bosses and 
other 'feudal remnants' were still in existence and wielding 
influence. Elsewhere, too, they had not only not been 
eliminated, but had actually consolidated their position by 
gaining positions of power in the new management and trade 
union structures. After the launching of the DRM in Guangzhou 
in the summer of 1951, it was revealed that some 'feudal
170 See 'GTU work report', Guangzhou Gongyun 1, 24-5.
171 'Delegates to Canton Conference support DRM', Nanfang
Ribao 27.8.51, in Current Background 128, 34. For an 
account of the operation of the gang-boss system on the 
Shanghai docks before and immediately after liberation, 
see Chen Gang, 'Changes at the Shanghai Harbour Docks', 
in Stephen Andors (ed.) Workers and workplaces in 
revolutionary China, especially 33-38, 89-94.
172 Ibid., 34.
173 Ibid., 34.
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elements' had been 'able to use their former influence and 
connections' 174 to become '"members*1' of the Party and the 
Youth League and "cadres" of trade unions; some were even 
elected model workers.' 175 As we noted earlier, after union 
organizers had been repeatedly criticized for 'closed-doorism' 
in recruiting members and paying too much attention to the 
'complex' social and political background of workers in 
Guangzhou, the recruitment of union members proceeded much 
more rapidly and with less scrupulous examination of workers' 
backgrounds. This, coupled with the policy of temporarily 
'maintaining the status quo* in enterprises after liberation, 
had allowed some political undesirables to keep their 
positions and a great deal of their influence over their 
fellow workers, hence their presence in positions of influence 
in various organizations.
It is interesting to note that in addition to their usual 
activities, gang-bosses were said to have '[taken] advantage 
of the weaknesses' 176 of the often inexperienced management 
of state enterprises, and of the 'undesirable work style' 177 
of some of the enterprise leadership, in order to foment 
discord among workers and between workers and enterprise 
management. 'In this way they alienated the workers from the 
administrative authorities in factories and mines and hindered 
the Party from maintaining contact with the working masses.' 17S
174 Brugger, Democracy and organization, 79.
175 Liu Zijiu, 'On the belated introduction...', Current
Background 123, 2. See also Nan fang Ribao 10.7.51
(reprinted from Changjiang Ribao 13.6.51), 'Democratic 
reform in state enterprises', in Current Background 115, 
3.
176 'Democratic reform in state enterprises,' in Current
Background 115, 3.
177 Ibid., 3.
178 Ibid., 3.
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Some, it was reported, had 'agitated strikes' 179. Indeed, 
some gang-bosses who 'had achieved prominent positions in 
management' were said to have 'engineered strikes and go-slow 
resistance' 180 to the DRM itself. The degeneration of some 
basic-level trade unions into 'tails of management' 'meant 
that secret agents could hide behind left slogans and incite 
the workers to oppose both management and unions. » 181
Although in 1950 both Party and trade union authorities 
took very seriously workers' criticisms of basic-level unions 
which sided with management and found it necessary to respond 
to them, there were no references at the time to organized 
resistance from workers or strikes during this period. Yet 
these accusations against gang-bosses seem to indicate that 
such incidents did take place. Reference to them during the 
DRM is clearly intended to demonstrate both the extent of the 
influence of 'feudal remnants' and the damage it could cause 
in enterprises, but looking at them from a different angle, we 
can see these events as evidence of the depth of workers' 
discontent with the attitude of both the administration and 
the trade union. In the next section we will see how when 
unions failed to support workers and sided with management in 
1956-7, workers were quick to bypass them and form their own 
organizations. While there is no evidence of this sort of 
self-organization during the early 1950s, discontented workers 
were clearly ripe for agitation against the enterprise 
leadership, something which must have acted as a warning to 
the official unions that their continued failure to support 
and represent workers in their dealings with management might 
render them irrelevant as workers formed alternative 
organizations. This may account for the unions' subsequent 
tendency to present themselves more as the workers'
179 Ibid., 3.
180 Brugger, Democracy and organization, 105.
181 Ibid., 100.
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organization and the adversary of the administration 182 
during 1951.
This sort of activity notwithstanding, the continued 
influence of gang-bosses and other 'feudal remnants' was not 
generally to workers' advantage, as it was an impediment to 
the management democratization which was designed to allow 
workers to act as 'masters of the enterprise' in the new 
society. In effect, it kept enterprise management back in its 
pre-liberation state: workers in private factories in
Guangzhou who were still 'ideologically and organizationally 
controlled' 183 by feudal or reactionary elements were said 
to feel that they 'had not yet achieved genuine liberation, as 
is reflected in their comments that "we are in a place that 
the sun doesn't reach", "the streets have been liberated, but 
not our factory".' 184
Back in March 1950, the Gongren Ribao had insisted that, 
contrary to the belief of many workers and union cadres, there 
was no need for any mass movement for democratization in 
enterprises 185. However, as the DRM was launched it was 
acknowledged that in fact a mass movement was necessary if the 
gang-boss system in particular was to be eradicated:
Mere dependence on government orders to abolish 
these [feudal remnants and] systems is ineffective; 
the labouring masses must be mobilized to stamp out 
the evils of such systems and remnants. 186
182 Nanfang Ribao 19.5.53, 2.
183 Nanfang Ribao 1.12.52, 2, 'The work of democratic reform
is now unfolding in a planned way'.
184 Ibid., 2.
185 Gongren Ribao 3.5.50, 2.
186 Nanfang Ribao 20.8.51, 'Determine to mobilize the working
masses, carry through the Democratic Reform Movement', in 
Current Background 115, 12.
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But a mass movement in enterprises where reform since 
liberation had had only limited success could in itself create 
problems, and concerns about the possible dangers are evident 
in many of the early documents on the conduct of the movement.
One of the main dangers was that, given the involvement 
to some degree of the vast majority of workers in Guangzhou in 
some sort of reactionary, GMD-sponsored or 'feudal' 
organization ('yellow' unions, secret societies etc.), the 
movement's net would be spread far too widely. The cadres 
responsible for the movement were urged 'not to make too many 
enemies' 187 during the course of the movement, and to ensure 
that the movement was directed only at the 'principal 
culprits' 188, i.e. 'special agents, despots and underworld 
gangsters, but not the men deceived into joining their 
organizations. ' 189 While it was acknowledged that most 
workers had belonged to secret societies or 'fake' trade 
unions under the GMD, a Nanfang Ribao editorial insisted that
they deeply hate[d] these reactionary organizations.
They should be clearly told that those who had been 
pressed into such organizations under coercion and 
were not seriously guilty should be pardoned. 190
But at the same time as avoiding the danger of targeting 
ordinary workers, the leaders of the DRM, the Guangzhou Party 
Committee and the GTU, also had to guard against an extreme
187 Ibid., 12.
188 Nanfang Ribao 10.7.51, 'Democratic reform in state 
enterprises', in Current Background 115, 4.
189 Nanfang Ribao 27.8.51, 'Delegates to Canton conference 
support DRM', in Current Background 128, 34. Emphasis 
added.
190 'Determine to mobilize the working masses...', Current 
Background 115, 12.
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response by these workers to what appeared to them to be a 
necessary and long overdue mass campaign to establish them as 
the real 'masters of the enterprise'. It was anticipated that 
workers might attempt to widen the movement by targeting the 
capital side in private enterprises, white-collar and 
technical staff, or even skilled workers. The danger stemmed 
from the fact that the policy of maintaining the status quo 
during the takeover of enterprises after liberation meant that 
staff and technicians had in many cases retained their 
original, relatively privileged position in enterprises, 
particularly in later liberated cities in the South. Since, 
as we saw in 1950, workers' leftist tendencies had been curbed 
and retaliation and the settling of scores largely prevented, 
this policy had given rise to a great deal of antipathy among 
ordinary workers, who often felt that the enterprise was still 
being run by the same small, pre-liberation elite while their 
suggestions for reform and attempts to participate were 
rebuffed. Thus there were fears among those about to launch 
the DRM that this long-postponed movement might prove too 
popular among workers, and would quickly get out of control. 
As we will see, these fears were not realised during the DRM 
itself as mass mobilization was generally unsuccessful, but 
something very similar did in fact occur at the height of the 
anti-capitalist Five-Anti movement.
While admitting that workers' feelings with regard to 
enterprise elites, whether technical or managerial, were not 
entirely unreasonable, the authorities stressed that technical 
personnel were 'an important force, indispensable to 
factories' 191, and that all those not found to be political 
counter-revolutionaries must be won over and reformed, 
'despite the dissatisfaction of the working masses.' 192 
Workers' disputes with staff and technical personnel were
191 'Directive of the Central-South Bureau', Current
Background 115, 7.
192 'Determine to mobilize the working masses...', Current
Background 115, 12.
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classed as 'internal' 193 matters which 'should be openly 
discussed and settled' 194, but which had nothing to do with 
the movement to eradicate the minority of feudal elements 'who 
politically oppress and economically exploit and defraud' 195 
the workers. The united front against these elements was to 
include not only staff and technicians who, 'under the old 
regime, might have offended the workers and aroused their 
dissatisfaction' 196, but also capitalists in private
enterprises who 'had employed the feudal reactionary 
influences to maintain "order"' 197, incurring similar
hostility among workers. Capitalists were deemed to have
suffered the ill effects of these influences as well, and 
therefore their support for the movement '[could] and [had to] 
be secured. ' 198 The reservations which are apparent in 
these documents about the advisability of mobilizing workers 
for an all-out mass movement give the impression that 
enterprise cadres were unlikely to give the movement their 
wholehearted support, and in fact cadres' lack of commitment 
to reform was soon to be identified as a factor hindering the 
development of the DRM in Guangzhou. 199
The movement in Guangzhou had its only notable success 
during 1951 on the docks, which, it was reported in October,
193 'Directive of the Central-South Bureau', Current
Background 115, 7.
194 'Democratic reform in state enterprises', Current
Background 115, 5.
195 Ibid., 5.
196 'Directive of the Central-South Bureau', Current
Background 115, 7.
197 Ibid., 7.
198 Ibid., 7.
199 Nanfang Ribao 20.9.51, 'Progress of democratic reform in 
state-owned enterprises slow, confusion noted', in 
Current Background 128, 38.
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had already embarked on the third, democratic construction 
stage 200. A 'marked change in [dock workers'] work 
attitude, in their unity, and in their mutual assistance' was 
noted, as was the fact that 'leadership cadres of all levels 
had begun to acquire a deep understanding of the significance 
and [necessity] of the movement.' 201 Summing up the success 
of the DRM on the docks, it was claimed that 'the basic labour 
union organizations [had been] reorganized and purified' 202, 
while 'the remnant feudal influences on the wharves had been 
wiped out, the political consciousness of the working class 
greatly raised, and a new labour attitude established.' 203 
It is possible that early efforts at reform among dock- 
workers, however little they seemed to have achieved at the 
time, provided the basis for a successful movement at the 
second attempt.
Towards the end of September 1951, five months into the 
movement, two DRM success stories appeared in the Nanfang 
Ribao, one about the experience of the state-owned Xinhua 
Rubber Works, and the other by the manager of the private Yi 
Chang Cigarette Factory 204. Clearly aimed at giving impetus 
to the movement, the articles included comments from the two 
enterprise directors on the beneficial effects of the DRM on
200 Nanfang Ribao 9.10.51, 'Democratic Reform Movement 
developed in 12 cities in south China', in Current 
Background 128, 43.
201 Ibid., 43.
202 'Delegates to Canton conference support DRM', Current 
Background 128, 34.
203 Ibid., 35.
204 Guo Wen, 'The beneficial effects of democratic reform on 
production as I have felt it', Nanfang Ribao 28.9.51, in 
Current Background 128, 39-40; Chen Dong, 'Yi Chang 
Cigarette Factory provides illustration of beneficial 
effects of DRM', Nanfang Ribao 29.9.51, in Current 
Background 128, 41-2.
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both production and worker-management relations 205. In both
plants it was claimed that the DRM had mobilized workers to 
rise up against 'feudal remnants' and remove them from their 
positions of influence, with positive results in terms of 
improvements in production and workers' morale and 'their 
spirit of being masters of the enterprise. ' 206 The manager 
of the Yi Chang Cigarette Factory, Chen Dong, admitted that 
the private management's initial worry 'that the movement 
might lead to a free-for-all among the workers' had been 
dispelled, as had fears of an adverse effect on 
production. 207
However, despite these two well-publicized examples, an 
investigation by the Guangzhou CCP Committee into the DRM in 
seven enterprises in early September confirmed that success in 
the movement was largely confined to the docks, while 
'progress was slow and confusion was prevalent' 208 
elsewhere. The Guangzhou Cement Works was reportedly still 
stuck at the study stage, while in other enterprises only a 
perfunctory struggle, or none at all, had taken place, and 
these enterprises had moved straight on to assessing workers 
for registration for labour insurance. It was also reported 
that mass mobilization had 'not [been] seriously taken up by 
the 1st [Guangzhou] Iron and Steel Works even after the 
discovery of the sabotage of production in the plant.' 209 
In the 3rd Iron and Steel Works, many of the workers were 
known to have had GMD connections, but
the leadership of the movement, although aware of
205 'The beneficial effects...', Current Background 128, 40.
206 Ibid., 40.
207 'Yi Chang Cigarette Factory provides illustration...',
Current Background 128, 41.
208 'Progress of democratic reform...', Current Background
128, 38.
209 Ibid., 38.
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the complicated situation relating to the political 
status of the men, resorted only to a very casual 
struggle, and proceeded immediately to the 
reorganization of the labor union, with the result 
that a former puppet officer was elected [as] 
representative of the workers. 210
The directors of these and the other enterprises 
investigated were called to a municipal Party Committee 
meeting to discuss the DRM, at which cadres were urged not to 
gloss over the difficulties involved in carrying through the 
reforms. Some of the specific criticisms made recall the 
complaints we heard in 1950 that administrative cadres were 
setting up FMCs in their enterprises in a purely formalistic 
way, because they had been told to do so rather than because 
they were committed to management democratization. During the 
DRM, as, one suspects, during many other campaigns, leading 
cadres in some enterprises merely went through the motions of 
struggle and eliminating feudal remnants, and were chiefly 
concerned with successfully completing this 'task' and 
returning quickly to normal operations. They did not consider 
it important actually to rid the enterprise of all 'feudal 
remnants', and were more concerned about the possible 
consequences of mass mobilization and the movement's adverse 
effect on production.
After the meeting a directive was issued recommending 
that administrative, Party, Youth League and union cadres 
'should be ideologically aroused into attaching importance to 
the democratic reform movement' 211, and that they should 
avoid the error of underestimating the enemy and 
overestimating themselves, 'leading to the hasty conclusion of 
the stage of struggle before the enemy has really been
210 Ibid., 38.
211 Ibid., 38.
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systematically knocked out.' 212 Most of the blame for the 
DRM's slow progress was said to be 'traceable to ideological 
deviations on the part of the leadership' 213, mainly 
bureaucratism, disunity and buck-passing.
Cadres were also warned against the 'highly erroneous 
attitude' of 'overcautiousness under the pretext of avoiding 
confusion, hesitation to mobilize the masses, and withholding 
of support for the workers' righteous demands [which would] 
result in detachment from the masses.' 214 'Avoiding 
confusion' usually meant restricting the scope and duration of 
the struggle to prevent the workers from going too far, and 
also to ensure the maintenance of production. This is a 
specific warning to cadres about the likely consequences of 
preventing workers from carrying out the sort of campaign they 
considered justified and necessary, and in the context of a 
meeting which was in effect a post-mortem on an unsuccessful 
phase of the reform movement, it indicates that cadres had in 
fact been hindering the movement in this way, resulting in 
'separation' from disillusioned workers.
It was repeatedly stressed to unconvinced enterprise 
leaders that the DRM would not damage production:
On the contrary, it will render a service to 
production. Even if it yields temporary ill effects 
on production, yet in the long run it will be all to 
the good. It [would] be an error to resist or give 
up democratic reform under the pretext of 
maintaining production. 215
212 Ibid., 38.
213 Ibid., 44.
214 'Democratic reform in state enterprises'. Current 
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Cadres were given examples of the effects the improvement in 
workers' morale would have on production, being told that 'in 
some factories democratic reform took up 20% of the working 
hours for a whole month. Yet production targets which had not 
been fulfilled in the past were overfulfilled on time.' 216 
In this way the movement's leadership attempted to shore up 
ideological commitment to democratic reform in enterprises 
with a demonstration of the practical benefits it would bring 
for all concerned.
All the available evidence on the conduct of the DRM in 
Guangzhou during 1951 indicates that in most enterprises, 
cadres held back from complete ideological and practical 
commitment to the movement, mainly because of fears that 
workers, if they were allowed free rein, would quickly expand 
the movement to include almost all those in positions of power 
in the enterprise, and also because of related worries about 
its likely effect on production. Given the prevalence of this 
attitude, workers' own enthusiasm for the movement tended to 
evaporate. 217 The DRM's lack of success is shown very 
starkly by reports on what amounted to a re-launch of the 
movement in large sections of the city's industry at the end 
of 1952. Only the docks and state enterprises were said to 
have successfully completed the reform, while workers in 
private enterprises were still either openly or covertly 
controlled by 'feudal remnants and reactionary forces' 218, 
and the gang-boss system of labour contracting was still in 
operation in the construction industry. In fact, workers' 
views on the necessary breadth of the movement were to some 
extent vindicated by developments in late 1951 and early 1952, 
when the Three- and Five-Anti movements which then overtook
216 Liu Zijiu, 'On the belated introduction...', Current 
Background 123, 9.
217 'DRM developed in 12 cities in south China', Current 
Background 128, 43.
218 Nanfang Ribao 1.12.52, 2, 'The work of democratic reform 
is now unfolding in a planned way'.
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the DRM were launched to remedy some of the very deficiencies 
in state organs, state and private enterprise management, and 
in the trade unions, which had hitherto impeded democratic 
reform.
The Three- and Five-Anti movements
The Three-Anti movement was launched towards the end of 
1951 to combat the problems of waste, corruption and 
bureaucratism in the state bureaucracy, including the 
administration of state-run enterprises and the official trade 
unions. The campaign was later extended to the private sector 
in the form of the Five-Anti movement, which was directed 
against the so-called 'five poisons' practised by some 
capitalists: bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, 
cheating on government contracts, and theft of secret state 
economic data. In Guangzhou, these two movements were in 
effect intended to solve the problems of bureaucratism and 
separation from the masses in both enterprise management and 
the trade unions, the extent of these problems having been 
revealed by the failure of the DRM to achieve its aims of 
management democratization in enterprises of all types and the 
establishment of workers as the 'masters of the enterprise'. 
But although both movements were apparently approaching their 
conclusion in Guangzhou by the end of June 1952 amid official 
praise for their 'great victories' 219 and 'brilliant 
results' 220, by October a 'thorough review of the 
achievements of the Three-Anti movement' 221 was underway in
219 Nan fang Ribao 15.6.52, '4th session of 4th Congress of 
People's Representatives of [all] Canton areas', in 
Current Background 187, 2.
220 Nanfang Ribao 15.6.52, 'Consolidate and develop the 
victories gained in the Five-Anti campaign', in Current 
Background 187, 5.
221 Tao Zhu, 'The present situation in Guangdong and our 
tasks and missions', Nanfang Ribao 28.10.52, in Current 
Background 226, 7.
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Guangzhou, while doubts were raised about the actual results 
of the Five-Anti campaign as well.
As cases of bureaucratism and corruption among basic- 
level trade union cadres were exposed during the course of the 
Three-Anti movement, the unions were warned that they would 
have to reform their own organizations, satisfying the workers 
as to their probity and financial rectitude, if they were to 
be able to lead workers against 'lawless capitalists' in the 
Five-Anti movement. 222 Unions were supposed to lead the 
Five-Anti movement 'at the action level' 223 in enterprises, 
and the movement is generally regarded as the high point of 
the influence of both workers and unions in private industry, 
establishing their rights over private management in what were 
subsequently known as 'state capitalist' enterprises. 
However, there was another side to the Five-Anti campaign: 
attacks on capitalists who had committed the 'five poisons' 
also revealed numerous cases of corruption of union cadres by 
these same capitalists. 224 So while the movement is, 
rightly, regarded as an overall victory for unions and workers 
over the remaining capitalist employers, it also served to 
reveal the depth of the problems in some union organizations 
up until 1952-3, with Guangzhou by all accounts one of the 
worst affected areas. 225
Uncertainty about the conduct and the results of the 
Five-Anti movement is evident even in the articles published 
in Guangzhou in June 1952 to applaud its achievements and 
anticipate its final victory. While not all commentators
222 See Gongren Ribao 16.12.51, 1; 20.2.52, 2; 9.4.52, 2.
223 Harper, 'Party and unions', 99.
224 See Gongren Ribao 29.2.52, 2; 5.4.52, 2;16.4.52, 2.
These examples, from Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou 
respectively, are just a few of the many cases reported 
in the paper during this period.
225 See Gongren Ribao 16.4.52, 2; 11.3.55, 1.
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would go so far as to say the movement had had a 'devastating 
effect' 226 on production and employment, there is general 
agreement that at its height 227 it did cause a number of 
enterprises to cease operations, and interfered with 
production in many others as workers' and union cadres' time 
was taken up with the movement, despite the slogan of 
'struggling and carrying on production at the same time. ' 228 
In terms strongly reminiscent of those used immediately after 
liberation, industrial and commercial workers were urged to 
unite with the 'educated and reformed' 229 capitalists in 
restoring and developing production and enlivening the 
economy, while capitalists were offered loans and tax 
concessions to assist those in difficulties. 230 Capitalists 
were also assured that 'the object of the "Five-Anti" was not 
to exterminate the capitalist class, but to purge the "five 
poisons" among law-breaking capitalist elements' 231.
A reminder to workers of the need to respect capitalists' 
property rights, right to manage, and right to hire and fire 
within the limits of the law 232 strengthens the impression 
that the authorities were anxious to curb a movement which was 
beginning to get out of hand. If we remember that as of the 
end of 1952, the DRM was reported to have had no effect in
226 Ong Shao-erh, Labor Problems in Communist China (to 
February 1953), 37.
227 Brugger, Democracy and organization, 116.
228 'Consolidate and develop the victories gained...', 
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private enterprises in Guangzhou, so that management 
democratization and workers' participation in the running of 
their enterprises cannot have made much progress in these 
plants since liberation three years before, it is easy to 
understand the strength of feeling among workers which must 
have been unleashed by this first genuinely successful mass 
mobilization of workers against capitalist employers. It was 
in fact the sort of reaction from workers which had been 
feared at the launch of the DRM, but which had not 
materialized as the movement stagnated with little mass 
involvement on the part of workers. Anti-capitalist feelings 
among workers during the Five-Anti movement seem to have 
reached a point where virtually no-one in an enterprise was 
prepared to act as an agent of the private management 'for 
fear of being considered to be serving the interests of the 
capitalists' 233. Workers had to be reminded that as long as 
capitalists ran their enterprises lawfully and in a way which 
benefitted the state and the people, 'serving such capitalists 
would not conflict with [their] desire to serve the 
people. ' 234
During 1952 the conduct and progress of the Three- and 
Five-anti campaigns in urban areas in Guangdong and the land 
reform movement in the countryside became caught up in a major 
rectification of the province's Party and government 
leadership. 235 In October of that year Tao Zhu (officially 
Fourth Secretary of the Party's south China sub-bureau, but 
actually de facto First Secretary of the Guangdong Party from 
this time on), assessed the progress of the various movements 
underway in the province, and concluded that although the 
unemployment resulting from the disruptive effects of the
233 '4th session of 4th Conference...', Current Background 
187, 7.
234 Ibid., 7.
235 For an account of these events, see Vogel, Canton Under 
Communism, 116-124.
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Five-Anti movement had been 'successfully tackled' 236, at 
least in the city of Guangzhou itself, it was still necessary 
to conduct a re-examination of the results of the Three-Anti 
movement and to reorganize the Party in the province.
Although the crisis which necessitated changes in the 
provincial Party leadership and that of the city of Guangzhou 
mainly centred on the issues of the slow progress of land 
reform and the conflicts between cadres native to Guangdong 
province and those from north China, criticisms of the old 
leadership put forward during the first half of 1953 show the 
effects on industry and on workers of the defects identified 
in Party leadership. He Wei, a newcomer to the province who 
had been First Secretary of the CCP in Guangzhou since the 
middle of 1952 and mayor of the city since December of that 
year 237, summed up these criticisms of the city's leadership 
since liberation in an article published in Guangzhou Ribao in 
April 1953. 238 In the article he identified the mistakes 
which had been made as basically constituting 'a rightist 
tendency' 239, and condemned the 'lack of humility, lack of 
democracy, patriarchal leadership, formalism, and all kinds 
and forms of bureaucratism in work style' 240 which had been 
exhibited by the leadership. He claimed that local conditions 
were poorly understood, bureaucratism was widespread, mass 
consciousness was 'still at a very low level', the political 
superiority of the masses had yet to be 'genuinely
236 Tao Zhu, 'The present situation in Guangdong and our 
tasks and missions', Nanfang Ribao 28.10.52, in Current 
Background 187, 7.
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established', and understanding of Party policy was 
'inadequate'. 241
Behind all these errors and deviations, He found an 
absence of any understanding of 'the mass viewpoint and the 
production viewpoint' 242, a failure to rely on the masses, 
and a strong tendency towards petty-bourgeois individualism on 
the part of the city's leadership. If we look at some of the 
more detailed comments made by He about the way in which 
cadres in enterprise leadership manifested these faults, we 
begin to see why institutions such as the FMC had often failed 
to go beyond a formalistic existence, why the DRM had 
stagnated in many enterprises, and why the Three-Anti 
movement, led by these same cadres, had been unable to achieve 
the aim of reforming their bureaucratist style of work.
In his report, He painted a picture of the sort of cadre 
who views any success in work as his own personal achievement, 
and who obeys high-level orders mechanically without regard 
for the actual situation in his enterprise and concentrates on 
pleasing his superiors.
He seldom bothers to see whether the work done is of 
any real good to the masses, or what the reactions 
of the masses are to the work. As a result, he 
cannot assume a democratic work-style, and can only 
proceed with his work and with his treatment of the 
masses in an attitude of bureaucratism and 
commandism. 243
He also criticised factory directors who hardly ever showed 
their faces on the shop floor, 'and even on the occasions they 
did pay visits, they just rushed through the place and failed
241 Ibid., 7.
242 Ibid., 7.
243 Ibid., 11.
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to solve concretely the problems which were present. ' 244 
Such a cadre, according to He,
does not serve the people honestly [or] do a good 
job of [running] the enterprises owned by the 
masses. Instead he is there as a 'bureaucrat', the 
'superior' of the masses, and he wants the cadres 
and masses to work for his personal honor and 
position. 245
In the light of the usual official denial that the difference 
in status between workers and leading cadres in an enterprise 
amounts to anything more than a simple division of labour, 
this charge that factory directors were acting like old-style 
bureaucrats and saw themselves as the workers' superiors was 
a particularly serious one.
Of course, He's highly critical account of the Guangzhou 
leadership posed the question of how such serious mistakes 
could go uncorrected for three whole years, especially as 
there had apparently been 'many complaints from the 
workers.' 246 He admitted that the city's leadership (in 
which he included himself) had 'made a mess of the good 
tasks' 247 entrusted to them by the Party and by the people, 
and that bureaucratism was serious 'in the leadership of all 
levels in the Party, administrative, labor and mass organs of 
Canton city. Also universal and serious are the phenomena of 
commandism and the abuse of the lower ranks.' 248 Coupled 
with a 'lack of interest in the sufferings of the
244 Ibid., 10.
245 Ibid., 11.
246 Ibid., 10.
247 Ibid., 10.
248 Ibid., 10.
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masses' 249, how could such conduct have persisted for so 
long?
He characterized the situation in the municipal Party 
Committee as 'very abnormal', with an 'atmosphere of a lack of 
principles' and a tendency towards complacency, where many 
cadres 'not only fear[ed] criticism and self-criticism, but 
even suppress[ed] democracy and suppress[ed] criticism' 25°, 
allowing them to continue in their old ways. This accusation 
is supported by other press accounts at this time which 
revealed that the leadership's critics, including reporters on 
the Nan fang Ribao, had been intimidated into silence. 
Reprisals against reporters were said to have been common, 
with those attempting to expose defects in leadership work 
labelled as 'unorganized and undisciplined', forced to make 
self-criticisms, and accused of having 'political problems' 
and even of plotting to overthrow the Party. 251 Reporters 
were urged to have the courage to expose this sort of conduct 
in future, and assured of the leadership's support if they did 
so. 252 He ended his report with a reminder of the vital 
importance to democratic life of criticism and self-criticism, 
'particularly from the lower ranks leading up to the higher 
ranks.' 253
He's harsh verdict on the achievements of the Guangzhou 
city leadership since liberation was accompanied by a re- 
evaluation of both the Three- and Five-Anti movements. He 
remarked that in industrial and commercial work there had been
249 Ibid., 10.
250 Ibid., 13.
251 Nanfang Ribao 13.2.53, 1.
252 Ibid., 1.
253 'Experiences and lessons ...', Guangzhou Ribao 21.4.53, 
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no adequate struggle against certain law-violating 
capitalists, and there was accommodation and 
concession to a great degree* Accordingly, certain 
commercial capitalists in Canton still did not 
assume an honest attitude even after the Five-Anti 
movement, and this produced bad influences on other 
areas. 254
The Nan fang Ribao reported in November 1953 that the 'five 
poisons' were still being committed by some capitalists, and 
problems with corruption of union cadres by capitalists also 
seem to have persisted. A survey of union cadres on a 
training course in Guangzhou more than a year later found that 
almost hinety per cejii of them admitted having assisted 
capitalist employers in cheating the state in various ways, or 
having known about such conduct without doing anything about 
it. 255
The original verdict on the success of the Three-Anti 
movement was also revised considerably. In June 1952 it had 
been announced that in the course of the movement,
loopholes of corruption and waste in [official] 
organs had been stopped, bureaucratic errors had 
been overcome, working efficiency had been 
heightened, and a simple, austere, self-effacing, 
and public-minded style of work that truly serves 
the people [had been established]. 256
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But He's catalogue of leadership errors and deviations made it 
clear that little if any of this was true. Early in 1952 it 
was admitted that bureaucratism and commandism were still 
serious in many organs, and were alienating the masses; some 
cadres referred to the Three-Anti as vonly the "Two and a half 
Anti" or the "Two Anti", or even the "One Anti" - only 
opposing corruption'. 257 Consequently a twelve-day meeting 
to re-examine the results of the movement took place in March 
and April of 1953. After what was reportedly some 'very 
spirited' 256 debate, it was announced that the meeting had 
'laid down a good beginning for the future development of the 
struggle against bureaucratism, commandism, and violations of 
law and discipline' 259, a statement which comes very close 
to admitting that the original Three- Anti movement, which had 
after all been intended to tackle precisely these problems, 
had failed completely.
The first half of 1953 saw an anti-bureaucratism campaign 
which was in effect an extension of the Three-Anti movement, 
as well as the final completion in Guangzhou's private 
industrial sector of the long-postponed DRM. 260 Yet the 
emphasis during this period was not on management 
democratization and the promotion of workers' participation in 
management, the original aims of both of these movements; the 
anti-bureaucratism campaign was aimed at the Party and state 
bureaucracy rather than basic-level cadres in 
enterprises. 261 Within enterprises, a strong emphasis on
257 Nanfang Ribao 13.2.53, 3.
258 Guangzhou Ribao. 21.4.53, Canton leadership for past
three years reviewed in meeting of senior cadres, in 
Current Background 253, 30.7.53, 3.
259 Ibid., 3.
260 Nanfang Ribao 27.8.53, 2, 'Democratic reform in
Guangzhou's private enterprises reaches victorious 
conclusion'.
261 Nanfang Ribao 11.2.53, 1.
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discipline and a shift in workers' activism from politics to 
production became evident. 262 Workers were constantly 
reminded of their responsibilities in production, and were 
warned that violations of discipline were incompatible with 
their status as 'masters of the enterprise'. 263
This tendency was reinforced by the effects of the 
Seventh ACFTU Congress held in May 1953, at which unions were 
criticized for having paid far too much attention to welfare 
and to supporting workers' 'excessive' demands in the past, at 
the expense of their duties in production. All unions were 
now reminded that production was their central task, even in 
private enterprises, where it was not for the sole benefit of 
capitalists and their profits, but was vital to the national 
economy and to workers' own long-term interests. 264 
Although only a few months earlier the persistence of 
bureaucratism in the unions had still appeared to be a cause 
for concern, with the absence of democratic life within them 
and the failure to hold elections and to report back to the 
WRC specifically mentioned 265, workers' continued 
dissatisfaction with their unions seems subsequently to have 
been put to one side as all attention was directed towards 
production.
The criticism of unions at the Seventh Congress was of 
course aimed at the economist and syndicalist tendencies which 
some of them had displayed during 1951. But time had not 
stood still for the unions since then, and we must also
262 Nanfang Ribao 3.2.53, 2; 27.8.53, 2; 28.8.53, 5.
263 Nanfang Ribao 28.8.53, 5, 'The masters' ideology of the 
working class'.
264 Nanfang Ribao 31.5.53, 1, 'Guangzhou's representatives to 
the 7th National Representative Congress of Chinese Trade 
Unions pass on the Congress's decisions to Guangzhou's 
working masses'. See also 25.4.53, 1 and 2, and 19.5.53, 
2, for similar comments on union work and production.
265 Nanfang Ribao 27.2.53, 1.
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consider what impact the criticism was intended to have in the 
light of other events, such as unions' activities during the 
Five-Anti campaign. It seems likely that the down-playing of 
unions' political activities in favour of their central task 
of production was also a measure designed to bring to a 
decisive end the struggle of workers and unions against 
capitalists in private enterprises, a struggle which, as we 
saw, had at times threatened to escalate out of control and 
which in some cases adversely affected production. It was now 
firmly denied that workers in private enterprises were 'only 
half masters' 266, and they were discouraged from further 
attempts to enlarge their power within the enterprise.
Although it is true that the Five-Anti movement 'was 
designed to increase the power and participation of workers in 
management' 267, this increase in participation was not 
promoted purely for its own sake, or even primarily as a 
response to workers' demands; had this been the case, one 
would have expected to see a further expansion of 
participation once enterprises were taken into state ownership 
in 1955-56, whereas in fact the role of workers and unions in 
management was curtailed once enterprises were nationalized or 
socialized. More will be said about this in the next section. 
The involvement of workers and the leadership of the Five-Anti 
campaign by unions in enterprises should be seen in the 
context of general Party policy towards industry. While the 
influence exercised by workers and unions definitely increased 
as a result of the campaign, 'the primary purpose of the 
mobilization of workers into management in private enterprises 
by unions was for the ultimate nationalization of the 
economy.' 268 After nationalization, production would be
266 Nanfang Ribao 28.8.53, 5, 'The masters' ideology of the
working class'.
267 Stephen Andors, China's Industrial Revolution: Politics,
planning and management, 1949 to the present, 52.
268 Lee Lai To, Trade Unions in China. 1949-. 99.
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their central task and great emphasis would be placed on 
discipline and obedience to Party and administrative 
leadership, as was already the case in state enterprises.
In 1954 a Remain Ribao article on labour discipline set 
out the new line, advocating enforceable rules and regulations 
as a guarantee of order and discipline in the enterprise 
(rather than relying on education and group pressure), 
something which had hitherto been regarded as the 'working 
style of warlords'. 269 It was now claimed that ' "what 
threatens the normal progress of production and affects the 
labour activism of the masses is not that discipline is too 
strict but that it is too slack."' 270 Along with this 
renewed emphasis on obedience rather than activism, 'the 
growth of a planning system restricted [workers'] 
participation to matters of detail' 271, while there was a 
growing tendency for management 'to take increased production 
as the sole success indicator' 272, subordinating issues of 
democracy and participation to the goal of fulfilling state 
production plans.
From 1953, the first year of the PRC's First Five-Year 
Plan, until about the middle of 1956, there was a strong 
emphasis on centralized national planning in industry and on 
the Soviet system of one-man management, a strictly 
hierarchical system of management with the enterprise director 
at its apex. Although this system was never introduced in all 
sectors or in all areas of the country 273, and was
269 Remain Ribao 6.6.54, quoted in Brugger, Democracy and 
organization, 117.
270 Ibid., 118.
271 Ibid., 137.
272 Ibid., 138.
273 See the discussion in Peter Nan-shong Lee, Industrial 
management and economic reform in China, 1949~1984, 29-
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officially repudiated and replaced in 1956 with the factory 
director responsibility system under the leadership of the 
enterprise Party committee, its appearance in China at this 
time was in keeping with the changed emphasis in enterprise 
management. In this period, '[t]he management-worker split 
grew wider from the control system and the realities of 
decision-making. ' 274
The new atmosphere also affected the work of the official 
trade unions: Brugger notes 'an increasing tendency to relate 
everything to matters of production' 275 in union work as 
well as in management. The unions' role was reduced to that 
of a one-way transmission belt, passing on production plans 
and the instructions of management to the workers but not 
carrying any feedback in the opposite direction. Structures 
for workers' participation such as the FMC and WRC, which as 
we have seen were of limited effectiveness even when initially 
introduced, also declined further under the new system, with 
the tendency to use the WRC 'to instruct workers' 276 
reinforced by one-man management, and the role of the FMC much 
reduced. Brugger finds few mentions of the existence of FMCs 
after the end of the Three- and Five-Anti movements, and 
concludes that 'their very existence could not be reconciled 
with one-man management forms of organization.' 277 The new 
emphasis on labour discipline and production seems to have 
been successful in bringing about a temporary suspension of 
the conflict between workers and the Party which had been 
unfolding since liberation.
274 Andors, China's industrial revolution. 57.
275 Brugger, Democracy and organization, 247.
276 Lee Lai To, The structure of the trade union system in 
China, 1949-66, 30.
277 Brugger, Democracy and organization. 249-50.
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Conclusions
If we trace the outlines of this first confrontation 
between workers and the CCP, we find that it had its roots in 
the moderate policy for the takeover of industry in later 
liberated cities such as Guangzhou, which conflicted with 
workers' expectations that after liberation, their theoretical 
position as 'masters of the enterprise' would soon become a 
reality in the enterprise, as institutions for democratic 
management were established and new trade unions were 
organized which were to be run by the workers themselves. But 
the Party enforced the policy of 'maintaining the status guo' 
in the enterprises it took over, rather than allowing workers 
to take over management themselves, and reacted to what it 
considered to be ultraleftism or 'extreme democratization' on 
the part of workers immediately after liberation, in some 
cases supported by unions, by imposing a policy which 
subordinated workers' demands to the imperatives of economic 
recovery and stability. The CCP insisted that there was no 
need for a mass movement to reform enterprise management in 
the direction of greater democracy and participation by 
workers, in direct contradiction to many workers' own demands. 
A combination of Party pressure and the unions' own weaknesses 
(the lack of strong links with their members and a clear
understanding of their proper stance under a socialist
government), led them to adopt the attitude of always siding 
with the administration against workers' demands in both state 
and private enterprises.
Workers' criticism and protests against this state of 
affairs mounted through the spring of 1950, prompting a union 
rectification movement during the second half of the year and 
a renewed emphasis on management democratization, which, it 
was admitted, had made little progress since liberation.
Subsequent developments, including the Democratic Reform 
Movement and the Three- and Five-Anti movements, can be 
understood as attempts by the Party to make the radical
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democratic reforms of enterprise management which it felt were 
necessary, but without conceding all of workers' demands or 
unleashing any mass movement in industrial enterprises which 
might lead workers to renew their collective efforts for 
'extreme democratization'. From the beginning of 1951, 
workers had more support in the enterprise from the unions, 
who were later criticized for their economist and syndicalist 
tendencies during this period, but union organizations were 
still plagued with the same problems of bureaucratism and the 
lack of internal democracy which had marked them from the 
beginning, so the real value of this new union line to workers 
in their attempts to assert their rights in the enterprise is 
doubtful.
The Democratic Reform Movement achieved its aims in only 
a few industrial sectors during 1951, generally foundering on 
enterprise leaderships' reluctance to mobilize workers for 
fear that they might widen the scope of the movement to 
include technical and managerial authorities in the enterprise 
as well as ' feudal remnants'. The stagnation of the movement 
left workers disillusioned about the prospects of a genuinely 
powerful role for them in enterprise management, but the 
Three- and Five-Anti movements were somewhat more successful 
in tackling the attitudes among cadres which had so far 
hindered the progress of democratization. In the Five-Anti 
movement in particular, workers were finally mobilized against 
the numerous capitalist employers who had remained in business 
after liberation, and who had benefitted from earlier, 
moderate policies towards capital which had apparently placed 
few restrictions on their ability to hire and fire workers and 
run enterprises as they pleased. During the movement, workers 
were able to establish their right to supervise private 
management, but their activities were curtailed as the 
campaign threatened to get out of hand, and both workers and 
unions were subsequently brought back under tight control in 
private as in state enterprises, with a strong emphasis on 
discipline and production as the country strengthened central
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planning mechanisms and prepared for its First Five-Year Plan.
By mid-1953, then, workers1 original demands for the 
concrete establishment of their theoretical position as 
masters of the enterprise had been met only partly in the 
remaining private enterprises, where production was still 
declared the main task of both unions and workers, with 
political considerations, such as the improvement of the 
rather weak mechanisms for democratic consultation of workers 
by management, taking second place. In state enterprises, 
workers' position was little better, and may even have been 
worse, since management there was appointed by the state which 
in turn was led by the working class, making a strong role for 
workers and their union representatives in management appear 
redundant. The nationalization of the remaining private 
enterprises in Guangzhou during 1956 brought this problem home 
to large numbers of workers, who found themselves at an 
unexpected disadvantage under state or joint state-private 
management with regard to participation in management as well 
as wages and conditions.
Workers' response to the thwarting of their aspirations 
to run their own enterprises in this early period does not 
seem to have extended to organizing themselves in opposition 
to management or the Party, but judging from press accounts 
and official reports, it did include often harsh criticism of 
leading cadres which could not safely be ignored. Workers' 
alienation from enterprise leadership is frequently mentioned, 
and there are references to strikes, although these are blamed 
on agitation by '‘feudal remnants'. However, this first 
confrontation between workers and the Party left a legacy of 
dissatisfaction among workers and unresolved problems 
regarding the implementation of democratic management which 
would also form the basis of the second major confrontation in 
1956-7.
It might be argued that some degree of conflict in the
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years immediately following liberation was inevitable, as 
workers, unions, enterprise management and the Party explored 
the limits of their respective roles under the new regime and 
reached some sort of modus vivendi in the enterprise. The 
ambiguities of the official trade unions' role, in particular, 
would mean that they could not be expected to make a smooth, 
swift transition to a means of operation which would be 
equally acceptable to them, to their members, and to their 
Party superiors. But once the various movements for 
democratization launched by the Party had been carried 
through, even if they did not go as far as some workers would 
have wished, conflict could be minimized and the attention of 
all parties turned towards the tasks of modernization and 
industrialization.
But conflict between workers and the Party not only broke 
out again a few years later, as the First Five-Year Plan 
neared its end, but did so in a way which bore striking 
similarities to this early period of confrontation. Once 
again in 1956-7, unions' failure to protect workers' rights 
and interests and dissatisfaction with severely limited 
management democratization provoked protests among workers to 
which the authorities had to respond. But on this occasion 
workers did not stop at criticizing union, administrative and 
Party cadres for their attitudes, but bypassed the official 
unions and organized themselves to force concessions from 
enterprise authorities. There was even talk of organizing 
fully independent trade unions. And once again, unions were 
forced by workers' criticism and rejection of them to switch 
from acting on behalf of management in controlling workers, to 
siding with workers and attempting to gain more autonomy for 
themselves from the Party, resulting in accusations of 
economism and syndicalism, rectification campaigns, and a 
purge of union leadership. There are also parallels in the 
Party's reaction to workers' protests during this second 
confrontation, as moves to accommodate workers' demands and 
accept their criticisms resulted in a further escalation of
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those protests/ and eventually necessitated a crackdown by the 
Party when the challenge to its authority was perceived to 
have gone beyond what could be tolerated. In the next section 
we will see how workers' criticisms of unions, the Party and 
the administration in 1956-7 closely mirrored those made in 
the first few years after liberation, pointing to serious and 
possibly irresolvable problems in the relationship between 
workers and the Party.
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SECTION TWO
CONTRADICTIONS AMONG THE PEOPLE
There are clear similarities between the first major 
confrontation between workers and the CCP and the second, 
which developed during 1956 and 1957. As we saw at the end of 
the last section, the post-liberation conflict developed as 
workers' demands that they should genuinely act as the masters 
of democratically-managed enterprises clashed with the Party's 
fears of 'extreme democratization'. This conflict was shelved 
in 1953, in favour of renewed concentration on the development 
of industrial production, but was not resolved. Although 
workers and unions in private enterprises were able to 
exercise some influence over management after the Five-Anti 
movement, once those enterprises were taken into state or 
joint state-private ownership at the beginning of 1956 they 
found themselves in the same situation as workers in older 
state enterprises. Institutions for democratic management 
such as the FMC and WRC had long since lost what little 
influence they had, and the official unions were unsure of 
their role vis-A-vis the state administration and reluctant to 
challenge it even when its actions seemed to infringe upon 
workers' interests, leaving workers no legitimate means of 
protecting their interests and exerting influence over the 
running of the enterprise. The main underlying conflict in 
workers' relationship with the CCP thus remained in existence.
Elements common to both confrontations include weak, 
demoralized and undemocratic trade unions which were 
constantly criticized and finally rejected by their members, 
participatory institutions for workers which ultimately 
depended on the goodwill and cooperation of management for
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their efficacy, and a tendency on the part of the CCP to point 
to deficiencies in the implementation of policies rather than 
the nature of the policies themselves as the root cause of 
mounting discontent among workers. The Party's response to 
criticism of undemocratic management during 1956, the 
promotion of the workers' congress (zhigong daibiao dahui), 
marks a similar shift in policy to the one we saw in 1950, as 
it was acknowledged that workers' protests that enterprise 
leadership had moved too far in the direction of discipline 
and control had some basis in fact, and the pendulum swung 
back towards democracy and participation in management.
This second confrontation, however, seems to have 
revealed a more serious division between workers and the CCP 
and to have been more difficult to keep under any sort of 
control than the first. There are a number of reasons for 
this, not least the fact that this was the second time that 
workers had been roused to protest at the leadership's 
treatment of them, and having been unsuccessful in their first 
challenge to Party policy, they were now inclined to go 
further in their protests and to take more direct action in 
pressing their demands to avoid a similarly unsatisfactory 
outcome this time. Added to this, it was now seven years 
since liberation, and workers were much less inclined to be 
patient and to trust the Party's assurances that all the 
sacrifices made now were necessary to guarantee future 
prosperity. It is also probable that the Party, whose own 
cadres enjoyed certain very visible privileges over the 
workers they controlled (favourable treatment in housing 
allocation, for example), was starting to lose the moral 
authority to demand frugality and self-reliance from workers. 
A change in attitude along these lines is clearly discernible 
in some of the letters from workers published in the Guangzhou 
Ribao between April and June 1957 during the debate on Wang 
Cai's ideas, about which more will be said later. 1
1 See for example Guangzhou Ribao 13.4.57, 19.5.57.
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A number of other political, social and economic factors 
combined to make the years 1956 and 1957 a watershed for 
Chinese workers, and helped to precipitate the second 
confrontation. Prior to the nationalization of the remaining 
private enterprises in January 1956, the CCP whipped up 
enthusiasm for the change with a strong emphasis on the 
material benefits it would bring for workers in terms of wages 
and welfare provision, raising expectations which were 
subsequently ignored in a drive for increased production. The 
forced pace of industrialization in 1956, the penultimate year 
of the First Five-Year Plan, to some Soviet sinologists 
'stands out ... for policies inimical to the interests of 
workers' 2, as 'the call for efficiency and productivity 
tended to intensify industrial work, ... placing additional 
strains on industrial workers'. 3 Given these priorities,
workers' welfare and even safety tended to be ignored, as we
democracy which occurred once private enterprises were taken 
over, this created a mood of bitterness and disillusionment 
among workers which fuelled increasingly frequent bouts of 
industrial unrest.
The conduct and results of the comprehensive national 
wage reform programme carried out between April and October 
1956 further worsened relations in the enterprise, and the 
whole direction of wage and other policies, with their 
emphasis on piece-work, frequent raising of norms, and 
material incentives as a spur to productivity, contributed to 
a change in many workers' attitudes towards enterprise 
leadership and towards their own labour. The most striking 
thing which emerges from newspaper articles, and particularly 
from workers' letters to the press, at this time is the extent 
to which workers seem to have regarded the leadership of their
2 See Gilbert Rozman, A mirror for socialism - Soviet 
criticisms of China, 113.
3 Peter Nan-shong Lee, Industrial management and economic 
reform in China, 1949-1984, 40.
shall see. Coupled with the further weakening of enterprise
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enterprises as adversaries, and to have adopted the methods of 
the withdrawal or selective application of their labour to 
gain concessions and the reversal of unacceptable decisions. 4 
It was frequently argued by workers that unless they took this 
sort of action their views and demands would continue to be 
ignored by the leadership and problems would go unsolved, and 
many even recommended creating disturbances (chaonao) as the 
only effective means of influencing enterprise authorities, 
claiming that workers had to stand up for themselves in this 
way against leaders who 'bullied the good, but feared the 
bad.' 5 It should be noted that workers never mentioned the 
official unions in this context, having already come to the 
conclusion that they were useless in the event of a dispute 
with the enterprise leadership.
Some workers also adopted the slogan of 'work according 
to payment' (an chou fu lao, a pun on Marx's 'to each 
according to his work', or an lao fu chou; payment according 
to work was the cardinal principle of the 1956 wage reform). 
This meant that they refused to do work of a higher grade than 
that to which they had been assigned during wage reform, or 
refused to work overtime. Many of the workers who advocated 
these tactics admitted that they really belonged to the 
capitalist era of wage relations 6 and were not suited to 
workers' role as masters of the enterprise under socialism, 
but they nevertheless defended them as necessary given the 
bureaucratist and undemocratic nature of many enterprise 
leaderships. This comes very close to accusing these leaders 
of behaving like the capitalist employers of the old society, 
showing the seriousness of the split which was developing 
between leaders and led in the industrial sphere.
4 See for example Guangzhou Ribao 10.5.57, 2, and 24.5.57, 2;
Nanfang Ribao 19.5.57, 1; Gongren Ribao 25.4.57, 1, and
30.4.57, 2.
5 Guangzhou Ribao 19.5.57, 2; 21.5.57, 2.
6 Guangzhou Ribao 3.5.57, 2; 8.5.57, 2.
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The movement to 'let a hundred flowers bloom, and a 
hundred schools of thought contend' had little effect when 
first launched by Mao in May 1956, as few responded to his 
invitation to speak out freely, but it gained momentum the 
following spring after his February 27 speech, v0n the correct 
handling of contradictions among the people'. Contradictions 
within the ranks of the people, rather than between the people 
and its enemies, were identified as the main source of 
conflict in Chinese society now that acute, mass class 
struggle had basically come to an end, and these non- 
antagonistic contradictions were to be resolved by peaceful 
methods such as debate and criticism and self-criticism. 
After the launching of a Party rectification movement in March 
1957, particular importance was attached to criticism of the 
higher levels by the grassroots.
It is not usually emphasized that Mao's report on 
contradictions within the people was prompted at least as much 
by the industrial unrest of 1956 and early 1957 as by 
intellectual agitation and discontent among the peasantry. 
However, given the seriousness of the conflict between workers 
and their leaders as outlined above, it should not surprise us 
that this was a major cause of concern. Frangois Gipouloux 
has pointed out that Mao's report contains frequent references 
to 'various trade union reports' 7 and quotes workers' angry 
criticism of administrative cadres as contained in an internal 
ACFTU report. One particular remark noted in the ACFTU report 
and quoted by Mao must have set alarm bells ringing among the 
Chinese leaderships some workers had apparently expressed the 
opinion that in their disputes with the enterprise 
administration, 'if you don't learn from Hungary, you won't 
get anything.' 8
The possibility that the sort of popular protest and
7 Ibid., 191.
8 Zhongguo Gongyun 2, 1957, quoted in Gipouloux, 191.
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revolt which had occurred in Poland and Hungary during 1956 
might be repeated in China was something which the Chinese 
leadership took extremely seriously; they had, after all, just 
experienced a wave of industrial unrest at the enterprise 
level during 1956. Knowledge of the events in Eastern Europe 
was undoubtedly a further motive for the policy of (limited) 
liberalization and democratization and increased scope for 
criticism of the Party which took shape during 1956 and the 
first half of 1957, particularly as it related to workers. It 
is interesting to note also that at least some workers were 
themselves aware of the events elsewhere in the socialist camp 
and were keen to adopt the same methods as their East European 
counterparts: the comment about learning from Hungary is a 
further example of the sort of attitude we found expressed by 
Guangzhou's workers earlier, namely that unless workers 
caused trouble and stood up for themselves against the 
leadership, they would continue to be ignored.
Articles in the Chinese press on the Hungarian Incident, 
in particular, show Chinese awareness of the similarities 
between the conditions which had given rise to the rebellion 
in Hungary and those created during the course of the First 
Five-Year Plan in China. It was noted that in Hungary,
some Party leaders in their work failed
conscientiously to rely on the masses and mobilize 
the masses, and did not have sufficient concern for 
the masses, ... with regard to improving the 
people's livelihood, they did not adopt effective 
measures; workers' real wages increased very little 
... [These mistakes] greatly damaged links between 
the Party and the masses, restricted the people's 
democratic rights and hindered improvements in their 
standard of living. 9
9 Yi Han, 'How to understand the Hungarian Incident', 
Zhongguo Gongren 22, November 1956, 8.
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This is very similar to Chinese accounts of how the 
institutions of democratic management had over the years 
degenerated into formalism, as the leadership became 
complacent and 'did not care about the masses, did not respect 
the masses' opinions, did not solve difficulties which could 
have been solved...' 10, leading workers to become 
'sceptical, negative, disappointed, and even 
dissatisfied.' 11 It also reflects the same problems in the 
relationship between workers and their leaders which gave rise 
to the first confrontation in China after liberation.
It is interesting that, while condemning the 
'counterrevolutionary elements' who took advantage of it to 
launch their attempt to overthrow the socialist government, 
the author of this article on Hungary regards the original 
mass demonstration in Budapest as 'just' in its intention 'to 
demand that the Party and government strengthen and broaden 
democracy and further improve livelihoods'. 12 This
reflects the official view in China during the Hundred Flowers 
period that valid criticism of the leadership by the led not 
only should not be suppressed, but should be welcomed as an 
aid to improving workstyle. Similarly, if people had to 
resort to the methods of strikes and demonstrations to make 
their views known, this was a sign not of incipient 
counterrevolution (although opportunists might seek to push it 
in that direction), but of a failure on the part of the 
leadership to observe the usual principles of democratic life 
and criticism and self-criticism which ought to be corrected.
As an alternative to intensified repression of unrest, 
which might only lead to a more devastating explosion in the
10 Li Chun, 'Why democracy must be broadened in enterprise 
management', Zhongguo Gongren 6, March 1957, 3.
11 Ibid., 4.
12 'How to understand the Hungarian Incident', Zhongguo 
Gongren 22, November 1956, 8.
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long run, Chinese leaders saw an opportunity to establish, or 
re-establish, institutions for democratic participation which 
they hoped would provide a relatively safe outlet for the 
discontent which had built up among workers. If the workers' 
congress could be made to operate in such a way as to satisfy 
workers' desire for greater participation in management and 
more control over their working lives, workers would be far 
less likely either to set up their own independent 
organizations outside Party control or to link up with 
discontented groups beyond their own enterprises in larger- 
scale collective action, both of which the Chinese leadership, 
with the examples of Poland and Hungary before them, were 
anxious to prevent.
If we look specifically at the diagnoses of the root 
cause of the unrest and at the preferred solutions put forward 
by the ruling parties in Poland and Hungary with regard to 
workers, the parallels with the Chinese situation are even 
more striking. The Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), 
committing itself to democratization in response to the 
unrest, declared that
a decisive part ... must be played by widening the 
workers' democracy, by increasing the direct 
participation of workers in the management of 
enterprises, [and] by increasing the part played by 
the working masses in governing all sectors of the 
country's life. 13
Calls for workplace democratization and increased worker 
participation in management featured in many statements by the
13 Trybuna Ludu, 24.10.56, 'Letter from the First Secretary of 
the PUWP, Gomulka, to the workers and youth, October 23, 
1956', in Paul Zinner, National communism and popular 
revolt in Eastern Europe - a selection of documents on 
events in Poland and Hungary, February-November, 1956, 266. 
Similar statements by Gomulka appear in other documents in 
this collection, for example 272-3, 285.
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ACFTU Chair Lai Ruoyu during 1956 and 1957, and his proposals 
for the system of workers' congresses were broadly accepted by 
the Chinese leadership. The Hungarian Workers' Party took a 
similar line, noting that
The social activity of the working class and the 
working masses has increased significantly in the 
past few months ... The interest of the workers has 
increased in the affairs of the enterprises, public 
life, and international events. 14
It was also evident that Hungarian trade unions had been 
suffering from the same problems of lack of authority and 
respect in the enterprise, and from workers' lack of 
confidence in their own mass organizations, as had their 
Chinese counterparts: 'the belittling of the trade unions and 
trade union work ... quite frequently observable' 15 in 
Hungary also loomed large in the trade union press in China 
throughout 1956 and the first half of 1957. And just as in 
China there were calls for the reinvigoration of the 
enterprise trade union role as the standing organ of the 
workers' congress, and thus a vital component in the structure 
of democratic management, in Hungary it was asserted that
Growing democracy in the factories and places of 
work requires the inclusion of trade union organs in 
discussions on problems of management and economic 
organization to a much greater extent than 
before. 16
14 Szabad Nep, 23.5.56, 'With Party unity for a socialist
democracy - Resolution adopted by the Central Committee of
the Hungarian Workers Party, July 18-21, 1956', in ibid., 
352.
15 Ibid., 366.
16 Ibid., 366-7.
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Given the example of the events in Hungary, and in 
particular of the widespread formation there of workers' 
councils to run enterprises, which the Central Council of 
Trade Unions hailed as '[the completion of] the process of 
taking over factories as the property of the people' 17, the 
weakness of the official trade unions in China combined with 
the growing assertiveness of many workers was a special cause 
of concern. The trade union press of 1956 abounds with 
incidents in which individual workers with grievances found 
their enterprise trade union either unwilling (at the higher 
level) or unable (at the lower level) to help them resolve 
their difficulties, and so went over the heads of the trade 
union directly to leading administrative cadres, whereupon the 
problem was solved on the spot. 18 This growing tendency to 
bypass the trade union took on a new dimension as the 
industrial unrest of 1956 gained momentum. The official 
unions, as we have already mentioned, played no role in these 
disputes.
The first decision of the strikers ... was to do 
without the trade union and to elect their own 
representatives. The workers won when they 
addressed themselves directly to the political 
authorities to assert their rights, going over the 
heads of their inconsistent intermediaries. 19
The same phenomenon was observed in 1957, when Li Xiuren, the 
deputy head of the ACFTU General Office, said that all the 
labour disputes which had come to his attention on his '8,000
17 Presidium of the National Council of Trade Unions, 'Appeal 
by the Central Council of Trade Unions on the elections of 
workers' councils, October 27, 1956' in ibid., 422.
18 See in particular the series of articles in Zhongguo 
Gongren 15, 18-22 and 24 (August-December 1956), under the 
general title 'How can trade union activists do a good job 
in the trade union work they've taken upon themselves?'
19 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs A L'Usine, 210.
128
li tour' along the Beijing-Wuhan-Guangzhou railway line 'had 
one thing in common: trade unions were cast aside.' 20 The 
ACFTU head Lai Ruoyu similarly acknowledged that 'if a trade 
union is estranged from the masses, when they make trouble, 
they [will] abandon their trade union and form another 
organization of their own.' 21
With this sort of self-organization by workers becoming 
such a common feature of conflict in Chinese enterprises, 
there arose the possibility that it might go beyond the 
formation of ad hoc strike committees and delegations to 
higher-level organs and extend to the organizing of 
independent trade unions. Indeed, it was revealed after the 
launch of the anti-rightist campaign that 'some people [had] 
even proposed the organization of so-called "free trade 
unions"' 22, while an ACFTU official, Gao Tuan, reminded 
workers and union cadres alike that workers had the right 
under the Trade Union Law to organize their own unions outside 
ACFTU auspices if they wished; he was severely criticized for 
this and other views during the anti-rightist campaign in the 
second half of 1957. 23
The reasons why there was in fact no widespread formation 
of independent unions in China at this time will be discussed 
later. For the present, we should note that self-organization 
by workers in this period went much further and was a cause of 
much greater concern to the authorities than was the case 
during the first confrontation. With these informal and 
generally short-lived forms of organization proliferating at
20 'On an 8,000 li tour of hurried observation', Remain Ribao,
9.5.57, in SCMP 1551, 17.6.57, 10.
21 Gongren Ribao, 9.5.57, 'How contradictions within the ranks 
of the people are handled by the trade unions', in SCMP 
1535, 22.5.57, 9.
22 'Rightist elements' secret plot to usurp the trade unions', 
Zhongguo Gongren 16, August 1957, 3.
23 See Gongren Ribao 22.10.57, 1; 12.11.57, 3; 19.11.57, 2.
129
the enterprise level, proposals for fully independent unions 
were made, and the attempts to attribute these proposals to 
unspecified rightists who were trying 'to usurp the leadership 
of the trade unions' 24 from the Party fit in with the 
general pattern of the anti-rightist campaign, in which a 
concerted effort was made to dissociate ordinary workers from 
the unrest of the preceding months and to channel their 
discontent into criticism of 'rightist' engineers and 
technicians in the enterprise and intellectuals in general. 
This should not distract us from the fact that 'workers' 
statements reached, in June 1957, an explosive degree of 
radicalism' 25 which conceded nothing to the most radical of 
the student protests of the Hundred Flowers era. The 
'authentically political character' 26 of the action taken by 
workers in support of their demands should also be recognized; 
more will be said about this later.
Finally, the significance of the industrial unrest which 
unfolded during these two years should not be underestimated. 
The Hundred Flowers movement is commonly portrayed as a 
movement for liberalization and democratization involving 
students, intellectuals and the small democratic parties 
remaining in existence after 1949; if the involvement of 
workers is mentioned at all, it is in connection with 
officially orchestrated worker criticism of intellectuals 
after the launch of the anti-rightist movement. 27 But as we 
have already seen, growing discontent and protest among 
workers actually preceded the launch of the movement, and was 
a major factor influencing Mao in his thinking on the problem
24 Ibid., 3.
25 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs A L'Usine, 274.
26 Ibid., 274.
27 See for example Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 17.6.57, 'Peking 
workers challenge Ge Guy', in SCMP 1569, 15.7.57, 18;
Renmin Ribao, 10.6.57, 'Workers start to speak up', in SCMP 
1553, 19.6.57, 6.
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of contradictions among the people which was central to it. 
And in spite of the general suppression of criticism once the 
anti-rightist movement had been launched, workers' discontent 
continued to make itself felt until the end of the year. 
Gipouloux has found
as late as December [1957] virulent attacks on the 
state and the administration. This obstinacy and 
courage is without doubt the authentic expression of 
labour' s taking a political stand with regard to the 
regime. 28
The temporary openness of the Hundred Flowers period did 
allow much freer reporting in the press of industrial and
other disputes, as well as a more honest appraisal of the
problems inherent in the relationship between leaders and led, 
in the enterprise as in wider society, in a socialist state. 
But it would be wrong to conclude that workers were simply one 
more group taking advantage of the moderate policy to let off 
steam and press their own demands; their actions before, 
during and after the movement show the scale of the crisis in 
their relations with the Party and government, and indicate
that rather than industrial unrest being an episode in the
Hundred Flowers movement, the reverse is closer to the truth. 
The difficulties experienced by the Party in bringing workers' 
protests to an end testify to the seriousness of this second 
confrontation, with the effects of the First Five-Year Plan 
and the influence of the uprisings in Eastern Europe on both 
workers and the top leadership adding to the tensions which 
remained from the early, post-liberation period of conflict: 
the contradiction between workers' demands for further 
democratization and cadres' fears of 'extreme 
democratization', and workers' doubts about the 
extent to which they actually were masters of the state and of 
their enterprises, given the growing tendency of cadres to
28 Gipouloux, Lea Cent Fleurs A L'Usine, 274.
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become separated from the workers and to form a distinct 
stratum with its own interests and privileges.
1956: The nationalization of industry in Guangzhou
The nationalization, or socialist transformation, of 
industry and commerce in Guangzhou was perhaps the key event 
in the city's development during the course of the First Five- 
Year Plan. As of September 1955, the transformation of the 
many remaining private enterprises into joint state-private 
enterprises was projected to take five years to complete; in 
November, after Mao's speech of October 29 calling for a 
speed-up in the transformation process, this was revised to 
two years; and in fact all industrial and commercial 
enterprises were transformed, on paper at least, by January 
20, 1956. 29 The term 'joint state-private enterprise' is
slightly misleading, for although former capitalists were to 
continue to receive fixed interest for a specified period 
(originally seven years) after the takeover of their 
enterprises, and would in many cases become ordinary employees 
of the enterprise in a managerial capacity, the enterprise 
would actually be run by representatives appointed by the 
state.
Workers seem to have had high expectations of their 
enterprises after nationalization, especially in terms of 
improved welfare benefits and living conditions of the sort 
enjoyed by workers in some older state enterprises; this was 
indeed the impression they were given in official propaganda 
about the change. One thing they might not have anticipated, 
however, was that the transformation of private enterprises 
would lead to a sharp decrease in workers' opportunities for 
participation in management and would reduce almost to nothing
29 For an account of this process and the probable motives 
behind the successive speed-ups, see Ezra Vogel, Canton 
Under Communism, 156-173.
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the influence of the remaining democratic institutions such as 
the WRC. This should not have come as a complete surprise, 
since, it will be recalled from the last section, the scope of 
action allowed to workers and their trade union 
representatives in private enterprises at the height of the 
Five-Anti movement was granted not for its own sake, but for 
a specific reason; 'the primary purpose of the mobilization of 
workers into management in private enterprises by the unions 
was for the ultimate nationalization of the economy.' 30 
Once nationalization was complete there could be no question 
of any antagonism between workers and state representatives in 
industry, since it was an article of faith that the long-term 
interests of the workers were identical to those of the state 
and were best served by diligence and obedience to state 
instructions. The implication was that there was no longer 
any particularly pressing need for workers themselves to 
participate directly in management since state representatives 
were already running the enterprise on their behalf.
The decline in democracy and participation in private 
enterprises after nationalization clearly came as a great 
disappointment to many workers. Towards the end of 1956 this 
disappointment was officially acknowledged to be entirely 
reasonable, since the new joint state-private enterprises had 
'neglected the democratic tradition allowing workers in 
private enterprises to participate in management.' 31 A 
Remain Ribao editorial in November of that year deplored the 
fact that
the greater part of the enterprises brought under 
state-private ownership failed to carry on as a good 
tradition the experience of the masses in 
management.... The machinery of democratic 
management was done away with ... some state
30 Lee Lai To, Trade Unions in China, 1949 to the present, 99.
31 Lai Ruoyu, 'The current tasks of trade unions in joint 
state-private enterprises', Xinhua News Agency (Beijing),
23.11.56, in SCMP 1422, 3.12.56, 3.
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representatives would not consult with the masses 
... [and] many workers were doubtful of their 
position as "master of the enterprise". 32
The article asserted that the democratic tradition 'should not 
only be carried on but also enlarged upon. The power of the 
trade unions to exercise supervision [over the administration] 
should be restored.' 33 This was the thinking behind
proposals for management democratization, and specifically for 
the establishment of the workers' congress with the enterprise 
trade union committee as its standing organ, which gained 
widespread acceptance during the second half of 1956.
Workers' expectations that they would benefit materially 
from the transformation to joint state-private ownership were 
also disappointed during the course of 1956. Workers in 
Guangzhou found that in terms of housing, welfare provisions, 
and in many cases real wages, any improvement in their 
situation was minimal in spite of the rapid progress made in 
production. 'Economic activity had seen an unprecedented 
expansion, but this was not always translated in tangible 
fashion to the daily life of the worker.' 34 One worker, 
recalling the mood in his factory when joint management was 
first introduced, clearly expressed workers' subsequent 
disappointment:
I remember when joint management first came in, when 
we celebrated our enterprise starting out on the 
socialist road with a great fanfare, how happy we 
all were thinking that now we had joint management, 
we would become the masters of the enterprise, just
32 Remain Ribao, 30.11.56, 'Bring the fighting role of trade 
unions into play in state-private enterprises', in SCMP 
1433, 18.12.56, 4.
33 Ibid., 4.
34 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs A L'XJsine, 165.
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like in state enterprises today, and we would go to 
and from work by bus and have state housing to live 
in..., but now that we have joint management, the 
factory's production has increased, but our lives 
have not only not improved, but are actually worse 
than before... 35
There was also the issue of cadre privileges there is evidence 
that a disproportionate amount of newly constructed housing, 
for example, was allocated to cadres and their families 36, 
while factory directors and leading cadres also received 
larger wage increases than workers in joint state-private 
enterprises. These issues will be discussed in greater detail 
later.
The disillusionment and discontent felt by workers at the 
failure of any significant material improvement in their lives 
to emerge from nationalization was exacerbated by the fact 
that, compared to when their enterprises were privately owned, 
they now had even fewer resources at their disposal with which 
they might make their grievances known and exercise some 
influence in the enterprise in defence of their interests. 
This situation was given a further twist in Guangzhou where so 
many enterprises remained in private hands until the 
nationalization of industry and commerce in January 1956. As 
we saw in the previous section, the new communist regime was 
anxious to persuade as many former private industrialists and 
businessmen as possible to stay on in the city after 
liberation and keep their enterprises open, and resisted 
workers' demands for immediate expropriation, leaving 
Guangzhou with a much higher proportion of retained personnel 
in enterprises than was the case in earlier liberated areas. 
With the transfer of private enterprises into joint state-
35 Guangzhou Ribao 13.4.57, 2.
36 Gipouloux, Lea Cent Fleurs A L'Usine, 183-4. In addition 
to the sources cited by Gipouloux, see also Guangzhou Ribao
23.5.57, 2, and 29.5.57, 2.
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private management/ many of the retained personnel were 
appointed as factory directors or managers by the state 37, 
thus keeping their old positions of authority while evading 
the supervision which workers had been able to exercise over 
them in private enterprises since the Five-Anti movement. 
This led some workers to think that
before joint management, capitalists had to accept 
the workers' supervision; after joint management, 
some capitalists were assigned by the state to take 
up the duties of factory director or manager and the 
workers instead had to heed the capitalists
instructions.... since joint management [came in], 
the capitalists have been riding roughshod over the 
workers even more, and the workers' power is 
actually less than it was before joint
management. 38
The official explanation offered to workers was that such 
personnel were vserving socialism under the leadership of the 
working class and of the state' and ' [could] not in the
slightest belittle the leading position of the working class
in jointly-managed enterprises' 39, and that workers had no 
need of their old powers of supervision as they had now 'moved 
from supervising production to managing it directly together 
with the state representatives.' 40 This might have
persuaded workers but for the fact that, as we shall see in 
more detail later, institutions for direct participation such
37 Nanfang Ribao 9.1.56, 1.
38 XHSocialist education study materials for the working 
class” supplementary material - is joint state-private 
management better, or is private management better?', 
Zhongguo Gongren 6, March 1958, 21.
39 Ibid.,22.
40 Ibid., 21.
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as the workers' congress were subject to important 
restrictions on their powers which always threatened to 
undermine them, and were in any case fairly easy for cadres to 
ignore or evade if they so wished. In practice, state 
representatives could run joint enterprises as they saw fit, 
without consulting workers or allowing them to participate in 
management. So workers were left with the thought that
Since joint management, the capitalists have a 
professional position, and also have fixed interest 
[payments] and high salaries? they live an easy life 
in the same old way while workers still have their 
noses to the grindstone. 41
In this situation it was not surprising that 'some workers 
even [thought] that the Party's policy [was] rightist' 42.
This combination of continued (relative) economic 
hardship, social inequality and political restriction led 
during 1956 to the appearance among disillusioned workers of 
the attitude noted above, namely that their labour was 'a 
commodity for which one negotiated the best price' 43 and 
that their only defence against exploitation, in socialist as 
in capitalist enterprises, was the selective disposal or 
ultimately the withdrawal of that labour. Thus the scene was 
set for growing labour unrest and conflict between workers and 
Party and government authorities during 1956, with the same 
bureaucratist attitudes among cadres which successive 
campaigns after liberation had failed to remove now pushing 
workers towards methods of direct action which, if not 
actually illegal, certainly lacked official approval.
The high-level support for increased democratization, 
participation in management, and concern for workers' material
41 Ibid*, 22.
42 Ibid., 22.
43 Ibid., 172.
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well-being which gained ground after the 8th Party Congress in 
September 1956 might have been expected to ameliorate this 
situation, but it seems to have had little immediate impact at 
the enterprise level, with some workers having so little faith 
in the system of workers' congresses, for example, that they 
refused to elect representatives. 44 It is equally possible 
that the policy's very prominence, rhetorically if not in 
fact, actually exacerbated workers' anger and bitterness 
against the official trade union, the enterprise 
administration, and ultimately the Party and government, thus 
precipitating even more acute conflict in the spring of 1957. 
This can be taken as a Chinese example of the situation which 
we noted earlier with reference to Eastern Europe, where 'the 
official ideology makes claims on behalf of the industrial 
workers which the day to day reality contradicts' 45, 
resulting in sharp and persistent conflict between workers and 
the regime.
Background to the 1956-7 industrial conflict
Democratic management
From about the middle of 1956, something of a backlash 
against authoritarian or undemocratic management in general, 
and against the system of one-man management in particular, 
begins to emerge in the trade union press. It has already 
been noted that this system of management was never introduced 
in all areas or all industrial sectors in China, and indeed 
there were early signs of less than wholehearted support for 
it at the highest level. 46 But even where this specific
44 Nanfang Ribao 3.6.57, 1.
45 Denitch, 'Yugoslav Exceptionalism', in Triska and Gati 
(eds.) Blue-collar workers in Eastern Europe, 254.
46 See Stephen Andors' comments in China's industrial 
revolution - politics, planning and management, 1949 to the 
present, 59.
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system was not in operation, the tendency mentioned in the 
last section to emphasize strict labour discipline and to 
regard production as the sole criterion on which to judge an 
enterprise's performance was by 1956 very pronounced, and 
seems to have resulted in a rather authoritarian style of 
management in most if not all industrial enterprises.
In one analysis in 1957 of what had gone wrong in the 
system of democratic management set up in enterprises after 
liberation, the problem was traced back beyond the spread of 
Soviet management practices to central and south China, to 
defects in the organization of FMCs, specifically the 
excessive powers of the factory director as ex officio chair 
of the committee with the right of veto over its decisions. 
The author observed that
From certain articles of the regulations, it would 
appear that the FMC possessed very great power, but 
in reality, when it came to implementation, power 
was completely concentrated in the hands of the 
factory director. Moreover, at its meetings it 
mostly discussed the problems raised by the higher 
level and the administration and very few questions 
raised by the masses. Because of this, the masses' 
interest in the FMC declined, while the leading 
administrative cadres found its existence no longer 
justified, and it could not but decline into 
formalism. 47
This description of the weaknesses of democratic management in 
Chinese enterprises accords with our findings in the previous 
section. The WRC seems to have suffered the same fate as the 
FMC, with workers in Guangzhou in 1957 reporting that their
47 Su^  Ke, 'The problem of democratic management of state- 
private enterprises viewed in the light of workers' 
experience in industrial management', Gongren Ribao,
5.1.57, in SCMP 1491, 13.3.57, 8.
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housing problems had been repeatedly raised in this forum, 
without any response from enterprise leaders. 48
This lack of democracy and absence of genuine 
participation in state enterprises spread to private 
enterprises on the latter's transformation to joint state- 
private status. How much scope there had been for democratic 
participation in private enterprises between the end of the 
Five-Anti movement in mid-1952 and nationalization in early 
1956 is difficult to gauge given the lack of attention to it 
in the press. Much is made in articles advocating the 
expansion of democracy in 1956-7 of the powerful role of the 
trade unions in the old private enterprises, and of the 
supervisory powers over private management enjoyed by the 
product ion-increase-and-economy committees (formed during the 
campaign of the same name) made up of workers and staff. 49 
Chen Yun, discussing the transformation of industry at the 
Eighth Party Congress in 1956, said that unions had had va 
high degree of authority over the enterprise management' 50 
after the Five-Anti campaign.
But according to one 1956 account from Wuhan, the union 
participation in the democratic management of private 
enterprises mandated by workers after the Five-Anti movement 
virtually ceased during 1953 under the influence of one-man 
management, causing great dissatisfaction among workers who 
did not feel that they were the masters of the enterprise in 
any real sense. 51 So it seems that democratic management in 
private enterprises may have reached a peak in the year or so
48 Guangzhou Ribao 19.5.57, 2.
49 See for example ibid., 8; Remain Ribao, 30.11.56, vBring 
the fighting role of trade unions into play in state- 
private enterprises', in SCMP 1433, 18.12.56, 3.
50 Xinhua Mews Agency (Beijing) 21.9.56, in Nanfang Ribao
22.9.56, 3.
51 Gongren Ribao 4.12.56, 2.
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immediately after the Five-Anti movement before going into 
decline. Whatever the actual extent of management
democratization in private enterprises during these years, it 
is clear that there was a feeling among workers themselves 
that powers and influence in the enterprise which they once 
enjoyed had been lost when their enterprises were 
nationalized: at the Eighth Party Congress, workers were said 
to be asking 'why it is that workers' and staff members' 
powers have actually declined since joint management? Why do 
former capitalists still have power and position in the 
enterprise today?' 52
It is equally clear that workers and trade unions were in 
a much less ambiguous position in the event of a confrontation 
with private management than they were in any disputes after 
1956 when ultimate power in the enterprise had passed into the 
hands of state representatives:
The administrative cadres headed by representatives 
of the state ... placed under their control the 
entire administrative work of the enterprises.
Trade union cadres and the masses, finding it 
impossible to enquire into the management of 
enterprises, had quite some cause for complaint. 53
It does indeed seem to have been difficult in this period for 
workers to make any criticism of administrative cadres. Such 
was the attitude of factory directors and other high-ranking 
cadres to their own authority that they tended to react to any 
criticism, justified or not, as if it were an act of rebellion 
and a serious attack, not on their personal actions or style 
of work, but on the state organization which they represented. 
Thus workers raising perfectly reasonable criticisms found 
themselves accused of, and even punished for, 'undisciplined
52 See Chen Yun's speech at the Eighth Congress, cited above.
53 Su Ke, 8-9.
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and unorganized behaviour' 54, or 'opposing the 
management' 55. It was reported that 'some enterprises even 
draw up a lot of 'prohibitions' to restrict workers and 
staff' 56, for example banning criticism of the higher level 
by the lower, i.e. workers, in production conferences and 
other meetings.
The phenomenon of retaliation by factory directors 
against their low-ranking critics was by all accounts 
widespread, with the imposition of arbitrary and 'unlawful 
punishments' 57 common in many enterprises and 'very 
serious' 58 in some. In extreme cases, reassignment to 
unsuitable work-posts, perhaps forcing a worker to travel much 
longer distances to work, could be arranged by a director 59, 
but the favoured method of warning off critics appears to have 
been 'one-to-one chats' with the director, or '"one-to-one 
threats"' 60 as they were perhaps more accurately termed. 
Such an attitude on the part of the factory director could 
easily spread commandist and coercive methods to all levels of 
the enterprise, as reflected in the workers' saying that 
'"each level orders the next about, and the workers order the 
machines about."' 61 With this style of management rapidly 
becoming the norm, it was not long before the question was
54 'Covert suppression of criticism', Zhongguo Gongren 16, 
August 1956, 4.
55 'Can you treat someone who raises a criticism like this?', 
Zhongguo Gongren 20, October 1956, 11.
56 'Discussing "one-man management" in enterprises', Zhongguo 
Gongren 16, August 1956, 5.
57 Ibid., 5. See also Gongren Ribao 18.5.56, 1, and 14.7.56, 
2.
58 Ibid., 5.
59 'Can you treat someone who raises a criticism like this?', 
Zhongguo Gongren 20, 11.
60 'Covert suppression of criticism', Zhongguo Gongren 16, 4.
61 'Discussing "one-man management" in enterprises', Zhongguo 
Gongren 16, 5.
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posed:
This quite simply is feudal order; the "managers" in 
these enterprises have become the feudal kings of 
petty kingdoms. How can this phenomenon be allowed 
to continue to exist in socialist enterprises? 62
The trade union crisis
The enterprise trade unions must bear some of the blame 
for the state of affairs described above, since they patently 
were failing in their duty to protect workers' interests. The 
accusation by one worker that the trade unions had 'lost ... 
their guts since the Seventh National Congress' 63 in 1953 
has some basis in fact, since the charges of economism which 
were made at that time, and the accompanying purge of many of 
the top leadership of the ACFTU, had left the unions cowed and 
somewhat reluctant to be outspoken in defence of workers' 
rights when such statements could easily be construed by Party 
authorities as further outbreaks of economism and syndicalism. 
It was in fact acknowledged by Lai Ruoyu and others in the 
ACFTU leadership that although it had been necessary to attack 
these tendencies, the unions had subsequently gone too far in 
the opposite direction, committing the error of bureaucratism 
and showing no concern for their members' interests and 
failing to support their proper demands. 64
Careerism among union cadres must also be mentioned in 
this context: the fact that being a union official was often
62 Ibid., 5.
63 Gongren Ribao, 21.5.57, 'What is the real fundamental cause 
behind the trade union work "crisis"?', in SCMP 1551,
17.6.57, 19.
64 See Gongren Ribao 22.5.56, 7; 12.5.56, 1; 24.9.56, 2.
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the first rung on the ladder of promotion which might 
eventually lead to Party membership, with all its attendant 
privileges, created its own pressures on cadres not to rock 
the boat by siding with workers against factory leadership. 
The same applied to union cadres who were already Party 
members. Each one faced the choice of
blindly carrying out under Party discipline a policy 
which he knows to be wrong, and thereby separating 
himself from the workers through the deviation of 
"coramandism", or else ignoring the directive and 
thereby becoming a "tail of the masses" and 
jeopardizing his Party career. 65
In practice, as had happened in the spring of 1950, unions 
tended to side with the administration in any case where 
workers' views conflicted with those of the factory 
leadership. Union cadres were roundly criticized for making 
'unprincipled concessions' 66 and giving in to administrative 
cadres without an argument whenever they expressed divergent 
views. Many union officials seem to have been ruled by their 
fear of 'spoiling relations' 67 with the administration and 
thereby losing its support for their work in future; they were 
afraid that a stand against the administration on whatever 
issue would be remembered when the time came to evaluate them 
for wage increases and promotion. 68 The safest course for 
the trade unions was to concentrate on those welfare matters 
which came under their jurisdiction, and on the organization 
of labour emulation competitions and other activities which 
promoted production and so were unlikely to lead to any 
conflict with the administration.
65 Harper, 'Party and unions', 8 8 .
66 Gongren Ribao 4.5.57, 3.
67 Gongren Ribao 2.3.56, 2.
68 Gongren Ribao 4.5.57, 3.
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Trade union defence of workers' rights in private 
enterprises seems to have been greatly weakened after their 
transfer to joint state-private ownership, as the 
authoritarian tendencies of many state representatives 
affected their performance of their duties and undermined 
their supervisory role. It was reported in December 1956 that
Some state representatives think: when the
enterprises were privately run, trade unions had to 
exercise supervision to prevent capitalists' illegal 
activities. Now that enterprises have implemented 
joint management, with state representatives heading 
the administration, they are managing it on behalf 
of the state, and if the trade union wants to 
exercise supervision, won't it just be stirring up 
opposition to the administration and seeking trouble 
for its own people? 69
Some state representatives, it was said, 'even demand that the 
trade union obey the administrative leadership' 70. And some 
trade union cadres were themselves unsure of their rights in 
the new situation, thinking 'the state representatives are 
cadres appointed by the state, of a higher level ths(£) us, so 
how can we possibly supervise them?' 71
Enterprise trade union cadres were reminded in this 
article, which appeared in the ACFTU's official journal and 
therefore can be assumed to have the backing of the union 
leadership, that they had the full authority of the 
Constitution (Article 17) and of the Trade Union Law (Article
69 'Should the trade union organization supervise the
administration in joint state-private enterprises?',
Zhongguo Gongren 23, December 1956, 3.
70 Ibid., 3.
71 Ibid., 3.
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7 ) to ensure mass criticism and supervision of the enterprise 
leadership and to protect workers' interests and supervise the 
administration's adherence to Party policy and the law. 72 
Although the common task of the administration and the trade 
union was 'to promote the development of production and on 
that basis to improve the material and cultural lives of the 
working masses' 73, and although the trade union was supposed 
in normal circumstances to exercise its authority in support 
of the administration, there was a possibility that 
administrative power might be used inappropriately, in which 
case
this [would] often tend to distort Party and state 
policy and laws and harm the democratic rights and 
material interests of the working masses. So the 
trade union, as a mass organization and a body 
representing the interests of workers, must exercise 
supervision in respect of the administration, to 
prevent the misuse of administrative power. 74
Unions were urged to 'struggle against any abuse of 
administrative power, failure to act on the masses' proposals, 
attacks or reprisals against people making complaints, 
arbitrary punishment of workers etc..' 75; as we have already 
seen, it was precisely this which enterprise trade unions had 
been failing to do during 1956. The Soviet sinologist A P 
Davydov noted that in the drive for production at this time,
not only were the opinions of workers ignored, many 
unions at the enterprise level dealt harshly with
72 Ibid., 3.
73 Ibid., 3.
74 Ibid., 3.
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those who complained. The unions' neglect of worker 
interests is evident in the greatly increased number 
of occupational injuries. 76
In Guangzhou the root cause of the 1956 increase in industrial 
accidents involving injury or death was identified as 
leadership bureaucratism, i.e. a lack of concern for workers' 
health and safety and the view that safety precautions would 
hinder the completion of production quotas, and should 
therefore be dispensed with. Unions were frequently 
criticized not only for their failure to protect workers' 
interests, but even more for their role in actually enforcing 
dangerous practices such as excessive overtime. 77
Why was it that the unions were so ineffective in defence 
of workers' rights? In 1957 workers in Guangzhou were said to 
have 'dubbed their trade unions "workers' control department" 
... "tongue of bureaucracy" and "tail of administration"' 78. 
Their bitterness towards the unions is understandable, but it 
should be remembered that, as we saw in the first section, 
there were genuine difficulties inherent in the role of the 
official trade unions. They were obliged both to support the 
administration and to protect workers' rights and interests. 
In theory there was no conflict between these two tasks, but 
in practice many union cadres did see their dual 
responsibilities as incompatible 79, and when a conflict 
arose, as it all too often did, it was extremely difficult for 
unions to side with the workers without provoking charges of 
economism, syndicalism, or challenging Party and state 
authority.
76 A P Davydov, quoted in Gilbert Rozman, A mirror for
socialism - Soviet criticisms of China, 112.
77 Nanfang Ribao 14.6.56, 2, and 15.6.56, 1.
78 Renmin Ribao, 9.5.57, 'On an 8,000 li tour of hurried
observation', in SCMP 1551, 17.6.57, 10.
79 See for example Gongren Ribao 4.5.57, 3, and 7.5.57, 1.
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It might have been possible for trade unions to fulfil 
their obligations towards their members if they had had the 
necessary support from the administration, but often the 
actions of the administration would undermine the union's 
authority and prestige among workers. In some enterprises 
there were 'even instances where production plans and safety 
and welfare measures were kept "secret" from the trade 
unions' 80 by administrative cadres. When workers made 
requests for welfare benefits to which they were entitled 
(such as emergency loans or allowances for visiting sick 
relatives etc.), the request would be dealt with by the 
chairperson of their trade union small group or section 
committee, in other words by a fairly low-level union cadre 
with little real authority in the enterprise and no control 
over budgets. Cases were reported in the second half of 1956 
where such requests had been arbitrarily turned down several 
times by the enterprise administration, whereupon the worker 
or workers concerned would go over the head of the ineffectual 
cadre to an administrative cadre or to the enterprise trade 
union chairperson, who was usually a Party member and 
therefore did have real power in the enterprise. The request 
would then be granted without further ado, leaving workers to 
conclude that the trade union at the lower level simply would 
not take the trouble to do even a simple thing for them, and 
that in future it would be better to rely on their own 
resources to get things done. 81
The outlines of the trade union crisis which came to a 
head in the spring of 1957 can be seen from the above 
comments. The basic problem was the same as in 1950, that of 
obligation without authority: the trade union did not have the
80 Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), 23.11.56, 'The current tasks 
of trade unions in joint state-private enterprises', in 
SCMP 1422, 3.12.56, 3.
81 See for example two articles in the series 'How can trade
union activists do a good job in the trade union work
they've taken upon themselves?', in Zhongguo Gongren
nos.15, August 1957, 4, and 19, October 1956, 12.
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right to give orders to anyone in the enterprise, but had to 
rely on persuasion and education to see that the work it 
delegated to activists or ordinary trade union members was 
accomplished. Since it relied on this Bort of mobilization, 
the vicious circle of ineffectiveness in helping its members 
and lowered prestige among workers was a particularly
destructive one for trade unions. Union cadres were forced to 
conclude that their organization
really has no position and no power, when there's a 
problem, what the trade union says doesn't count, it 
can't take responsibility, and the factory director 
must ratify [anything] before it can take
effect. 82
A series of articles in the labour movement monthly 
Zhongguo Gongren 83 between August and November 1956,
consisting almost entirely of contributions from workers, 
described in considerable detail the nature of the crisis in 
trade union work as experienced by trade union activists and 
lower-level cadres, and in particular highlighted the effect 
of the reformed wage structure and the system of material 
incentives then in force in industry on these people's
willingness and ability to do trade union work. As we noted 
in the previous section, the problem of responsibility without 
authority was most acute for union activists who had no 
official position and whose union work was purely voluntary. 
Their complaints and the universal demoralization which is 
evident in these accounts show that activists' position had 
not improved substantially since their original protests about
82 Ibid., 12.
83 The six articles appeared in issues no. 15 (August 1956), 
18 (September), 19, 20 (October), 21 and 22 (November). 
Appearing under the heading 'How can trade union activists 
do a good job in the trade union work they've taken upon 
themselves?', they will hereafter be referred to as 'Trade 
union activists' 1-6 .
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the lack of support for their activities in 1950.
It emerges from these accounts that most activists and 
lower-level cadres felt that union work was a thankless task
which frequently got them into trouble both with the
administration and with their fellow workers. Many frankly 
admitted that they were waiting impatiently for the next round 
of union elections when they would have a chance to pass their 
responsibilities on to someone else. 84 One of the
contributors to this series described the typical activist's 
career thus:
When trade union activists first take on
responsibility for trade union work they have great 
energy, but afterwards their energy diminishes more 
and more with time, until finally they don't want to 
go on; this is virtually an activist's law of 
development. 85
The reasons behind activists' plummeting morale are not hard 
to find. Firstly, all their trade union work was supposed to 
be done in their spare time. One problem with this, which 
also applied to lower-level union cadres, was that after work 
workers who did not live in enterprise dormitories would 
disperse and go home, making it impossible to do any union 
work with them. Another was that however well-organized and 
experienced in their jobs activists were (some work, for 
example that connected with union-administered labour 
insurance or with finances, was quite technical, and activist 
competence could be a problem), they simply did not have 
enough spare time for all the work they were supposed to do, 
mainly because many of them held more than one post 
concurrently. Judging from the evidence in these articles, it
84 See for example 'Trade union activists' 1, Zhongguo Gongren 
15, 6 .
85 'Trade union activists' 2, Zhongguo Gongren 18, 11.
150
was not unusual for a union small group head, for example, to 
hold five or six posts simultaneously, and s/he might in the 
past have held as many as nine. 86
When trade union work did encroach on working hours, it 
not merely 'incurred the displeasure of the 
administration' 87, but could also have a direct effect on 
the income of the activist or cadre concerned and that of 
his/her colleagues. Under the newly established eight-grade 
wage system, workers were appraised for promotion with 
reference to factors such as their performance in production, 
technical skill and attitude to labour. Any enforced absence 
from the shop floor on union business would adversely affect 
an activist's rating on all these criteria. In enterprises 
which practised a system of group piece-work, an activist's 
poor performance might mean the group as a whole failed to 
reach its target and thus lost income, not something 
calculated to boost the prestige of the trade union. And if 
activists and cadres did spend all their spare time doing 
union work they still lost out, falling behind their 
colleagues in technical skill as they had no time for study. 
One small-group head recounted how in the course of his union 
career,
my apprentices all overtook me, and some had already 
been promoted from grade two to grade six; quite a 
few workers who were originally grade six workers 
like me have gone ahead of me, and all get paid more 
than me. 88
The common feeling among activists and lower-level cadres 
was that far from their union work doing any good, it was
86 See 'Trade union activists' 1, Zhongguo Gongren 15, 5, and 
2, Zhongguo Gongren 18, 11.
87 'Trade union activists' 1, Zhongguo Gongren 15, 5.
88 Ibid., 6 .
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actually harmful, not only to themselves in terms of their 
performance in production, technical progress and pay, but 
also to their colleagues, since they could do nothing to 
assist them without the cooperation of the enterprise 
administration and might drag down their income and lose them 
bonuses through time spent away from production on union work. 
A common theme, as mentioned above, was the lack of support 
from the enterprise administration, and also, in the case of 
activists, from the enterprise trade union leadership, who 
were accused by one worker (in terms almost identical to those 
we saw in 1950) of
treating us like "a brick picked up to knock on the 
door"; when they can use us, they press us into 
service, and when they can't they cast us aside, and 
nobody gives a damn. 89
According to this worker, the leadership's attitude 'not only 
turns dedicated and energetic trade union activists into 
demoralized ones, but also produces a bad impression of 
activists among the masses, so no-one is prepared to do trade 
union work. ' 90 He insisted that he was fully aware of the 
importance of trade union work and would be willing to 
undertake it at any time, but only on condition of 
'understanding, concern and support' 91 for activists from 
the union and administrative leadership. Otherwise, he felt 
that he could make more of a contribution to socialism by 
doing a good job in production and improving his skills, and 
some of his more sympathetic colleagues had urged him to do 
exactly that.
It was of course quite convenient for the higher levels 
to have the basic-level trade union in the enterprise bearing
89 'Trade union activists' 3, Zhongguo Gongren 19, 13.
90 Ibid., 13.
91 Ibid., 13.
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the brunt of workers' discontent at their lack of material 
progress and democratic influence after the socialist 
transformation of industry. When, for example, a union's 
inability to stand up to the administration and protect 
workers from excessive overtime resulted in damage to workers' 
health and posed the risk of a serious accident92, workers' 
anger would not unnaturally be directed primarily at the trade 
union. But in spite of some harsh criticism from workers of 
union cadres' bureaucratism and general ineffectiveness during 
1956 and the spring of 1957, workers seem to have been well 
aware of the difficulty of their position as 'fourth class' 
cadres (ranking below Party and Youth League cadres and 
technical personnel in terms of influence and authority in the 
enterprise). They did not agree with the view that cadres' 
work-style was the main problem, and pointed instead to their 
lack of authority in the enterprise and the almost total lack 
of cooperation they received from management and enterprise 
Party committees.
Workers felt that trade unions were 'not in a position to 
support the proper demands of the masses' 93, and could do 
nothing about the arbitrary rejection of such demands. They 
were aware that union cadres who did try to defend workers' 
rights and so came into conflict with the administrative or 
Party leadership in the enterprise tended to be accused of 
trying to perpetuate class struggle even though enterprises 
were no longer privately owned, as in the comment that '[y]our 
trade union is not the labour side and the administration is 
not the capital side. No reason for staging the same 
play! ' 94 They also pointed out their own difficulties in 
selecting union cadres who would actually defend their
92 Such an incident is described in 'Trade union activists' 1, 
Zhongguo Gongren 15, August 1956, 5.
93 Gongren Ribao, 21.5.57, 'What is the fundamental cause
behind the trade union work "crisisM?', in SCMP 1551,
17.6.57, 15.
94 Ibid., 19.
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interests: cadres who 'always backed up the masses' 95 had
problems with their careers and with getting or keeping Party 
membership, and those who 'persisted in the proper demands of 
the masses, were accused of "conceit", "no respect for Party 
leadership" or "fomenting discord and independence"'. 96
In fact, the problem with the unions as far as workers 
were concerned, as in 1950, was a dual one: not only that CCP 
policies put pressure on them not to respond to workers' 
demands and to side with the administration, but also that 
they still were not democratic organizations elected and 
controlled by their members. New ACFTU regulations on the 
election of basic-level union committees were published in 
February 1956 97, and an article the following month revealed 
the sort of practices which these regulations were intended to 
curb. It was reported that many unions were failing to hold 
regular elections and meetings of members, that where meetings 
were held, most of the time was taken up with the chair's 
report leaving little time for discussion, and that workers 
were being prevented from discussing or approving candidates 
for election to the committee, being compelled instead to 
elect whatever list of candidates was presented to them by 
acclamation rather than balloting. 98 This resulted in weak 
basic-level union organizations which were separated from 
workers, led by cadres who were the 'bosses', rather than 
members, of the masses. 99 As had happened in 1950, the 
weakness of 'the administration's union department' 100 and
95 Ibid., 20.
96 Ibid., 21.
97 Gongren Ribao 24.2.52, 2.
98 Gongren Ribao 17.3.56, 1. For confirmation of undemocratic
election practices among Guangzhou trade unions, see 
Guangzhou Ribao 17.5.57, 2.
99 Gongren Ribao 11.5.57, 1.
100 Gongren Ribao 18.5.57, 3.
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its lack of contact with its members militated against its 
being able to defend their interests effectively even where 
cadres were inclined to support workers against the 
administration, while undemocratic election practices reduced 
workers' chances of getting into office cadres who would 
support them.
Given workers' low regard for their unions and their 
awareness of the constraints on union cadres' activities, it 
is not surprising that they were quick to abandon the official 
trade union organization whenever they felt the need to 
confront the enterprise leadership on any issue. The 
enterprise trade union thus became an irrelevance in disputes, 
and workers who had become accustomed to taking individual 
problems and demands straight to the administrative leadership 
or to the Party began to do the same thing collectively, 
organizing themselves to present their demands to those they 
believed had the power to meet them. Together with the 
absence of any effective means of influencing the 
administration through democratic representation or 
participation in management, this meant that there remained no 
intermediary structures between the discontented workers on 
the one hand and the Party and administrative authorities on 
the other. Since by spring 1957 collective management under 
the leadership of the enterprise Party committee had been 
established, this in turn meant that '[t]he decisive 
confrontation took place between the Party and the working 
class.... All disputes developed into a political 
confrontation.' 101
101 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs A L'Usine, 276.
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Workers' discontents welfare, wages and privilege
It was in 1956, when, as we have seen, workers were 
perhaps least well provided with effective mechanisms or 
organizations through which they could defend their interests, 
that economic and social pressures on them resulting from the 
First Five-Year Plan's emphasis on accumulation and heavy 
industrial development became acute. As was noted above, 
workers who were already accustomed to bypassing their trade 
union representatives when seeking solutions to their 
individual problems in the workplace not unnaturally now took 
the same course collectively, when in the aftermath of 
nationalization and wage reform groups of workers, or 
sometimes the whole workforce of an enterprise, found 
themselves at a disadvantage. Hence the large number of 
strikes, petitions, demonstrations, go-slows and incidences of 
mass absenteeism which marked industrial life during 1956, and 
continued into 1957.
An internal ACFTU report for the year 1956 noted twenty- 
nine strikes and fifty-six petitions during the year, not 
including incidents registered by the trade union statistical 
service. Oral accounts mentioned in this report give much 
higher figures for individual cities: for example, there were 
said to have been more than forty incidences of strikes and 
petitions in Xi'an alone, while Shanghai saw a total of 
eighty-six incidents, increasing throughout the year from six 
in the first quarter to forty-one in the final quarter. 102 
This apparent escalation tallies with accounts of wage reform 
disputes which resulted in industrial action, which seem to 
have peaked in November 1956. 103 Unfortunately comparative
102 Zhongguo Gongyun 2, 1957, quoted in Gipouloux, Lea Cent 
Fleurs A L'Usine, 189.
103 See for example Guangzhou Ribao 10.5.57, 2; Nanfang Ribao
25.4.57, 1; Gongren Ribao 25.4.57, 1; 30.4.57, 2. These 
articles refer to such disputes in Guangzhou, Tianjin and 
Wuhan.
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figures for other years are hard to come by, although as we 
saw in the previous section there were reports of strikes 
during the early post-liberation period. However, it seems 
clear from these figures that the level of industrial unrest 
in China in 1956 was very high.
The reasons behind this unrest are not difficult to find: 
'Wages, authoritarian assignments, working and living 
conditions were at the centre of all demands' 104, with 
inequality between workers' and cadres' households a 
particular cause of friction. To start with working and 
living conditions: we have already noted the pressures on 
workers during 1956 as the deadline for meeting the production 
targets of the First Five-Year Plan approached, and the 
results in terms of increased industrial accidents and 
injuries which followed. After the nationalization of 
Guangzhou's remaining state enterprises in January 1956, calls 
for a 'high tide' of production were made, with workers 
encouraged to focus their efforts on improving production 
during a six-month period of 'business as usual' in 
enterprises. 105 It was denied that the retention of old 
management systems during this period would dampen workers' 
enthusiasm for socialist transformation 106, and cadres were 
instead warned of the dangers of lagging behind workers who, 
it was claimed, were themselves supporting this policy and 
pressing for increased norms and production targets 107. Our 
natural scepticism about such claims should perhaps be 
tempered by the undoubted enthusiasm for the new era of joint 
management initially expressed by many workers, including the 
participant in the 'Wang Cai' debate quoted earlier, but it is
104 Ibid., 189.
105 Nanfang Ribao 3.2.56, 1; 12.2.56, 1.
106 Renmin Ribao, 'We must not lightly change original 
production and management systems9, in Nanfang Ribao
12.2.56, 1 .
107 Nanfang Ribao 23.3.56, 1.
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likely that the pressure for results in production even at the 
expense of basic safety during this period quickly dissipated 
this enthusiasm.
Following an ACFTU conference on labour protection, 
welfare and housing in May 1956, a renewed emphasis on 
workers' safety, livelihood and welfare is evident not only in 
articles in the labour movement press 108, but also in the 
local press in Guangzhou. From June 12-18, the Nanfang Ribao 
published a series of articles 109 exposing the bureaucratist 
indifference among enterprise administrative and union cadres 
and the staff of various industrial bureaux to workers' 
substandard working and living conditions. No-one could 
accuse the paper's reporters of a lack of courage in exposing 
bureaucratism this time, as in the time-honoured style of 
investigative reporting they first detailed blatant violations 
of workers' basic rights and interests, and then presented 
their evidence to the relevant authorities, recording in 
detail for their readers the unconcerned, evasive, or 
downright hostile responses this provoked. These articles, 
accompanied by editorials reinforcing their message on 
welfare, safety, excessive overtime etc., were followed by 
admissions from one of the top leaders of the ACFTU, Liu 
Ningyi 110, and the CCP's Minister of Labour, Ma Wenrui 111, 
that progress in these areas had lagged far behind 
improvements in labour productivity, not just in the six 
months since nationalization, but going right back to the
108 See for example Gongren Ribao 31.5.56, 2; 6.6.56, 1;
12.6.56, 1? 24.6.56, 2? 5.7.56, 2? 7.7.56, 2.
109 The articles appeared on page 2 of the paper on June 12-15 
and 18. Accounts of similarly poor living and working 
conditions in other Chinese cities can be found, in 
translation, in Union Research Service 3, 5, 17.4.56, 'Many 
workers complain of poor living standards'.
110 Nanfang Ribao 25.6.56, 6 . A deputy chairman of the ACFTU 
at this point, Liu succeeded Lai Ruoyu as chairman in 1958.
111 Nanfang Ribao 2.7.56, 2.
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beginning of the First Five-Year Plan in 1953.
At one of the enterprises visited by a Nanfang Ribao 
reporter, a construction site on the outskirts of Guangzhou, 
the deputy chairperson of the union recounted how petty 
economy measures had aroused discontent among the workers. 
For example, the cost of the tea-leaves provided to workers 
had been transferred from the welfare to the construction 
budget and then the provision had been withdrawn, to 'save' on 
construction expenses. Transport was a major problem on this 
site, as was the overcrowded canteen with its poor quality 
food; workers were not allowed to use waste materials to build 
furniture in their spare time for their bamboo shacks on the 
site, and so had no chairs or tables for study outside working 
hours. All these matters had been repeatedly raised by the 
union, but, as this union cadre put it, 'the higher-ups always 
pretend not to know anything about it' 112.
These sorts of 'little problems', it was reported, also 
existed on other sites, but were frot going uinsolyed because of 
a lack of funds. On the contrary, tens of thousands of yuan 
in medical subsidies and enterprise reward funds were piling 
up unused, and the labour insurance fund of the No. 3 
Construction Company was running a monthly surplus of 2,000 
yuan, with 22,000 yuan left unspent from 1955. Various 
'responsible personnel' at the company and at the Municipal 
Construction Engineering Bureau denied any responsibility for 
deciding how the money should be spent and were apparently 
unconcerned at the amounts accumulated; one official in the 
company's finance department, 'in response to repeated 
questioning', finally retorted, 'surely you don't think we 
should spend the whole day encouraging the use of this 
money?' 113 The finance departments did not publish details 
of the money they had accumulated, 'so the workers and union
112 Nanfang Ribao 12.6.56, 2.
113 Ibid., 2.
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organizations on the building sites don't know how much money 
the company or Bureau has which could be used to improve 
workers' livelihood and welfare.' 114 Senior union cadres in 
any case claimed to have been too busy with other campaigns to 
concentrate on these problems, leaving the reporter to 
conclude that with these '"bureaucrats"' and 'leading cadres 
who don't know anything about anything' 115 in charge, the 
prevalence of bureaucratism and indifference to workers' 
welfare was hardly surprising.
Similar attitudes were evident at two of the livestock 
rearing and meat supply stations which were part of the 
Guangzhou branch of the China Foodstuffs Co.. At one plant, 
workers shared a cramped, stuffy, insanitary warehouse with 
some of the company's livestock; the workers' accomodation 
could not be lit at night because of the fire risk in what was 
basically a barn. 'But for the mosquito nets and beds', the 
reporter noted, 'it would have been difficult to distinguish 
where the people lived and where the livestock.' 116 Serious 
problems with the provision of medical care and safety 
equipment also existed in these enterprises, but what caused 
the most resentment was the indifference of the higher levels 
to repeated requests for improvement. It was reported that
Company managers and department heads often came to 
check on the work, but every time they came, they 
were only concerned about whether any of the pigs or 
cattle had died, or asking whether they were ill?
How were the animals fattening up? As for the 
workers' livelihood, they almost never asked about 
it. 117
114 Ibid., 2.
115 Ibid., 2.
116 Nanfang Ribao 13.6.56, 2.
117 Ibid., 2.
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Workers at one of the plants had been allowed to use waste 
materials to build themselves recreation rooms and a canteen, 
but the five structures they built were in fact all used by 
the management as barns for livestock. 'Because the workers 
had volunteered their labour, the construction of these five 
new barns saved the state more than 1,600 yuan' 110, but 
workers were no better off than before in terms of welfare 
amenities.
Two of the remaining articles dealt with the problem of 
excessive overtime and extra shifts, which by all accounts was 
widespread in Guangzhou and elsewhere at this time. 119 Not 
only were enterprise leaders using this as their main method 
of fulfilling and over-fulfilling production quotas, in some 
cases regularly exceeding the legal maximum of 32 hours 
overtime by any worker in one month120, but they were also 
finding ways to avoid paying workers the proper rates for this 
overtime. In some cases the job was done for them, when 
higher-level organs approved the overtime or extra shifts 
requested but then refused to provide any extra money for 
wages, so that the enterprise had to cut bonuses and other 
payments to workers to make up the amount, leaving workers at 
best no better off than if they had not worked the extra 
hours, and at worst reducing their income. 121
Another plant had come up with a 'clever scheme' whereby 
overtime was 'borrowed' from workers during the enterprise's 
busy period, and workers could then request time off when 
production tasks were less pressing in lieu of the free time
118 Ibid., 2.
119 Nanfang Ribao 14.6.56, 2; 15.6.56, 1 and 2; Gongren Ribao
5.7.56, 2.
120 Nanfang Ribao 14.6.56, 2.
121 Ibid., 2.
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they had foregone. 122 However, since workers needed the 
administration's permission to regain their 'borrowed' time 
off, there was often a considerable delay before they could 
actually take it, with 'arrears' in some cases of more than a 
year, after which many gave up hope of ever getting the time 
off to which they were entitled. The deputy manager claimed 
that overtime was not a problem at the plant and was all 
strictly voluntary, something which workers flatly told the 
reporter was 'not true'. When he took his findings to the 
manager himself, the reporter was told, 'Comrade, I have to 
point out to you, we have backward workers here!' 123 The 
union in this enterprise also criticized as 'backward' workers 
who protested at the new system, and helped to enforce it. As 
well as the obvious effect on workers' health and morale, 
excessive overtime was also said to have had 'undesirable 
political consequences' 124 in some enterprises. These were 
not specified, but we can assume that they included sharp 
antagonism between workers and the enterprise leadership, 
including the union leadership, and probably some sort of 
industrial action as well.
The many pressures on workers' incomes were revealed by 
various sections of the press during the summer of 1956. 
Reference was made to the profiteering of public utilities 
which were levying high charges 125, and fares on public 
transport and rents were also singled out as too high for many 
workers to afford. 126 The emphasis on economizing in 
enterprises led to a policy of 'commercializing' canteens and 
other facilities, i.e. raising the prices paid by workers so
122 Nanfang Ribao 15.6.56, 2.
123 Ibid., 2.
124 Nanfang Ribao 15.6.56, 1.
125 Liu Ningyi, 'Overcome the tendency not to care about the 
livelihood of workers and staff', Nanfang Ribao 25.6.56, 6 .
126 See Gongren Ribao 31.5.56, 2; 7.7.56, 2; Nanfang Ribao
4.9.56, 1-2.
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that these facilities made a profit. At the same time petty 
money-saving measures were introduced which had an adverse 
effect on working conditions out of all proportion to the 
financial saving made: in one factory in Guangzhou, for
example, workers were forbidden to use the enterprise's tap 
water for washing when they came off shift from high- 
temperature glass workshops, thus saving about 10 yuan per 
month on the factory's water bill. 127 There was reportedly 
some misappropriation of welfare and medical funds in the new 
joint enterprises 128, and many enterprises let their medical 
and hygiene funds (constituting 5-7% of the wage bill) pile up 
unused while workers and their dependents fell behind with 
hospital bills. In some cases patients who had recovered were 
'detained' in hospital until money could be borrowed by their 
relatives to pay off their bills. 129 Funds for workers' 
housing were also improperly diverted to other uses, and 
planned housing construction cancelled as an economy 
measure. 130
Once the seriousness of the neglect of workers' welfare 
and the ignorance on the part of administrative and union 
cadres about workers' genuine difficulties became clear, a 
campaign against bureaucratist indifference to workers' 
problems and the separation of cadres from the masses was 
launched. Delegations of cadres, especially from the unions, 
visited workers' homes to find out the real circumstances of 
their lives and to offer emergency relief to those in 
difficulties, and newspapers ran articles detailing the large
127 Nanfang Ribao 18.6.56, 2. For other examples of
'capitalist management' of welfare amenities, see Union 
Research Service 3, 5, especially pages 66-6 8 .
128 Nanfang Ribao 18.8.56, 2.
129 Nanfang Ribao 19.8.56, 2.
130 Nanfang Ribao 25.6.56, 6 ; Gongren Ribao 6.6.56, 1; 24.6.56,
2.
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amounts of money now being spent on welfare and housing. 131 
Indeed, a report from Shanghai on the 'unprincipled 
accommodation' by cadres of all workers' welfare demands, 
regardless of merit, accused cadres of picking out isolated 
points from higher-level directives to support their own 
'deviations' 132, with the result that enterprise welfare 
funds for the whole year had been exhausted during the first 
half or even the first quarter of the year. A Remain Ribao 
editorial criticized sections of the press for making too much 
of some workers' problems and raising expectations with regard 
to welfare and living standards 133, and the working-class 
tradition of 'hard work and plain and frugal living' was 
promoted once again as an antidote to the one-sided emphasis 
on opposing bureaucratism and improving workers' lives. 134
However, despite this mini-backlash against excessive 
concern for workers' welfare and living conditions, it seems 
unlikely that the 'welfare wind' of the summer of 1956 had any 
great effect. In fact, problems with housing and union 
cadres' refusal to grant emergency assistance to workers from 
welfare funds were still exercising workers in the spring and 
summer of the following year: they are the subject of many of 
the contributions from workers to the debate on Wang Cai's 
ideas in the Guangzhou Ribao, with one worker reporting that 
the findings of union cadres' home visits had been ignored by 
the administration, and that the union had subsequently failed 
to press workers' requests. 135 Workers also asserted that 
they had been criticized for demanding improvements in working 
conditions during this period and that their complaints had
131 See for example Nanfang Ribao 16.7.56, 2; 19.7.56, 2;
8.8.56, 4; 2.9.56, 2.
132 'Don't bend with the wind', Nanfang Ribao 12.10.56, 1.
133 Reprinted in Nanfang Ribao 28.11.56, 1.
134 Gongren Ribao 23.12.56, 1.
135 Guangzhou Ribao 29.5.57, 2.
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been suppressed. 136 It is evident from workers' comments at 
this time that many of them still considered welfare after 
nationalization to have been 'one step forward and two steps 
back' 137, with the old, 'irrational' and 'egalitarian' 
benefits such as double pay at the end of the year and 
allowances for meals, haircuts, laundry etc. abolished, but 
nothing of any substance put in their place.
One problem which clearly had not been successfully 
tackled, the withholding of welfare funds from workers, 
reemerged as a source of conflict the following year. We saw 
earlier that the accumulation of unspent funds while welfare 
problems went unsolved continued largely because workers and 
even lower-level union cadres did not know that the money 
existed. However, when awareness that money was available but 
was not being used for workers' benefit did begin to percolate 
down to workers, this not surprisingly caused enormous 
resentment. It was reported in the Guangxi Ribao in October 
1957 that four months earlier, a worker of the Guilin 
Construction Engineering Company had 'collected fragmentary 
financial statements of the company, and distorted them by 
saying that the cadres " split the welfare funds among 
themselves" and that "the workers were denied any of 
them."' 138 Passing on this information to others, a group 
of workers was alleged to have violently disrupted a mass 
meeting called to discuss workers' grievances and assaulted a 
union cadre whom they believed to be primarily responsible for 
the corrupt dividing-up of welfare funds; they then called a 
strike which lasted for three days. We have no way of knowing 
whether these accusations against cadres were true, but it is 
clear from earlier reports concerning the construction and 
other industries in Guangzhou that large sums were being
136 Guangzhou Ribao 17.5.57, 2.
137 Guangzhou Ribao 17.4.57, 2.
138 Guangxi Ribao 16.10.57, in Union Research Service 9, 20
(6.12.57), 314.
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accumulated in welfare funds for no apparent reason, and cases 
of corruption were by no means unknown. The Guilin incident 
shows how unresolved problems of this nature which first 
surfaced during the 'welfare wind' of 1956 could eventually 
result in serious disturbances, if nothing was done to allay 
suspicions that cadres were benefitting themselves at workers' 
expense.
It was sometimes suggested during the second half of 
1956 that the programme of wage reform carried out in all 
enterprises between April and October of that year would solve 
many of the difficulties workers were experiencing. 139 But 
as we shall see, not only did wage reform not solve many of 
these problems, it actually created some of its own (as well 
as exacerbating some existing problems, such as the difficult 
position of union activists, mentioned above), and became a 
major source of discontent and protest among workers.
The programme was intended to remove all remaining 
irrationalities and inconsistencies in the wage system left 
over from the pre-revolutionary era. The resulting integrated 
system would reflect the Party's priorities for 
'decisive' 140 heavy industrial sectors during the First 
Five-Year Plan. It was a general principle in the reform that 
if workers were evaluated according to the new system and 
found to be in a lower grade or on a lower wage than before, 
they would keep their original grade and wage, so that the 
reform seemed to be in effect a general wage increase, with no 
workers seeing their pay reduced as a result of the new system 
of assessment 141, and most seeing an increase. It was
139 See for example Nanfang Ribao 25.6.56, 6 .
140 'Why wage standards for different regions and industries 
are not the same', Zhongguo Gongren 11, June 1956, 6 .
141 Statements to this effect appear in 'Wage reform questions 
and answers', Zhongguo Gongren 10, May 1956, 4; 'Wage 
reform questions and answers', Zhongguo Gongren 13, July 
1956, 6 .
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admitted, however, that wage reform would not solve all 
workers' livelihood difficulties, and workers were encouraged 
to help themselves by improving their technical skills, with 
those in serious difficulties to rely on trade union emergency 
allowances or mutual assistance funds. 142 Given what we 
know about workers' difficulties in getting assistance from 
these sources, this clearly shows the limitations of the 
reform and the potential for continued hardship among some 
workers and their families.
Workers inclined towards more egalitarian forms of 
distribution and anxious about the widening of the gap between 
the highest and lowest wages both within and between grades 
were assured that
In a socialist society, disparities in wage 
standards are entirely necessary, and this sort of 
disparity is rational, and is an important part of 
the guiding principle for the realization of 
socialism of "more pay for more work, to each 
according to his work", and material 
incentives. 143
A regular system of evaluation, testing and promotion was to 
be put in place in every enterprise, with criteria for 
evaluation including workers' technical skill, speed of work, 
cultural level, and attitude to labour. No consideration was 
supposed to be given to workers' age or length of service in 
itself, since it was assumed that this would be reflected in 
higher technical capabilities and professional experience, 
both factors which could be taken into consideration when
142 'Wage reform questions and answers', Zhongguo Gongren 10, 
May 1956, 4.
143 'Wage standards', Zhongguo Gongren 11, 7.
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assessing workers' grades. 144 In fact., many veteran workers 
who were poorly educated or even illiterate found their wages 
rapidly overtaken by those of the new intake of young workers 
in 1956-7, many of them middle school graduates, in spite of 
the latter's lack of work experience, and this caused 
considerable resentment and friction in some enterprises. 145
If the new wage structure sounded reasonable enough in 
theory, its actual application, in Guangzhou as elsewhere, 
seems to have entailed considerable arbitrariness and 
injustice. It had always been claimed that the reform would 
end the phenomenon of workers receiving different pay for the 
same work, but in fact this was still a frequent occurrence. 
It was one of the main grievances of Wang Cai, a turner in an 
unnamed Guangzhou factory, whose letter to the Guangzhou Ribao 
in April 1957 complaining of leadership bureaucratism and lack 
of concern for workers' welfare in his enterprise began a two- 
month debate in the paper's pages. 146 Wang had been 
evaluated as a grade four worker during wage reform, but 
considered this unfair as he was capable of grade five work, 
and many workers with records similar to his had in fact been 
promoted to grade five. His own assessment of his abilities 
was actually vindicated when, due to pressure of work in the 
factory, cadres asked him to do the work of a grade five 
worker. Incensed, he refused, adopting the principle of 'work 
according to payment' (an chou fu lao) which, as we noted 
above, gained widespread support among workers at this time.
Many of the workers who joined the debate supported 
Wang's decision not do any work for which he was not paid: 
what else, they asked rhetorically, did 'payment according to
144 'Wage reform questions and answers', Zhongguo Gongren 13, 
4.
145 'How to handle internal contradictions in the enterprise 
correctly?', Zhongguo Gongren 11, June 1957, 3-4.
146 The letter was published on April 10 1957 , together with a 
call for widespread discussion of its contents.
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work' mean? 147 Workers protested that the new wage 
regulations had been inconsistently applied with no regard to 
the real situation on the factory floor, resulting in numerous 
mistakes. In some enterprises the problem of undemocratic 
management affected the reforms, with very little democratic 
discussion or consultation taking place before wage-grades 
were decided on. Cadres instead resorting to simplistic, 
commandist methods to carry out 'closed-door' reform in these 
plants, and in these cases dissatisfaction among workers was 
both widespread and justified. 148 There were also clear 
instances of partiality and corruption where reforms were 
implemented in this way: in one enterprise, the entire
department in charge of wage reform was promoted in the 
process, in marked contrast to the proportion promoted in 
other departments, and there were cases of preferential 
treatment for Party and Youth League members who gained 
undeserved promotions which were not approved by workers. 149 
All of the above criticisms of the wage reform process were 
admitted to be correct and justified in June 1957, in the 
article which brought to a close the 'Wang Cai' debate. 150
Another aspect of wage reform which provoked discontent 
and protests was the promotion of piece-work. 1956 saw the 
percentage of the Chinese workforce on piece-rates peak at 
forty-two per cent. 151 Workers on this form of pay found 
that the frequent upward revision of norms which became common 
practice following the completion of wage reform 
'systematically eroded [their] income', with wage gains 'eaten
147 Guangzhou Rihao 12.4.57, 2; 25.4.57, 2.
148 See for example Nanfang Ribao 4.10.56, 2; 25.4.57, 1;
5.5.57, 3; Guangzhou Ribao 30.5.57, 2; 14.5.57, 2.
149 See Nanfang Ribao 4.5.57, 3; Guangzhou Ribao 17.5.57, 2.
150 Guangzhou Ribao 8.6.57, 2.
151 Barry Richraan, Industrial Society in Communist China, 314.
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away by increases in pace [of work] and productivity. ' 152 
Workers had been assured during the progress of the reform 
that the new piece-work system would include a basic wage as 
well as a piece-rate element, which would protect them from 
the old problem of severe or even complete loss of income in 
the event of work stoppages which were beyond their control, 
but in reality this measure does not seem to have had the 
intended effect. During the 'Wang Cai' debate, an official of 
the Municipal Textile Bureau conceded that the allowance paid 
to piece-rate workers in the new joint enterprises in the 
event of unavoidable stoppages in work was 'not enough to live 
on' 153.
As the above comment indicates, after wage reform piece­
workers still seem to have found themselves at a disadvantage 
in the event of power-cuts ('a common occurrence' 154), 
errors on the part of management, late delivery of raw 
materials, or any other factor which might force production to 
be halted temporarily, since workers on time-rates received 
full pay during stoppages while piece-workers were not 
entitled to a supplementary allowance which came anywhere near 
their normal pay to make up for the lost production time. X55 
Hold-ups in production caused by management mistakes were 
particularly galling for workers. In their letters to the 
press, their anger at the administrative incompetence which 
undermined their own achievements in production and squandered 
their efforts comes across very clearly 156; they were not 
solely concerned with its effect on their wages, but felt 
generally let down and exploited.
152 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs A L'Usine, 169.
153 Guangzhou Ribao 11.5.57, 2.
154 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs A L'Usine, 172.
155 Guangzhou Ribao 8.5.57, 2.
156 Guangzhou Ribao 25.5.56, 2.
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The reorganization and amalgamation of enterprises after 
nationalization also affected the income of piece-workers, 
with norms in some factories being aligned with those of all 
other enterprises in the same line of work, regardless of 
factors such as the varying degree of mechanization or 
differences in conditions of work. In Guangzhou, it was 
reported that 4,727 industrial units employing 60,000 workers 
had been taken into joint state-private ownership in 1956 and 
reorganized into 700 enterprises 157. Given the scale of 
this reorganization, it is not surprising that complaints 
about the inappropriate alignment of norms featured in 
workers' letters to the Guangzhou Rihao. Two workers from the 
Yongguang Rubber Factory reported that their pre-reform pay of 
100 yuan per month had been cut by 40% since then because 
after the reorganization norms in their factory had been 
aligned with those of other, more highly mechanized 
enterprises in the same sector. 158 A similar action by the 
management of the Canton Rubber Shoe Factory159 meant that 
workers 'saw their pay fall by 70%' 160. Not only were their 
protests about this ignored, but the management 'reproached 
the recalcitrant workers for their passivity and poor 
spirit' 161, treating the matter as an ideological problem on 
the part of the workers.
In May 1957 some of the undesirable consequences of the 
wage reform in Guangzhou were acknowledged when the Guangdong 
Party Committee cited dissatisfaction with wages as the prime 
cause behind thirteen instances of 'strikes and trouble-making
157 Wen Hui Bao (Hong Kong), 4.2.57, in SCMP 1468, 12.2.57, 19.
158 Guangzhou Ribao 8.5.57, 2. This and the following case are
discussed in Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs A L'Usine, 169-172.
159 Guangzhou Ribao 10.6.57, 2.
160 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs, 169.
161 Ibid., 169.
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activities' in the province since the beginning of the 
year 162. The 'giving of a bigger increase to factory 
[directors] and leading personnel and a smaller increase to 
workers' 163 was specifically mentioned. This was not the 
only instance of cadre privilege in enterprises at this time, 
as we shall see below. There is some evidence that workers in 
the new state-private enterprises were at a disadvantage when 
it came to wage rises: they were excluded from figures 
prepared by the city Statistical Bureau which showed that 
average workers' wages in Guangzhou had risen by 13% after 
wage reform. 164 Further evidence for this comes from a 
report in November 1956 that wages reduced after the 
nationalization of enterprises were now to be restored to 
their pre-nationalization level. 165
Housing, which came very low on the list of investment 
priorities at this point, was a serious problem in Guangzhou, 
where 'the overwhelming majority of the housing stock was 
dilapidated and insalubrious' 166, with 80% of it dating from 
the Qing dynasty or from before the Sino-Japanese War, and 
some flats too dangerous for habitation. This might have been 
a less divisive issue if the available housing had been fairly 
allocated, but instead the crisis 'was exacerbated by social 
inequality' 167, as cadres, often with the connivance of the 
enterprise trade union, allocated a disproportionate share of
162 Xinhua News Agency (Guangzhou), 14.5.57, 'Some 
contradictions within the people exposed by the CCP 
Guangdong Committee', in SCMP 1536, 23.5.57, 18. The lack 
of democracy in factories was the second cause cited.
163 Ibid., 18.
164 Wenhui Bao (Hong Kong), 4.2.57, 'Higher standard of living 
for people of Canton revealed in communique of Statistical 
Bureau', in SCMP 1468, 12.2.57, 21.
165 Nanfang Ribao 16.11.56, 2.
166 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs A L'Usine, 181.
167 Ibid., 183.
172
any new housing to themselves. 168 It was particularly 
ironic that, according to statistics from the Municipal 
Construction Bureau, in 1956 only 8.3% of Guangzhou's 
construction workers 'had solved their housing problems.' 169 
The majority of unmarried workers in the industry who had 
found accommodation were cadres. 170 This irony was 
certainly not lost on construction workers themselves, who 
were the most vociferous critics of the lack of progress in 
housing provision for workers during the 'Wang Cai' debate.
Workers protested that they and their families were stuck 
in dangerous, leaking housing while cadres' dependents, and 
even siblings, had ample accommodation. 171 They clearly 
resented the contrast between cadres' relatively spacious 
flats and their own cramped dormitories, and the way in which 
vacant rooms could always be found for new cadres, while there 
was no space in the already overcrowded and insanitary 
dormitories for supplementary workers. 172 It did not help 
that cadres' rent, paid by their enterprise in this case, was
ten times as much as that paid for workers' dormitory space.
It is evident from workers' statements, and indeed it was 
officially acknowledged as the 'Wang Cai' debate was brought 
to a close, that it was not the housing shortage in itself 
which had provoked so much anger among workers, but rather the 
unfair allocation of the limited stock. 173 The crux of the 
problem was, as ever, the still subordinate position of 
workers and cadres' isolation from them. One of the first 
workers to contribute to the debate made the point that all 
talk about workers having 'stood up' and being 'masters' was
168 Ibid., 183. See also Guangzhou Ribao 9.6.57, 2.
169 Guangzhou Ribao 4.6.57, 2.
170 Ibid., 2.
171 Guangzhou Ribao 29.5.57, 2.
172 Guangzhou Ribao 23.5.57, 2.
173 Guangzhou Ribao 8.6.57, 2.
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meaningless so long as they were still treated unfairly and 
with disdain by those with power over their lives. 174
Workers' disillusionment at the injustices of wage 
reform, the lack of significant improvement in welfare 
provisions after the nationalization of industry, the decline 
in democracy in the new joint enterprises, and the failure of 
the trade unions to defend their rights, contributed to the 
change in attitude towards work which we noted earlier, with 
workers adopting the slogan of 'work according to payment'. 
In doing this they were using 'the only weapon which remained 
to them, the disposal of their labour power, lowering their 
performance and imposing their own rhythm of work.' 175 In 
Gipouloux's view,
This practice exposed what the mythology which held 
the political economy in place wished to cover ups 
the relations of exploitation which bound the 
working class to the Party. 176
The policies of the First Five-Year Plan, as we have 
seen, placed a heavy burden on workers, who by 1956 found that 
'pay was meagre, the rhythm of work exhausting, and living 
conditions deplorable. To say nothing of the exclusion of 
workers from the whole process of decision-making...' 177 
The last point is particularly important, as participation in 
management was supposed to be the feature which distinguished 
socialist enterprises from capitalist ones 178 and showed
174 Guangzhou Ribao 11.4.57, 2.
175 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs A L'Usine, 173.
176 Ibid., 173.
177 Ibid., 270.
178 See for example Lai Ruoyu, 'The current tasks of trade
unions in joint state-private enterprises', Xinhua News
Agency (Beijing), 23.11.56, in SCMP 1422, 3.12.56, 3.
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that workers really were the 'masters of the enterprise' in 
some meaningful sense. Yet despite workers' demands for far- 
reaching democratization and participation in management 
immediately after liberation, the CCP had held back from full 
mobilization of workers to achieve these goals, creating 
tensions in its relationship with workers which fuelled the 
first major confrontation between them. These same tensions 
also underlay the second confrontation with its accompanying 
industrial unrest, and were exacerbated by workers' 
disappointment and disillusionment at the results of the final 
nationalization of industry. If workers' democratic rights in 
state and joint-managed enterprises were ignored and they had 
no accepted legal means of protesting or of attempting to 
enforce those rights, then there really was a sense in which 
they were in a weaker position than had been the case under 
capitalism or in private enterprises, since in a state 
enterprise under a communist government, any attempt at self- 
organization or strike action would be treated as a challenge 
to the regime, which based its legitimacy on its status as the 
vanguard of the proletariat.
If the description of relations between the Party and the 
workers as exploitative sounds extreme, we should remember 
that in 1956-7, workers were being compelled to work all-out 
for socialist construction without enjoying the benefits of 
socialist democracy or the protection of socialist trade 
unions in the enterprise. It is in this context that some 
workers' comments that they were freer in the old society, 
when they could at least vote with their feet and seek work 
elsewhere if working conditions were intolerable, should be 
understood. This sort of freedom was officially condemned as 
'nothing more than the freedom to sell labour power, the 
freedom of the wage-slave' 179, but as we have just seen, 
under the wage and other policies in force in 1956, some 
workers felt like wage-slaves, in the absence of any concrete
179 Wen Jin, 'How we should view freedom and discipline', 
Zhongguo Gongren 18, September 1956, 10.
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manifestation of their theoretical status as 'masters of the 
enterprise'. The scale of the crisis in the CCP's\ 
relationship with the working class is clearly evident from j 
the nearly universal adoption by workers of the so-called/ 
'wage-labour mentality', or 'work according to payment'.
Democracy and the mass line, November 1956 - June 1957
The workers' congress
Distinct signs of a high-level shift in industrial policy 
emerged from the Eighth Party Congress of September 1956, 
where the Soviet model of strictly hierarchical one-man 
management was finally rejected in favour of the mass line in 
industry and the collective leadership of the enterprise Party 
committee. The Congress called for the strengthening of mass 
supervision as part of the 'further broadening of democratic 
life in China' 180, and decided on the establishment of 
experimental workers' congresses, consisting of directly 
elected representatives who could be recalled by workers at 
any time, as the best means of ensuring the 'expansion of 
democracy and introduction of the mass-line method of work in 
state enterprises.' 181 Two months later, at a conference of 
basic-level trade union cadres from joint state-private 
enterprises, the ACFTU Chairman Lai Ruoyu identified 
democratization of management as the feature which
180 Renmin Ribao, 22.3.57, 'On the question of strengthening 
mass supervision in enterprises', 1 .
181 Renmin Ribao, 29.5.57, 'Gradually introduce the system of 
workers' congresses in state-owned enterprises', in SCMP 
1547, 11.6.57, 10.
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' distinguished socialist; enterprises from capitalist 
ones' 182, and called on trade unions to 'preserve and 
improve the system of workers' congresses' 183 in order to 
make workers feel that they really were 'masters of the 
enterprise'.
This change of policy was clearly designed to avert the 
danger of serious, open confrontation between restive and 
alienated workers and the Party and administrative authorities 
in enterprises and beyond; it was a recognition that policy 
had gone too far in the direction of only emphasizing 
production and neglecting democracy, welfare and workers' 
rights. The decision must also have been infuenced by events 
in Eastern Europe during 1956, which the CCP took as an 
indication that it could not safely ignore the pressures that 
were building up in China. The similarity between 
democratization policies in various parts of the socialist 
camp has already been noted.
In promoting wider democratization as an antidote to 
workers' growing discontent, the CCP did in fact reach the 
heart of the matter, for it was not the fact that China was a 
relatively poor and under-developed country which provoked so 
much unrest among the working class, but issues of democracy 
and equality. Herein lies the political content of workers' 
protests: these were not just that their living and working 
conditions were poor and sometimes downright dangerous, but 
that their requests for modest improvements could be 
disregarded with bureaucratist indifference by cadres who did 
not share these hardships, and who even criticized workers for 
venturing to complain; not just that wages were still low and 
that there were irrationalities in the system, but that 
reforms intended to remedy this had been carried out in a
182 Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), 23.11.56, 'The current tasks 
of trade unions in joint state-private enterprises', in 
SCMP 1422, 3.12.56, 3.
183 Ibid., 4.
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high-handed and sometimes corrupt way which violated all 
principles of democratic management and workers' 
participation, and were manipulated by cadres for their own 
advantage while many workers lost out; not just that there was 
a serious shortage of housing, but that the limited stock was 
not allocated according to need, instead being monopolized by 
a privileged group. In short, the state and Party 
bureaucracy, right down to the level of enterprise management 
and including the official unions, had control over virtually 
all important aspects of workers' lives, including the 
organizations and institutions through which they were 
supposed to participate in decision-making and act as the 
'masters'. This left workers with no option but to resort to 
illegal or semi-legal methods to have any influence on the 
most fundamental issues affecting their lives.
The intention behind proposals for enterprise 
democratization was to restore and reinvigorate intermediary 
structures in the enterprise, including the official trade 
union and a revised version, with more extensive powers, of 
the sort of participatory structure which had existed in state 
enterprises after liberation (the WRC) and in private 
enterprises before nationalization (the production-increase 
and economy committee). As we saw, the absence of these sorts 
of intermediary structures had come to mean that rebellious 
workers quickly came into direct conflict with the Party 
itself. With the advantages and defects of earlier 
institutions as a guide, a debate unfolded from the end of 
1956 on what the powers of the new democratic body should be, 
and various models were tried out on an experimental basis in 
enterprises.
A description of the role and powers of the workers' 
congress as they emerged from the debate clearly shows its 
relationship to the earlier workers' representative congress 
(WRC), although given that it was generally accepted that the 
WRC had quickly declined into formalism, there was evidently
178
a need to modify the institution in order to ensure that 
workers' participation would go beyond 'making a 
guarantee' 184 at meetings to carry out managers' 
instructions. Over the seven months from November 1956 to May 
1957, the ACFTU's Lai Ruoyu was a consistent advocate of wider 
and more clearly defined powers for the workers' congress, 
although these were always conditional on the 'non-violation 
of plans, decisions and orders of the higher levels'. 185 It 
was emphasized that if workers and cadres alike were not to 
feel they were wasting their time at congress meetings, all 
congress resolutions which met this condition had to be 
implemented without fail 186, but as we recall from the last 
section, similar statements were made with regard to the WRC 
without these good intentions being translated into reality.
Under Lai's proposals, the workers' congress would have 
the right to take decisions on matters concerning workers' 
interests and benefits, such as the use of factory bonuses and 
state appropriations for safety, and the right to 'recommend 
the appointment and removal of leading officials' and ask for 
revocation of 'inappropriate' decisions. 187 The congress 
was also entitled to 'hear reports of the leadership, 
discuss..., criticize and make proposals' 18e, although this
184 See Li Chun, 'Why democracy must be broadened in enterprise
management, Zhongguo Gongren 6 , March 1957, 3; Renmin
Ribao, 29.5.57, 'Gradually introduce the system of workers' 
congresses in state-owned enterprises', in SCMP 1547,
11.6.57, 10.
185 Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), 23.11.56, 'The current tasks 
of trade unions in joint state-private enterprises', in 
SCMP 1422, 3.12.56, 3.
186 Zai Heng, 'Develop the supervisory role of the workers' 
congress', Zhongguo Gongren 11, June 1957, 7.
187 Xinhua News Agency (Beijing, English), 7.3.57, 'Trade union 
chief on tests of democratic institutions in industry', in 
SCMP 1487, 12.3.57, 22.
188 Ibid., 22.
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entitlement was backed by nothing stronger than moral pressure 
on cadres not to ignore workers' opinions and dismiss their 
suggestions as they had tended to do in the past. Congress 
representatives were to be 'nominated and elected by the 
masses' 189, and in turn management cadres would be 'elected 
by the workers' congress or the general meeting of all 
workers.' 190
The workers' congress as formulated by Lai had the 
additional advantage of providing a useful and positive role 
for the enterprise trade union committee, which was to act as 
the standing organ of the congress, organizing the election of 
delegates, convening the congress regularly, and carrying out 
its resolutions and day-to-day business when it was not in 
session. In this way it was hoped that unions would regain 
the respect and trust of workers and authority in the 
enterprise: according to Lai, 'the trade union management
committee should be a regular organization under the 
leadership of the workers' congress, and also an organization 
with authority.' 191
Early proposals that workers should elect their factory 
director 192 had already been rejected by the end of May 
1957, when a Renmin Ribao editorial stated that
[i]nasrauch as the state enterprises are owned by all 
the people and not collectively owned by the workers 
... the leading administrative personnel of the
189 Renmin Ribao, 30.11.56, 'Bring the fighting role of trade
unions into play in state-private enterprises', in SCMP
1433, 18.12.56, 4.
190 Ibid., 4.
191 Xinhua News Agency, 'The current tasks of trade unions in
joint state-private enterprises', in SCMP 1422, 3.12.56, 4.
192 Xinhua News Agency (Beijing, English), 27.12.56, 'Workers
to take greater part in factory management', in SCMP 1483,
2.1.57, 17.
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enterprise should be appointed by the state 
administrative organs representing the interests of 
all the people and should not be elected by the 
workers' congresses. 193
This was a rather ominous statement, since we saw earlier that 
it was precisely this unchallengeable authority of the state 
representatives which virtually did away with enterprise 
democracy and workers' participation in management after the 
nationalization of industry; the leading role of the factory 
director, the highest state representative in the plant, was 
identified as the main reason for the FMC's decline into 
formalism. Similarly, proposals that the workers' congress 
should be the 'highest administrative organ' 194 in the 
enterprise, or that it should be on 'an equal footing with the 
management' 195 were discarded after trials in only a few 
enterprises.
However, the free election by workers of congress 
representatives was strongly emphasized: union cadres, who 
were to oversee the process of nomination and election of 
candidates, were reminded that although it was important for 
representatives to be competent, 'it is advisable to make no 
mention of the required qualifications so that the masses may 
have a wider latitude in choosing the persons to represent 
them.' 196 But it should also be noted that elections, like 
all other congress activities, were subject to higher-level
193 Renmin Ribao, 29.5.57, 'Gradually introduce the system of 
workers' congresses in state-owned enterprises', in SCMP 
1547, 11.6.57, 11.
194 Xinhua News Agency (Beijing, English), 27.12.56, 'Workers 
to take greater part in factory management', in SCMP 1441,
2.1.57, 17.
195 Xinhua News Agency (Beijing, English), 9.1.57, 'Trade union 
president on factory democracy', in SCMP 1449, 14.1.57, 3.
196 Renmin Ribao, 29.5.57, 'Pool all wisdom to overcome 
internal contradictions and to push production forward', in 
SCMP 1547, 11.6.57, 14.
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approval and could be strongly influenced by the enterprise 
Party committee. Cadre interference in elections was
evidently still common, although it might be disguised as 
concern for democracy:
Some people, although they don't say anything to 
oppose democracy, still don't much trust the masses; 
they are afraid that the masses' "consciousness is 
low, their cultural level is very low", "they don't 
know how to apply democracy", "they raise
excessively high demands", and so, at election time,
[they think] it is necessary to circulate a list of 
names and make the masses "pledge" that they will 
elect these people.... the masses will not be the 
slightest bit interested in this sort of 
"democracy", and will not be prepared to act as this 
sort of "voting machine". 197
This is exactly the same attitude towards elections that we 
found exhibited by union cadres in the months immediately 
following liberation, one which aroused a great deal of 
discontent then among workers who were being deprived of their 
democratic rights. It should be remembered that these same 
union officials who were supposed to run democratic elections 
for workers' congress representatives had themselves been
castigated for undemocratic practices and rigging union 
committee elections early in 1956, something which casts doubt 
on their ability or inclination to adhere to democratic 
principles in organizing workers' congresses.
Overall, in spite of the good intentions of at least some 
of those concerned, no institutional arrangements were put in 
place during late 1956 and the first half of 1957 which would 
have enabled the workers' congress to avoid the fate of its 
predecessors. An article from the Gongren Ribao in 1965 on
197 Li Chun, 'Why democracy must be broadened in enterprise 
management', Zhongguo Gongren 6 , March 1957, 4.
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the strengthening of the congresses shows that they had failed 
to live up to expectations. It reported that congresses over­
emphasised the 'assignment of tasks by leadership and the 
offer of pledges by the representatives, without adequate 
attention to...the opinions of the worker masses.' 198 This 
was exactly the complaint which had been made about the WRC 
when its replacement by a more effective body was first 
mooted. The article also revealed that rather than being 
elected by the workers, 'the workers' representatives were 
mostly nominated by the leadership. Most of them were 
cadres.' 199
The campaign against bureaucratism
If there were definite limits to democratization in 
response to workers' protests, there was, during the first 
half of 1957, a clear attempt to recognise workers' demands 
for greater attention to their welfare and their democratic 
rights as legitimate, and to go some way towards meeting these 
demands. Since it could not be admitted that most of the 
difficulties workers were experiencing, in terms of livelihood 
as well as democratic participation, were directly 
attributable to deliberate Party and state policy decisions 
(one-man management, nationalization and reorganization of 
enterprises, wage reform, piece-work and the setting of norms, 
the emphasis on production at the expense of welfare and even 
safety; the whole direction of the First Five-Year Plan, in 
fact), the campaign had to be cast in terms which would stress 
problems in the application of policy at the lower level, i.e. 
in the enterprise.
As was noted in the previous section, the CCP took a
198 Gongren Ribao, 13.10.65, 'Metallurgical workers of Shenyang 
improve system or workers' congresses', in SCMP 3576, 
10.11.65, 11.
199 Ibid., 11.
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similar line when opposition to the policy of 'benefitting 
both labour and capital# among workers reached serious levels, 
blaming mistakes by union cadres, who had in fact followed 
Party guidelines to the letter, rather than the fact that this 
sort of reformist policy could never be accepted by many 
workers. Now, even the fundamental question of the proper 
relationship between leaders and led in a socialist society 
was to be tackled in terms of errors in basic-level 
application of policy, hence the emphasis in so many articles 
on democratization on the problems caused by cadres' 
bureaucratism and authoritarianism, and the combination, from 
March 1957, of the revived Hundred Flowers movement with an 
open rectification movement.
One of the more authoritative analyses of the labour 
unrest of 1956-7, the Renmin Ribao editorial 'On labour 
trouble' 200, closely followed Mao's line on the handling of 
non-antagonistic contradictions, and identified cadre 
bureaucratism as the main cause of the unrest. While 
insisting that 'the fundamental interests of the leaders are 
identical with [those] of the worker masses' 201, the article 
acknowledged that there was a possibility of conflict between 
partial and overall, or immediate and long-term, interests. 
Bearing this in mind, the article reminded cadres that if 
workers made demands, they should listen to them and decide 
whether or not they were reasonable and could feasibly be 
granted. All reasonable and feasible demands should be met; 
in the case of those demands which were not reasonable, or 
which could not at present be met for practical reasons, it 
was vital that cadres explained to the workers exactly why 
this was so, because it was not when workers' demands were 
turned down that they resorted to strikes and other disruptive 
activities, but when they were turned down and no convincing
200 Renmin Ribao, 13.5.57, 'On labour trouble', in SCMP 1536,
23.5.57, 1-3.
201 Ibid., 1.
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explanation was forthcoming.
Cadres were particularly warned against arrogance and 
dishonesty towards workers; it was noted in another article 
that some leading cadres 'behaved in the presence of the 
masses as if the leadership were infallible.' 202 Cadres who 
'put on airs and [told] lies to the masses' failed to keep 
their promises and lacked proper concern for workers' welfare:
Over problems of vital interest to the masses, the 
deeds of leaders do not correspond to their words 
and their disposal of things is not fair. All such 
[actions] will cause serious discontent among the 
masses. 203
We have already seen that this sort of behaviour was extremely 
common, and that it did indeed provoke great anger and 
bitterness among workers. However, decisions on 'problems of 
vital interest to the masses' were not solely the province of 
the basic-level cadres at whom these criticisms were aimed: at 
the heart of workers' discontent was the fact that the CCP's 
own 'words did not conform to its deeds', as the supposed 
'masters' of the state and the enterprise were still largely 
powerless unless they were prepared to resort to extreme 
methods.
Precisely in order to avoid this eventuality, cadres were 
also warned against resorting to repression to deal with the 
workers, since prohibiting the expression of workers' 
discontent would merely 'aggravate the contradiction behind 
the trouble instead of solving it.' 204 The very fact that 
workers had found themselves compelled to use such methods as
202 Renmin Ribao, 5.5.57, quoted in Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs 
A L'Usine, 193.
203 Renmin Ribao, 'On labour trouble', SCMP 1536, 2.
204 Ibid., 2.
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strikes and go-slows showed that cadres were at fault, since 
they must have disregarded the first rumblings of discontent 
and failed to keep in close contact with the workers so as to 
understand their mood. Trade union cadres were particularly 
culpable on this point, since they were supposed to provide 
the link between the Party and the workers. Facilitating 
communication between the two was one of the main tasks of the 
large networks of union activists in enterprises:
Only someone who lives among the masses can 
understand them most clearly. Trade union activists 
are themselves workers and staff, and so they can 
report everyone's demands to the trade union, and 
thus make it easier for the trade union to act on 
everyone's behalf. 205
But as we have seen, trade union activists at this point were 
so badly demoralized that few were willing or able to make 
much effort in the job, and at the level of the trade union 
hierarchy where cadres actually had some influence which could 
be exercised on workers' behalf, i.e. the enterprise trade 
union leadership, cadres were often just as out of touch as 
administrative cadres, and were inclined to side with the 
latter against the workers. Hence workers' adoption of more 
forceful means of expressing their discontent.
Some gave these union cadres the benefit of the doubt, 
believing that if they had been in touch with actual working 
conditions they would have intervened to protect workers' 
interests when these were threatened by administrative 
action 206, but that 'due to bureaucracy, [they did] not feel
205 Liu Shi, 'The glorious responsibility of trade union 
activists', Zhongguo Gongren 24, December 1956, 10.
206 Renmin Ribao, 9.5.57, 'On an 8,000 li tour of hurried 
observation', in SCMP 1551, 17.6.57, 10.
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the masses' hardship as they [did] their own. ' 207 Some 
workers might have put it more bluntly, blaming not just 
bureaucratism, but the fact that cadres sat in their offices 
all day pen-pushing and had superior housing, welfare benefits 
and other privileges which came with their positions to 
prevent them from ' feeling the masses' hardship as their 
own'. 208 In any case, given the widely acknowledged 
weakness of the union in the enterprise hierarchy, it is to 
say the least doubtful that union action in defence of 
workers' rights would have been successful even if the union 
leadership had been fully aware of workers' problems. The 
claim that trade union cadres were themselves too 
bureaucratist to be able to correct management bureaucratism, 
and contributed to contradictions within the working class 
rather than resolving them 209, probably also has some truth 
in it.
While the debate on bureaucratism, democracy and how best 
to enable the 'masters of the enterprise' to participate in 
management went on, fuelled by workers' demands for democratic 
management 210, the industrial unrest which had gained 
momentum during 1956 continued unabated in Guangzhou and 
seemingly in every other major Chinese city. We have already 
seen that some workers made explicit reference to events in 
Hungary when discussing their motives for this sort of direct 
action, and that this was in keeping with the general mood of 
militancy in Chinese enterprises where 'creating disturbances'
207 Renmin Ribao, 13.5.57, 'On labour trouble', in SCMP 1536, 
2.
208 See for example the letter from Chen Qing of the Huanan 
Sewing Machine Factory, Guangzhou Ribao 11.5.57, 2.
209 See for example 'On the correct handling of contradictions 
within the rank of the working class', Xinjiang Ribao,
9.5.57, in Union Research Service 8 , 12, 9.8.57, 223.
210 See Union Research Service 8,12, particularly 225, 228, and 
232; Li Chun, 'Why democracy must be broadened in 
enterprise management', Zhongguo Gongren 6 , March 1957, 4.
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was gaining ground as the only effective means of putting 
pressure on the leadership. Chinese reports of the Hungarian 
unrest stressed that the strikes there were not supported by 
all workers, involved a great deal of violence and damage to 
property, and were organized by illegal workers' organizations 
which had been ordered to disband211, thus signalling 
official disapproval of the events, but these reports did mean 
that workers in China were well aware that strikes were taking 
place elsewhere in the socialist camp, and knew in broad terms 
what was behind the disputes, namely leadership bureaucratism. 
This knowledge may well have acted as an encouragement to 
Chinese workers, particularly as articles in the labour 
movement press were sometimes more sympathetic towards events 
in Eastern Europe. 212
April 1957 was a particularly eventful month in 
Guangzhou, with the publication of Wang Cai's letter 
coinciding with two major industrial conflicts which 'had in 
common their origin: the autocratic style of management and 
the harshness of working conditions.' 213 The first 
incident, at the Nanjiang Steelworks, reflected the impact of 
the nationalization of industry, as it was said that 
management at the plant had been particularly lax since the 
arrival of state representatives.
The immediate cause of the April incident was 
management's failure to pay workers who had worked on a public 
holiday, but this seems just to have been the spark which set 
light to months of accumulated resentment:
For a long time, workers' demands had been
systematically ignored by the leadership. The
211 See for example Nanfang Ribao 13.12.56, 4.
212 See for example 'How to understand the Hungarian Incident', 
Zhongguo Gongren 22, November 1956, 8 .
213 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs A L'Usine, 194.
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blunders of the administrative staff aggravated the 
tension: it was not unusual for workshop heads to 
make deductions from workers' pay during stoppages 
[ due to breakdowns ]. 214
On April 10, 1957, workers drew up a petition demanding the 
pay that was owed to them and, bursting into the factory 
director's office, compelled the deputy director to sign it 
and to accompany them to the headquarters of the industrial 
corporation to present the petition, in what was reported to 
be 'an extremely tense atmosphere'. 215 At this point the 
enterprise's administration and Party and union committees 
became involved, as did the local district committee, and 
negotiations were begun which after more than two weeks 
completely vindicated the workers. As part of the agreement, 
'cadres promised to go down to the workshops more often' 216, 
showing that this dispute, like so many others, was blamed in 
part on cadres' bureaucratism and lack of knowledge of actual 
conditions in the enterprise.
It was accepted that earlier instances of unprincipled 
behaviour on the part of the management had led the Nanjiang 
workers to conclude that only direct action in the form of 
creating disturbances could get results. A vicious circle 
thus came into being, as the administration, well aware of 
workers' readiness to cause disturbances in pursuit of their 
demands, became afraid of 'giving full play to democracy', as 
the slogan went, and thereby provoked even greater 
dissatisfaction among the workers by its undemocratic and 
secretive conduct, which dissatisfaction found expression in 
more disturbances, and so on. The administration's fear of 
involving workers in decision-making led it to attempt 
'closed-door' wage reform, resulting in prolonged protests and
214 Ibid., 195.
215 Guangzhou Ribao 14.5.57, 1.
216 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs, 195.
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simmering discontent after wage-grades and promotions were 
decided by a 'small group' of Party, administrative and union 
cadres and the list simply posted for workers to read. Since 
the lack of democracy in the enterprise seemed to be the crux 
of the problem, the solution recommended was self-criticism, 
first by cadres and then by members of the workers' 
'delegation', and the promotion of the workers' congress, 
which had yet to be established in many Guangzhou
enterprises. 217
The second major dispute in Guangzhou during the spring 
developed on the docks, the site of much conflict immediately 
after liberation. Here, '[c]adres' intransigence and the 
harshness of working conditions provoked growing
absenteeism.' 218 It was reported that in April only 75% of
workers were at work219, and according to Li Xiuren's report
on his '8,000 li tour' in May, only 40% were working. 220 
'The reason for these defections was simple: dockers who were 
paid piece-rates earned less than those on sick-leave (which 
guaranteed them 75% of basic wages).' 221 Workers may not 
actually have called a strike, but this deliberate, mass 
absenteeism amounted to the same thing. The main bone of 
contention on the docks was the new shift system which had 
been imposed in spite of workers' protests. This system 
forced workers to work eight hours on, eight hours off for two 
days, after which they would get one day off. The sixteen- 
hour day left workers overworked and exhausted, and so unable
217 Guangzhou Ribao 14.5.57, 1.
218 Ibid., 196.
219 Guangzhou Ribao 15.6.57, 1.
220 Gongren Ribao 9.5.57, 2. The Nan fang Ribao (19.5.57)
stated that attendance fell to 60% at its lowest.
221 Ibid., 196.
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to earn a decent wage on the piece-rate system 222 as the 
highest rates were earned for the most physically demanding 
tasks; it also caused an increase in accidents and work- 
related illness among workers. 223
Not only did the dockers' trade union not object to this 
new system, 'on the contrary, [the union] helped the 
administration devise ways and means... to compel the workers 
to go to work.' 224 In one of the more blatant examples of 
the union failing in its duty to protect workers' health and 
safety in the face of excessive demands from the 
administration, the union assisted management by preventing 
doctors from signing workers off on sick leave 225, and 
acquiesced in the increase of penalties for absence and the 
imposition of tighter regulations on absence, under which 
workers who were just five minutes late would be locked out 
for the entire day, unable to earn any wages. 226 Workers 
were punished for stopping work by being made to spend an 
entire eight-hour shift at the personnel department 
undertaking 'self-criticism'; they received no wage for this 
time, just a meal allowance of fifty fen. 227
Workers also had other grievances, about the management 
of social and medical services (the clinic dispensary opened 
an hour after work began, making it difficult for workers to 
find time to visit it), and about housing; new housing built 
by the workers themselves, heeding the official line that they
222 Renmin Ribao, 9.5.57, 'On an 8,000 li tour of hurried
observation', in SCMP 1551, 17.6.57, 10; Gongren Ribao,
9.5.57, 2.
223 Gongren Ribao 9.5.57, 2; Nanfang Ribao 19.5.57, 1.
224 Ibid., 2.
225 Ibid., 2.
226 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs, 197.
227 Nanfang Ribao 19.5.57, 1.
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should not rely on the state for everything, had been occupied 
by government employees. 228 In May, the striking dockers 
'gave themselves over to a closely-argued criticism .. . of the 
administration and its practices.' 229 Of the 160 grievances
which they identified, almost half (73) were to do with
regulations, work discipline and cadres' workstyle, while 40 
concerned wages and excessively high norms, 30 health, hygiene 
and labour insurance matters, and 17 housing, canteens and 
welfare. 230
These represented a familiar picture of workers'
discontent in 1956 and 1957, reflecting the basic problem of 
workers' lack of influence in the enterprise. Once again we 
see how workers were powerless in the face of unfair housing 
allocation and unrealistic norms which drove down incomes, set 
by cadres who had quickly forgotten what hard physical labour 
was like once they gained their position. 231 The lack of 
democratic consultation, unions' siding with the
administration against the workers, the application of illegal 
and arbitrary punishments when workers objected to the new 
regime - all these forms of behaviour had been criticized in 
the press for more than a year, and a shift in policy in the 
direction of acknowledging and correcting these defects had 
long since been signalled by no less an authority than the 
Eighth Party Congress, yet down on the docks, and on many 
other shop floors, it seemed very little had changed. 
Workers' letters during the 'Wang Cai' debate are full of the 
same problems and injustices which were exposed by the short­
lived 'welfare wind' of the previous year, which still 
remained unsolved.
228 Ibid., 197.
229 Ibid., 196.
230 Guangzhou Ribao 15.6.57, 1.
231 Li Xiuren singled out two union vice-chairs, former 
dockers, for particular criticism in this respect.
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From the proportion of dock workers' complaints which 
concerned cadres' workstyle and regulations we can perhaps see 
why it was that democratization and the much-vaunted system of 
workers' congresses had had little effect. Looking at the 
above description of how the dispute developed, it is easy to 
see that cadres, including trade union cadres, behaved in an 
extremely high-handed and autocratic way, changing rules and 
imposing fines and punishments on workers in an attempt to 
force them to comply with the new organization of work. This 
is the sort of behaviour attributed to bureaucrats and 
capitalists in the old society, and closely resembles the 
criticisms of one-man management made in early 1956. It is 
hard to reconcile with the official insistence that workers 
and cadres were political equals, with their different roles 
in the enterprise merely reflecting the division of labour 
necessary in a modern industrial organization; it is equally
difficult to see how, with cadres taking this attitude, any
mechanism for democratic participation by workers in 
management could be made to work, if it did not include any 
provision for forcing cadres to listen to and take note of 
workers' opinions and demands, but simply relied on their good 
faith, as the workers' congress ultimately did.
On the subject of the workers' congress, it is
interesting to note that the revised norms which caused so 
much discontent on the docks had, the leadership argued, been 
passed by the workers' congress. Many norms had been raised 
by as much as 18% while most unit prices were reduced, meaning 
that it was difficult for many workers to achieve the new 
standards, and even those who could earned less than they had 
for the same level of production the previous year. 232 
Workers countered that the decision had only been passed by 
their representatives 'under duress' and in a formalistic way, 
i.e without real discussion and agreement. This seems to 
indicate that the workers' congress could actually be used
232 Nanfang Ribao 19.5.57, 1.
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against workers, with resolutions forced through it on the 
basis of dubious management findings 233 then presented to 
workers as 'their own' decisions.
In May the leadership on the docks, alarmed by 
'absenteeism [and] the collapse of productivity' 234, brought 
in reforms which met some of the workers' demands, 
specifically those on work norms, medical care and welfare, 
and regulations on absence from work and lateness? other 
matters were referred to the higher level for resolution. 235 
The cadres deemed responsible for the work stoppages and 
losses in productivity were criticised, for as workers pointed 
out, 'if the leadership had listened to us a little earlier, 
production would not have been damaged.' 236 One more 
characteristic feature of this dispute is that nowhere is 
there any mention of trade union involvement in its 
resolution: 'everything was played out between the pressure of 
the workers and the higher levels of the Party 
hierarchy.' 237
Workers vs. cadres: the failure of democratic reform
By May 1957, the debate on democracy and bureaucratism 
was threatening to go far beyond what the CCP could tolerate 
and still maintain its legitimacy. In the previous section, 
we saw how workers' demands for extended democratization 
foundered on leadership fears of 'extreme democratization.' 
In the case of the Democratic Reform Movement, cadres'
233 Workers claimed the new norms had been arrived at after 
hasty and partial observation of their work by inspection 
staff.
234 Ibid., 197.
235 Guangzhou Ribao 15.6.57, 1.
236 Ibid., 1.
237 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs, 198.
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reluctance fully to mobilize workers for fear that they would 
take the movement to extremes resulted in workers' losing 
interest in the campaign, and even when the Five-Anti movement 
allowed workers' demands to come to the fore again, the Party 
was able to regain control fairly quickly. But in this second 
confrontation over the issue, the fact of widespread
industrial unrest, with workers' protests directed not at 
'feudal elements' or capitalists, but at the Party and state 
bureaucracy itself, sharpened the conflict considerably.
Although no actual opposition to management
democratization and the workers' congress is evident in the 
press between November 1956 and June 1957, we have already 
seen how the more far-reaching proposals were dropped after 
very limited trials in a few enterprises, and it was not long 
before fears that the reforms would unleash 'extreme
democratization' surfaced again. 238 As had happened at the 
Nanjiang Steelworks, the reluctance on the part of enterprise 
leaders to broaden democracy as a means of defusing workers' 
discontent led them into repressive measures which actually 
exacerbated that discontent. When the officially approved, 
democratic channels for dealing with their grievances were 
thus denied to workers, they resorted to other methods, 
including mass absenteeism, strikes etc., which in turn 
confirmed leaders' fears of workers' militancy and extremist 
tendencies and reinforced their inclination to respond with 
authoritarian measures, provoking a further escalation in the 
unrest. Given that this was workers' reaction to attempts to 
limit democracy in enterprises, it became clear that workers' 
congresses could only be successful if workers were genuinely 
permitted to speak out freely and exercise their democratic 
rights; if this demand was not met, not only would they 
swiftly abandon the organization, but their discontent would 
have been intensified. 239
238 Gongren Ribao 17.4.57, 3.
239 See Gongren Ribao 13.5.57, 2.
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The official trade unions must take some of the 
responsibility for the escalating conflict in industry at this 
time. It seems likely that the unions' reputation among 
workers, which reached a new low during 1956-7, helped to 
discredit the system of workers' congresses before it was even 
fully implemented. There is evidence of opposition to the 
proposal to make the union committee the standing organ of the 
congress 240, with some workers concerned that congress 
resolutions would be meaningless if their implementation was 
left to such an ineffective and untrustworthy organization. 
Once it was decided that the union committee would definitely 
take this role, workers' hopes of exerting significant 
influence in the enterprise through the workers' congress must 
have faded somewhat, leaving them to continue with the more 
direct method of pressing their demands through industrial 
unrest.
No-one was more aware of the precarious position of the 
unions at this point than the unions themselves. Li Xiuren, 
deputy head of the ACFTU's General Office, concluded from his 
tour of cities on the Beijing-Wuhan-Guangzhou railway line 
that 'the unions have lost the masses. With the unions 
separated from the masses to this extent, how can it be 
anything but a crisis in union work?' 241 This 'crisis' 
caused Li Xiuren, Gao Yuan and others to begin to formulate a 
role for the unions in which they would concern themselves 
mainly or exclusively with the interests and demands of the 
workers, without the usual riders about the identity of their 
long-term interests with those of the state; in other words, 
the unions would now side with the workers rather than with 
the Party or administration. 242
240 Gongren Ribao 11.1.57, 1; 25.2.57, 1'
241 Gongren Ribao 9.5.57, 1.
242 See the attacks on Gao Yuan's ideas in Gongren Ribao
22.10.57, 1; 11.11.57, 3; 12.11.57, 3; 19.11.57, 2.
196
This change in attitude within the unions is illustrated 
by the growing tendency during the spring of 1957 for unions 
to condone workers' resort to usually unacceptable methods of 
expressing their discontent and gaining concessions. The view 
gained ground that workers who resorted to strike action
sometimes ... have no choice but to act in this way.
It would be best if it didn't happen at all. 
Because it affects production, it actually damages 
the workers themselves. But once this sort of 
incident has occurred, cadres should not blame the 
masses too much, as strikes and disruptions are 
often provoked by bureaucratism, and cadres should 
adopt the methods of broadening democracy and 
following the mass line to solve them. 243
Even with the authority for this response to unrest coming 
ultimately from Kao himself, most cadres still took a far 
harder line than the unions on even those actions by workers 
which were perfectly legal, such as the independent 
organization of delegations to present petitions to higher- 
level organs. 244 The opprobrium heaped on Gao Yuan later in 
the year for having said strikes were a good method of 
combatting leadership bureaucratism 245 shows how quickly 
this sort of tolerance came to be regarded as counter­
revolutionary, suggesting perhaps that support for it had 
never been wholehearted.
243 'How to handle internal contradictions in the enterprise 
correctly?', Zhongguo Gongren 11, June 1957, 4.
244 See Gongren Ribao 23.4.57, 1.
245 Gongren Ribao 11.11.57, 3. Mao never went so far as to 
describe strikes as a good method, but approved of them as 
a last resort after criticism of bureaucratism had failed. 
However, he warned delegates at a January 1957 conference 
not to go back to their own regions and 'say that there was 
a meeting in Beijing and now the whole country can go on 
strike (laughter)... and say that I said so...' (Mao Zedong 
Sixiang Wansui1, 94).
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In May 1957, union cadres, including the ACFTU head Lai 
Ruoyu, also began to turn their attention publicly towards the 
problems at the higher levels of their organizations, rather 
than focusing exclusively on the work-style defects of 
grassroots cadres 246, and in this they both echoed the 
opinion of increasing numbers of workers 247 (in a deliberate 
attempt to regain their allegiance), and gave further impetus 
to the widening of the debate, which now threatened to spread 
to include all aspects of the CCP's policies towards workers. 
The beginnings of a shift in unions' attitude brought 
predictable Party accusations of economism and syndicalism 
later in the year, and a purge of union leadership similar to 
that which took place in 1951-2.
The most striking characteristic of the many accounts of 
conflict between workers and the authorities during this 
second period of confrontation is the palpable sense of 
division, hostility and mistrust between workers and cadres 
which permeates them all. It is at the root of this division 
that we will find the reasons why an underlying conflict in 
the Party's relationship with the working class which had been 
shelved, apparently successfully, for three years burst into 
the open again during 1956. One reason, of particular
relevance to Guangzhou because of the size of the remaining 
private sector in that city, was undoubtedly the final
nationalization of industry in that year, with its advance
propaganda which led workers to expect a dramatic improvement 
in their material lives 248 contradicted by actual events, as 
workers in these enterprises in many cases found themselves 
worse off in terms of welfare, pay, and democratic
participation after the transformation.
246 Gongren Ribao 11.5.57, 1; 18.5.57, 3.
247 See workers' comments on unions in Gongren Ribao 21, 22,
29.5.57.
248 Guangzhou Ribao 19.4.57, 2.
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Yet this cannot be the only reason for the outbreaks of 
unrest in Guangzhou and elsewhere, which seem to have been far 
more serious than anything which occurred during the first 
confrontation after liberation. There is of course the point 
that there were no longer any significant groups such as 
capitalists or 'feudal remnants' against whom protests could 
be directed; the target of workers' animosity now would always 
ultimately be the CCP, which meant that industrial unrest and 
strikes, still legal but not approved of, took on more serious 
political overtones. But conflict also escalated in the old 
state enterprises during this second confrontation, so we must 
look further for its causes.
The division of workers from cadres was widely recognized 
as a problem during the final phase of the Hundred Flowers 
movement, but analyses of this division tended to stop at the 
level of work-style and attitude. One article on workers' 
congresses carried the headline, 'What is the most outstanding 
contradiction within the working class? The leadership's 
bureaucratist workstyle and the workers' demands for extended 
democracy' 249, and this was a typical conclusion. But there 
were signs, as the confrontation reached a climax in the 
spring of 1957, that deeper questions of political and social 
inequality were behind the split. Workers were not simply 
protesting that cadres behaved as if they were old-style 
bureaucrats or capitalists, bossing workers about and treating 
them with disdain, but that they actually possessed power over 
workers' lives which allowed them to take decisions in an 
autocratic and arbitrary way, and that workers had no 
legitimate power available to them to counteract this. This 
is why workers rejected the workers' congress as soon as it 
became apparent that it would not be allowed to become an 
institution with real power in the enterprise, and instead 
went back to the illegitimate methods of industrial unrest and 
causing disturbances which seemed to them to be the only ones
249 Gongren Ribao 13.5.57, 2.
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which had any effect.
This imbalance of power was of course not a new 
development, but the more time passed after liberation, and 
the more the Party's reputation became tarnished by cadre 
privilege and the failure of improvements in workers' 
conditions to keep pace with improvements in production, the 
more starkly it appeared. Some cadres still attempted to hark 
back to the early days of revolutionary struggle and sacrifice 
to demonstrate how little workers now had to complain about, 
but this was _not— successful tactic. When workers in a 
Guangzhou(machine work^ asked for improved ventilation in a 
workshop where temperatures regularly reached 110° (more in 
the summer), they were rebuked by a cadre who reminded them 
that
When the Red Army was on the Long March, they 
managed to survive by eating tree bark, and you're 
saying when it's a bit warm in the workshop you 
can't work? 250
Coming from a cadre with an electric fan in his office, this 
remark provoked outrage rather than a shamefaced withdrawal of 
the demand. The constant exhortations to workers not to rely 
on the state for everything also risked an angry response, as 
workers were not slow to point out that if anyone relied on 
the state for everything, it was the cadres, with their 
special sanatoria and cadres-only canteens; they, not workers, 
were 'entering communism ahead of schedule', as the joke went, 
with everything provided for them according to need. 251
All the different points of contention in this second 
confrontation, then, from corrupt and undemocratic practices 
during wage reform, unfair housing allocation, and the failure 
of promised welfare benefits to materialize, to the criticism,
250 Guangzhou Ribao 17.5.57, 2.
251 Gongren Ribao 21.5.57, 2.
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labelling, and punishment of workers expressing legitimate 
grievances, came down to this inequality of power. The Party 
never admitted it, and even at the height of the conflict 
workers too spoke mainly of attitudes and work-styles, but 
their ready resort to withdrawing their labour and organizing 
themselves shows their awareness of their own lack of power if 
they kept to the structures of participation and 
representation which had been set up for them. They quickly 
realized that the new system of workers' congresses would not 
give them any real authority in the enterprise, and so 
rejected it; some refused even to elect representatives. 252
The anti-rightist campaign: the end of 'blooming and
contending'?
One view of Mao's motive in launching the Hundred Flowers 
movement is that it was intended to trick his rightist 
opponents into revealing themselves; this is the motive which 
in fact was claimed for it at the beginning of the anti­
rightist campaign in June 1957. Another view, perhaps more 
plausible, is that Mao, in common with other top leaders, was 
not aware of the depth of feeling which the call to outsiders 
to criticise the Party might unleash. It is certainly hard to 
believe that the CCP leadership was fully aware of the depth 
of the division between workers and their leaders, since it 
seems to have attempted to paper over the cracks with a 
revised version of democratic institutions which had failed in 
the past and token participation in physical labour on the 
part of cadres. 253 But whatever the original intention, it 
became clear by the beginning of June 1957 that criticism of 
the CCP regime had reached dangerous levels, and with the 
lesson of the Hungarian Incident fresh in the leadership's
252 Nanfang Ribao 3.6.57, 1.
253 See Gongren Ribao 1.5.57, 1; 3.5.57, 2; 4.5.57, 1.
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minds, the anti-rightist campaign was launched on June 8.
The targets of the anti-rightist campaign were all 
intellectuals of one sort or another. The fact that only a 
few union leaders were officially branded as rightists and 
punished for their activities during the Hundred Flowers 
period has given the impression that workers did not suffer 
any reprisals once the brief interval of liberalization and 
democracy had come to an end, being involved in the anti­
rightist campaign only to the extent that they 'spoke out' at 
meetings organized to condemn the main rightists. One of the 
first articles to report veteran workers' criticism of 
rightist intellectuals was somewhat disingenuously titled 
'Workers start to speak up' 254; workers had of course been 
doing precisely this for some months, but not in support of 
the Party. No explicit reference was made during the campaign 
to the industrial unrest of the preceding eighteen months 
which had exposed the crisis in the Party's relationship with 
the working class, although some of the points made as veteran 
workers compared their lives before and after liberation 
touched on the issues involved: for example, claims by
intellectuals that the CCP was exploitative and lived in 
luxury at the expense of ordinary people were refuted, but 
with no hint that broadly the same conclusions had been 
reached by many workers. 255
But even if it was not publicly acknowledged, given what 
we know about their scale and seriousness it is not credible 
that workers' criticisms of the Party and protest actions 
escaped punitive measures. As early as January 1957, long 
before the anti-rightist campaign began, Mao had warned 
provincial and municipal Party secretaries that nothing short 
of a counter-revolutionary revolt should be met with armed 
force, but the very fact that such a warning against 'the
254 Remain Ribao 10.6.57, in SCMP 1553, 6 .
255 Guangzhou Ribao 10.6.57, 1.
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methods of the GMD' 256 (such as mass arrests and firing on 
demonstrators) was necessary shows how disturbances were 
likely to be dealt with. Once the anti-rightist campaign 
began, it was much easier to brand anyone involved in 
disturbances as a counter-revolutionary (particularly if they 
had violated the conditions for legitimate criticism laid down 
in the revised version of Mao's speech on contradictions among 
the people, which was only now published), and thus to resort 
to harsher repressive measures. Workers, and some union 
activists, were in fact imprisoned and sent to labour camps in 
the aftermath of the Hundred Flowers movement, and some were 
executed 257, but they were distinguished from the 
intellectuals by being labelled 'bad elements' 256 rather 
than rightists, a term which has criminal rather than 
political connotations. This repression seems to have had a 
lasting impacts memories of this period are adduced by a 
Guangzhou Red Guard, Dai Xiao'ai, as a reason for the 
reluctance of most workers to get involved in political 
campaigns in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. 259
However, there was no immediate cessation of the 
rumblings of discontent from workers; these continued 
sporadically until the end of the year, and were accompanied 
by further promotion of democratization and the establishment 
of workers' congresses, and by a rectification campaign in 
enterprises in the autumn of 1957 which consisted chiefly of 
criticism of enterprise leaders by workers as a means of 
correcting the former's bureaucratist errors. In this way, 
the CCP attempted to deal harshly with those it considered
256 Mao Zedong Sixiang WansuiJ, 8 6 .
257 See Chan, 'Revolution or corporatism?', 33, and Union
Research Service 9, 20, 6.12.57, 'Workers made to pay for
mistaken ideas about striking'.
258 See Chan, ibid., 33.
259 Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard - the political
autobiography of Dai fisiao-ai, 56.
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most culpable, whose words and actions had gone far beyond 
what was permissible, and to make some limited concessions to 
the rest who had not gone so far and whose grievances were 
recognized as legitimate. But to keep this campaign under
control, it was coupled with a 'systematic socialist 
propaganda and education movement' 260 which was intended to 
strengthen political and ideological education of workers. 
The same newspaper which announced this campaign in Guangzhou 
had a few months earlier ridiculed the leadership on the docks 
for resorting to the 'talisman' of political and ideological 
education to suppress fully justified protests by
workers 261, showing the change in atmosphere which had taken 
place. The appearance of democratization given by the methods 
to be used in the campaign, such as 'great debates' and 'free
airing of views' 262, is belied by the subject matter
prescribed for it, namely the correct relationships between 
democracy and centralism, freedom and discipline, individual 
and collective interests, etc.. Organized discussion of these 
issues had long been the standard method of peacefully 
suppressing unrest among workers.
Reports on the progress of the campaign throughout the 
second half of 1957 show how the sharp conflict between 
workers and cadres which had dominated the preceding six 
months rumbled on. While workers' 'candid and incisive' 263 
criticisms of their leaders in dazlbao were praised by 
visiting higher-level officials, such as the provincial Party 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang 264, they were evidently a little too 
candid for some of the cadres to whom they referred, who had 
reportedly restricted the development of the movement by
260 Nanfang Ribao 12.9.57, 2 .
261 Nanfang Ribao 19.5.57, 1.
262 Nanfang Ribao 12.9.57, 2 .
263 Nanfang Ribao 5.10.57, 2 .
264 Nanfang Ribao 11.10.57 r 1 •
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failing to dispel workers' suspicions that the invitation to 
speak out was some sort of trap 265 . Some had also prevented 
certain dazibao from being put up, covered them up or even 
destroyed them, and had taken reprisals against their 
critics. 266 But despite the persistence of some workers in 
asking the difficult questions about who really was the master 
of the enterprise, workers or the Party, by the time of the 
Eighth ACFTU Congress in December 1957, the CCP's application 
of 'repression, persuasion or concession' 267 had been 
largely successful in bringing to a close this second period 
of confrontation.
Conclusions
Stemming from the same basic contradiction in workers' 
relationship with the Party as the first confrontation between 
the two, but taking it a stage further in terms of both 
political ideas and methods of action, this second 
confrontation can be seen in some respects as transitional, 
linking the first outbreak of conflict between workers and the 
CCP with the third, the Cultural Revolution. Where workers in 
the early 1950s had criticized their official unions, in 1956- 
7 they ignored them altogether, preferring to organize 
themselves in the event of a dispute and confront the Party 
directly, and during the Cultural Revolution, such was the 
degree of animosity felt by workers with regard to the unions 
that they actually ceased to operate for some years. 
Similarly, the forms of management democratization offered to 
protesting workers with limited success immediately after 
liberation were summarily rejected in the second 
confrontation, as workers began to pose more probing questions
265 Nanfang Ribao 25.10.57, 1. Gipouloux notes that in a union 
survey of workers in Harbin, 17% harboured this suspicion 
(Les Cent Fleurs, 247).
266 Nanfang Ribao 25.10.57, 1.
267 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs, 256.
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about who the masters of the enterprise really were, and by 
1966-7 the debate had moved on altogether, from participation 
in management by workers to 'mass management' with workers in 
the dominant position. Thus these periodic confrontations, 
all rooted in the same basic conflict, escalated with each 
reoccurrence and became progressively harder for the CCP to 
control.
The shift of attention from questions of attitude and 
workstyle to actual inequalities of power and their 
consequences, which we have identified as the major element 
distinguishing this second, more serious confrontation from 
its predecessor, brings us in turn to an idea which would 
become increasingly important in discussions of the conflict 
between workers and their leaders, playing a vital role in 
particular in the third confrontation which began with the 
launch of the Cultural Revolution. This is the idea that the 
bureaucracy, including its lowest level, the enterprise 
bureaucracy, can constitute a new 'class' wielding political 
power over the workers.
The idea that cadres could become detached from workers 
and begin to act as a privileged class as the process of 
bureaucratic routinization set in was behind one of the most 
important polieies in industry during the Great Leap Forward, 
that of the ''two...participations', i.e. the participation of 
workers in management and of cadres in manual labour; the 
latter, the beginnings of which we have already seen as part 
of the Party's response to rebellious workers in 1957, was 
particularly strongly emphasized. A rather defensive 
theoretical article published in December 1957, before this 
policy really began to be promoted, provided tacit 
acknowledgement of the dangers inherent in the division of 
labour, claiming that
It is true that, comparatively speaking, the
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personnel of state organs do not take a direct part 
in productive labour but directly exercise the 
administrative power, while the people take a direct 
part in productive labour and do not directly 
exercise administrative power. But it does not 
follow from this that the personnel of the state 
organs form a privileged class standing above the 
people and that the contradictions between the 
Government and the people are the contradictions 
between this so-called "privileged class" and the 
people who do not enjoy such privilege. 268
But in spite of protestations that the socialist ownership of 
the means of production would prevent such an occurrence, 
during the Socialist Education Movement in the early sixties 
the danger of the emergence of a new bureaucratic class was 
frequently mentioned by Mao. He warned that
If the management staff do not go down to the 
[production] teams in workshops, practice "three 
togethernesses" [with workers], and treat workers as 
teachers and learn [from them], they will end up in 
a fierce, life-long class struggle with the working 
class. Eventually they as the bourgeois class will 
be defeated by the working class. 269
As Maurice Meisner has described it,
In a society that has abolished private property and 
private ownership of the means of production, Mao 
early recognized that the principal social
268 Fu Rong, 'My understanding of the contradictions among the 
people under the socialist system', Xuexi 24, 18.12.57, in 
Extracts from China Mainland Magazines (ECMM) 123, 17.3.58, 
20.
269 Quoted in Peter Nan-shong Lee, Industrial management and 
economic reform in China, 1949-1984, 100.
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contradiction is no longer primarily economic but 
rather political, the elemental distinction between 
those who hold political power and those who do not,
... between (as Mao put it in 1957) the leadership 
and the led. From there he was inexorably driven to 
the conclusion that China's bureaucrats were 
becoming a new exploiting class . .. "bourgeois 
elements sucking the blood of the workers" - in 
effect, a functional (albeit propertyless) 
bourgeoisie able to exploit society and appropriate 
much of the fruits of social labour by virtue of the 
political power they wielded. 270
Much more will be said about the debate on exploitation and
class in the context of relations between workers and
enterprise authorities in later sections, and in particular 
with reference to the Cultural Revolution. For now it is 
sufficient to note these ideas were already beginning to be
expressed by restive workers in 1956-7, indicating the
seriousness of the crisis in their relationship with the Party 
only seven years after liberation.
The 1956-7 industrial unrest cannot be dismissed as 
merely another outbreak of economism among workers 271. 
Studies of workers in other socialist countries point out that 
the 'latent political content and overt political 
significance' 272 of such activities as absenteeism and go- 
slows should not be disregarded even if they are prompted by 
mainly economic demands. In Eastern Europe it appears that 
among workers,
270 Meisner, 'The concept of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat in Chinese Marxist thought', in Nee and Moringo 
(eds), State and society in contemporary China, 123.
271 Paul Harper describes it in these terms in 'Party and 
unions', 1 0 0.
272 Alex Pravda, 'Political attitudes and activity', in Triska 
and Gati (eds.), Blue-collar workers, 56.
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dissatisfaction with economic progress promote[d] 
political and social dissatisfaction that tend[ed] 
to spill over quickly into more radical worker 
demands for political and workplace liberalization, 
especially in the form of workers' councils. 273
We can see the beginnings of a similar process in China in 
1956-7, as the final years of the First Five-Year Plan saw the 
'usual progression from economic to sociopolitical 
demands' 274 beginning to develop among workers. Although 
'[w]ith a few rare exceptions, the labour discontent never 
took an organized form' 275, there were some calls for 
independent trade unions, and given a few more weeks or months 
before the reimposition of repressive controls, workers' 
activities in China, which included a great deal of grassroots 
self-organization by workers, albeit mainly for the pursuit of 
enterprise-specific disputes, might well have developed in 
this direction. Certainly the experience of autonomous, 
collective political action which many workers gained through 
their involvement in Red Guard groups in the three years of 
the Cultural Revolution, as well as the effect of this 
activity on their attitudes to authority, made the formation 
of independent unions more of a possibility in the event of 
conflict with enterprise or higher authorities in the late 
1970s and 1980s, as we shall see from the third and fourth 
sections of this study. Although the unrest of 1956-7 cannot 
really be classed as national in scope, since it involved no 
nationwide organization by workers or coordination of action, 
it did occur in virtually every Chinese industrial centre, 
bringing it close to the sort of nationwide disturbance 
identified by Mao as a sign of errors in the Party's overall
273 Laura D'Andrea Tyson, 'Aggregate economic difficulties and 
workers' welfare', in ibid., 130.
274 J M Montias, 'Observations on strikes, riots and other 
disturbances', in ibid., 173.
275 Gipouloux, Les Cent Fleurs, 211.
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line, rather than merely its methods or policies. It is clear 
from his comments in 1957 that, had those involved in the 
disturbances attempted to organize themselves in the same way 
as activists in the Workers' Autonomous Federations did in 
1989, they would have met with a similar response from the 
regime: even if errors of line resulted in protests reaching 
all the way to West Chang'an Avenue in Beijing 276, he 
asserted, 'as long as we build up the army, we will not lose 
the country'. 277 The severity of the repressive measures to 
which the Chinese leadership was prepared to resort testifies 
to the seriousness of this second confrontation; during the 
Cultural Revolution, the third confrontation, it did in fact 
become necessary to send the army in to restore order in 
factories, marking a further escalation in the conflict.
276 The road separating Tian'anmen Square from the Forbidden 
City and the Zhongnanhai leadership compound.
277 Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansuit, 87.
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SECTION THREE
'TO REBEL IS JUSTIFIED's
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND AFTER
In the autumn and winter of 1957, the policy of combining 
suppression, persuasion and limited concessions had restored 
order in enterprises, stifled workers' protests, and stopped 
in its tracks the trend toward the formation by workers of 
their own, small-scale independent organizations. In the 
autumn and winter of 1966, however, workers began forming 
unprecedentedly large organizations of their own, first 
illegally and then with the blessing of some top-level 
leaders, and a wave of protest by workers swept through urban 
China the force of which threatened to push the Cultural 
Revolution in entirely unintended directions. To describe 
what happened in these months as a crisis in workers' 
relationship with Party-state authorities is something of an 
understatement, since their actions for a short period 
constituted an all-out attack on those authorities and an 
attempt to overthrow them completely. Before we can examine 
in detail the actions of workers in the Cultural Revolution1
1 At the time, the Cultural Revolution was generally 
understood by both those in power and ordinary Chinese 
people to have come to an end with the Ninth Party Congress 
of spring 1969. It was only after Mao referred to the 
movement in the present tense in a 1974 document that 
officials began to refer to it again as ongoing. The post- 
Mao Chinese leadership has adopted the ten-year (1966-76) 
periodization of the Cultural Revolution, as have most 
current researchers on China, but this is a distortion of 
actual events. In this study I have found it important to 
distinguish between the Cultural Revolution proper, the 
mass movement of 1966-69, and the following seven years of
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itself, however, something must be said about what happened in 
enterprises in the intervening nine years, how old issues 
developed and new ones emerged, to prime workers for their 
involvement in this movement.
The issues of the correct way to manage socialist 
enterprises and the proper relations between workers and 
cadres were the subject of much official discussion and
experimentation, and not a little controversy, during the 
Great Leap Forward (GLF) of 1958-60 and in the years up to the 
launching of the Cultural Revolution in May 1966. In fact, 
the outlines of what came to be known as the 'two-line
struggle' in industry can be discerned in the debates of the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, as the 'revisionist' and
'revolutionary' programmes for enterprise management began to 
coalesce around the Seventy Articles2 and the Anshan
Constitution3 respectively. In broad terms, the Anshan 
Constitution (which was closely identified with Mao's line 
during the Cultural Revolution and even more so after it in 
the Gang of Four's disputes with Deng Xiaoping) stood for: 
politics in command in enterprises; stronger Party leadership 
in management and politics; mass movements and the methods of
political dominance by the Gang of Four and their 
followers, for reasons which will become apparent. Since 
there is no generally accepted term for the latter period,
I refer to it simply by its dates. For a more detailed 
exposition of the problems of Cultural Revolution 
periodization and the competing paradigms of social 
cleavage during the movement, see Anita Chan, 'Dispelling 
misconceptions about the Red Guard movement: The necessity 
to re-examine Cultural Revolution factionalism and 
periodization', Journal of Contemporary China 1, 1, Fall 
1992, especially 69-70, 73-4.
2 The document's official title is 'Regulation of tasks in 
state-owned industrial enterprises (Draft)', issued by the 
CCP Central Committee, 15.9.61.
3 The Constitution of the Anshan Iron and Steel Corporation 
in north China; Mao personally endorsed the Anshan 
Municipal Party Committee Secretary's 'Report concerning 
technical reform and the technical revolutionary movement 
on the industrial front' in March 1960.
212
mass mobilization in enterprises; the continuation of the GLF 
policies of workers' participation in management, cadres' 
participation in productive labour, reform of irrational rules 
and regulations, and the three-in-one combination of workers, 
technicians and cadres for technical reform4; and technical 
revolution.5 If the Anshan Constitution could thus be seen 
as upholding the GLF emphasis on the mass line in industry and 
associated policies, then the Seventy Articles were 
' essentially aimed at negating the GLF experiments and 
returning to one-man management'6, with their stress on the 
primacy of the economic role of enterprises and of production 
(economics in command, as the Cultural Revolution polemics had 
it); the authority of the factory director and the chief 
engineer; strict responsibility systems and regulations and 
tighter labour discipline; material incentives and some 
reintroduction of piece-rates; and less political study.7 Of 
course, the distinction between these two 'lines' was not as 
clear-cut in theory or in practice as it might appear from the 
outline above. Yet neither was the so-called 'two-line 
struggle' in industrial management a total fiction: real
issues lie behind the debate which concerned not only top- 
level leaders but also workers.
It is now generally agreed that the Cultural Revolution 
could not have developed into an all-embracing, large-scale 
mass movement in the way that it did simply as a result of 
high-level manipulation of various mass organizations by Party 
leaders engaged in a power struggle. Clearly genuine and 
powerful social forces were at work, both in bringing Chinese
4 Often known as the 'Two participations and one reform' 
policy, or the 'two-one-three'.
5 These are the five principles always emphasized in press 
discussions of the Anshan Constitution; see for example 
Guangming Ribao 21.3.70, in SCMP 4327, 78-88.
6 Andors, China's industrial revolution, 129.
7 See the discussion of the Seventy Articles in Lee, 
Industrial management and economic reform, 87-93.
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citizens into the movement and in shaping the split, apparent 
in every section of society, into two different and 
antagonistic factions; this is as true of workers as it is of 
other groups such as students.8 The demands and criticisms 
put forward by workers in the last weeks of 1966 did not 
appear out of thin air, but have their roots in the policies 
which were implemented, or in some cases not implemented, in 
enterprises in the years leading up to the launching of the 
Cultural Revolution.
It will be remembered that workers' protests in 1956-7 
centred on three main concerns: inequalities and injustices in 
wages and welfare, cadre bureaucratism and workstyle, and 
democratic rights and participation in the workplace; all 
these issues were of course related. If we take official 
statements of policy over the years 1958-1966 at face value, 
we would expect to find improvements with regard to the latter 
two concerns during the GLF period, with particular emphasis 
on workers' participation in management, while a more austere 
approach toward wages and welfare prevailed, with a marked 
move away from piece-rates and bonuses and stress on self- 
reliance and mutual aid in welfare provisions. From 1961 this 
would change, with a much greater emphasis on material 
incentives and wage differentials, implying material benefits 
for at least some workers, while measures for improving 
participation and cadres' workstyle slipped down the agenda. 
A further shift might be expected from about 1964 as the 
Socialist Education Movement (SEM) received more attention and 
aspects of GLF policies, especially those concerning political
8 On the factional alignment of students, see for example 
Chan, Children of Mao, and Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism 
and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou; on workers, 
Walder, 'Zhang Chunqiao and Shanghai's January Revolution', 
Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies 32, 1978, Wylie, 
'Shanghai dockers in the Cultural Revolution: the interplay 
of political and economic issues', in Howe (ed.), Shanghai: 
Revolution and development in an Asian metropolis, and Liu 
Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution (ed. 
Chan).
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relations in the workplace, began to come to the forefront 
again. In fact, this somewhat superficial account of what 
went on in enterprises in these years is not entirely 
inaccurate, but if we examine one or two points in detail, we 
will see how measures which seemed to address some of the 
major grievances behind the 1956-7 industrial unrest failed to 
live up to expectations, and in some cases significantly 
worsened the position of many workers.
Workers during the Great Leap Forward
The participation of workers in management, one aspect of 
the GLF 'two-one-three' policy, is a case in point. Initially 
it seemed to offer 'a further expansion of democracy in the 
management of enterprises ... a new form of direct
participation of the workers in management'9, by allowing 
workers at the production-team level to take over certain 
tasks, such as attendance and production record-keeping, 
planning, management of tools, quality inspection, and 
maintenance of equipment.10 This new form of direct
participation was not intended to replace the representative 
system of workers' congresses, which was to continue alongside 
it, but was seen as putting management 'on an even broader 
mass basis'11, further strengthening mass supervision and 
participation. Clearly, this policy of more direct 
participation in management should have been a major step 
forward in meeting workers' demands for more influence in the 
workplace, yet there are a number of reasons why it proved a 
disappointment in practice.
One limitation was inherent in the system: participation
9 Remain Ribao 26.4.58, in SCMP 1774, 8 .
10 Chung Chong-wook, Maoism and development: the politics of 
industrial management in China, 147.
11 Renmin Ribao 26.4.58, in SCMP 1774, 8 .
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was limited to the level of the production team. This aspect 
of the policy drew particularly harsh criticism from Soviet 
observers of China, who, noting that 'participation was very 
modest and occurred only at the lowest level with little 
possibility of influencing the enterprise plan'12, condemned 
the Party's rhetoric on the subject as '"social demagoguery 
that was directed at the creation of illusions in the working 
class".'13 But even at the team level, not all workers had 
an opportunity to participate: figures for 1960, according to 
Wang Hefeng of the Heilongjiang Provincial CCP Committee, the 
main promoter of the policy, showed that 30-50% of workers 
were involved14, and this percentage 'seemed to have been even 
less in 1958 and 1959.'15 It seems likely that this figure 
includes relatively high levels of participation in a small 
number of 'model' enterprises where the policy was first tried 
out and experiments went furthest, but fairly low levels 
elsewhere.
Workers' participation in management does seem to have 
been the most problematic component of the ' two-one-three' 
policy, not least because of the 'active and passive 
resistance of cadres'16 which Stephen Andors finds to have 
been the 'major obstacle'17 to its implementation. As we saw 
earlier with the WRC, even where structures for representation 
and participation exist, cadre attitudes can render such 
structures virtually useless to workers, and this seems to 
have been the case with GLF participation in management, where 
some workers' own lack of enthusiasm for the policy can be 
traced to the intimidatory effect of cadres' known opposition
12 Rozman, A mirror for socialism, 120.
13 Quoted in ibid., 120.
14 Hongqi 15, 1960, 9.
15 Chung, Maoism and development, 147, note 53.
16 Andors, China's industrial revolution, 73.
17 Ibid., 77.
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to it.18 As the retreat from the GLF gathered pace from 1961, 
variations in the degree and importance of workers' 
participation continued to exist, but in general this aspect 
of the 'two-one-three' policy declined more than either cadre 
participation in labour or the three-in-one technical 
groups.19 There is evidence of greater persistence with
workers' participation in heavy industry, while light 
industrial management remained 'closely related to pre-1949 
methods' with cadres 'less likely to accept the GLF 
revolutionary concepts of human relationships'20 such as the 
equality of workers, technicians and cadres. Given this 
tendency, it is unlikely that what appeared to be a concerted 
effort for improved participation by workers in management 
made much headway in, for example, the textile and other light 
industries in Guangzhou. Moreover the city's distance, in 
terms of policy as well as geography, from the heavily
industrialized northeast where the policy was pioneered also 
militates against its having had a significant impact in the 
southern city beyond the first thrust of the GLF in 1958.
Another factor undermining workers' ability to take 
advantage of the 'two participations' policy, or to make use 
of the workers' congress, a form which continued to exist 
throughout these years, was the lack of powerful union
support. Again, this is something we noted as an obstacle to 
meaningful participation by workers in the early post­
liberation period and in 1956-7. Union organizations had been 
purged in the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957 and again in 
1958, a year which saw a debate on whether there was any point 
in the unions' continuing to exist21, and so were in as weak 
a position as they had ever been and very unlikely to be able
18 Ibid., 77.
19 See the discussion in ibid., 105-120.
20 Ibid., 121.
21 See for example Gongren Ribao 3.2.58, 1.
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to support workers in exercising increased influence at any 
level in the enterprise. The weakness of the unions may also 
have contributed to other problems for workers during the GLF, 
such as the rescinding of many of the concessions on welfare 
and livelihood which had been won in the strikes of 1957. 
Demands made during that period were now invariably 
characterized as 'excessive'22, and the press strove to create 
the impression that workers themselves were in the forefront 
of the return to 'plain living'23, voluntarily giving up over- 
generous welfare benefits. In the case of piece-rate wages, 
the argument that workers themselves had decided on abolition 
is more plausible, as this form of pay had always proved 
divisive and was at the root of some of the bitterest disputes 
over wage reform in 1956-7; it is quite possible, therefore, 
that many workers supported the move away from piece-rates 
even if they did not initiate it. However, the claim that 
large numbers of workers were also volunteering to give up 
overtime pay and bonuses for the sake of 'building socialism 
with more, better, faster and more economical results'24 
should be treated with greater scepticism, not least because 
excessive overtime was a serious problem in many enterprises 
during the GLF. Additionally, as we saw in the previous 
section, the ingenious schemes devised in some of Guangzhou's 
enterprises to avoid giving workers the overtime pay to which 
they were legally entitled were themselves the target of 
fierce criticism in 1956-7; it seems unlikely that workers' 
attitudes towards compulsory, excessive and unpaid overtime 
had undergone such a complete transformation in barely two 
years.
One of the bleakest assessments of workers' experiences 
during the GLF which this author has come across is that of 
the Soviet sinologist A P Davydov, who finds that during these
22 Ibid., Gongren Ribao 7.7.58, in SCMP 1817, 2.
23 Ibid., 2.
24 See for example Jiefang Ribao 19.10.58, in SCMP 1947, 16.
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years, workers
were made to labour almost without rest. Exhausted 
by that gruelling experience, they then experienced 
the years of hunger and, for many, relocation to 
villages. The Great Leap Forward was characterized 
by reduced worker participation in management, wages 
that provided little incentive to diligent work, 
unconcern about well-being of workers .. .the rate of 
accidents sharply increased.25
These comments may appear exaggerated, but in fact evidence 
can be found to support them with regard to the three main 
points: participation, safety, and overtime. We have already 
seen that both workers' direct participation in management and 
their supervision of cadres through the workers' congress were 
undermined by cadres' lack of commitment, or even hostility, 
to these institutions, as well as by the weakness of the 
unions, purged and now under very tight Party control.
Fears that safety was being sacrificed in the pursuit of 
ever higher production quotas surfaced very early in the 
GLF26, and reappeared frequently thereafter. However, the 
regular appeals to cadres to view safety measures as a help, 
not a hindrance, to increased production seem to have had 
little effect, apparently unable to compete with the enormous 
pressure on all enterprises to meet impossibly high targets by 
whatever means necessary. The extent of the safety problem in 
these years is well illustrated by a Gongren Ribao editorial 
promoting safety in production, which nonetheless also 
includes praise for the 'advanced experience' of a certain 
enterprise in carrying out cleaning and maintenance of
25 Quoted in Rozman, A mirror for socialism, 117. Lay-offs 
and rustication of industrial workers will be discussed 
below.
26 See for example Gongren Ribao 26.3.58, 1.
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machines without stopping them27, a prospect which will
horrify anyone who has ever operated machinery. As for
excessive overtime, the problem of overwork was quite frankly
acknowledged in the press in 1960, although the phenomenon was 
attributed, not very plausibly, to workers' own excessive 
enthusiasm for production.28 As late as 1965, editorials on 
combining labour and rest in correct proportions were still 
appearing, indicating a very persistent problem.29 We should 
keep this aspect of the situation in enterprises in mind when 
we evaluate the extent and significance of workers' 
participation in management during the GLF. Since
participation in certain product ion-team management tasks was 
to be done in workers' spare time, on top of the usual eight 
hours of production work, overwork and poor safety standards 
must have undermined workers' enthusiasm and ability with
regard to these extra tasks.
Finally, it should be noted that many of the problems of 
overwork and neglect of safety during this period are directly 
attributable to the 'one reform' component of the 'two-one- 
three' policy, i.e. the reform of irrational regulations and 
systems in enterprises. Intended to promote the revision of 
'those regulations and systems that restrict the activism of 
the masses and the development of their productivity'30, this 
policy sometimes seems to have resulted in measures essential 
to safety at work being abolished as 'irrational', without any 
adequate replacement first being developed by 'the masses'.31 
This is a clear example of a measure intended to benefit 
workers, not least by facilitating their participation in
27 Gongren Ribao 9.6.59, in SCMP 2041, 17.
28 Gongren Ribao 26.7.60, in Current Background 640, 23.
29 For example Renmin Ribao 21.6.65, 1.
30 Renmin Ribao 26.4.58, in SCMP 1774, 4.
31 See for example Gongren Ribao 9.6.59, in SCMP 2041, 15-17;
Gongren Ribao 19.7.59, in SCMP 2080, 11-15.
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management and breaking down some of the unnecessarily rigid 
regulations by which cadres exercised control in the 
enterprise, actually having a very negative impact on vital 
aspects of workers' conditions of work.
It is important to remember that although policies in 
industrial enterprises from 1961 onwards represented a general 
retreat from the 'mass line' of the GLF, the latter was by no 
means completely discredited or repudiated, but on the 
contrary, still had its powerful partisans, notably Mao. With 
his endorsement of the Anshan Constitution in 1960, 'the issue 
of the mass line in industrial management continued to become 
politicized'32. It should also be noted that although the 
results of the GLF were often inimical in the extreme to 
workers' interests, this was almost entirely due to the 
continual upward revision of production targets already at 
unrealistically high levels, and the consequent pressure to 
increase production at all costs. The stated aims of GLF 
policies in industry, however, did not necessarily run 
contrary to workers' interests and aspirations: workers did 
want to participate more in management; they did want cadres 
to lose their arrogant disdain for workers and reform their 
bureaucratist work-style by coming out of their offices and 
participating in productive labour; and they did want their 
suggestions for innovation and reform taken seriously and, if 
feasible, implemented promptly, rather than being shunted off 
into some labyrinthine process of upward referral and endless 
discussion. So support for GLF policies both at the highest 
and lowest level did exist, and to a certain extent continued 
in the 1961-66 period.
It is true that as the GLF developed, ' [Revolutionary 
rhetoric not backed by worker participation in management and 
cadre participation in labour could lead to cynicism'33, which
32 Lee, Industrial management and economic reform, 67.
33 Andors, China*s industrial revolution, 150.
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in turn might precipitate a shift away from these sorts of 
political incentives and back to material incentives. But 
this is evidence of the tendency we noted earlier, whereby the 
discrepancy between the official rhetoric about workers' 
position as the masters of the enterprise and their actual 
experience in the workplace created disillusionment and 
discontent; it shows not that workers rejected political 
incentives such as increased participation and more control 
over their own work, but that the failure of these incentives 
to materialize (mainly because of cadre opposition) led to 
dissatisfaction which could only undermine production, 
necessitating greater reliance on other forms of incentives 
which could actually be implemented.
1961-65: Enterprises under the Seventy Articles
Although as we have seen workers' interests generally 
suffered as a result of the actual impact of GLF policies, 
this does not necessarily mean that workers were in favour of 
the policies, based on the Seventy Articles, which despite 
some high-level opposition began to replace them from 1961. 
In fact, given that these policies in many ways represented a 
return to one-man management34, with a strengthening of the 
authority of the factory director, the chief engineer35 and 
administrative and technical staff in general, a certain 
amount of resentment among workers would be expected: one-man 
management and the cadre attitudes which tended to accompany 
it were, after all, one of the major causes of the discontent 
and protests which built up during 1956-7.
Policies based on the Seventy Articles were 'intensively 
implemented'36 between 1961 and 1966, and any adjustments made
34 Ibid., 129.
35 Lee, Industrial management, 89.
36 Ibid., 91.
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seem to have resulted from pressure from Mao.
For instance, a fresh effort was made to 
institutionalize the cadres' participation in manual 
labour ... an attempt was made to accommodate 
workers' participation in managerial functions 
through an institutionalized, rather than a 
mobilizational, channel (the congress of the 
representatives of workers and staff).37
But the revision of the Seventy Articles suggested by Mao in 
September 1962 at the 10th Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress 
was not carried out until 1965, and few changes were actually 
made even then.38 Some sensitivity to workers' likely 
opposition can be detected in early articles on the new 
direction in enterprise management, where it was often 
stressed that management systems were not intended to control 
workers, but reflected their own practical experience.39 A 
distinction was made between the operation of, for example, 
responsibility systems in socialist enterprises, which were 
said to reflect 'the comradely and mutually cooperative 
relations between the workers', and systems such as Taylorism, 
which Lenin 'most appropriately called ... the "blood and 
sweat system of science.**'40 The often heated debate on what 
constituted rational and necessary regulations and what rules 
and systems designed for 'control, check and suppression'41 
of workers is one to which we will return, with particular
37 Ibid., 8 8 .
38 Ibid., 92.
39 See for example Jiefang Ribao 5.6.61, in SCMM 312, 16-20.
40 'On the responsibility system...', Jingji Yanjiu 7, 3.8.62,
in SCMM 333, 30.
41 This is the phrase (guan, ka, ya) commonly used by
supporters of the Gang of Four in their polemics against
Deng Xiaoping's policies for industry, especially in 1975- 
6.
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reference to the 1970-76 period and the influence of the Gang 
of Four in industry, but these concerns were clearly already 
present in the aftermath of the GLF.
If we examine the extent to which concessions on the 'two 
participations' made policies based on the Seventy Articles 
more acceptable to workers, we soon find that their impact was 
rather limited. Cadre participation in labour had been 
stressed since the spring of 1957 as a valuable method for 
tackling bureaucratism, bringing cadres closer to the rank and 
file workforce and preventing their political degeneration. 
Initially introduced in response to workers' criticisms, this 
measure continued to be stressed throughout the GLF and right 
up until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.42 However, 
its success in reforming the arrogant and high-handed 
attitudes which did so much to fuel workers' protests in 1956- 
7 appears questionable. Given the attacks on cadres' 
bureaucratism and lack of concern for workers, strongly 
reminiscent of those made in 1956-7, which accompanied the 
nationwide wave of 'counterrevolutionary economism' among 
workers in December 1966 and January 196743, it seems unlikely 
that participation in labour brought about any major or 
lasting change in cadres' attitudes. Andors has noted that 
'[b]y itself, participation did not lead to better and more 
egalitarian relationships between workers and managers. 
Cadres had to change subtle aspects of their behaviour ...,44.
Where cadres did go down to the shop floor, this did not 
always have the desired effect of dispelling workers' 
hostility toward their leaders. Many cadres lacked the 
necessary skills to participate in productive labour, and so
42 See 'The participation of cadres in manual labour', Hongqi 
6 , in BCMM 163, 11-13.
43 See Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural 
Revolution, 46.
44 Andors, China's industrial revolution, 72.
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might end up hanging around on the factory floor leaning on 
their brooms for much of the time45, in which situation, far 
from appreciating cadres' presence among them, workers 
generally suspected them of using 'participation' as an 
opportunity to supervise workers more closely46, or even to 
spy on them. There were also reports indicating widespread 
reluctance among cadres to participate in labour, with one 
early article finding that they had to be 'driven' to 
participate47; 'nominal' participation, avoiding any dirty or 
strenuous work, was also noted.46 But in part, cadres' 
reluctance stemmed from a genuine conviction that regular 
participation in manual labour was not compatible with the 
efficient performance of their other duties. This was 
acknowledged as a real problem from about the middle of 1963, 
as cadres' participation in labour was re-emphasized as part 
of the SEM. The search for improved practical methods of 
participation was, however, accompanied by a strong emphasis 
on the political importance and benefits of participation.49
Yet articles on improved systems for participation from 
this time still identify cadre resistance as a significant 
problem, and their portrayal of the majority of enterprise 
cadres indicates that little progress had been made since 1957 
in improving work-styles and overcoming bureaucratism, as can 
be seen from this description of cadres at the Guangzhou 
Chemical Works:
[S]ome leadership cadres were seriously affected by 
bourgeois individualism, ... for a long time they
45 See for example Nanfang Ribao 22.9.64, in SCMP 3325, 11.
46 See Andors, China's industrial revolution, 73.
47 Renmin Ribao 27.11.58, in SCMP 1914, 3.
48 Nanfang Ribao 22.9.64, in SCMP 3313, 11.
49 See for example Hongqi 13-14, 10.7.63, in SCMM 376, 1-13;
Nanfang Ribao 22.9.64, in SCMP 3325, 10-16; Renmin Ribao
22.9.64, in SCMP 3313, 16-19.
225
estranged themselves from the masses and from 
reality, and ... made rather grave errors of 
bureaucratism and commandism . .. Among the 
leadership cadres, some indulged in an extravagant 
life and demanded privileges. Some individual 
cadres even succumbed to bribery and thievery and 
became degenerate.50
And despite the renewed emphasis from mid-19 6 3 on the 
necessity of cadre participation in labour as 'an effective 
guarantee against corruption by bourgeois thinking'51, in 1965 
we find that
Massive and overlapping administration, detailed and 
anomalous scholasticist regulations, complicated 
administrative procedures, and the pompous airs of 
administrative personnel which separate them from 
production and alienate them from the masses 
continue to be the common defects of many industrial 
enterprises.52
Evidently the 'revolution in enterprise management'53, which 
this article identifies as having begun a year earlier, had
yet to make much progress in breaking down the 'invisible
barrier'54 between workers and cadres which had caused so much 
resentment and hostility over the past ten years.
What of the workers' congress in this period? Renewed 
efforts to promote this form of workplace democracy are 
evident from’the end of 1961, but the emphasis is always on
50 Nanfang Ribao 22.9.64, in SCMP 3325, 10.
51 Renmin Ribao, 22.9.64, in SCMP 3313, 16.
52 Renmin Ribao 24.9.65, in SCMP 3555, 3 (emphasis added).
53 Ibid., 3.
54 Nanfang Ribao 22.9.64, in SCMP 3325, 12.
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the role of the congress in solving production problems and 
increasing productivity.55 This tells us a number of things: 
firstly, that the workers' congress was being revived after 
the GLF largely because more direct (although low-level) forms 
of participation were no longer in favour; secondly, that 
workers' role in the enterprise was now for the most part 
restricted to matters directly connected to production; and 
thirdly, that cadre resistance to the implementation of the 
congress system necessitated a strong emphasis on its 
beneficial, not harmful, effect on production. But in spite 
of signs of revival of the workers' congress in 1961, as was 
mentioned above, this and other concessions to workers unhappy 
with the influence of the Seventy Articles in industry made 
little headway until 1965.
In that year it was announced that in some enterprises 
the system of workers' congresses had been 'overhauled and 
improved'56 as part of the SEM, to remedy defects such as the 
use of congress meetings simply to give instructions and 
concomitant neglect of workers' opinions, and the practice 
whereby 'the workers representatives were nominated by the 
leadership. Most of them were cadres.'57 Monthly 'democratic 
life meetings' organized by the enterprise trade union 
committee also began to be promoted toward the end of 1965 as 
a forum where workers could speak out freely, report on 
conditions at the shop-floor level and participate in 
democratic problem-solving.56 But there is nothing in any of 
the 1965 accounts of how the system was to be improved which 
would lead one to expect a significant increase in meaningful 
participation by workers in the running of their enterprises
55 See for example Gongren Ribao 11.11.61, 1; Hongqi 2,
16.1.62, in SCMM 300, 20-23.
56 Gongren Ribao 13.10.65, in SCMP 3576, 11.
57 Ibid., 11.
58 See ibid., 11-12; Gongren Ribao 9.10.65, in SCMP 3569, 12-
16.
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by means of the workers' congress. So we see that neither of 
the 'two participations' was able to make significant progress 
while the Seventy Articles were in force in industry, in spite 
of renewed political pressure for their implementation as the 
SEM gathered momentum, and in contravention of workers' own 
preferences.
To summarize workers' experiences between 1958 and 1966, 
we have seen that only some of the issues at the heart of 
workers' protests in 1956-7 were addressed by GLF policies in 
industry, and even here progress was limited and temporary; at 
the same time, other aspects of the GLF line significantly 
worsened working conditions and put many workers at risk in 
the enterprise. Materially, workers did not fare well as 
material incentives were done away with and overtime was often 
unpaid; politically their position suffered too, as they could 
expect no support from the purged and weakened unions, and 
cadres were thus largely able to resist pressure from workers 
for an enlarged role in management and to continue to 
disregard the decisions of the workers' congress. Cadres' 
participation in labour also made only limited progress, and 
appeared to have little effect on those attitudes to which 
workers had most objected in 1956-7. The increased authority 
of enterprise leadership cadres after the implementation of 
the Seventy Articles, which has been described as tantamount 
to a return to one-man management, can only have worsened this 
situation. In all, we are led to conclude that workers' main 
grievances after the transformation of industry in 1956 must 
have remained to a large extent intact throughout the GLF and 
in the years leading up to the Cultural Revolution, and in 
some cases may have intensified.
Workers' grievances on the eve of the Cultural Revolution: the 
emergence of new issues
As we saw in earlier sections, the issues of workplace
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democracy and participation discussed above had long been a 
bone of contention in enterprises, with enterprise-level 
cadres and the Party as a whole unwilling to allow workers the 
degree of control over their enterprise which they desired. 
But during the GLF and in the years up to 1966, two more 
issues emerged which were to become increasingly important 
during the Cultural Revolution and in the early 1970s. These 
two issues, the system of temporary or contract labour, and 
the problem of enterprise systems and regulations formulated 
by cadres to control or 'rule over' workers, reflect both the 
way in which many workers found their economic position and 
political rights undermined by changes in the employment 
system prior to the Cultural Revolution, and the growing 
tendency to see the relations between cadres and workers in an 
enterprise as those between a minority who had power and a 
majority who did not, or between 'rulers' and 'ruled'. While 
the contract labour system was a major cause of the upsurge of 
workers' protest from the end of 1966, the debate over 
regulations and authority in the enterprise shows how the 
deep-rooted antagonism between workers and cadres which we 
identified as the distinguishing feature of the 1956-7 
protests had not only not been alleviated by GLF measures 
designed for that purpose, but had if anything worsened over 
the years.
We have already seen how during the GLF the movement to 
reform irrational regulations and systems led to the removal 
of vital safety measures as well as genuinely superfluous 
rules, and thus contributed to the high rate of industrial 
accidents in these years. But it must be remembered that, 
along with the 'two participations', this 'one reform' policy 
was in part intended to correct the impression, which had been 
gaining ground among many workers in 1956-7, that cadres in 
their enterprises and above constituted a separate, privileged 
group which had great power over workers' lives, including the 
power to make the rules in enterprises. Giving workers a 
stronger role in reforming regulations would be one concrete
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way in which their theoretical status as the masters of the
enterprise could actually begin to become a reality. It is in
this context that the criticism, from 1964 onwards, of
excessive regulations in enterprises designed specifically to 
control workers should be understood:
In some cases, leading cadres of a number of
enterprises have even set up sections and sub-units 
as well as other administrative organs for the 
purpose of controlling workers. They have laid down 
regulations and instituted systems for the express 
purpose of bringing workers into line ... It is 
wrong for the leadership and administrative
personnel of enterprises to stress 'control' and 
their authority, to make every decision, and to act 
in accordance with the dead letter of the 
regulations instead of trusting and relying on the 
working masses.59
While some backtracking on GLF reforms for the sake of 
safety was undoubtedly necessary, it is clear that the Seventy 
Articles, with their emphasis on the authority of
administrative and technical cadres, gave free rein to those 
enterprise officials who preferred a very clear division of 
labour whereby they gave instructions and the workers followed 
them. Workers' position in the enterprise was summed up in/ 
the saying: 'the leadership makes the laws, the managers
enforce the laws, and the workers obey the laws.'60 It is
important to bear in mind that this issue of excessive 
regulation and control of workers was not just a convenient 
stick with which the Gang of Four and their supporters could 
beat Deng Xiaoping and his in their 1970s polemics, but that
59 Renmin Ribao 24.9.65, in SCMP 11.10.65, 4.
60 See Gong Xiaowen, 'The two-line struggle in enterprise 
management', Bongqi 3, 1976, 67. The phrase appears in 
many other articles around this time.
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workers' resentment at petty regulations governing even the 
time they were allowed to spend in the toilet61 was real, and 
was building up in the years immediately preceding the 
Cultural Revolution while the Seventy Articles held sway in 
industry.
The deep-rooted feeling was that the workers were 
excluded from meaningful participation in making 
decisions about production and industrial operations 
that constituted an intimate part of their lives... 
the workers operated machinery, used equipment and 
manufactured products, yet they were not permitted 
to have any say about their work environment. 
Instead, 'experts' controlled every move of the 
workers and every step of the operation or process.
While excluding workers from participation in 
management, the experts did not necessarily do a 
better job.62
Resentment of strict discipline, and a combative attitude 
among workers toward those who tried to enforce it, crop up 
repeatedly in reports on conflict in industrial enterprises 
even at the end of the Cultural Revolution in 196963, and 
continued indiscipline and 'anarchy' in enterprises, blamed on 
the influence of the Cultural Revolution, was a frequent 
complaint in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Even now,
61 See Lee, 'The Gang of Four: Radical politics and
modernization in China', in S S K Chin (ed.) The Gang of 
Four: First essays after the fall, 90-1. This hardy 
perennial among workers' complaints about excessive
discipline has recently reappeared among workers in
foreign-owned enterprises in Shenzhen - see the translation 
attached to Anita Chan's 'PRC workers under "capitalism 
with Chinese characteristics"', China Information 5, 4
(Spring 1991).
62 Lee, 'The Gang of Four', 91.
63 See for example China News Analysis 769, 15.8.69, 'Workers 
and discipline' (whole issue, 1-7 ).
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resentment among workers of strict control and regulation in 
the workplace, enforced by means of wage deductions, seems to 
exist in some of China's best-known state enterprises, despite 
the high wages and benefits which accompany it.64 Thus the 
potential of issues of regulation and discipline to arouse 
strong feelings among workers should not be underestimated.
The same articles which throughout the first half of the 
1960s stress the necessity of regulations and 'control' in 
industrial enterprises also struggle to distinguish between 
the nature of these regulations in socialist and in capitalist 
enterprises, and to draw a distinction between the 
exploitative nature of capitalist managers and the fundamental 
political equality between workers and management cadres in 
socialist enterprises.65 This subtext to the debate, the 
question as to whether cadres (especially those who fail to 
participate in manual labour) are merely carrying out their 
allotted tasks in the division of labour, or are actually 
using their position to exploit the workers, is one which 
becomes increasingly important in the years 1958-66. The 
possibility that those with power who did not take part 
directly in labour might begin to constitute a new, privileged 
stratum or class was raised as early as 195766, and the idea 
that the exercise of administrative power in isolation from 
workers might lead cadres to degenerate into a new bourgeoisie 
has already been identified as one of the main concerns behind 
the revival of cadre participation in labour from 1964. The 
concept of officials as a new class reached its apogee in the
64 See for example 'Model on the rocks', on the Shougang 
[Capital Iron and Steel] group, Far Eastern Economic Review 
156, 46, 63-4. (18.11.93)
65 See Xuexi 24, 18.12.57, in ECMM 123, 20; Jiefang 7, 5.6.61, 
in SCMM 312, 16-20; Eongqi 1, 1.1.62, in SCMM 298, 25-30; 
Jingji Yanjiu 7, 3.8.62, in SCMM 333, 29-41; Hongqi 13-14,
10.7.63, in SCMM 376, 1-13; Guangming Ribao 15.3.65, in CB 
765, 18-19, and other articles in this issue of CB.
66 Xuexi 24, 18.12.57, in ECMM 123, 20.
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Cultural Revolution itself with the publication of the 
Hunanese group Shengwulian's 'Whither China?' and its attack 
on the 'red capitalist' class in China67, but developments in 
enterprises in the years leading up to the Cultural Revolution 
undoubtedly laid the foundation on which this sort of view 
could develop, as retreats from even the limited GLF gains in 
participation and influence in the workplace made workers feel 
still less like the 'masters of the enterprise' they were 
claimed to be.
Finally, something must be said about the worker-peasant 
system of employment prior to the Cultural Revolution.68 
During the GLF, it had already become apparent that some 
groups of workers, namely new recruits to the rapidly 
expanding workforce and temporary or contract workers, were 
not enjoying the same rights and benefits in terms of job 
security, pay and conditions, and in some cases union 
membership, as were longer-established and more skilled and 
experienced workers. New recruits during the GLF, according 
to one Soviet observer,
67 'Whither China?' is translated in SCMP 4190, 1-18, and 
elsewhere. The original is reprinted in Minzhu Zhonghua 
(Democratic China), published by Zhongwen Daxue Xueshehghui 
(CUHK Student Union), 1982, 31-50.
68 Strictly speaking, there is a distinction between urban 
contract or temporary labour and contract or seasonal 
labour in industry in rural localities or in agriculture- 
related industry, as is pointed out in Andors, China's 
industrial revolution, 298, note 6 8 . In this study we will 
be referring mainly to the use of temporary and contract 
labour in urban industry; this pre-dates the use of the 
term 'worker-peasant system', but seems to have become a 
major cause of conflict only from 1964, when the 'worker- 
peasant system' began to be promoted. There is clearly a 
connection between the two forms of employment, hence the 
use of the terms 'worker-peasant' system and contract 
labour system interchangeably by many writers. For an 
account of the development of contract labour in China, 
particularly the controversial developments from 1964, see 
the translations from unofficial Cultural Revolution 
publications in SCMM 616, 21-30.
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were paid badly and had little chance of advancement 
as they acquired new work skills and experience.
They received little in the way of social benefits.
These workers were not only underpaid, they were 
without rights.69
As the GLF ground to a halt in 1960 amid confusion, shortages, 
and even famine, lay-offs in industry meant that 'the contract 
workers were the first sent back to their villages'70, and 
young workers from 'bad' class backgrounds in some cases also 
lost their jobs 'even if they had been admitted to unions'71.
From about 1962, and especially after 196472, this system 
of reducing costs by restricting the number of workers in 
secure, higher-paid, unionized posts, and making up the 
shortfall with lower-paid contract or temporary workers with 
fewer or no rights in the enterprise, was consolidated and 
expanded, and became generally known as the worker-peasant 
system. Although there was a political rationale to the 
scheme, namely the gradual diminution of two of the 'three 
great differences' which had to be overcome during the 
transition to communism, those between urban and rural areas 
and between workers and peasants73, it is likely that the 
system appealed to enterprise management mainly because of the 
savings on welfare spending which it offered. Contract 
workers did not have the right to bring their dependents to 
the city with them, reducing pressure on housing, nurseries 
etc., and could be sent back to their homes or communes when
69 Quoted in Rozman, A mirror for socialism, 117.
70 White, Policies of chaos, 159.
71 Ibid., 160.
72 See Walder, 'Zhang Chunqiao and Shanghai's January 
Revolution', 40.
73 The other is the difference between mental and manual
labour; the 'two participations' were intended to tackle
this.
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not needed, where other units would be responsible for their 
welfare. There were also clear advantages to the system where 
cades might otherwise have faced protests from workers, as any 
temporary or contract workers who showed signs of causing this 
sort of trouble could swiftly be got rid of.74
In fact, welfare for the better-established, unionized 
workers was actually expanded during 1962-5 as material 
incentives and welfare in general came back into favour, 'but 
cost-conscious managers tried to limit the groups receiving 
such benefits.'75 Many temporary and contract workers, who 
had been employed in large numbers as the workforce expanded 
during the GLF, had over the years come to be doing the same 
work as permanent workers in the same enterprise, and so in 
July 1963 the State Council promulgated the 'Notice on the 
question of shifting temporary workers doing regular work to 
the permanent establishment'. This Notice allowed enterprises 
to employ these workers as permanent workers on the usual 
terms and wages, provided this did not violate the State's 
labour plans for enterprises in 1963. But this clearly ran 
contrary to the desire to restrict the number of workers 
enjoying permanent status and the 'iron rice-bowl' benefits 
which went with it, and so from mid-1964, as the employment of 
fewer permanent workers and more on temporary contracts began 
to be promoted for all enterprises, the transfer of temporary 
or contract workers to permanent status was discouraged, until 
in March 1965 the 1963 'Notice' was declared null and void.76 
Dissatisfaction with and resistance to the contract labour 
system seem largely to date from this point, as workers who 
believed they had a good case for transfer to permanent
employment, and who thought, in 1963, that this case had been 
conceded by the authorities, were now refused permanent
74 White, Policies of chaos, 189.
75 Ibid., 184-5.
7 6 See ' Information about Liu Shaoqi in the system of 
temporary labour and contract labour', in SCMM 616, 22-24.
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status; some provincial Labour Department officials reportedly 
warned the Labour Ministry that this decision would be hard 
for workers to accept.77
The Seventy Articles emphasis on material incentives had 
already begun to create divisions in the workplace, just as 
similar policies had in 1956-7:
the rewards to workers who produced more encouraged 
an elitism that separated officials and technicians 
from the masses. This separation undermined the 
doctrine of 'politics in command' and the enthusiasm 
of the ordinary worker...78
With the development of the worker-peasant system, the 
division became more pronounced between much of the rank and 
file workforce on one side, and on the other another group, 
sometimes a majority but in some, especially smaller, 
enterprises not, of well-established and relatively 
privileged, more skilled workers, together with cadres, 
technicians and activists. The worker-peasant programme 
'lowered costs for managers; and it raised the relative status 
of well-established union members. But it repressed most 
others. '79 We will see this sort of division most clearly in 
the Cultural Revolution itself, as the above two categories 
largely coincide with the two factions which emerged during 
the movement.80 The roots of the division can also be seen
77 Ibid., 24.
78 Vogel, Canton under communism, 319.
79 White, Policies of chaos, 182 (emphasis added).
80 Conservative faction workers are often assumed to have been
in a majority in large enterprises, and therefore overall, 
but this view does not take into account the pressures on 
some workers in these enterprises to become 'nominal' 
Conservatives despite their own preference for the Rebel 
faction (Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural 
Revolution, 43, 75-6, 95). This point will be discussed 
more fully in the next section.
236
in the 1956-7 protests, where the most active protestors were 
often younger workers, especially apprentices, or workers from 
smaller, joint enterprises who enjoyed fewer benefits and 
lower pay than workers in large state enterprises.
If the worker-peasant system, by undermining the security 
of all workers to a certain extent, contributed to the actions 
of those workers who joined the Conservative faction in the 
Cultural Revolution in order to preserve their relatively 
privileged position, this is nothing to the impact it had in 
motivating others to flock to the Rebel faction to demand that 
what they saw as an unjust and unacceptably discriminatory 
system be abolished. The main importance of the worker- 
peasant system thus lies in its role in fuelling the outbreak 
of 'counterrevolutionary economism' in which workers first 
made their mark in large numbers in the Cultural Revolution, 
and in motivating the subsequent activity in the movement of 
many of the workers affected, who were often noted to be the 
most militant. Grievances related to the loss of rights and 
worsening living standards which were associated with the 
worker-peasant system (and which prompted one Soviet 
commentator to brand it 'a form of forced labour'81) were thus 
added to discontent over strict discipline in enterprises, and 
to the long-established list of complaints - lack of 
opportunities to participate in management, cadres' 
bureaucratist and arrogant attitudes, higher pay rises and 
other privileges for technicians and administrative cadres - 
which are already familiar to us from the protests of 1956-7, 
laying the foundations for another and a more serious outbreak 
of workers' protest.
The 'two-line struggle' in industry
When policies related to the Seventy Articles and the
81 Rozman, A mirror for socialism, 120.
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worker-peasant system are criticized by the Maoists in the 
Cultural Revolution (and by the Gang of Four and their 
followers after it), they are invariably referred to as part 
of Liu Shaoqi's so-called 'bourgeois reactionary line' in 
industry, with Deng Xiaoping identified as the other major 
representative of this tendency. However, contradictions soon 
begin to creep in. As the Cultural Revolution develops, we 
find Liu Shaoqi being accused simultaneously of promoting the 
authority of 'bourgeois experts' in the enterprise and 
supporting their strict control over workers, and of 
encouraging the tendency of some rank and file workers to 
overthrow all cadres without discrimination, rather than just 
targeting a handful of 'capitalist roaders in authority'. The 
point here is that loyalty to Mao and to the Chairman's 
'revolutionary line' were the sine qua non of Cultural 
Revolution activity, and conversely any tendency which a 
participant in the movement opposed had to be identified with 
Liu Shaoqi, the 'number one person in authority taking the 
capitalist road', whatever inconsistency this might demand. 
When some individuals did begin to have doubts about Mao 
himself as the Cultural Revolution progressed, they generally 
kept them to themselves; some activists, such as Yang Xiguang 
of Shengwulian, the author of 'Whither China?', tied 
themselves in ideological knots trying to find confirmation of 
their own views in Mao's writings.82
Since there is no need for us to follow the sort of 
convoluted reasoning necessary to blame Liu Shaoqi for 
absolutely everything with which workers were dissatisfied 
prior to the Cultural Revolution, we can instead look at why 
Mao's SEM and allied policies failed to benefit the majority 
of workers in the years 1964-66, and how aspects of this other 
'line' also motivated workers to take action during the 
Cultural Revolution. One reason why the SEM brought few
82 See Unger, 'Whither China? Yang Xiguang, red capitalists, 
and the social turmoil of the Cultural Revolution', Modern 
China 17, 1, January 1991, 3-37.
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improvements in the position of most workers is of course that 
this political campaign had little impact on the economic 
structure of enterprises, which in fact was still largely 
determined by the Seventy Articles. Thus the SEM was 'an 
attempt ... to sing the superiority of work and the worker 
when the social structure militated against it. ,83 The main 
beneficiaries of the SEM's renewed emphasis on 
'proletarianism'84 were actually those who could claim to be 
the vanguard of the working class: 'local leaders of Party
branches and activists in Socialist Education struggles. Many 
workers received no new benefits at all.'85 The promotion of 
'politics in command', particularly Mao's thought, could also 
be used to give unpopular programmes such as the worker- 
peasant system unimpeachable ideological authority, and did in 
fact make the system difficult to criticize in 1966-7; high- 
level public support for protesting contract workers from 
members of the Central Cultural Revolution Small Group (CCRG), 
especially Jiang Qing, seems to have been short-lived.86
The other main development in enterprises in the early to 
mid-sixties which is closely identified with Mao's policy 
preferences is the establishment of political departments, 
usually staffed by ex-PLA personnel, to promote the idea of 
'politics in command' in all areas of an enterprise's work, 
and also to control the confidential files compiled on all 
individuals for which more information had been gathered in 
urban areas during the SEM87. 'Learning from the PLA' had
83 Vogel, Canton under communism, 319.
84 White, Policies of chaos, 199.
85 Ibid., 218.
86 See Current Scene 6 , 5, 15.3.68, 'Sources of labour
discontent in China - the worker-peasant system', 9-12.
87 White, Policies of chaos, 197. It is safe to assume that
when the Renmin Ribao (24.9.65) called for the
revolutionization of enterprise management and condemned 
the establishment of systems specifically to control
workers, the criticism was aimed at the old leadership in
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been a common slogan since the campaign to emulate Lei Feng 
began in 1962, but intensive efforts to apply it to industrial 
enterprises can be observed from 1964. The official unions 
seem to have resisted it, bringing up many practical
difficulties in mechanically applying the military style of 
work to enterprises08, and it is very noticeable that
exhortations to learn from the PLA are almost entirely absent 
from the pages of Gongren Ribao during 1965, in sharp contrast 
to most other newspapers. Mao, however, is on virtually every 
page, so the objection seems to have been specifically to 
military, rather than political, influence in industry.
If union cadres were displeased with the growing
influence of the political departments, so too were many 
workers, as was shown once the Cultural Revolution started, 
when in at least some places cadres staffing political
departments became workers' preferred target of attack:
The spearhead of the workers' rebellion had at first 
been directed against some of the Party authorities 
at their work units ... At the time of the Cultural 
Revolution, China's grassroots work units contained 
two kinds of cadre. One kind consisted of the 
people who had actually been managing the work units 
before 1964; the other ... were those demobilized 
armymen in the political departments. When the 
Cultural Revolution broke out, the workteams sent by 
Liu Shaoqi often employed members of this second 
group to criticize members of the first, pre-1964
enterprises and not these political departments, however 
apt it might have been to them.
88 See Gongren Ribao 28.3.65, in SCMP 3436, 18-22; 7.4.65, in 
SCMP 3454, 17-21; 19.9.65, in SCMP 3552, 19-21. It is
striking that those who insist that the PLA's style is 
easily applicable, and must be applied, to union work, are 
invariably political department or militia cadres not 
directly involved in union work, while those who point out 
the difficulties are all union cadres, usually basic-level.
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group as revisionist. But when the workers 
spontaneously rebelled they seldom directed their 
attacks against the management cadres, but rather 
against the much-hated cadres in the political 
departments.89
An added incentive for attacking the political departments was 
that during the summer of 1966, when it was still not at all 
clear to the majority of people what sort of campaign the 
Cultural Revolution was going to be and many treated it as 
another anti-rightist campaign, still more 'black material' 
had been collected, in industrial enterprises as well as 
schools, on the usual suspects (those from 'bad' class 
backgrounds, those criticized in previous campaigns or who had 
made political errors or crossed powerful people in their 
unit, anyone given to making cynical remarks and complaints 
etc.).90 But as this initial stage of the movement, led by 
the work-teams dispatched by Liu Shaoqi, came to be 
discredited in the autumn of 1966, the Party Centre ordered 
that '" [djossiers compiled by the various schools and units 
during the Cultural Revolution for the purpose of nailing the 
rank and file should be annulled. They should all be taken 
out and burned in public.**'91 Rebel organizations of workers, 
which grew rapidly during December 1966, like other Rebel 
groups made every effort to seize and destroy these 'black 
dossiers', a course which inevitably brought them into 
conflict with the political departments. Later, it even 
brought them into direct conflict with the military and Public
89 Yang Xiguang, 'Wenhua dageroing dui shehuizhuyi zhidu tupo',
Zhishifenzi 2, 3, Spring 1986, quoted in Unger, 'Whither 
China? ... ', Modern China 17, 1, January 1991, 18-19.
Yang is referring to the situation in Changsha 
specifically, where most workers supported the Rebel 
faction.
90 See Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural 
Revolution, 22.
91 Ibid., 35. A translation of the document can be found in 
SCMM 617, 1-2.
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Security organs, as local Party authorities, reluctant to 
destroy all the files they had compiled on trouble-makers, 
hung on to some material and in some cases made duplicates 
which were stored with these organs.92 In Guangzhou, Rebels 
made plans to storm Public Security offices and seize this 
material during April and May 1967, as well as planning 
attacks on jails to free their comrades imprisoned in the 
February military crackdown.93
From the point of view of this study, the main development 
of the Cultural Revolution as far as workers are concerned is 
not that they followed either of the 'two lines' - Mao's 
revolutionary line, or the 'revisionist' line identified with 
Liu and Deng - because, as we have just seen, there were 
important elements of both programmes which were objectionable 
to at least some workers. The main point to be grasped is 
that during the Cultural Revolution, workers organized 
themselves, often in very large numbers, to defend their own 
interests and to promote their own views. These autonomous 
and representative organizations, which 'reflected the genuine 
but divided concerns of the workers'94, proved extremely 
difficult for the authorities to bring back under control, in 
some cases defying the Party and the army in pursuit of their 
goals. Although workers, like the rest of Chinese society, 
divided into two factions, it would be wrong to assume that 
these corresponded to the 'two lines'. In fact, as Liu Guokai 
has pointed out, despite the accusations of its opponents, the 
Conservative faction was not pro-Liu:
They were out to defend the existing social order, 
because of vested interests • They had higher social 
status than others. They held more important
92 Ibid., 35.
93 Zi Chuan, 'Li Yizhe yu wo' (Li Yizhe and me), Beidou 1, 
1.6.77, 10.
94 Rozman, A mirror for socialism, 128.
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positions and jobs and were paid higher wages. They 
enjoyed many privileges in their everyday lives.
They were unanimous that Mao, not Liu, was the 
supreme representative of this social order.95
Even though workers in groups belonging to the 
Conservative faction generally supported the existing order in 
society and in the enterprise, this did not always mean that 
the representatives of that order could control these forces 
once they were mobilized. Although there are many instances 
of direct manipulation or control of Conservative workers, 
which give credence to the image of Conservative workers' 
organizations as tools of those in authority who opposed real 
change in the Cultural Revolution, and although these 
organizations often included large numbers of 'nominal' 
members who either did not feel strongly about the actions 
they undertook or only went along with them because powerful 
people in their enterprise were in charge and they lacked the 
courage to resist, workers in these groups also had grievances 
of their own which prompted them to act, notably in the winter 
of 1966 when workers first became involved in the Cultural 
Revolution en masse. In the case of the Rebel faction, which 
came to see the whole of the new bureaucratic class as the 
source of its problems, it made no sense to draw a distinction 
between one section of the bureaucracy believed to support Liu 
and the other judged to be allied with Mao, and to oppose one 
and not the other. As we will see below, Rebel workers showed 
a distinct tendency to attack all cadres and all authority in 
their enterprises, incurring criticism from the Maoists in the 
leadership for their extremism, and opposed the 'liberation' 
or reinstatement of those cadres forced out of office in 
earlier phases of the Cultural Revolution when revolutionary
95 Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 
73.
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committees were formed during 1968.96 In general, 'the 
concentration on cadres and cadre behaviour suggests an anti­
authority dimension to the movement, a model of conflict 
between leaders and led. '97
Overall, it seems that despite their division into two 
strongly antagonistic factions during the movement, most 
workers were not responding directly to the manipulation of 
one or other faction in the top leadership of the Party, but 
acted with an unprecedented degree of autonomy and 
spontaneity. Whichever faction they joined, workers all seem 
to some extent to have shared in the experience of large-scale 
self-organization and independent political action and 
expression, in 'independent mass organizations which leant 
real power to the voice of workers for a fleeting period'98. 
It is this which makes the Cultural Revolution a turning 
point, if not in terms of workers' achievement of their 
desired position and influence in the enterprise and beyond, 
then at least in terms of the autonomous collective action 
which might ultimately be able to bring this about.
Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou's enterprises: official and 
unofficial actions, May-December 1966
This study is not intended to provide a blow-by-blow 
account of the three years of the Cultural Revolution in 
Guangzhou or elsewhere in China, but it is necessary to go 
into a certain amount of detail as, especially at the end of
96 See for example 'The present state of the movement in some 
factories in Guangzhou', Guangzhou Gongren 34, Hay 1968, in 
SCMP 4208, 7-16.
97 Blecher and White, Micropolitics in contemporary China: A 
technical unit during and after the Cultural Revolution, 
104.
98 Walder, 'Some ironies of the Maoist legacy in industry', 
Selden and Lippit (eds.) The transition to socialism in 
China, 229.
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1966 and the beginning of 1967, the situation changed markedly 
from week to week and even from day to day. What began in May 
as an effort to mobilize workers to criticize a small number 
of intellectuals singled out by the Party Centre in Beijing 
gave way, over the summer and early autumn of 1966, to more 
genuine protest activity in some enterprises by a minority of 
restive workers, with some involvement of student Red Guards. 
At first this activity seems to have been quite successfully 
suppressed by enterprise leaderships, but as workers' 
organizations, especially Rebel organizations, grew through 
November and December, mass action by workers became more and 
more common. When the existence of these organizations was 
legitimized by the CCRG in Beijing on November 17", the last 
important obstacle to workers' organizations was removed, and 
December and early January 1967 saw the nationwide outbreak of 
what became known as 'counterrevolutionary economism', or the 
'evil wind of economism'. This movement in fact bore a close
resemblance to the outpouring of workers' criticisms we saw in 
the spring of 1957, as the following description of Liu
Guokai's, worth quoting at length, will show:
In an upsurge of democracy unprecedented since the 
founding of the People's Republic, the long-pent-up 
thoughts and reasonable demands of the masses all 
burst out like a flood from an opened sluice gate.
The prolonged wage freeze, the delay in turning 
contract labour into regular workers, insufficiency 
of labour insurance, fringe benefits, and subsidies
or employment for high school graduates, the
assignment of dormitories, and overdue overtime 
compensation - in a word, all tumbled out as 
pressing problems... Once the masses in one unit 
took the first step to rise in rebellion, the news 
would spread to other units, and the masses there 
would immediately follow suit. In a rage, the rank
99 See Walder, 'Zhang Chunqiao and Shanghai's January 
Revolution', 28-31.
245
and file took the cadres to task, reprimanding them 
and complaining about the unreasonable treatment 
they had been subject to over the years. They 
accused the leadership of being relentless and 
brutal towards the workers and showing no concern 
for them, and they set forth their demands... those 
who had been poorly paid and had suffered 
horrendously in their working conditions and 
everyday lives were many. Therefore, the protests 
were manifestations of a genuine mass movement, much 
more vigorous than the campaign to criticize the 
bourgeois reactionary line.100
Early developments in the spring and summer of 1966 did 
not show many signs of leading to a movement markedly 
different from the ongoing campaign for 'politics in command' 
and ideological revolutionization in enterprises. However, 
although in the course of the SEM cadres had already been 
prevailed upon 'to give up their privileges in housing, in 
children's education, and in life-style'101, as the 
experiences of the model Daqing oilfield began to be promoted 
more strongly, the shape of things to come in workers' 
relations with leading cadres emerged more clearly. It was 
stated that
The revisionists turn an enterprise practically into 
the private property of the bourgeois privileged 
stratum; they manage an enterprise by commandism, 
the imposition of penalties and the enforcement of
100 Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 
45-6. The existence of genuine grievances among workers 
which can account for 'economism', obviating the need to 
prove outside agitation or manipulation, is confirmed by 
Walder, 'Zhang Chunqiao', 39-45, and Wylie, 'Shanghai 
dockers in the Cultural Revolution', especially 110-114.
101 Lee, Industrial management, 99.
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rigid systems.102
To counter this and implement the mass line in enterprises, 
workers were to have the right to elect basic—level cadres and 
to criticize cadres at any meeting.103 For their part, 
cadres were to agree to forego special privileges:
They will not build office buildings, auditoriums, 
hostels, and reception houses; they will live in 
'makeshift dwellings' or single-storey houses. They 
will hold no parties and present no gifts; they will 
neither dance nor put a sofa in their office. They 
will eat in collective dining rooms. And they will 
teach their children not to seek privileges for 
themselves.... They must persist in participating in 
physical labour and must never be bureaucrats 
sitting high above the people...104
These ideas about the need for workers to elect their own 
leaders, who would be subject to recall and would not enjoy 
high pay or other special privileges, are at the heart of 
calls made later in the year, and especially during the 
'January Storm' of 1967, for a new form of social and 
industrial organization based on the Paris Commune, by which 
the Rebels who advocated this form meant four main things:
the people govern themselves; they do this through 
elected leaders; these do not become a new and 
oppressive bureaucracy because they can be recalled 
at any time and do not get a higher wage than those
102 Jingji Yanjiu 4, 20.4.66, this translation revised version 
of SCMM 538, 8-27, in Andors, Workers and workplaces in 
revolutionary China, 254.
103 Ibid., 256.
104 Ibid., 271-2.
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who elected them; and the people are armed.105
Early in 1966, the development of this trend was foreshadowed 
by an article in Hongqi in praise of the Paris Commune, which 
emphasized the importance of this form of self-government in 
preventing a new regime from degenerating into the 
dictatorship of a privileged and exploitative elite after a 
successful workers' uprising.106 As a contrast to this 
ideal, the article criticized the existence of privileges, 
high pay, corruption and widespread material incentives in 
Kruschev's Soviet Union107; the applicability of this 
criticism to the policies associated with 'China's Kruschev', 
Liu Shaoqi, cannot have escaped many people. So even before 
the Cultural Revolution officially got underway, there were 
signs that a fairly radical reform of enterprise management 
and worker-cadre relations might be on the horizon.
During May and June 1966, workers' meetings and rallies 
were organized in Guangzhou for criticism of the intellectuals 
who were the very first targets of the Cultural Revolution, 
mainly the writers Deng Tuo and Wu Han. The main criticisms 
of these people attributed to 'progressive' workers and staff 
in official reports were concerned with their alleged claims 
(not made explicit in their writings, but quite clear to those 
at whom they were aimed, notably Mao), that the GLF had been 
a costly and disastrous failure which had brought only 
suffering to the ordinary Chinese people, and that the CCP 
despised the masses and ignored their views.108 Workers were 
said to have countered these slanders with evidence of the 
progress made in their own industries and enterprises,
105 Mehnert, Peking and the new left: at home and abroad, 12.
106 Hongqi 4, 1.4.66, 4-18.
107 Ibid., 14.
108 See the Guangzhou City Radio reports in News from 
provincial radio stations (NPRS) 158, 20-1 and 26-7, and 
159, 23-4.
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including the Guangzhou Iron and Steel Works and the 
construction and transport industries, during the GLF. It is 
notable that most of these rallies and forums involved only 
'progressive' or model workers and staff who were politically 
reliable and had some standing in their workplaces; the right 
to participate in the Cultural Revolution was at this point 
still limited to those people of 'high political quality'109 
who would later mostly be found in the Conservative faction.
There was a change in the direction of the Cultural 
Revolution from August 1966, following publication of the 'CCP 
Central Committee Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution'110 on August 8 . This document defined the 
targets of the movement as 'capitalist roaders in authority in 
the Party' and 'bourgeois reactionary "authorities*"111, thus 
indicating that this was not a campaign aimed at finding 
rightists among the ordinary people112, but was aimed at 
those in power who had deviated from the correct line. This 
change of tack brought to an end the campaign against the 
obvious targets in enterprises - the 'usual suspects' 
mentioned above - but did not yet lead to any new developments 
within enterprises. Cultural Revolution Committees and Groups 
were set up in all units to direct the campaign, but since it 
was 'mostly mainstays from the previous period of the 
campaign, namely, persons with high "political qualities"'113 
who were elected to these bodies, few attacks against 
'capitalist roaders in authority' in enterprises transpired.
109 Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 
43.
110 Usually known as the '16-Point Decision', and reproduced in 
Readings in the Chinese Communist Cultural Revolution, 224- 
230.
111 Ibid., 224.
112 See Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural 
Revolution, 23-4.
113 Ibid., 24.
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The '16 Point Decision' also stipulated that the Cultural 
Revolution was 'a powerful motive force for the development of 
the social productive forces', and should not be seen as any 
sort of obstacle to production; the masses were to be 
mobilized to 'grasp revolution and promote production' 
simultaneously.114 There were reports from various 
enterprises in Guangzhou that 'rules have been broken and 
difficulties resolved'115, as workers, influenced by their 
study of Mao's thought, abolished irrational rules and 
regulations116, including, in one plant, the system of 
checking on attendance by the use of attendance cards, 
something which was described as 'a big insult to workers' 
revolutionary spontaneity.'117 Since a system of
'revolutionary cards' was introduced to replace it, however, 
this was probably a very superficial change, more to do with 
the general trend of changing the names of enterprises and the 
foreign names of products and pieces of equipment than with 
any far-reaching reform of the regulations most resented by 
workers. Certainly there was still a very strong emphasis on 
channelling workers' enthusiasm for the Cultural Revolution 
into production, so it seems that the movement was largely 
marking time on the factory floor, with no widespread moves to 
criticize cadres and only gestures in the direction of 
reforming enterprise management and organization in the way 
that many workers would have liked.
Indeed, even the limited sort of Cultural Revolution in 
enterprises which was sanctioned by the '16 Points' seems to 
have been denied to many workers at this stage, whatever their 
'political qualifications'. The document
114 '16-Point Decision', 229.
115 Guangzhou City Radio 14.9.66, in NPRS 175, 28.
116 Ibid. 15.11.66, in NPRS 184, 23.
117 Ibid. 10.9.66, in NPRS 174, 49.
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contained ambiguities, so that both the Party and 
enterprise leaders tended to interpret it in terms 
of its emphasis on production and discipline. For 
instance, workers' spare time was filled with 
endless rounds of meetings to discuss the problems 
of production and daily life. Workers who wished to 
exchange 'revolutionary experiences' were 
transferred from day to might shift or from one 
workshop to another so as to make it difficult for 
them to organize political activities, When workers 
did go to other factories or to file petitions to
the higher echelons of authority they were charged
with 'wrecking production' and undermining the 
' Sixteen-point Resolution'.118
These are the usual tactics of enterprise leaders faced with 
awkward criticism from workers, and bear a close resemblance 
to the management methods we found employed under one-man 
management in enterprises up to 1956. As was mentioned 
earlier, contract workers protesting about their system of 
employment could be dealt with quite simply by being laid off, 
but it seems that even permanent workers could be kept under 
control at this stage of the movement using similar methods. 
It was later claimed that many workers, permanent and 
temporary, had been laid off or had their pay cut since the 
Cultural Revolution began119 as a direct result of their 
criticism of enterprise leaders. Thus we see that both the 
most 'politically reliable' permanent workers who were 
responding to the Cultural Revolution campaign by criticizing 
enterprise authorities, and temporary workers who had been 
restive for some time, were suppressed in a similar way at
this point of the movement, fuelling their later demands for
restitution and their enthusiasm for genuine participation in 
the Cultural Revolution.
118 Lee, Industrial management and economic reform, 107.
119 Renmin Ribao 26.12.66, in SCMP 3852, 3.
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As this phase of the Cultural Revolution unfolded, still 
under official direction, in Guangzhou's enterprises in August 
and September, with regular reports of excellent results and 
a 'double victory' in revolution and production120, there 
were signs of other activity among less 'progressive' workers 
in some of the city's workplaces. This activity was 
undoubtedly linked to the Cultural Revolution call to 
criticize certain people in authority, but it may also have 
been connected with an announcement by the Guangdong CCP 
Provincial Committee on August 13 that the worker-peasant 
system was to be implemented in all enterprises in the 
province where conditions were suitable, and that all existing 
and future enterprises should start employing worker-peasants 
and reduce their permanent workforce.121 It is not clear how 
widely the worker-peasant or contract labour system had been 
implemented in Guangzhou prior to this announcement, but given 
that it was most common in light industries such as textiles 
and food-processing and in storage and transportation122, it 
would be surprising if it was not already quite widespread in 
the area.123 Red Guard documents from a Labour Ministry 
Rebel group report that the urban contract labour system had 
been in force in Guangzhou since late 1956.124
Some of the earliest signs of criticism and protest among 
workers in the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou in fact came 
from workers with 'high political qualifications', judging by
120 See for example Remain Ribao 7.9.66, 1; Guangzhou City 
Radio 14.9.66, in NPRS 175, 27-8, and 15.10.66, in NPRS 
179, 35-6.
121 See Current Scene 6 , 5, 15.3.68, 7-8.
122 Ibid., 3, 4.
123 Walder notes that these industries were also concentrated 
in Shanghai - 'Zhang Chunqiao', 41.
124 See SCMM 616, 22.
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the recollections of middle-school Rebel activist Dai 
Xiao'ai125. He recalled that workers 'had stepped forward in 
late May and early June to write big-character posters 
attacking technicians and engineers who paid too little 
attention to the study of Mao's writings', and that criticism 
of enterprise management was also 'unmistakeably implied' in 
this. These workers had not found much support for their 
views, and 'had consequently drawn quickly the counter­
criticism of the confident factory leadership.'126 We have 
just seen the sorts of methods used by enterprise leaders to 
stifle criticism like this later in the summer, after the 
promulgation of the 'Sixteen Points'. Rumours about the 
'brutal suppression'127 of these workers concerned the 
students and prompted them to make their first forays into 
industrial enterprises to try to make contact with workers.
But it should be remembered that these earliest instances 
of criticism by workers happened before 'capitalist roaders in 
authority' had been specified as the movement's main target, 
at a time when many people still saw the Cultural Revolution 
as an anti-rightist campaign targeted at members of the rank 
and file with bad class backgrounds or political records. 
These 'politically qualified' workers were thus speaking out 
against those cadres, especially technicians, who were often 
not of worker or other 'good' class origin and had benefitted 
from the Seventy Articles line in industry, with the 
encouragement of the Maoists at various levels of the Party 
and probably also of the political department cadres in their 
enterprises; their criticisms were in keeping with the policy 
of revolutionization and 'politics in command', but seem to 
have been suppressed by management cadres who stressed 
professional over political work. It is interesting to note
125 Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard - The political biography
of Dai Xiao'ai, 55-6.
126 Ibid., 56.
127 Ibid., 57.
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that both future Conservative workers and Rebels probably 
sympathized with attacks on arrogant technicians and 
bureaucratist managers, the main difference between them being 
that Rebels also had Party and political department cadres in 
their sights. This general support for management reforms in 
the direction of 'mass management' by workers may account for 
the progress made in some enterprises even in periods when 
Rebel workers, who exerted the strongest pressure against 
enterprise cadres, were subject to political or military 
suppression; more will be said about this later.
In contrast to the 'progressive' workers mentioned above, 
the August announcement about the implementation of the 
worker-peasant system in Guangdong is likely to have alarmed 
less secure, unskilled and semi-skilled workers, especially 
those in the industries where this system was most widely 
applied, who were likely to be among the first to lose their 
permanent status and urban residence. As has already been 
mentioned, there were signs of unrest related to the system 
even before the start of the Cultural Revolution128, and so 
the announcement, together with the new focus of the movement 
on certain Party cadres who were said to be 'following the 
capitalist road', could be expected to encourage action among 
the workers most opposed to the general trend in enterprise 
management and employment systems prior to the Cultural 
Revolution. Indeed, although it was the plight of the 
'progressive' workers who had first spoken out which had 
aroused the concern of Dai Xiao'ai and his fellow students, it 
seems to have been workers inclined towards the Rebel faction, 
especially younger workers, who responded with most enthusiasm 
when they made contact129 and soon began putting up their own 
big-character posters in their unit criticizing the enterprise 
leadership.
128 See Current Scene 6, 5, 15.3.68, 6, 8.
129 Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 59.
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The students went to the unit where they had done their 
last stint of labour participation (part of the 'work-study' 
policy in education), which happened to be a warehouse, one of 
the enterprises most likely to be affected by the worker- 
peasant system. The management warned them against any 
activity which might disrupt production and clearly would have 
preferred them to leave and not interfere in the Cultural 
Revolution at that enterprise at all; for their part, the 
workers were 'unwilling to talk openly and freely'.130 But 
the students did uncover 'opposition sentiments among a part 
of the workers'; a fairly typical list of grievances, in fact, 
which reflect workers' experiences since 1958 and in many 
cases could have come straight out of workers' contributions 
to the Wang Cai debate in Guangzhou in 1957. They included 
'family difficulties to which the factory leadership paid no 
heed', many years of service in the same unit 'with little 
adjustment in wages'131, and the transfer of a worker's wife 
from the warehouse to the countryside.132 The students found 
that
other workers bore a grudge against the warehouse 
leadership for its bureaucratic style of work, 
staying always in their office and hardly ever 
descending into the shops to labour along with the 
workers.133
130 Ibid., 58.
131 Ibid., 58.
132 I have not found any clear reference to support this, but 
it seems possible that women workers were more likely to 
lose their permanent status and benefits in enterprises 
than men, particularly given the fairly generous maternity 
benefits for which women union members were eligible, an 
expense which managers might be keen to avoid. Certainly 
women seem to have been among the first to be laid off by 
enterprises anxious to save on welfare expenses following 
the recent economic reforms in China.
133 Ibid., 59.
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We do not. need to labour the point of the similarity between 
these sentiments and those expressed by workers in 1957, and 
even in 
1953.
Prior to the CCRG decision on November 17 that workers 
should be allowed to participate in the movement, exchanging 
revolutionary experiences outside working hours and setting up 
their own representative organizations134, it was relatively 
easy for enterprise authorities to argue that the imperatives 
of stable production justified suppression of workers' 
protests. Rebel workers at the warehouse visited by Dai 
Xiao'ai's group were reportedly 'severely suppressed by the 
management'135 after the students left, with the need to 
safeguard production cited to legitimize the authorities' 
action. Enterprise leaders generally were reluctant to allow 
students to intervene in the movement in enterprises:
They thought the students' intervention disruptive 
to production, and they were particularly worried 
that the undesirables in their factories, agitated 
by the students, might also become unruly.136
As we have just seen, this was precisely what was likely to 
happen in enterprises where the build-up of grievances among 
a section of the workers needed very little encouragement to 
break out into open rebellion. But the strong emphasis 
through September and October on maintaining production and 
preventing student Rebels offering any support to restive 
workers meant that in Guangzhou, workers' protests 'faltered
134 'Twelve-point decision regarding the Cultural Revolution in 
factories and mines (draft)'; see Lee Lai To, Trade Unions 
in China, 108-9.
135 Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 62.
136 Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution,
42.
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and nearly died out altogether'137 during this period.
In contrast to the suppression of these early Rebels in 
the workforce, 'so-called conservative elements' among the 
workers, mainly union members138, were much in evidence on 
the city streets during the autumn, mobilized by the 
provincial authorities to demonstrate against the student Red 
Guards who had come down from Beijing to promote the movement 
in the south. Although clearly the actions of these workers 
were being controlled by authorities in their enterprises and 
in the local Party and government, their own enthusiasm for 
the task was probably not negligible. We should remember that 
most Red Guards at this point were still the offspring of the 
'five red' groups (Party cadres, PLA personnel, revolutionary 
martyrs, workers and poor peasants), with those from cadre 
backgrounds particularly prominent, and that despite the 
theoretical status of the working class as the leading class 
in Chinese society, the attitude of these students towards 
workers (and towards the offspring of workers and peasants as 
opposed to the other three 'red' categories) was often very 
condescending:
[T]hose who suffered most before 1949 (the workers 
and peasants) owed a debt of gratitude to the 
revolutionaries who liberated them. As the passive 
recipients who gained most from the efforts of 
revolutionary cadres, workers and peasants were not 
in a strong position to provide class education to 
the children of their liberators.139
So resentment of the students' patronizing attitude towards 
workers and inflated sense of their own importance may have
137 Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 60.
138 Ibid., 61.
139 Rosen, Red Guard factionalism and the Cultural Revolution 
in Guangzhou, 78.
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encouraged these workers in their positive response to 
official mobilization against student Red Guards at this 
stage.
The Guangzhou press and radio stations' constant 
exhortations both to workers to stay at their production posts 
and concentrate on the Cultural Revolution in their own units, 
and to students not to interfere in the movement in 
enterprises, can be taken as evidence that the authorities did 
not wish to see the Cultural Revolution expand in scope to 
include large numbers of workers, and were concerned about the 
possibility of student agitation of discontented workers. 
However, alongside the calls for workers to be allowed to 
'liberate themselves'140 and run the movement in their units 
themselves, which were really aimed at stifling the 
development of the movement among workers, there clearly were 
also concerns about the clashes between workers and students 
which seemed to be occurring in various places.141 As well 
as the organized confrontations noted above between unionized 
workers from the larger state enterprises and student Red 
Guards, especially those from outside the city, the student 
Rebels were not always welcomed in enterprises even by the 
protesting workers they wished to support: 'Many rebel workers 
were extremely hostile to all forms of intervention from 
outside the plant.'142
In part this was probably due to the same resentment of 
students' attitudes towards workers which made it relatively 
easy for local authorities to mobilize Conservative workers 
against the young Red Guards: students at a Red Guard
conference in Guangzhou in September had to be reminded to
140 The insistence that 'The masses must liberate themselves' 
was included in the '16 Points@.
141 See for example Hong Wei Bao 9.9.66, in SCMP 3786, 11-15; 
Remain Ribao 12.9.66, 1.
142 Andors, China's industrial revolution, 165.
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'respect the revolutionary proposals and opinions of the 
masses'143, and not simply take over the movement in the 
factories and direct it themselves. It seems likely that 
student Rebels were inclined to try to monopolize control and 
direction of the movement even in industrial enterprises. 
Certainly, once workers were allowed to organize themselves 
freely from mid-November, even those students who welcomed 
this development had some misgivings, being 'aware that [they] 
would soon have to share leadership responsibility with 
workers.'144
Students in China have often tended to see themselves as 
the natural and rightful leaders of any movement of protest, 
harking back, as they did during the spring of 1989, to the 
intellectuals of the May Fourth era and their role in China's 
social and political development. Although they are often 
keen to have the support of other sections of (particularly 
urban) society, including workers, there is a noticeable 
tendency to guard their leading role and guidance over the 
direction of any movement quite jealously, and to regard 
workers as unsuited to playing anything more than a supporting 
role. Given their exclusion from any sort of political role 
since the founding of the People's Republic, it is perhaps not 
surprising that workers appropriated with such enthusiasm the 
slogan of 'the masses liberating themselves'145 and resisted 
even the intervention of outside activists inclined to support 
their demands, determined to make the best use of this 
unprecedented opportunity to organize themselves.
When workers' organizations received official sanction in 
mid-November 1966, this was in part simply recognition of the
143 Hong Wei Bao 12.9.66, in SCMP 3786, 17.
144 Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 144.
145 See China News Analysis 711, 7.6.68, 3-4, for the uses to 
which this slogan was put by workers resisting the PLA's 
reimposition of discipline in enterprises.
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fact that workers were already active in the movement in many 
cities.146 From early October, the campaign to criticize the 
'bourgeois reactionary line' (the conduct of the Cultural 
Revolution under the work-teams sent out by Liu Shaoqi, who 
suppressed some individuals who had actually spoken out 
against power-holders in the first phases of the campaign) had 
in general encouraged more, and more genuine, mass involvement 
in the movement, since it turned criticism against Party 
leaders themselves for the first time and weakened the 
position of the 'five-red' elite who had monopolized 
leadership of the Cultural Revolution since the early summer.
Many people were at first inclined to regard this change 
in the campaign's direction as 'too good to be true'147, 
especially those on whom 'black material' had been collected, 
and who were now told that all this material had to be 
destroyed. But as it became clear that this instruction was 
actually being carried out in some units, where it was an 
important part of the campaign against the 'bourgeois 
reactionary line', confidence grew:
Due to the widespread nature of this campaign ...
the broad ranks of people began to dare to rise up.
This happened around November and December of
1966.148
Just as the ranks of student 'revolutionary rebels'149 
swelled during these months, so 'organizations of
146 See White, Policies of chaos, 233; Walder, 'Zhang
Chunqiao', 28.
147 Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 
36.
148 Ibid., 37.
149 The name was adopted to distinguish them from the original
Red Guards of the summer months, many of whom had
cooperated with the work-teams.
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"revolutionary rebels" from among factory workers ... also 
mushroomed.'150 During December 1966 and the first half of 
January 1967, workers used the freedom allowed them by the 
campaign to criticize the bourgeois reactionary line to 'give 
their superiors a piece of their mind without fear of being 
beaten down as anti-party, anti-socialist elements'151, 
turning on cadres in their enterprises and demanding action on 
all the grievances which had been building up over past years, 
in some cases dating right back to 1956-7, in a movement that 
was soon to be branded 'counterrevolutionary economism'.
Factional division among workers
Before going on to an examination of the phenomenon of 
'economism' and the beginning of large-scale involvement of 
workers in the Cultural Revolution both inside and outside 
their enterprises, we should first consider where the division 
between Conservative and Rebel workers came in most cases, and 
how the different interests and aspirations of the two groups 
shaped their participation in the movement.
The conventional wisdom on workers during the Cultural 
Revolution for some time was the same as that for the Hundred 
Flowers period: it was said that workers' relatively
privileged position in society and political status led them 
to stand aloof from protests and defend the Party from attacks 
by other social groups. As we saw, this view is something of 
a travesty of workers' actual activities in 1956-7 since it 
takes no account of the powerful wave of workers' protest and 
strikes which preceded as well as accompanied the well-known 
intellectual and student movement. The idea that some workers 
supported and defended Party authorities during the Cultural
150 Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution,
43.
151 Ibid., 45.
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Revolution is well-founded, but care must be taken not to 
overlook the importance of Rebel workers' militant opposition 
to these same authorities.
The main reason why Conservative workers' groups (who 
often called themselves 'Scarlet Guards' (zhiweidui) to 
distinguish themselves from the student Red Guards) have been 
taken as representative of workers in general is that they are 
judged to have constituted a numerical majority among 
industrial workers, particularly in the large, modern state 
enterprises. Rebel workers were almost always a minority in 
large enterprises152, which might lead one to assume that 
these groups were less important and less representative of 
workers' opinions in general than were the Scarlet Guards. 
However, as was mentioned earlier, one of the main 
developments of the Cultural Revolution was that workers
formed their own large-scale organizations to press their own 
demands and put forward their own points of view; these 
organizations are highly significant whichever faction they 
were aligned with.
Another point which should not be overlooked is that 
there were severe pressures on workers not to stick their 
necks out by joining Rebel groups, especially in large 
enterprises where the influence of the Party and mass 
organizations and of the political and militia departments was 
strongest. Dai Xiao'ai and his fellow students soon realized
once they made contact with them that many workers in
Guangzhou were wary of any political involvement and
particularly reluctant to express their true opinions, because
152 Even in a city such as Changsha where the majority of 
workers joined the Rebel faction, those at the larger 
enterprises tended to be less militant; see Unger, 'Whither 
China?...', Modern China 17, 1, 20. For the proportion of 
Rebel and Conservative workers in some of Guangzhou's main 
enterprises see Table 5 in Hong Yung Lee's Politics of the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution, 135; Rebel workers in these 
enterprises constituted between 2 1% and 46% of the rank and 
file workforce.
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they
were old enough to have had personal experience of 
the notorious anti-rightist campaign in 1957-58 ...
The ones who had been most active in writing big- 
character posters and making known their ideas had 
even been struggled against and labelled as 
"rightists opposed to the Party and socialism".153
Liu Guokai has gone into workers' factional division in some 
detail, describing those enterprise personnel with 'high 
political qualifications' and vested interests in their unit 
as the 'had-had-it-good' faction, while 'those workers who had 
always been cold-shouldered by the leadership can be called 
the "had-it-bad" faction.'154 These latter of course existed 
in all enterprises to some extent (in the form of apprentices, 
unskilled, semiskilled or service workers, as well as workers 
from 'bad' class backgrounds and those with political problems 
or who had crossed swords with enterprise leaders before), but 
Liu points out that there were good reasons why they were not 
always willing or able to form a minority Rebel group.
In factories, particularly big factories, most of 
the "conservative" organizations were stable and 
powerful. This was because in big factories the old 
order had held powerful control. From the factory 
party committee, political department, and public 
security section down to cadres and staff members of 
the trade union and of youth and women's 
associations and even workshop superintendents and 
shift foremen joined the "conservative workers' 
organizations almost as a bloc. What could a rank- 
and-file worker do but throw in with the tide? The 
political and security cadres were "prestigious"
153 Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 56.
154 Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 
79.
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persons . .. and the workers were used to obeying 
them. The consecpiences would he grave if anyone 
dared to disobey them by joining a "rebel" 
organization. One would be up against a formidable 
opponent and duly penalized. For instance, one 
could easily be transferred to an undesirable job.
It was true the workers made up the majority, and if 
they were courageous enough to rebel the situation 
could be different ... But ... it was not easy for 
the majority of workers to rise to the occasion with 
spontaneous action. As a result, just a small 
number of backbone elements were able to coerce the 
rank-and-file workers to form organizations that 
really did not have genuine mass support,155
Elsewhere Liu points out that it was possible for members 
of the 'had-it-good' faction to go against their apparent 
interests, at least covertly, and support the Rebels, perhaps 
because although their own position in the prevailing social 
order was a favourable one, relatives might have been unjustly 
persecuted in previous campaigns, causing them to question 
that social order.156 And at the point in the summer of 1967
when Rebels had the upper hand in the cities, it was also
possible for workers to conform and belong to Conservative 
organizations in their large factories in the suburbs, while 
vat home in the cities they were "rebelH supporters.'157 One
last point to be considered when assessing the actual
155 Ibid., 75 (emphasis added). We have already seen that
penalties such as unwanted transfers and wage deductions
were readily applied to rebellious workers both in the 
1950s and in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, 
so the fear was well-founded. Enterprises also had a great 
deal of material in workers' dossiers with which they could 
vsettle accounts' with their critics once the high point of 
the movement passed.
156 Ibid., 95-6.
157 Ibid., 96.
264
significance of Rebel workers is that, because of the 
pressures and possible penalties which restrained workers from 
Rebel allegiance, those who did form Rebel organizations 'had 
their own independent views of things and ... enormous 
capacity to get things done ... everyone who joined was self- 
motivated in some way; no one who was afraid of the 
consequences would dare to join. They therefore had more core 
members and fewer nominal ones, and their effectiveness could 
not be measured in numbers. '150
Finally, something should be said about the nature of 
Conservative workers' organizations. Although they had 
obvious links with enterprise and other local authorities, 
these organizations were not only the creations and 
instruments of these forces. As we have just seen, even in 
solidly Conservative large factories Rebel sympathies existed, 
and people's factional allegiances did not correspond to their 
own vested interests in every single case. But, large numbers 
of the well-established, unionized, skilled and secure workers 
in big enterprises did have genuine reasons of their own for 
the actions they took, including joining the Conservative 
faction. For example, in Shanghai Scarlet Guards went on 
strike to protest against concessions made by the city 
government to Rebel contract and temporary workers, and 
dockers in the same city put forward their own 'economistic' 
demands to maintain wage differentials when contract workers 
received pay rises.159 These outbreaks of Conservative 
'economism' were later blamed on local Party manipulation and 
instigation, but there is evidence that the main impetus for 
the demands came from workers themselves.160
158 Ibid., 44, 79.
159 Walder, 'Zhang Chunqiao', 48-9; Wylie, 'Shanghai dockers in 
the Cultural Revolution', 102.
160 Walder, 'Zhang Chunqiao', 48.
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Economism and the attacks on the contract labour system
The mass movement unleashed, apparently unintentionally, 
throughout urban China in December 1966 was universally 
condemned a few weeks later even by those members of the CCRG, 
particularly Jiang Qing, who initially seemed inclined to back 
the demands of contract workers when these were presented to 
them late in December. Rebel students, too, were often in the 
forefront of the campaign to get workers to renounce the 
concessions made to them and return the back-wages which many 
had received161, urging them not to be fooled by the plot of 
'capitalist roaders' in enterprises and local government, who 
were claimed to have tried to sabotage the Cultural Revolution 
by diverting workers' activity into economic demands with 
'bribes' of back-wages and other payments. It was insisted 
that 'economism' could be traced back to these local Party and 
government leaders, who had first incited workers to make 
demands and then met them, thus disrupting production and 
causing losses to the state, in an attempt to force the 
leadership in Beijing to modify the Cultural Revolution which 
was now beginning to threaten local power-holders' own 
positions.
As Andrew Walder has pointed out, many Western accounts 
of the Cultural Revolution accept this explanation of 
economism in part or in whole162, but this is to ignore the 
fact that, as we have already seen, workers' resentment and 
protests on a variety of issues had actually been brewing for 
months if not years, and the suppression of their earlier 
attempts to use the Cultural Revolution to voice some of their 
demands and criticisms can only have added to the pressure. 
There is in fact no need to look for evidence of behind-the- 
scenes manipulation of workers, as it is entirely plausible
161 Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 
48.
162 Walder, 'Zhang Chunqiao', 39.
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that, under the unique conditions of the early Cultural 
Revolution when the usual controls on organizations 
independent of the Party had been lifted and all officials 
made legitimate targets of attack, workers seized a rare 
opportunity to press their demands, give vent to their anger 
and seek redress for some of the wrongs they felt had been 
done to them over the years.
It was a cry out of the bottom of the masses' 
hearts, a cry coming out spontaneously from 
thousands and thousands of people without prior 
consultation. .. There was no need to agitate them or 
to help them fall into ranks.163
There is also the point that cadres may have conceded 
some of workers' demands quite simply because it would have 
been almost impossible to justify a refusal. One example of 
this is the 'economistic' disbursement of 'long-overdue 
overtime pay' and raising of the compensation limits on some 
medical insurance items164. We have already seen how common 
unpaid and compulsory overtime was in Chinese enterprises even 
after the 6LF, and medical bills seem to have been as much of 
a worry for workers and their families in the 1960s as they 
had been in 1956 in Guangzhou, when hospitals' 'detention' of 
workers' dependents unable to pay their bills caused such an 
outcry. There were also cases in Harbin and Shanghai, and 
probably elsewhere, of Rebel transport workers getting hold of 
official documents on wage levels and discovering that local 
governments and enterprises were paying workers less than they 
were authorized to do. It would have been extremely difficult 
for any cadre to refuse a demand for back-pay in this 
situation, and indeed workers
163 Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution,
46.
164 Ibid., 46.
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reportedly demanded and received payment of the 
difference between the authorized and actual levels 
of wages, retroactive for three years. Transport 
workers in Harbin reportedly received about 1,000 
yuan each in back-wages, whereupon workers in other 
trades demanded and received similar payments.165
In all of the above cases it would have been extremely 
difficult for cadres to categorize workers' demands as 
excessive or unreasonable, as workers had good grounds for 
insisting that they were only asking for what was due to them.
Probably the worst accusation which can be levelled at 
the cadres who made concessions is that they caved in to some 
genuinely unreasonable demands instead of adopting the correct 
course of explaining the state's difficulties to workers and 
persuading them to withdraw excessive demands. However, given 
the force of the movement it seems doubtful that such a course 
of action was a real possibility. After all, the same policy 
had been advocated by high-level union officials and the Party 
alike in 1957, when the ideal of the union cadre who would be 
able to reason with workers and explain to them why they 
should drop their demands was equally far from reality. In 
one 1957 case, two union cadres of the Shanghai Fertilizer 
Factory were marched to the banks of the Huangpu river by 
protesting workers and almost drowned in an attempt to force 
them to agree to workers' demands.166 Like many aspects of 
the official unions' mandate, this policy for dealing with 
unreasonable or excessive demands sounded fine in theory but 
does not seem to have worked at all in practice, especially 
when cadres were confronted with ' [ 1 ]arge groups of workers, 
fresh from a violent and ... bloody defeat, possibly still 
armed with clubs and stones, [and] probably in no mood to
165 Current Scene 6 , 5, 13.
166 Elizabeth Perry, 'Shanghai's strike wave of 1957', 
forthcoming China Quarterly, March 1994, 24-5.
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negotiate'167 with them.
Articles attacking economism in the last weeks of January 
all concentrate on the supposed plot by capitalist roaders to 
disrupt production and corrupt workers' revolutionary will by 
giving them back-pay, bonuses, and travelling expenses for 
chuanlian16B, but in fact at least part of what was later 
condemned as the 'evil wind of economism' stemmed from the 
December 26 editorial in the Renmin Ribao. This article 
stressed the necessity for a vigorous and thorough Cultural 
Revolution in industrial enterprises, many of which were
seriously influenced in varying degrees by
capitalism, revisionism and even feudalism in the 
fields of political ideology, organizational
leadership, and production management. These 
influences not only shackle the workers'
revolutionary enthusiasm and hinder the development 
of productivity, but also breed the seed of
revisionism and are hotbeds for capitalist
restoration.169
While encouraging a new upsurge in the Cultural Revolution in 
enterprises in which the working class would be the 'leading 
force and the most active factor'170, this article also 
revealed what had happened to many of the workers who had 
tried to speak out in the preceding few months, and barred 
enterprise cadres from taking similar retaliatory measures in 
future:
The Party Central Committee has ruled that ... no
167 Walder, 'Zhang Chunqiao', 48.
168 'Linking up', i.e. travelling to other units all over the 
country to exchange revolutionary experiences.
169 Renmin Ribao 26.12.66, in SCMP 3852, 2.
170 Ibid., 1.
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leaders of industrial and mining enterprises should 
strike at and retaliate upon the workers who have 
put forth criticism and disclosed facts, nor are 
they to reduce the wages of these workers, to 
discharge these workers from their posts, and, for 
the same reason, to discharge contract workers or 
temporary workers ... all those wrongly accused of 
being 'counter-revolutionaries' must be vindicated* 
Transfer of any post in production is disallowed. 
Threatening and persecution of dependents of workers 
is also disallowed. Revolutionary workers who have 
been struck off and forced to leave their factories 
must be allowed to return to their factories to 
participate in production and in the cultural 
revolution. These revolutionary workers should be 
given any wages which were held up when they were 
forced to leave the factory.111
These provisions for payment of back-wages to at least some of 
the workers, permanent and temporary, who had been laid off or 
sacked because of their protest activities, however limited 
they were intended to be, nonetheless paved the way for an 
even greater upsurge in 'economistic' demands.
This was particularly true of contract and temporary 
workers, one of the most discontented and rebellious groups in 
the whole of the Chinese workforce, representatives of whom 
were widely reported in wall-posters to have met with Jiang 
Qing on the evening of December 26 and to have received her 
full support for their claims. Posters in Guangzhou dated 
January 4 1967 reported that Jiang 'had denounced officials of 
the Ministry of Labor and of the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions for permitting the worker-peasant system to exist. ,172 
Liu Guokai gives a similar account of workers'
171 Ibid., 3 (emphasis added).
172 Current Scene 6 , 5, 15.3.68, 9.
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representatives# reception by members of the CCRG:
On December 25, the Ministry of Labor in Beijing was 
closed down by petitioners. The next day Jiang Qing 
received the petitioners, and right in front of them 
she reprimanded Xi Zhanyuan, vice-minister of labor.
She said: 'The Ministry of Labor is simply a
Ministry of the Lords. Even though the country has 
been liberated for so many years, the workers are 
still suffering so much; it is unbelievable. Does 
your Ministry of Labor know about this or not? Do 
you mean to say that contract workers are the 
offspring of a stepmother? You, too, should work as 
a contract workerI' Saying this, Jiang even burst 
into tears.173
News of this support for the contract workers' cause spread 
throughout the country via telephone calls and posters 'at 
lightning speed ... People were overjoyed, people were 
excited, and they were ready to whip up an even more powerful 
wave.'174 Although signs soon appeared of a backlash against 
'economism', particularly with regard to contract and 
temporary workers175, condemnations of the worker-peasant 
system continued to appear in the press and in wall-posters.
173 Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution,
47.
174 Ibid., 47.
175 Wall-posters in Shanghai in January also reported a later 
meeting between contract workers' representatives and Zhou 
Enlai, at which Zhou insisted that the contract labour 
system had to be maintained because of conditions in China 
(Current Scene 6, 5, 10), while on January 9 some
'revolutionary organizations' in Shanghai published their 
'Urgent Notice' attacking economism and laying down 
guidelines for a reimposition of discipline in industry; 
Mao ordered the 'Notice' to be broadcast nationally on 
January 9, and it was reprinted in the Renmin Ribao on 
January 12.
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Some posters alleged that Liu Shaogi and the Labour 
Ministry were planning to halt all hiring of permanent workers 
from 1967, and that all demobilized soldiers would henceforth 
be hired on a contract basis.176 The second of these 
allegations is particularly significant for Guangzhou, where 
one of the largest and most militant of the Rebel groups was 
the August 1 Combat Corps, formed in mid-January 1967, the 
majority of whose members were demobilized soldiers now 
working in factories or neighbourhood labour service 
stations.177 Many of these ex-servicemen had joined the 
labour force during the GLF and in the years immediately 
after, and so formed part of the group of 'new workers' which 
we noted before as being disadvantaged in comparison to more 
established workers, in terms of pay and conditions and 
especially job security.
Most soldiers demobilized around 1955 and 1956 found 
promising new jobs in recently collectivized 
enterprises and farms, but those demobilized in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s had difficulty finding 
comparable opportunities. Many veterans complained 
that local officials failed to give them good work 
or adequate welfare for their dependents.178
The rumour that demobilized soldiers would now only be 
employed on a contract basis removed any prospect of 
permanent, secure employment for an already disadvantaged 
group, fuelling the radicalism of these workers who already 
felt they had little to lose in becoming actively involved in 
the Cultural Revolution, in sharp contrast to the most 
privileged and secure members of the industrial workforce.
176 See the quotation in Current Scene 6 , 5, 10; also the Red
Guard document translated in SCMM 616, 29-30.
177 See Hai Feng, An account of the Cultural Revolution in the
Canton area, 61-2.
178 Vogel, Canton under communism, 342.
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Given the August 1966 announcement of the widespread 
implementation of the worker-peasant system in all Guangdong 
enterprises, too, many workers would have found rumours of a 
universal contract-labour system very easy to believe, and 
this news would not only threaten workers who might be 
included in such a system in the future, but would also make 
the chances of a transfer to permanent status for any of those 
already employed on a contract or temporary basis extremely 
remote. Add to this the fact that large numbers of contract 
and temporary workers had recently been laid off because of 
the disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution itself179, 
and it is not surprising that this section of the workforce 
was so militant in pressing its demands, forming a national 
organization to do so as early as the beginning of December 
1966.180
The political content and significance of workers' 
'economistic' demands is perhaps most obvious in the case of 
the revolt of contract and temporary workers. While this 
system of employment had clear benefits in terms of cost 
savings for the state, it was not easy to find any ideological 
justification for giving enterprises such total power over a 
group of workers.
From the contract workers' point of view, the system 
was obviously Manti-socialistic" ... [They] were not 
eligible for fringe benefits, such as medicare, 
accident insurance, job security, retirement 
pensions, sick leave, and so forth. In contrast 
even to the capitalist market system, in which the 
law of supply and demand generally sets up the wage 
and the labor unions protect the interests of the 
workers vis-h-vis the owners, in a socialist economy
179 See Hong Yung Lee, The politics of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, 131.
180 The National Red Workers' Rebel Headquarters; ibid., 137.
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in which the management is strongly motivated toward 
profit there is no such mechanism to protect the 
interests of contract workers. The absolute power 
regarding contractual conditions for hiring rested 
in the hands of the enterprise.... In some places, 
the management asked for monthly renewals of the 
contract in order to strengthen their position vis- 
A-vis the contract workers.181
It should also be noted that contract workers were 
discriminated against politically as well as economically: 
besides being excluded from the union, they also had no right 
to participate in institutions such as the workers' congress 
and could not take part in political study classes.182 It 
was thus quite easy for the workers affected to attack the 
system as one which 'divides workers into two strata, creating 
differences, disintegrating the ranks of the workers, 
eliminating revolutionary enthusiasm, and obstructing the 
development of the social productive forces.'183
Since the contract labour system had obvious benefits, 
both financially and in terms of control and leverage over 
workers, for enterprise management as it was constituted in 
the mid-1960s, it was particularly hard to counter workers' 
accusations that the system was a manifestation of Liu 
Shaoqi's 'bourgeois reactionary line' and the Seventy 
Articles' emphasis on 'profit and money in command' and strict 
control in enterprises. At a rally of more than a hundred 
thousand temporary and contract workers in Shanghai on January
181 Ibid., 131.
182 Walder, 'Zhang Chunqiao', 45.
183 Laodong Zhanbao, 3.2.68, quoted in Hong Yung Lee, Politics 
of the Cultural Revolution, 131.
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6 1967184, workers were reported to have called on the Party 
to 'thoroughly abolish the Irrational system of contract 
labour and outside contract labour and establish a brand new 
labour system in conformity with Mao Zedong's thought.' The 
Ffen Hui Bao report described these systems as 'remnants of the 
capitalist system of labour employment'.185 Articles in Red 
Guard newspapers during January praised worker-peasants 
elsewhere who had
"destroyed the reactionary bourgeois line of Liu and 
Deng and their system of contract and temporary work 
which harmed the workers". The system was described 
as an attempt to "raise the greatest amount of cheap 
labour and to extract the maximum profits".186
Contract workers in Shanxi also couched the issue in similar 
terms:
"[Ojver 95% of the workers in our construction 
brigade in the Xi'an Metallurgical and Electrical 
Industry are temporary and contract workers and we 
have suffered just as bitterly as our comrades under 
the old society." Workers in Xi'an had demanded 
abolition of the temporary and contract work system 
at the commencement of the Cultural Revolution, the 
article stated. Provincial Party leaders reportedly 
responded that the system was laid down by the CCP 
Central Committee, "but we exposed this by saying
184 By the time the Cultural Revolution began, there were 
estimated to be ten million contract workers in China, and
in some enterprises they constituted 9 5% of the workforce
(Hong Yung Lee, 130). Shanghai, like Guangzhou, had large 
numbers of these workers as it was a regional and national 
centre for light industry and transportation.
185 Wen Hui Bao 6.1.67, quoted in Current Scene 6 , 5, 11.
186 Current Scene 6 , 5, 11.
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that it was laid down by the revisionist Liu 
Shaoqi. "187
It is not clear whether workers emphasized the system's links 
with Liu Shaoqi because they were aware of the danger of a 
direct attack on the Party centre as a whole, or because they 
genuinely held the 'bourgeois reactionary line' responsible 
for the system. There is something in the accusation that Liu 
was ultimately responsible, and Red Guard publications, 
especially those produced by Labour Ministry Rebels188 gave 
workers plenty of evidence to support this, so it is possible 
that workers 'believed that the hardships they had suffered in 
the past were the result of a bourgeois reactionary line 
executed by leaders at different levels, while the party 
centre under Mao still cared about them.'189 Whatever the 
answer, it clearly suited both workers and that section of the 
Party opposed to Liu Shaoqi to make him the main scapegoat for 
the system.
Despite later official attempts to portray workers' 
actions in December and January as solely concerned with 
economic demands, and therefore a dangerous diversion from the 
real business of a political mass movement, it is clear both 
that political demands were also raised, and that even purely 
economic demands had some political content and significance. 
This applies not only to the temporary and contract workers 
discussed above, who couched their grievances in terms which 
reflected the political concerns of the Cultural Revolution 
itself, namely the struggle against the bourgeois reactionary 
line and revisionism, but to many others who found themselves 
in the Rebel camp. Wylie has noted that criticism of the 
employment system and differentiation between types of worker
187 Ibid., 11.
188 See SCMM 616, 21-28.
189 Liu Guokai, A brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 
46.
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on the Shanghai docks inevitably called into question the 
authority of the Party Committee there:
Since the Party authorities were closely identified 
with this economic system, the workers' economic 
discontents were often voiced as criticisms of the 
Party Committee's political authority. Similarly, 
those dockers seeking to challenge the political 
authority of the Party often appealed to the 
economic grievances of the rank and file in order to 
gain support.190
Back in the 1950s, workers were already aware that 'economic 
cleavages and concerns ... were inextricably linked to the 
policies of the new socialist state', and so tended to direct 
their protests at state, enterprise, Party and union 
cadres.191 In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, 
'revisionists' and those who had implemented Liu Shaoqi's line 
in industry were legitimate targets of attack, giving new 
impetus and a distinctly anti-authority and political 
character to this outbreak of workers' rebellion.
Common accusations made against Party and management 
authorities were that they were 'adopting superior airs and a 
bureaucratic workstyle, refusing to carry out the mass line', 
implementing individual prize and bonus systems which 'set 
worker against worker', and that cadres were 'reluctant to 
leave their offices, avoiding physical labour ..., enjoying 
high salaries and personal privileges, and favouring certain 
workers over others in assignments and promotions.'192 These 
are of course exactly the sort of grievances which we have 
seen building up throughout the 1960s and in some cases even
190 Wylie, 'Shanghai Dockers', 93.
191 Perry, 'Shanghai's strike wave of 1957', forthcoming China 
Quarterly, March 1994, 29-30.
192 Wylie, 'Shanghai dockers', 97.
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earlier; similar points were raised by workers at the 
Guangzhou Chemical Works in 1964, and by the warehouse workers 
contacted by Dai Xiao'ai's group of student activists earlier 
in 1966. While it is important to remember that economic 
grievances were real193, workers' most important complaints 
centred on their position and rights in the enterprise, their 
relationship with their leaders, and the 'highly political 
issue of authority'194; in sum, on whether or not they were 
the 'masters of the enterprise' in any meaningful sense. This 
should come as no surprise since it was precisely this issue 
which brought workers into conflict with Party and state 
authorities immediately after liberation and again in 1956-7.
So for many Rebels in enterprises, ' [distribution 
questions were only part of the problem, but the issues of 
authority and morality were more important ultimately.'195 
What concerned workers was not just who had authority in the 
workplace, but also how that authority was exercised, 'a 
decision-making method and a work-style. Officiousness and 
snobbery were more than marginal concerns of many rebels.'196 
We have already seen that attempts to reinforce the 
theoretical political equality and 'comradely relations' of 
workers and cadres, mainly by compelling the latter to give up 
the attitude of 'bureaucrats riding over the heads of the 
people' and participate in labour, had made little progress in 
the nine years since they began, and the question of whether 
cadres were 'leaders' or 'rulers' was clearly still a
193 Most workers' wages had remained at roughly the same level
since the GLF under the CCP's policy of wage stabilization
(Wylie, 99); and apprentices were forced to train for three 
years on very low pay when most could master their jobs 
comfortably in six months, making them one of the most 
aggrieved and active groups in Guangzhou and elsewhere 
(Current Scene 6 , 5, 21).
194 Wylie, 'Shanghai dockers', 104.
195 Andors, China's industrial revolution, 167.
196 Ibid., 167.
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contentious one. Objections to the typical Seventy Articles 
policies of rigid division of labour and tight control over 
workers in the enterprise also surfaced again as Rebels spoke 
out during the Cultural Revolutions
Arbitrary controls over workshop communications and 
regimentation of the pace of production, based on 
quotas made by functionaries in factory offices, 
antagonized enough people to fuel the rebels' 
spark.197
Morality entered into workers' considerations where they 
focused not just on questions of their own individual material 
benefits, but rather on 'the relative distribution between 
workers and managers. They attacked privileges both on and 
off the job.'198 In the context of workers' rebellions in 
Poland, J M Montias has observed that workers often refrain 
from overtly political protests and demands as they are well 
aware of the likely consequences, namely swift suppression and 
retribution. However, there are signs that political and 
moral issues are important in workers' protests:
[I]t is evident both from [workers'] formal 
complaints and from the points formally raised at 
meetings with officials, that justice and human 
dignity - including the right to have a say in 
working conditions and other pertinent matters - are 
issues that are virtually as basic to the interests 
of Polish workers as prices, wages and working 
hours.199
197 Ibid., 167.
198 Ibid., 168.
199 Montias, 'Observations on strikes, riots, and other 
disturbances', Triska and Gati (eds.), Blue-collar workers 
in Eastern Europe, 182.
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Chinese workers seem to share this attitude, strongly 
objecting to their exclusion from decision-making which 
affects their working lives, and showing deep resentment of 
cadres' high-handed and arrogant disposal of questions of 
direct concern to them.
Given this concern both with the power exercised by 
cadres in the enterprise and the way in which they exercised 
it, and with particular attention to questions of privilege 
and lack of accountability, there are clear connections 
between the issues which were of greatest importance to 
workers in the Cultural Revolution and the developing Rebel 
paradigm of Chinese society, which saw the main social 
division as between the masses below and a privileged and 
exploitative 'red capitalist' minority with power above.200 
Thus workers' involvement in the Cultural Revolution cannot be 
construed as marginal and concerned only with narrow economic 
issues, despite the fact that only a minority were active 
Rebels. Nor, however, should the possible political 
significance of industrial action in support of economic 
demands itself be neglected: Montias finds that of ten major
disturbances in the communist countries of Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1977, eight 'had their 
origin in economically motivated work stoppages.'201
Power seizures and the anti-econamism backlash
As was mentioned earlier, the first attack on economism 
came in the form of the 'Urgent Notice' published by a number 
of 'revolutionary rebel' organizations in Shanghai; this was 
broadcast nationally on January 9 and published in the Renmin 
Ribao on January 12, and a similar notice put out by various
200 See Chan, 'Dispelling misconceptions'. Journal of 
Contemporary China 1, 1, Fall 1992, 70.
201 Ibid., 175.
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groups in the city was broadcast on Guangzhou City Radio on 
January 16 .202 The tone and content of the 'Urgent Notice' 
suggest both that 'economism' was extremely widespread, and 
that what was happening all over China constituted a mass 
movement which had taken central authorities by surprise and 
run completely out of control. The Notice represents a
concerted effort to regain control over the Cultural 
Revolution, if necessary by arresting all those who deviated 
from the correct line and direction for the movement as laid
down by Mao. It was made very clear that
all those who have opposed Chairman Mao, Vice-
Chairman Lin, and the CCRG, and all those who have 
sabotaged the Cultural Revolution and production 
will immediately be arrested by the PSB in 
accordance with the law.... all those who violate 
the above [anti-economism] provisions will 
immediately be punished as saboteurs of the Cultural 
Revolution.203
As well as calling a halt to chuanlian and demanding that 
all expense money received for travelling to other units and 
cities be repaid, in instalments if necessary, the document 
laid stress on workers' and cadres' duty to stay at their 
posts and work their normal eight-hour day, and called on all 
personnel to return to their original units to 'grasp 
revolution and promote production'. In addition, enterprise 
funds were frozen to prevent any further unauthorized payments 
to workers making 'economistic' demands, and the issues of 
'wage adjustments, back-pay and welfare' were shelved until 
the final stages of the Cultural Revolution 'to avoid shifting 
the overall direction of the struggle'.204 The scale of
202 See NPRS 191, 44-9.
203 Renmin Ribao 12.1.67, 2.
204 Ibid., 2.
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economism is revealed by the myriad articles condemning it in 
all newspapers during the second half of January, all of which 
blame 'reactionaries' and local Party power-holders for 
inciting workers to forget state, collective and long-term 
interests and demand immediate individual benefits. However, 
it is evident that despite this outpouring of official and 
unofficial criticism, there was some recognition of the 
strength of feeling behind workers' demands and protests, and 
perhaps even of their legitimacy, as the problems raised were 
not dismissed out of hand, but had their solution postponed to 
a later stage of the movement.205 Similarly, although
temporary and contract workers were banned from setting up 
their own organizations in February 1967, power-holders were 
forbidden from taking 'class reprisal' against them and they 
were accorded the same political (but not economic) rights as 
other workers, showing that their protests had been justified 
in part.206
It is interesting that many Rebel students supported the 
anti-economism campaign, accepting the allegation that 
workers' demands all stemmed from a plot by a few 'capitalist 
roaders' in enterprises:
Student organizations that had had no direct 
involvement in economic affairs now assumed the role 
of firefighters, serving as Mao's tool in cracking 
down on the movement. Students who had no worries 
about daily necessities and had never tasted the 
burden of providing for a family ran into the 
factories to publicize the 'emergency notice' and 
the two 'circulars' from the centre, calling upon 
the workers not to be taken in by capitalist roaders 
and to return the overtime pay and retroactive wages 
they had already received so that they could fight
205 Guangming Ribao 16.1.67, in SCMP 3870, 4.
206 Current Scene 6 , 5, 16.
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back with their concrete actions the evil trend of 
"counterrevolutionary economism" and smash the new 
conspiracy of the "bourgeois reactionary line".207
Students' enthusiasm for the anti-economism campaign may 
explain why in mid-January, attacks by workers on 
revolutionary rebel students were still said to be a serious 
problem in some Guangzhou enterprises.208 In Shanghai, some 
Rebel leaders on the docks also responded to the assault on 
economism, attempting to persuade workers to concentrate on 
the overthrow of the local Party first and then turn to 
economic problems, but many workers argued that political and 
economic reforms were not incompatible and could be pursued 
simultaneously. This case features the same sort of split 
between a minority which, like the students, followed the 
ideological line laid down by the centre, and the rank and 
file who were reluctant to abandon what seemed to them 
eminently reasonable demands.209 One Hong Kong commentator 
considers Rebel students' failure to support workers' demands 
their greatest mistake in the Cultural Revolution, since it 
made workers view them as 'tails of the power-holders' and 
keep their distance instead of uniting with the students.210
Alongside attacks on and measures to combat typical 
examples of 'economism', such as the payment of unauthorized 
back-wages, bonuses and travelling expenses, we also find 
indications in many articles and broadcasts that there had 
been political developments during the weeks of mass 
involvement in the Cultural Revolution which had pushed it in 
a direction not entirely to the central leadership's liking.
207 Liu Guokai, Brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 48.
208 Guangzhou Radio 16.1.67, in NPRS 191, 46.
209 See Wylie, 'Shanghai dockers', 115-6.
210 See 'Li Yizhe dazibao pingjie' (Evaluating the Li Yizhe 
big-character poster), Shiyue Pinglun 13, 15.1.76, 14.
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Although a call for 'extensive democracy' had been made at the 
beginning of the year, when the involvement of workers and 
peasants in the movement was hailed as a new stage of the 
Cultural Revolution, two weeks later warnings were being given 
about 'ultra-democracy' and 'extreme democratization'.211 
The latter term is familiar to us from both of the previous 
confrontations between workers and the authorities which we 
have examined; in all cases, it indicates that workers are 
acting independently of the Party and attempting to enlarge 
their own role and influence in the enterprise and in society 
as a whole. Through March and April the preferred term 
changed from 'extreme democracy' to anarchism212. It might 
be expected that the accusation of anarchism was a 
misapplication of the term to indicate nothing more sinister 
than the chaos and disorder in many enterprises, but in fact 
its use seems to have been not entirely inaccurate in at least 
some cases, when it was applied to the tendency of some 
workers 'to oppose, negate, exclude and overthrow all the 
cadres'.213 Clearly the struggle in many enterprises and 
industries during late December and January had not been 
confined to wage and welfare-related demands, but had in some 
cases included a comprehensive assault on enterprise 
authorities.
Power seizures at the provincial level were encouraged by 
the CCR6 throughout January 1967, and occurred both on the 
'Paris Commune' model, as in Shanghai, and on the Heilongjiang
211 See for example Remain Ribao 12.1.67, 3; Guangming Ribao
16.1.67, in SCMP 3870, 3; Guangzhou/Guangdong Radio
28.2.67, in NPRS 197, Ml.
212 See for example Guangzhou/Guangdong Radio 15.3.67, in NPRS 
199, M4-9; Xinhua News Agency 18.3.67, in SCMP 3904, 8 .
213 Guangzhou Radio 31.3.67, in NPRS 201, M13 (emphasis added). 
This broadcast refers specifically to the struggle in the 
Guangzhou Railway Sub-bureau, where 50,000 unskilled 
workers in the Guangzhou Railway Workers' Headquarters 
(Rebel faction) opposed the 10,000-strong Spring Thunder 
group of skilled workers, engineers and cadres (Hong Yung 
Lee, Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 133).
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'triple combination' model, which was eventually adopted as 
official policy and promoted as an example to follow 
nationwide, the main problem with the 'Commune' form being 
that it left no room for the leading role of the Party.214 
But power seizures also seem to have occurred at the 
enterprise level during January and February 1967. The 
picture of what was happening in enterprises and throughout 
cities during these months is unclear, and most of our 
information on events has to be pieced together from later 
accounts. However, what we can tell from these later 
references is that there were widespread work stoppages 
involving industrial production and transportation, and that 
most cadres either stepped aside from their posts under the 
pressure of the movement or were forced out by Rebel workers. 
In Guangzhou there were also attacks on PSB stations and even 
army installations by some Rebel groups, who were probably 
attempting to seize the 'black material' on many Rebels held 
there. Rebels were of course also angry at the failure of the 
army to support them; more will be said about this later. The 
above indications of what was happening in cities give us some 
idea of the seriousness of the situation from the point of 
view of the authorities, and explain the stringent measures 
advocated for 'strengthening the proletarian dictatorship', 
i.e. clamping down on protests through police action, 
contained in the 'Notices' on economism.
Recalling the 'January Revolution' in the famous 'Whither 
China?' article, Yang Xiguang indicated that industrial power 
seizures then had been both common and extremely popular with 
workers:
The bureaucrats had tried to intimidate workers
before the revolution, saying, "Without us,
production would collapse, and the whole of society
would be in a state of chaos." ... As a matter of
214 See the discussions in P N Lee, Industrial management and 
economic reform, 111-2, and Walder, 'Zhang Chungiao', 60-3.
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fact, without the bureaucrats and bureaucratic 
organs, productivity was greatly liberated... The 
management of industrial plants by the workers 
themselves after January was really moving. For the 
first time the workers felt that it was not the 
state which managed them, but they who managed the 
state. For the first time they felt that they were 
producing for themselves. Their enthusiasm was 
never so high and their sense of responsibility as 
masters of the house was never so strong.215
It is very noticeable that although first reports of 
industrial power seizures all note approvingly that workers 
themselves had set up new Revolutionary Production Committees 
in their enterprises, using the election methods of the Paris 
Commune whereby delegates could be recalled by workers at any 
time and had no special titles or privileges216, in only one 
case reported in the official press at the time was it stated 
that all former staff in an enterprise had been relieved of 
their posts, despite their expertise, in an effort to wipe out 
bureaucratism in the plant.
Some suggested that, since the members of the former 
staff were very "shrewd" in management, they could 
be kept to take care of technical matters. But the 
majority disagreed, arguing that revolution meant 
complete severance with the old and blazing a new 
trail entirely. Any idea of reconciliation and 
compromise must be rejected. So the former 
functionaries were relieved of their posts and went 
to work in the workshops.217
215 Shengwulian, 'Whither China?', Guangyin Songqi 5, March 
1968, in SCMP 4190, 3-4.
216 See for example Renmin Ribao 14.1.67, 3; Xinhua News Agency 
(Shanghai) 15.1.67, in SCMP 3863, 2-3; Renmin Ribao
24.1.67, in SCMP 3879, 18-20.
217 Xinhua News Agency 23.1.67, in SCMP 3869, 2.
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This case occurred in Shanghai before the Commune form was 
abandoned in favour of 'triple combinations', which always 
included some former cadres, and before concern about the 
number of cadres leaving or being forced out of their posts 
became widespread.218 It seems that the trend of removing 
all cadres from their posts never gained official approval in 
most places and was soon corrected even in Shanghai, and as 
the weeks passed it was emphasized more and more often that 
the majority of cadres (95% was the figure often given) were 
'good or relatively good'219 and should be judged on their 
whole record, not just on a few recent mistakes. The very 
frequency of these restatements of the 'correct' cadre policy, 
however, indicates that many unreported power seizures were 
still occurring in which all cadres stood aside or were 
overthrown by Rebel workers.
Power seizures took place in a number of enterprises in 
Guangzhou during the January Revolution, and seem to have been 
dominated by Rebel workers. We know this because after the 
March military suppression of the Rebel faction in Guangzhou, 
when many Rebel organizations were branded 
'counterrevolutionary' and banned, accounts of events in 
factories stressed that January power seizures had involved 
'counterrevolutionary organizations' rather than the 'genuine 
proletarian revolutionaries', i.e. the Conservative faction, 
which had PLA support. A Red Guard publication from Guangzhou 
provides further evidence of Rebel dominance in enterprise 
power seizures in early 1967, reporting that in the first half 
of February 1967, workers' Rebel organizations were growing in 
the city while Conservative 'Scarlet Guards' were 
disintegrating. Given what we know about the situation in 
Guangzhou and elsewhere in China at this point, there is no 
reason to disbelieve this claim.220 One example of the rapid
218 See Renmin Ribao 11.2.67, in SCMP 3884, 3-6.
219 Guangzhou Radio 31.3.67, in NPRS 201, M14.
220 Guangzhou Hongweibing 14, 10.2.67, in SCMP 3929, 2.
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growth of a Rebel organization in Guangzhou is that of the 
August 1 Combat Corps. With five thousand members at its 
founding on January 15, 'in the struggle to seize power, it 
achieved rapid growth and expanded to about 80,000 members in 
city districts, in addition to approximately 30,000 in 
counties outside the city proper.'221
Two cases of power seizure by Rebels in Guangzhou will 
show how their hold on power tended to be rather short-lived, 
being ended in both cases by the intervention the PLA on 
behalf of the 'genuine proletarian revolutionaries', i.e. 
Conservative veteran workers, activists and cadres. In one 
case, that of the Guangzhou Auto Repair and Assembly Plant, 
Rebel workers had evidently set up a new management body of 
their own in the enterprise, the 'Plant Revolutionary Joint 
Committee'222, and seized power.
A tiny handful of Party power-holders taking the 
capitalist road colluded with a few heads of the 
"Plant Revolutionary Joint Committee". They 
deceived the masses who did not know the truth into 
seizing the seal of authority. Afterward they 
directed the spearhead at the genuine proletarian 
revolutionaries and imposed a reign of white 
terror.223
221 Hai Feng, Cultural Revolution in the Canton area, 62. The 
August 1 Combat Corps was of course one of the largest of 
all Rebel organizations in the city, but some others, 
notably the railway 'coolies' (unskilled workers) also 
numbered their members in the tens of thousands. Rebel 
workers in large enterprises, as was indicated earlier, 
would usually constitute less than half of the rank and 
file workforce, and therefore would more often be numbered 
in the hundreds, but in the early stages of the Cultural 
Revolution before they were banned, district or city-wide 
groups could be far larger than this.
222 Guangzhou Ribao 2.4.67, in SCMP 3961, 16. The Committee's 
title is in inverted commas throughout the article to 
indicate its lack of legitimacy.
223 Ibid., 16.
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This analysis, blaming a minority of leaders for 'hoodwinking' 
the masses, is standard in Cultural Revolution attacks on any 
organization or event lacking official approval. The 
reference to the involvement of power-holders may indicate 
that some cadres participated in the Rebel power seizure; 
Rebel sympathies among higher-level, political department and 
militia cadres are almost unheard of, but this is not true of 
all other basic-level cadres.224
The Rebel 'handful' in the plant were said to have 
encouraged economism among the workers, thereby damaging 
production, and this was only stopped by the intervention of 
typical Conservative faction adherents among the plant's 
personnel, 'old workers, production group leaders, political 
cadres, activists in studying Chairman Mao's works, and five- 
good workers', on the side of the PLA.225 The PLA in 
Guangzhou interpreted their task of 'supporting the left' in 
the Cultural Revolution as an instruction to support the 
Conservative groups with whom they had a natural affinity; 
they were hardly likely to judge the Rebels to be 'genuine 
proletarian leftists' when these groups
stormed the party and government offices, seized 
hold of dossiers and documents, closed down and took 
over newspapers, and singled out and struggled 
against cadres at will, all of which were seen by 
the military as outrageous and lawless acts.226
On top of this, some Rebel groups in Guangzhou had of course
224 See Hong Yung Lee's table of factional divisions in 
Guangzhou enterprises, Politics of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, 135.
225 Ibid., 17.
226 Liu Guokai, Brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 59.
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specifically attacked the military and the PSB227, making it 
still more unlikely that they would gain PLA support 
themselves.
At the Guangzhou Power Plant, a similar January 
Revolution power seizure was reported, and it was alleged that 
'a handful of people' and 'counterrevolutionary organizations' 
had conspired 'to concoct an incident of power stoppage and to 
sabotage the great Cultural Revolution. ,228 Here, the PLA 
cooperated with 'revolutionary workers and staff' and 
'revolutionary cadres' to defend the plant, maintain 
production, correct those workers 'led astray' by the 
counterrevolutionaries, and restore discipline. But this was 
not achieved without opposition, as the 'handful' denounced 
the PLA unit themselves as 'power-holders' and 'incited the 
workers to put up big-character posters' criticizing them.229
But order seems to have been restored with military
assistance, and it was reported that production targets were 
now being over-fulfilled.230 There are obvious similarities 
between these two accounts of power seizures, both of which 
play down any mass support for Rebels among the plants'
workers and stress production. But it is still apparent, 
despite the best efforts of the authors of official accounts, 
that there was considerable disruption to production during 
the power seizure stage of the January Revolution, and that 
some workers, 'hoodwinked' or not, did support Rebel
resistance to the PLA when the military went into enterprises 
in March 1967 to help workers re-establish order in production 
and form alliances with revolutionary cadres.231
227 See the accusations in Nan fang Ribao 24.2.67, in SCMP 3904, 
4-5; and Xiao Bing 25.2.67, in SCMM 575, 21-6.
228 Guangzhou Ribao 2.4.67, in SCMP 3961, 13.
229 Ibid., 14.
230 Ibid., 15.
231 See Guangzhou/Guangdong Radio, 15.3.67, in NPRS 199, M4-9.
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The provincial power seizure in Guangdong which occurred 
on January 22 1967 was a controversial one, carried out 
without any use of force by an alliance of only a few Rebel 
organizations, including many which were only liaison centres 
for organizations in other parts of China, and which was often 
accused of lacking any real mass involvement and including a 
few organizations of Rebel workers as mere window-dressing. 
This naturally made the Provincial Revolutionary Rebel Allied 
Committee (Shenggelian) an easy target for its Conservative 
critics, but even Rebel groups offered only qualified support. 
Dai Xiao'ai was of the opinion that
workers and peasants ... were added only to provide 
legitimacy in a period when the centre was stressing 
workers as the 'main force' for revolution and 
insisting that intellectuals unite with them.232
Shenggelian' s power seizure was criticized by other Rebels not 
only for having been carried out without any mass 
mobilization, but also for adopting an arrogant and high­
handed attitude toward the masses after power was seized:
The '16 Articles' pointed out: "It will be necessary 
to trust the masses, rely on them, and respect their 
pioneering spirit." Some leaders of [Shenggelian], 
however, do nothing of the sort. As soon as they 
have taken over a certain unit, they would rise high 
above the revolutionary masses of that unit, issue 
orders and tell the masses what to do ... They even 
say arrogantly: "We take orders from Chairman Mao, 
and you shall take orders from us." ... Comrades who 
go down to factories and rural villages must not act 
presumptuously and issue orders to everyone.233
232 Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 157.
233 Guangzhou Hongweibing 14, 10.2.67, in SCMP 3929, 2, 6 .
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This sort of behaviour is of course precisely what Rebel 
workers had revolted against.
The controversy surrounding Shenggelian's power seizure 
even among the Rebels must have weakened the position of the 
Rebel faction in Guangzhou as a whole, including the position 
of Rebel workers who had seized power in their own 
enterprises, and this probably facilitated the March military 
crackdown in the city. Undoubtedly the attacks on the PLA and 
PSB were a major motive for the imposition of military rule, 
but the scale, force and direction of the mass movement of 
'economism' and the January Revolution's industrial unrest and 
power seizures must also have played a part. It is 
significant that the first targets of the mass arrests in 
Guangzhou were 'organizations of non-student elements'234; 
according to Dai Xiao'ai, 'worker and professional groups 
within [Shenggelian] were consistently treated more severely 
than their student affiliates.'235 Workers' organizations 
which extended across different trades, industries, and 
districts were banned, and organizations of demobilized 
soldiers (many of whom were now workers) and those branded 
'economist' were ordered to disband, showing where the real 
threat to the authorities from these weeks of mass political 
activity was thought to lie.236 The provisions for the 
disbanding of organizations which cut across the boundaries of 
different trades and those which united workers in a 
particular district hit Rebel workers' organizations 
particularly hard, as they relied on these connections for 
their strength, often being a minority in individual 
enterprises. 'Few were able to seize power in their own 
units; most joined citywide, provincewide, or nationwide
234 Zi Chuan, 'Li Yizhe yu wo', Beidou 1, 1.6.77, 8.
235 Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 166.
236 See Hongqi 4, 1.3.67, 20-25.
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activities.'237 As we have just seen, groups of Rebel
workers who did seize power in their own enterprises were 
easily defeated once the PLA moved in to support the 'genuine' 
left.
March-December 1967: Military control, factional struggle, 
revolutionary alliance
Central authorities called in the military to keep order 
in Guangdong from February 25 1967, and the Military Control 
Commission (MCC) was formally established in Guangzhou on 
March 15.238 Since January, the PLA had been told it could 
not stand on the sidelines of the Cultural Revolution, but 
must 'support the left'. However, it was left to the military 
themselves to make decisions as to which individuals and 
organizations were 'genuine proletarian leftists' and which 
counterrevolutionary, and as was noted above, they tended to 
favour Conservative workers' organizations over those of the 
Rebels. Rebel groups were thus in a very difficult position, 
especially as many had taken part in storming military 
establishments, when it became clear that it was the military 
who had the responsibility for restoring order and banning any 
groups which did not conform to the approved course of the 
movement. Further, it was announced on Guangzhou Radio that 
attitude towards the PLA was in itself one of the main 
criteria for distinguishing who belonged to the genuine 
left.239 Probably because of the involvement of some members 
in attacks on the PLA240, but also because of the size and 
nature of the group, the August 1 Combat Corps was the first 
Rebel organization to be banned as counterrevolutionary in
237 Liu Guokai, Brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 79.
238 Vogel, Canton under communism, 332.
239 Guangzhou Radio, 15.3.67, in NPRS 199, M6 .
240 Vogel, Canton under communism, 332.
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Guangzhou, on March 1. This organization, 100,000 strong at 
its peak and still claiming 40-50,000 members when it was 
banned, contained large numbers of workers, many of them 
demobilized soldiers241, and as we have already noted, 
workers were one of the first groups targeted in the crackdown 
on the Rebels.
When an organization was classified as 
counterrevolutionary, not only would its leaders be 
arrested242, but even ordinary members were subject to close 
supervision. Zi Chuan recalls that in Guangzhou,
In March 1967 the Cultural Revolution was at its 
last gasp under the butcher's knife of the military. 
Most of the original mass organizations collapsed, 
and those still in existence had to submit to strict 
supervision by the military.243
Later in the year when its supporters were campaigning for the 
full rehabilitation of the Corps, with the MCC very reluctant 
to grant this, the experiences of some ordinary members in the 
March suppression were revealed. In a Red Guard article, 
which characterized the military's action as 'sanguinary
241 One of the main accusations against it was that it 
contained and was run by former GMD officers, escapees from 
labour camps, people who had been purged in previous 
campaigns, and people of dubious class background. In fact 
there is some truth in these accusations (they are true of 
elements in many Rebel groups, for obvious reasons), but 
the Corps was itself aware of the problem and undertook a 
substantial reorganization and re-election of leaders in 
mid-February, after which its claims that the majority of 
its members were workers of fairly good class origin were 
substantially true. See Hai Feng, Cultural Revolution in 
the Canton area, 62.
242 Instructions on dealing with these groups are littered with 
phrases such as 'attack without mercy' and 'severe 
punishment for evil ringleaders'; see Hongqi 4 , 1.3.67, 23- 
4.
243 Zi Chuan, 'Li Yizhe yu wo', Beidou 1, 1.6.77, 8 .
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dictatorship of the bourgeoisie'244, the case of Liang X, 
demobilized in 1958 and a worker at the Guangzhou People's 
Automobile Company, was used as an example. Liang was 
arrested on the evidence of a rival Conservative organization 
in his workplace and detained for a month on charges of being 
a leader of the counterrevolutionary Corps. He protested his 
innocence of this and of any counterrevolutionary act, but 
although he was not dealt with as a counterrevolutionary 
himself, his release papers declared him to be 'an 
intermediate ring-leader' of the organization, and he was 
barred from any further involvement in Rebel activities in his 
unit. He was also forbidden to say anything about conditions 
in the detention centre where he had been held, a provision 
which was presumably intended to intimidate other Rebels in 
the unit who had not yet been arrested.245
This article also reveals that all members of banned 
organizations had to register with the municipal PSB, showing 
that they were indeed supervised closely. Another account of 
the suppression of the Corps later in the year alleges that in 
March, many more people were arrested than was admitted by the 
authorities, often without proper warrants, and that ordinary 
members and their families were subject to other penalties, 
too:
After the dissolution of August 1 Combat Corps, all 
members were forcibly ordered to surrender and 
register and to write self-examinations.... The 
homes of many were raided, and many were struggled 
against and severely beaten up. They and their 
wives and children were generally discriminated 
against and denounced. Some were fired, some were 
transferred to other posts, some had their wages 
reduced, and for some the welfare benefits to which
244 Dongfanghong 8 , 11.7.67, in SCMP 4010, 4-8.
245 Ibid., 8 .
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they were entitled were abolished. This caused some 
people to lose their jobs and their homes.246
These were of course exactly the sort of reprisals which had 
initially deterred many workers from participation in Rebel 
activities. Firing, transferring, docking pay and struggling 
against workers were familiar methods to those of them who had 
witnessed earlier campaigns in the 1950s, and we saw the same 
tactics used against workers in the early stages of the 
Cultural Revolution itself. But it seems that the momentum of 
the 'economism' movement and the January Revolution carried 
workers along into actions and organizations which they knew 
to carry serious risks. Paradoxically, their treatment during 
the March suppression may have contributed to the militancy of 
many Rebel workers and others later in the year and in the 
first half of 1968, as it confirmed the likely consequences if 
they ended up on the losing side in the struggle. A group 
which by its very nature - the 'had-it-bad' faction - had less 
to lose than others in the movement thus gained a further 
motive for its militancy and commitment to final victory.
Spring 1967 saw a number of developments in enterprises 
which were specifically designed to counteract the Cultural 
Revolution trends which most concerned the authorities, 
including the forcing from office of all cadres and disruption 
to production as power-seizures and counter-seizures 
progressed. Calls for discipline and the maintenance of 
production with PLA assistance were made directly to workers 
and staff in the form of the 'Letter from the CCP Centre to 
all revolutionary workers, staff, and cadres in industrial 
enterprises'247. This document stressed efficiency, economy, 
keeping to the eight-hour day, attention to quality, 
cooperation with the PLA, and proper application of Mao's
246 Gang Ba-Fi, 15.10.67, in SCMP 4099, 5-6.
247 Hongqi 5, 30.3.67, 3-4; also Xinhua News Agency, 18.3.67, 
in SCMP 3904, 8-9 (English version).
296
cadre policy (which stipulated that the vast majority of 
cadres were good or relatively good and that those who had 
made mistakes should be allowed to reform themselves and go 
back to work). Power-seizures continued, but only on the 
approved model, and given the attention to the Heilongjiang 
'triple combination' (sanjiehe) in the press, no-one could be 
in any doubt as to what that was.248
The most important feature of the 'triple combination' 
was that it included 'revolutionary cadres' and military 
representatives as well as representatives of mass 
organizations. This of course meant that many cadres were 
immediately restored to their posts, and in Guangzhou it was 
said that even those who had 'serious problems' could continue 
their work under mass supervision.249 Clearly workers were 
under strict control in this phase of the movement in 
enterprises, with at least some cadres and technicians back at 
their posts and PLA representatives present, and equally 
clearly there was a strong emphasis on meeting production 
plans. Yet in some places changes were being made on the 
factory floor and new leadership bodies were being developed, 
and despite the tense and often threatening atmosphere in 
which this occurred and the obvious top-down control being 
exercised, when we look at the reforms made in some 
enterprises, we can see that some of them did, in theory at 
least, conform to many workers' preference for a bigger say in 
decision-making and a more equal relationship with cadres. 
While not forgetting the large numbers of workers in prison or 
under surveillance at this point, we should give some 
attention to the achievements claimed by the power-seizures on 
the 'three-way alliance' or 'triple combination' model.
We noted earlier that it is not entirely accurate to say
248 Hongqi 4, 1.3.67, 12-14, 'The basic experience of
Heilongjiang's Red Rebels' struggle to seize power', is one 
of many accounts.
249 Guangzhou/Guangdong Radio, 28.2.67, in NPRS 197, M2.
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that workers generally supported Mao's line in industry rather 
than that of Liu Shaoqi, since there were elements of both to 
which some or all workers objected. However, the resentment 
building up among workers over the years when the Seventy 
Articles were in force in industry centred to a large extent 
on the issues of rigid division of labour, unnecessarily 
complex and strict miles and regulations, and the exclusion of 
workers from decision-making. The larger questions of 
authority and the relationship between workers and their 
managers had now been ruled out of bounds, as 'ultra­
democracy' and the overthrow of all authority was condemned, 
but progress could still be made on reversing some of the more 
unpopular trends in management systems from the Seventy 
Articles era, and this was likely to find support among 
workers.
In the course of 'triple alliance' power seizures in 
enterprises throughout the country, it was reported, 'the 
rebels and revolutionary cadres joined forces,took all power 
into their own hands, and promptly started to institute a new 
order of things in their factories'250 by tackling the 
bureaucratism which had long hampered the workers:
The handful of persons taking the capitalist road 
... enforced an out-and-out bureaucratic system 
which stifled the initiative and ingenuity of the 
workers... some leading cadres sat in their offices 
like high-and-mighty bureaucrats. All they did was 
to issue orders, dream up plans and indulge in the 
formulation of rules and regulations. Division of 
labour was so rigidly applied that it became a 
barrier between cadres and workers, between the 
managing and producing section, and between one 
workshop and another.251
250 Xinhua News Agency 21.2.67, in SCMP 3887, 29.
251 Ibid., 29.
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These bureaucrats had been replaced by a new sort of 
administrator, described as 'pathbreakers in the Cultural 
Revolution and model workers in production', people with 'high 
political qualifications' who were elected by workers 
themselves to be their 'true servants':
They work among the workers. Planners go to the 
workers to discuss their ideas and the resulting 
plan fully tallies with actual conditions. And the 
managing departments are now beginning to serve, and 
not just to "control", the workshops... A worker 
expressed exactly the sentiments of his comrades 
when he said: "We are now the real masters of our 
plant. Chairman Mao has given us the right to run 
it and we must do it well."252
We saw in the 1950s that the existence of a system of 
elections does not guarantee that workers have anything like 
a free choice in selecting cadres, but at that time elections 
for administrative, as opposed to union, cadres were only 
experimented with briefly, so this reform of management does 
represent a step forward whatever the extent of the choice 
being offered to workers; more consultation on planning would 
have been appreciated by many workers as well.
Later in the year, more examples of the success of three- 
way alliances in promoting both revolution and production were 
publicized. One model recommended for emulation was that of 
the Guiyang Cotton Mill, where the plant's twenty-two 
administrative departments were abolished and replaced with 
four offices which led revolution and production, bringing 
about a reduction in the proportion of non-productive 
personnel and closer relations between workers and especially 
technical cadres, who now 'have ... gone to the shops to live,
252 Ibid., 29.
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study and struggle together with the rank and file.'253 This 
was said to be 'a good beginning ... for eradicating the evil 
influence of the former capitalist, revisionist system of 
management.'254 But there were also signs that little might 
actually have changed in some enterprises despite all the 
rhetoric about putting politics in command and implementing 
the mass line, for the simple reason that although a 'handful' 
had been removed from their positions, it was stated that 
'many revolutionary cadres have taken part in leadership work 
and a sound command system has been set up'255; in other 
words, much the same people were in charge in many cases and 
discipline was still being enforced.
However, these sorts of post-power seizure reforms cannot 
be dismissed entirely, as they represent attempts to move in 
the direction of mass management which were to be repeated, 
with varying degrees of success, in many enterprises during 
the Cultural Revolution, and which are closely concerned with 
some of workers' main grievances before and during the 
Cultural Revolution. Moreover, these reforms were clearly 
prompted, at least in part, by a desire on the part of the 
authorities to control the mass movement by suppressing their 
most radical and vocal critics, and then offering limited 
concessions to others; this is very similar to the way in 
which the 1956-7 protests were brought to a halt, though it 
was rather less successful on this second occasion. That 
reforms had to be implemented at all shows the strength of 
feeling on issues of bureaucratism and control even among 
workers who were not active Rebels, or who had joined the 
Conservative faction, especially as these had just witnessed 
the suppression and in some cases the sacking and imprisonment 
of Rebel activists from their own enterprises.
253 Beijing Review 15, 7.4.67, in SCMM 573, 28.
254 Ibid., 29.
255 Ibid., 27.
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Towards the end of January, reports of power seizures 
(seizing power back from Rebels, in some cases) began to 
appear in Guangzhou, concerning the Guangzhou Heavy Machinery 
Plant, the Guangzhou Railway Sub-bureau, and the Guangzhou 
Motor Vehicle Repair Plant.256 In all of these enterprises, 
the PLA were reported to have assisted genuine proletarian 
revolutionaries in forming alliances and restoring discipline 
and production. Like the account of events in the Auto 
Assembly and Repair Plant which we looked at earlier, the 
reports on how the workers and cadres of the Railway Bureau 
formed their alliance reveal something of what went on during 
the outbreak of economism and the original January Revolution 
power seizure.
As in other Rebel power seizures, the people involved 
'launched attacks on all cadres'257 and seem to have caused 
disruption in rail traffic. They were also stated to have 
targeted 'Mao-study activists, CCP and CYL members, and 
"five-good" workers as "unrevolutionary"'258, terminology 
which shows that they were in conflict with the Conservative 
faction. It should be remembered that the Rebel faction rail 
workers outnumbered the Conservative Spring Thunder group five 
to one259, and even in these reports which condemn them there 
seems to be no way round the fact that the Rebels had mass 
support: it is admitted at one point that the first attempt at 
a counter-power seizure in the Railway Bureau failed because 
the Conservatives had not 'striven to rally the great majority
256 See Guangzhou/Guangdong Radio reports for details, in NPRS 
200, M15, 18-22, and 201, M3-5, 7-10, 13-14, and 17-19.
257 NPRS 201, M13.
258 Ibid., M4.
259 The Guangzhou Railway Workers' Headquarters, consisting 
mostly of unskilled workers or 'coolies', had around 50,000 
members (see note 219), while the Conservative Spring 
Thunder group comprised 10,000 cadres, engineers and 
skilled workers (Hong Yung Lee, Politics of the Cultural 
Revolution, 133).
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of the masses ... revolutionary organizations and 
revolutionary masses ... did not understand us, or even 
suspected us'. 260 The Rebels even succeeded in 'inciting 
some of the masses who did not understand the real situation 
to storm the Control Centre, the nerve centre of railway 
communications, in a vain attempt to paralyse all traffic in 
the Sub-bureau.'261 Students were credited with a role in 
combatting economism on the railways, as they reportedly 
filled in for workers missing from their posts, serving as 
ticket-col lectors ,262 Students had been involved in this 
sort of strike-breaking activity on the Shanghai docks263 as 
well, and it cannot have contributed much to worker-student 
unity, at least as far as Rebel workers were concerned.
So the picture in enterprises and on the streets in the 
first half of 1967 was a mixed one as far as workers were 
concerned. Many of those who had joined the wave of 
'economism' and seizing power, an unprecedented opportunity to 
seek redress for what they felt to be years of mistreatment at 
the hands of cadres, and which actually led to most cadres 
being pushed aside, soon found themselves suppressed and in 
some cases arrested. And just as workers were among the first 
to be arrested, there is evidence that they were also the last 
to be released. Certainly in Changsha, non-student Rebels 
served much longer terms than did students264, and this is a 
familiar phenomenon from other protest movements, including 
that of 1989. In Guangzhou, Rebel workers' organizations did 
not revive as quickly as those of students once the
260 Ibid., M9.
261 Ibid., M4.
262 Guangzhou Radio 6.4.63, in NPRS 202, M8 .
263 Wylie, 'Shanghai dockers', 117.
264 Unger, 'Whither China?...', Modern China 17, 1, January
1991, 20.
302
suppression began to be lifted265, and were described in an 
unofficial newspaper as late as the end of August 1967 as 
having been recently restored and expanded.266
As we saw above, once the Rebels had been subdued, power 
seizures on the authorized model were carried out and seemed 
to result in some reforms of enterprise management which 
conformed to workers' demands. But many 'revolutionary 
cadres' also returned to their posts and the PLA was in 
factories to maintain order, so progress towards more freedom 
and participation in the enterprise must have been limited as 
far as workers were concerned. There were signs that the 
much-vaunted new order brought about in enterprises might not 
live up to expectations, as the new provisional power 
structures seemed to include large numbers of cadres, 
including members of the former leadership, despite the 
misgivings of workers who would have preferred more of their 
own representatives.267 Those workers' representatives who 
were chosen to serve on the new bodies tended to be veteran 
workers, Mao-study activists and five-good workers, 
representatives of the old establishment, in other words; and 
they were selected by 'repeated examination and discussion' 
among workers and staff, not by any form of election, still 
less the 'Paris Commune' type of election so strongly promoted 
a few months before.268
But the mass movement could not be brought back under 
strict central control that easily: once the spring Trade Fair 
was over in Guangzhou, Zhou Enlai visited the city and praised 
the Rebel Red Flag faction while criticizing the 
Conservatives, thus giving the Rebels new scope for action.
265 Liu Guokai, Brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 69.
266 Eongse Baodong 22.8.67, in SCMP 4026, 7.
267 See for example Renmin Ribao 8.5.67, 3.
268 Ibid., 3.
303
Central documents now asserted that groups should not be 
stigmatized as counterrevolutionary, that their basic 
orientation had always been correct, and that the army should 
'cherish the people', rather than suppressing them.269 It 
had been evident all along that Guangzhou was not entirely 
peaceful, as there were repeated warnings that some people 
were 'spreading rumours' to split the PLA and the masses270 
and still attempting to disrupt production. In fact, during 
April and May Guangzhou Rebels were making plans and 
reconnoitring the prisons and PSB stations where their 
comrades were being held with a view to storming them if the 
MCC would not release all its prisoners; this could be what is 
meant by continuing attacks on and rumours about the PLA.271
Praise for workers' success in forming alliances was 
premature, as well, since large-scale, armed and extremely 
violent factional struggle was to break out over the summer, 
involving the revived and expanded Rebel workers' 
organizations and the Conservative groups from large 
enterprises in some parts of the city.272 Despite editorials 
in the autumn insisting that there was no reason for workers 
to split into two antagonistic factions273, progress in 
forming revolutionary alliances and revolutionary committees 
in Guangzhou's enterprises was slow, dragging on from October 
1967 until late January the following year, and around the end 
of 1967 and early in 1968 there were further outbreaks of 
unrest involving contract and temporary workers, as well as 
other instances of renewed 'economism' in some places, 
including the Guangzhou Railway Sub-bureau where the problem
269 See Liu Guokai, Brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 
69.
270 See for example Guangzhou/Guangdong Radio 6.3.67, in NPRS 
197, M22.
271 Zi Chuan, 'Li Yizhe yu wo', Beidou 1, 1.6.77, 8-10
272 Bongse Baodong 22.8.67, in SCMP 4026, 7.
273 Renmin Ribao 14.9.67, in SCMP 4024, 28.
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was claimed to have been settled back in March 1967.274 What 
was even more surprising was that the Sub—bureau had been put 
under military control in November 1967, yet unrest 
persisted.275
The obvious difficulties experienced in trying to 
persuade, coax, and threaten workers into forming alliances 
were rooted in the unresolved issues of this and previous 
confrontations with workers. Rebel workers were still
adamantly opposed to the 'liberation' and return to work of 
large numbers of deposed cadres, and to the powerful role of 
the PLA representatives in the new power structures, the 
Revolutionary Committees. Concern about continued attacks on 
cadres prompted the usual measures to remove antagonism on the 
factory floor, with leading cadres being urged to go down to 
the masses, spend at least a third of their time there, and 
display a democratic workstyle, treating others as their 
equals.276 These exhortations, if heeded, might have won a 
favourable response from workers back in the mid-1950s, but 
now, after eighteen months of the Cultural Revolution, things 
had gone much too far for gestures like these to have any real 
effect. Workers were not now asking cadres to mend their ways 
and show workers more respect; they had already overthrown 
many of the cadres once, completely rejecting their authority, 
and had tried, for a brief period, to establish themselves as 
the true 'masters of the enterprise'. The insistence of the 
central authorities on the reinstatement of most cadres was 
bitterly resented by Rebels after this. It had also become 
apparent to most Rebels by now that
274 See Guangtie Zongsi 28, early February 1968, in SCMP 4129, 
1-4, 4-6. Unrest among contract and temporary workers was 
also reported in Sichuan and Shanghai (Current Scene 6 , 5, 
23).
275 Chunlei Zhanshi 19, 25.11.67, 'Warmly hail the imposition 
of military control on Canton Railway Sub-bureau', in SCMP 
4120, 5-6. See also other related articles in this issue.
276 See for example Guangzhou Radio 19-22.10.67, in NPRS 230, 
Ml-9; Guangzhou Radio 21-22.11.67, in NPRS 235, Ml-7.
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all their actions had to fall into some sort of 
orbit known only to those at the top, or else.
Those who were not reconciled to playing this role 
became angry. They started to shout the slogans "We 
want a genuine mass movement, not a manipulation of 
the mass movement!"277
This was of course a dangerous development from the point of 
view of the top leadership, and was one more motive for 
turning to the only institution Party leaders could still rely 
on, the PLA, for the suppression, by force wherever necessary, 
of those forces which were refusing to submit to the 
'restoration of the old' in enterprises and elsewhere.
1968: The fall of the Rebels and the rise of 'workers'
dictatorship'
The problems of persistent factionalism and attacks on 
cadres in Guangzhou were blamed in part on the re-emergence of 
the 'ultra-left trend'278 there, and there is some truth in 
this accusation. Left ideas grew in popularity among some of 
the Rebels during the last months of 1967 and the first half 
of 1968, and the influence of the extreme left 'trend' on 
Guangzhou's workers led to calls on provincial radio in June 
1968 for the smashing of 'illegal solidarities between groups 
of workers and the Trend'279. During March 1968
Shengwulian's manifesto, Whither China?, was circulating in 
Guangzhou, with its attack on the exploiting 'red capitalist' 
cadre class and its call not to 'go down the bourgeois
277 Liu Guokai, Brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 115.
278 As in Huang Yongsheng's 12.12.67 report on the overall 
situation in Guangzhou, Guangzhou Radio 14.12.67, in NPRS 
235, M4.
279 Guangdong Radio 7.6.68, quoted in China News Analysis, 769, 
3.
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reformist: road of the Revolutionary Committees'.280 The
leftist 'trend' brought forth 'Guangdong's Shengwulian', in 
the form of the so-called '85 thought trend' (named after the 
unofficial publication in which its writings appeared) which 
posed the question 'Whither Guangdong?'281 Echoing the 
analysis of Shengwulian's Yang Xiguang, a member of the '85' 
faction stated at a meeting that 'the present contradiction is 
between the basic level of the labouring people, the 
rusticated youth, and contract and temporary workers who have 
suffered the most deeply, and those who have climbed up onto 
the workers' throne.'282 This formulation clearly relates 
the idea of the existence of a new bureaucratic class 
exploiting workers and peasants to the conflict we saw in 1966 
and early 1967 between the more disadvantaged workers and 
enterprise and Party authorities, showing the relevance of 
workers' protests to perhaps the most important issue of the 
Cultural Revolution.
The danger of the idea that cadres constituted a new 
exploiting class in enterprises seems to have been taken 
seriously at the centre, as an April 1968 Renmin Ribao article 
on Revolutionary Committees in enterprises specifically denied 
that cadres' political power was that of an exploiting 
class.283 Cadres, however, were warned that the proletarian 
nature of their political power depended on maintaining close 
ties with the workers, becoming 'common people serving as 
officials', and guarding against bureaucratism, arrogance and 
oppressive behaviour.284 Later in the year, as Rebel attacks 
on the Revolutionary Committees' 'rightist reversal of 
verdicts' (i.e. the inclusion of cadres overthrown by Rebels)
280 Zi Chuan, 'Li Yizhe yu wo', Beidou 2, 1.7.77, 46.
281 Ibid., 46.
282 Hai Feng, Cultural Revolution in the Canton area, 330.
283 Renmin Ribao 3.4.68, in SCMP 4161, 8 .
284 Ibid., 8 .
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gathered momentum, further attempts were made to emphasize 
that the Revolutionary Committee was uniquely well-suited to 
the mass line and anti-bureaucratism, and that representatives 
were ordinary labourers with no special privileges; it was 
even claimed that criticism of the Revolutionary Committees by 
some Rebels was proof of the democratic atmosphere.285
The stress on the Revolutionary Committees' status as a 
'red political power' won by workers' own efforts during the 
Cultural Revolution made criticism of the institution 
problematic, but Rebel workers' groups in Guangzhou were very 
clear in their condemnation of the way in which the old power- 
holders had taken over the new institutions in enterprises, 
and the fact that both they and the Conservatives had 
effectively shut Rebel workers (and cadres) out of the new 
organs of power, including not just the Revolutionary 
Committee, but also the Workers' Disciplinary Teams which were 
organized in the spring and summer of 1968 to carry out the 
'cleansing of class ranks'.286
When revolutionary committees were established in 
various factories, the rebels ... suffered from 
discrimination of all sorts. For instance, in the 
Canton Iron and Steel Works and other plants, some 
rebel group leaders . .. were accused of having 
"strong factionalist character" or of being "extreme 
leftists" and were prevented from joining the 
"three-way combination" organs. When a
revolutionary committee was set up in the Canton Oil 
Refinery, all representatives of the rebel group 
were excluded from it.287
285 Xinhua News Agency 30.6.68, in SCMP 4212, 11-16.
286 See 'The present state of the movement in some factories in 
Canton - An investigation report', Guangzhou Gongren 34, 
28.5.68, in SCMP 4208, 9.
287 Ibid., 9.
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It was a similar story with the Workers' Disciplinary Corps, 
where Hebei workers were excluded almost entirely from the 
organizations, and particularly from their leadership; those 
who did join were reportedly harassed by Conservative faction 
members who made up the bulk of the forced88 Rebels also 
complained that
Apart from being subject to political attack and 
discrimination, many rebel fighters also suffered 
from economic persecution. In the Canton Paper Mill 
and Canton Shipbuilding Yard cases continued to 
appear where the wages of workers of rebel groups 
were unreasonably reduced and hardship subsidies 
unreasonably abolished, and so on.289
Cadres who had sided with the Rebels were also said to have 
been discriminated against and excluded from the new organs of 
power, while in contrast there were many cases where 'cadres 
who have made serious mistakes have one after another been 
placed on 'revolutionary committees' without their problem of 
"alignment" being solved. '29°
But what most concerned Rebel workers in Guangzhou early 
in the summer of 1968 was what they termed the ' return to the 
old'. It seemed to many of them that all the effort and 
upheaval of the past two years had changed very little in many 
units. Shengwulian insisted that the Cultural Revolution was 
not about the dismissal of individual power-holders, but the 
overthrow of the entire structure of authority in enterprises 
and in society; but now it seemed that not only had this sort 
of revolution not succeeded, but the Rebels had even failed 
permanently to dislodge the individuals in the old system. 
The Guangzhou workers were driven to conclude that
288 Ibid., 9.
289 Ibid., 9.
290 Ibid., 14.
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the same group of men are still in actual power, 
while mass representatives are merely the 
appendages... in Canton at present, both in those 
units where revolutionary committees have been set 
up and in those units where [they] have not, not 
only do the same group of men remain in power, but 
the same working systems remain intact also.291
In the examples given by the Rebel workers, the old Party 
committees and the political and militia departments still 
seemed to be operating within the framework of the 'new red 
political power', and it was said that 'some people in these 
departments are even now collecting black material against the 
masses', and in some cases had made preparations for the 
arrest of Rebel leaders in their enterprises.292
At the end of 1966 and the beginning of 1967, workers had 
taken advantage of the unprecedented opportunity presented to 
them by the lifting of Party controls on organizations and the 
legitimizing of attacks on Party and administrative cadres, to 
press for a solution to all the grievances which had been 
building up among them over the years, the roost fundamental of 
which - the question of power or authority and who really was 
the master of the enterprise - can be traced back to both of 
the previous confrontation between workers and the Party- 
state. In the circumstances of the Cultural Revolution, 
workers took their growing conviction that cadres were not 
simply allotted a different sort of work under the rational 
division of labour, but were actually a privileged and 
exploitative stratum or new class, to its logical conclusion 
and, briefly, attempted to take over enterprises themselves. 
Both this and the more obviously 'economistic' aspects of the 
mass movement proved equally unacceptable to the central 
authorities, and the movement was soon brought back onto its
291 Ibid., 15.
292 Ibid., 13.
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proper course. The subsequent struggles of the Rebels, bitter 
and hard-fought as they were, never aimed at or looked likely 
to achieve any radical changes in how enterprises were run or 
who held power in them, and by mid-1968 they were battling 
just to avoid total obliteration.
The report quoted above was intended to be the first part 
of a longer document, but there turned out to be no time for 
Rebel workers to prepare it. The final suppression of the 
Rebels began in the summer of 1968, and on July 15 the 
headquarters of Gonggelian, the Rebel workers' federation 
which prepared the report, was the target of the military's 
'mopping-up' operations; four people were killed as troops 
fought their way up through the building from floor to 
floor.293 'The Cultural Revolution came to an abrupt, 
shocking end'294 as the new revolutionary order was enforced 
and the campaign to 'cleanse class ranks' of proven 
counterrevolutionaries began.
It seems paradoxical that at precisely this moment when 
the final crackdown on Rebel workers occurred, workers seemed 
finally to have come to the forefront of the Cultural 
Revolution with the despatch of Workers' Propaganda Teams into 
schools and universities and all units in the 'superstructure' 
to exercise 'all-round working class leadership'. But it 
should be remembered that
only workers with "high political qualifications" 
were recruited into the propaganda teams. In places 
like Guangzhou, where typical "conservatives" had 
crushed typical "rebels", large numbers of workers 
were not only deprived of the honour of exercising 
"overall leadership", but were victims of the "clean
293 Zi Chuan, 'Li Tizhe yu wo', Beidou 2, 1.7.77, 48.
294 Liu Guokai, Brief analysis of the Cultural Revolution, 118.
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out * movement.295
The new direction of the movement in enterprises acknowledged 
that cadres had in some cases become an exploiting, privileged 
stratum usurping the product of workers' labour, and thus that 
the relations between workers and cadres had degenerated from 
those between leaders and led to those between exploiters and 
exploited.296 This was the result of the bourgeois
revisionism of Liu Shaogi and his agents who had imposed 
'profit in command' and material incentives, and had caused 
enterprise administration to become top-heavy, resulting in a 
split between the Party and the people, the proletarian state 
and the masses.297 The solution to this was the mass line, 
closer ties with workers and rejection of privileges, 'crack 
troops and simpler administration', i.e. retrenchment of 
administrative staff, and the revolutionary committee.298 
This formulation clearly represents a victory of the Maoist 
line in industry over that associated with Liu and Deng, but 
of course this did not necessarily represent a victory for any 
group of workers, and certainly not for the Rebels who were 
being suppressed.
These sorts of policies in industry, the Maoist line of 
politics in command and reliance on the masses to get rid of 
irrational regulations and systems, so-called mass management, 
persisted not just through what was left of the Cultural 
Revolution, but, on paper at least, on into the 1970s; they 
were the subject of a particularly fierce debate between the 
Gang of Four and Deng Xiaoping and their respective followers 
in 1975-6. In fact, when the lasting influence of the 
Cultural Revolution in industry is discussed, it is usually
295 Ibid., 126-7.
296 Renmin Ribao 9.7.68, 4.
297 Renmin Ribao 13.7.68, 1.
298 Ibid., 1.
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this policy line which is meant, rather than workers' earlier 
experiences in self-organization, 'economism', and seizing 
power.299 In this respect it is particularly important to 
distinguish between the three years of the Cultural Revolution 
proper and the years of Gang of Four rule from late 1969 to 
1976. The former period is the one which many workers saw as 
the high point of democratization and freedom of expression 
and organization in enterprises and in wider society, but in 
the latter seven or eight years, ubiquitous praise for the 
superiority of the working class and its leading role in 
society and politics was not matched by the reality of 
workers' position and influence, and workers seem to have been 
subject to the same sort of autocratic rule as the rest of 
Chinese society; indeed, workers were often prominent among 
those protesting against this type of rule.
Given that the Maoist line in industrial organization 
held sway in theory at least throughout the first half of the 
1970s, in order to evaluate how far these policies actually 
went in establishing the sort of enterprise management system 
for which workers had always lobbied, namely one in which 
their theoretical status as masters had some basis in reality, 
we should consider the whole of the 1968-76 period, looking 
not only at what reforms were made, how extensively, and how 
long they lasted, but also at any signs of renewed protest 
among workers which would indicate dissatisfaction.
After the Cultural Revolution
At the First Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress in April 
1969, Mao said
299 The ten-year Cultural Revolution model of course 
accommodates the whole of this policy's period of 
implementation, but it understates the importance of the 
earlier, mass activity of workers, as was explained in the 
note on Cultural Revolution periodization above.
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It seemed there was no alternative but to make the 
great Cultural Revolution, because this foundation 
of ours was not sound enough. According to my 
observations, still in a considerable number of 
enterprises, if not all or a majority of them, 
leadership was not in the hands of genuine Marxists 
and the masses of workers.300
From this time on, there was a strong emphasis on reliance on 
the workers in managing socialist enterprises, and the Anshan 
Constitution was once again promoted as the guiding set of 
principles for all management work.301 This would imply an 
extension of workers' participation in management, and indeed 
some researchers found this to be the case, describing 
institutions such as the workers' management team as 'attempts 
to develop organizational structures affording the greatest 
possibilities for the masses to participate in running the 
factories and to make their weight felt.'302 Bettelheim went 
even further, suggesting that Chinese enterprises were seeing 
a transition to 'management by the majority, or mass 
management. '303
But most of those who have examined the practice of 
participation in management and all the issues surrounding 
workers' achievement of their proper position in the socialist 
enterprise have concluded that 'the degree of change and its 
permanence was greatly overstated'304 by Bettelheim.
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The more radical and egalitarian demands for
fundamental changes in the prevailing system of 
industrial organization, issuing from sections of 
the working class movement and voiced by some of the 
more radical leaders in Beijing, were denounced as 
"ultra-leftist" well before the Cultural Revolution 
had run its tragic course.305
In the case of the revolutionary committee, its potential 
was not realized as
the appearance of control from below through 
election was not institutionalized through re-
election procedures, and there is no evidence to 
suggest that there was any form of re-election.306
As we saw with the workers' congress and unions in 1956-7,
this lack of provision for regular re-election of
representatives was often fatal in undermining participatory 
institutions. As for workers' management teams,
from 1973 they were put under the control of the 
reformed trade union and by 1975 certainly such 
bodies neither existed on the scale suggested by 
Bettelheim nor did they have the autonomy from 
management and Party structures.307
Measures for workers' participation in management and in 
technical innovation do not seem to have lived up to claims 
that they represented a revolution in industrial organization
305 Meisner, 'Marx, Mao and Deng on the division of labor in 
history', Dirlik and Meisner (eds.) Marxism and the Chinese 
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and management, being
at best reformist in character .. . Most were 
gradually abandoned in the early 1970s in favor of 
pre-Cultural Revolution forms of managerial 
authority, factory work rules, and labour 
discipline.308
And the results of the other 'participation', that of cadres 
and technicians in labour, were similarly disappointing. This 
sort of participation had been going on in one form or another 
for nearly twenty years, but there still was little sign that 
it was having the effect desired by the workers who had 
initially called for it. Cadres' participation in manual 
labour 'perhaps had a certain symbolic significance, but [its] 
effects on the consciousness of those involved were 
problematic in the short term and negligible over the long 
term'309.
The 'liberation' and reinstatement of former cadres after 
the 'cleansing of class ranks' which ended the Cultural
Revolution seemed to have the sort of effect Rebel workers had
feared when they opposed the policy back in 1967-8, as it 
'gradually eroded much of the impact of the Cultural
Revolution.'310 In at least one enterprise, this was what
happened:
As former cadres were "liberated", they were placed 
on the revolutionary committee where their numbers, 
skill and experience came to outweigh the mass 
representatives. As the unit resumed its normal 
activities, and political matters increasingly gave
308 Meisner, 'Marx, Mao and Deng on the division of labor', 
104.
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way to administrative and professional tasks, 
moreover, the revolutionary committee as a whole 
lost power to its standing committee, and the mass 
representatives on the standing committee became 
less influential. Their opinions were increasingly 
ignored, and they spoke less and less often.311
This is an almost verbatim repetition of the description of 
the fate of workers' representatives on the very first 
participatory organ set up after liberation, the WRC, which we 
noted in the first section of this study. It seems 
particularly ironic in view of all the praise of the Anshan 
Constitution and corresponding vilification of the Seventy 
Articles during the early 70s, that 'the basic orientation, 
and, in some cases, the specific provisions of the 'Seventy 
Articles' had outlived their opponents'312 after the Cultural 
Revolution.
But if 'the structure of the industrial establishment, 
together with its vested interests, suffered little 
discontinuity and disturbance from the early 1960s to the 
period right after the Cultural Revolution'313, we cannot say 
that the Cultural Revolution had no lasting impact in industry 
or on workers' lives and ideas. The Cultural Revolution did 
give workers 'a limited say in some areas from which they had 
been excluded ... led to the airing of many critical ideas', 
and also played a part in 'reducing managerial control in 
areas such as labour discipline.'314 Indeed, complaints 
about lax discipline and anarchism in enterprises in the late
311 Ibid., 111.
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1970s invariably cite the Cultural Revolution, as well as the 
influence of the Gang of Four, as its major cause. The 
experiences of the Cultural Revolution led to a crisis of 
managerial legitimacy315, and to a certain extent of the 
legitimacy of all authority, especially among younger workers. 
Workers who had overthrown or forced aside the leaders of 
their enterprises in the January Revolution still resented the 
way in which these cadres had in most cases been reinstated 
with military backing, and the legacy of bitter factional 
conflict must have poisoned the atmosphere in many units long 
after the end of the Cultural Revolution proper.
We saw earlier how eagerly workers adopted the slogan of 
'everyone liberating themselves' to justify their self­
organization in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, 
but this phrase also crops up later in a rather different 
context, being used by workers to resist the reimposition of 
discipline by enterprise authorities and the military.316 
This raises the possibility that the radical rhetoric of the 
Cultural Revolution and the early 1970s which celebrated the 
ideological superiority of the worker also had some lasting 
effect, since it could be used by workers themselves in 
unintended ways. Leaders seem to have given hostages to 
fortune in the shape of slogans which, however far removed 
from the reality of workers' subordination to Party-state 
authorities, were difficult to counter even when used by 
discontented workers in cynical and entirely negative ways, 
e.g. to justify absenteeism or slow working.
The Gang of Four's criticism of regulations and systems 
designed for 'control, check and suppression' of workers were 
particularly vulnerable to this sort of treatment, since 
workers had ample ideological justification for objecting to 
almost any control over their working lives as 'an insult to
315 Ibid., 230.
316 See China News Analysis 711, 3.
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their revolutionary spontaneity' and an encroachment on their 
right to 'liberate themselves'. The eulogizing of workers' 
role as masters in the enterprise does seem to have given them 
a weapon with which they could resist an overt return to pre- 
1966 management methods, although this resistance was on the 
whole unsuccessful; of course, its other main effect was to 
breed resentment against the Gang of Four, who had proved 
either unwilling or unable to realize their much-vaunted 
revolution in industrial management and organization. It is 
interesting to note that just as the pro-working class 
rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution and early 1970s may have 
been of use to workers in asserting themselves politically, 
the reforms of the 1980s disadvantaged them in that terms such 
as 'the masses' or 'the working class is the most progressive 
class' were largely lost to them and to their advocates317. 
However, in the 1989 protests, while well aware of the 
dishonesty of claims that workers were the 'leading class' in 
China, workers did attempt to use their widely proclaimed 
status as the 'most advanced class' to take what they felt to 
be their rightful place in the movement when this was resisted 
by student activists, and were certainly not defensive in 
their use of classic pro-working class terminology.
As to signs of dissatisfaction among workers, they are 
apparent in the first half of the 1970s. Many were directly 
related to material conditions, such as the fact that until 
1973 many workers had not had a single wage increase in nearly 
ten years (except, of course, the increases they demanded, and 
briefly received, during the 'economist' upsurge). Various 
cities saw serious industrial unrest in the years 1974-6, and 
in Hangzhou in 1975, one of the better-known incidents, the 
army had to intervene to bring strikes to an end.318 Workers
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Hangchow', Issues and Studies 22, 2, 4-86, 17-18? Lotta, 
And Mao makes fives Mao Zedong's last great battle, 31.
319
on the Shanghai docks also protested in 1974 that
[t]he leadership of our district always talks about 
relying on the masses, but the masses are forgotten 
when work is carried out. Herein lies the cause of 
not much change in our district over the past few 
years. The leadership has looked upon the workers 
not as the masters of the wharf but as the slaves of 
tonnage.319
This last case indicates that workers' grievances were not 
purely economic, but also encompassed disappointment over the 
lack of real progress during and after the Cultural 
Revolution, and a new unwillingness to endure an 
unsatisfactory situation, with the resort to self-organization 
and independent action coming much more quickly in the wake of 
the Cultural Revolution than it ever did before.
(
[T]he Cultural Revolution broke open the gates of 
thought of China's youth, and they can't be blocked 
up again ... Although everyone's path of thought 
wasn't the same [after the Cultural Revolution], yet 
the Earth was no longer asleep, Hthe people wouldn't 
be so badly fooled again", and the occurrence of the 
Tian'anmen Incident and the Li Yizhe dazibao are 
clear proof of this.320
Guangzhou in the summer and autumn of 1974 was 'seething 
with urban protest'321, much of it strongly reminiscent of 
Rebel protests during the Cultural Revolution. The Baiyun 
Mountain Incident was the culmination of these events:
319 Wylie, 'Shanghai dockers', 123.
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A crowd of more than a hundred thousand, mainly 
factory workers and youth who had been sent to 
settle in the countryside, climbed Baiyun mountain 
ostensibly to honour their ancestors according to 
the traditions of the Mid-autumn festival. But many 
of them used the occasion to protest against cadre 
privileges and other inequities ... 322
The celebrated Li Yizhe big-character poster, too, was 
concerned with some of the main themes of Cultural Revolution 
protests, namely the existence of a new bureaucratic ruling 
class or 'new nobility', and the inability of ordinary people 
to exercise their theoretical democratic rights and to 
participate in politics.323 It is clear from all these 
events that the concerns and ideas of young workers in 
particular were not that different in 1974 from what we saw in 
1967-8, which in itself suggests that the major underlying 
problems as far as less privileged workers were concerned had 
not been solved, and were still the subject of large-scale 
protest.
The above two protests, the Tian'anmen Incident and the 
Li Yizhe poster, were of course aimed at the Party leadership 
of the time, the Gang of Four, and at what ordinary people 
perceived as its autocratic and arbitrary style of rule. It 
is often said that workers, in their involvement in this sort 
of protest and in the workplace generally, rejected the Maoist 
line in industry which they experienced during the early 
1970s, and welcomed the return of Deng Xiaoping and his 
economic reforms. There is some truth in this; but we should 
be clear about what exactly it was that workers wanted, and 
what they therefore rejected. The austerity which stemmed
322 Ibid, 8-9. See also Zi Chuan, 'Li Yizhe yu wo', Beidou 7, 
1.12.77, 23. Zi states that demobilized soldiers 
protesting over wages were also involved in this incident.
323 A translation of the poster can be found in Chan, Rosen and 
Unger's On socialist democracy, 32-85.
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from the Gang's rejection of material incentives was 
undoubtedly unpopular, but as we noted above, another factor 
in workers' dissatisfaction was their disappointment that 
reforms in the direction of a greater role in running their 
own enterprises had failed to live up to expectations; those 
reforms which had been made had not lasted, and workers were 
faced with a very similar structure of industrial organization 
to that which they had experienced before the Cultural 
Revolution. We have seen that workers generally react to the 
discrepancy between rhetoric about participation and their 
position as masters and the reality of subjugation to 
management with discontent and eventually protest, and the 
Gang of Four were not immune to this process. As we noted 
above, their very emphasis on workers' right to run their own 
enterprises must have damaged them when it did not materialize 
in practice.
In all of these considerations it must be borne in mind 
that workers were divided, and that they did not, in fact, 
adhere to either Mao's or Deng's line in its entirety. There 
is a clear discrepancy between the concerns of the Maoists and 
later the Gang of Four, and those of workers: for example, the 
former gave much attention to criticizing the pre-1966 
official trade unions which were swept aside in the early 
stages of the Cultural Revolution, but most workers did not 
bother to condemn them. They had no need to; they had 
virtually ignored the unions since they were found so 
inadequate as a vehicle for representation and protest in 
1956-7, and in the Cultural Revolution workers simply 
organized themselves, as they had before, but on a larger 
scale. As for the reforms of enterprise management proposed by 
Deng Xiaoping in 1975, these involved a marked move away from 
workers' participation in management324, and whatever the 
realities of the much-vaunted Maoist participatory forms, this 
would not have been popular, especially among former Rebels.
324 P N Lee, 'The Gang of Four', 91.
322
And if workers had been so much in favour of Deng's reforms, 
it is difficult to see why they also became involved in the 
Democracy Wall movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and 
why the period was marked by industrial unrest which included 
the formation of independent unions, some of them bearing the 
name of 'Solidarity'. Indeed, industrial unrest seems to have 
so hampered the reforms that Deng found it necessary to remove 
the right to strike from the Constitution in 1982.
One of the major problems of the ten-year periodization 
of the Cultural Revolution, as Anita Chan has pointed out, is 
that the Rebel faction tends to be lumped together with the 
Gang of Four and their supporters as 'ultra-leftists'325; 
this has the effect of discrediting former Rebels (this is 
actually one of its purposes) and confusing the picture with 
regard to workers' allegiances during the Cultural Revolution 
and the early 1970s. Briefly, the Dengist version of events 
identifies the Rebels, who in this formulation had little 
support among workers, with followers of the Gang of Four, and 
insists that the Gang was actually able to place its people in 
positions of power in enterprises and implement its reforms 
over the 'Cultural Revolution decade'. These policies were 
then rejected by workers who rose up against the Gang at the 
end of the decade, most notably in the Tian'anmen Incident 
(which was reclassified from counterrevolutionary to 
revolutionary after the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping in
1978), and workers supported the Dengist reforms in industry.
In fact, as we have seen, many workers did join the Rebel 
faction, and the significance of their actions cannot be 
measured solely in terms of the numbers actively involved. 
Even before the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, many 
former cadres had returned to their positions of power in the 
new enterprise management structures, and this process 
accelerated afterwards. The Gang of Four's actual
325 Chan, 'Dispelling misconceptions', 72.
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achievements did not match their words with regard to 'mass 
management' of enterprises by workers themselves, and such 
limited progress as was made did not last long. Workers, 
including many former Rebels, did indeed revolt against the 
Gang's rule in the mid-1970s, but this seems to have had more 
to do with the failure of the Gang to establish workers as the 
true masters of the enterprise than with any reaction to the 
excesses of such policies. Attempts by the Gang to manipulate 
workers through the recently reformed trade unions326 may 
also have antagonized workers, who of course now had 
experience of forming their own independent organizations on 
a large scale, and so were even less inclined than before to 
waste their time on official unions. Industrial unrest during 
1975 and 1976 was blamed on the influence of the Gang of 
Four's 'anarchism', but in at least some cases it represented 
a 'protest against the imposition of pre-1966 rules and 
regulations'327, and therefore was aimed at Deng Xiaoping's 
'Twenty Articles'328, the successor to the Seventy Articles, 
showing that claims of unconditional support for the reforms 
among workers are wide of the mark.
Once we have separated the momentous events of the three- 
year Cultural Revolution from the period of rule by the Gang 
of Four which followed it, a more accurate picture of events 
surrounding the Tian'anmen Incident can be pieced together 
and, in particular, the actions of workers can be placed in 
the context of their original aspirations in the Cultural 
Revolution.
326 Remain Ribao 8.4.77, 5? Xinhua News Agency 21.4.77, in SCMP
6332, 131-3; Kraus, Class conflict in Chinese socialism,
160.
327 Lotta, And Mao makes five, 49.
328 The 'Twenty Articles', entitled 'Some questions on
accelerating the development of industry', are translated 
in Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines 
(SPRCM) 926 (1977), 8-30.
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[T]he rank and file members of the Rebel faction had 
no connection with the Gang of Four or its 
clique.... the actual unstated crimes of the Rebels 
were that they had attacked the Dengists and Party 
bureaucrats, and that at the end of the Cultural 
Revolution (1968-69) they had dared come out with a 
new paradigm of society that called into question 
the legitimacy of the ruling class.329
In 1976 it was still this question of the new ruling class 
which preoccupied protestors in Tian'anmen Square and 
elsewhere in China. Although it is not untrue to say that 
popular anger was directed against the Gang of Four (it 
undoubtedly was), this does not mean that the rest of the 
Party-state leadership was immune to criticism, and it 
certainly does not mean that workers or any other section of 
society were supporting one leadership faction against 
another. In fact both the Cultural Revolution Rebels and the 
demonstrators of April 5 'were all fighting against the 
autocracy of the privileged bureaucratic class.'330
In an unofficial forum of democracy activists in 
Guangzhou to mark the third anniversary of the Tian'anmen 
Incident, Wang Xizhe of the Li Tizhe group pointed to the 
dominance of young workers in the movement as a sign that the 
working class was now ready to take over the direct 
administration of society while the Party retreated from this 
role to one of ideological guidance, in line with the classic 
Marxist idea of the withering away of the state. In future, 
he considered that
[t]he system of economic management, "workers'
329 Chan, 'Dispelling misconceptions', 73.
330 Xiao Ping, 'The rise and decline of China's democracy 
movement', originally published in the underground journal 
Yecao (Weeds) in 1983, translated in Issues and Studies 22, 
1, 1.86, 173.
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participation in management" (in the realm of 
politics, "workers' participation in dictatorship") 
according to the formula of the "Anshan 
Constitution" must be changed into "direct 
democratic management by the workers". The class 
dictatorship of the proletariat can have its firm 
material foundation only under conditions in which 
the workers manage the means of production 
themselves directly and democratically. This was 
the aim of the Paris Commune331.
These references to the Paris Commune and to the need for 
workers now to take direct control of their own enterprises 
show clearly that the ideals of the Cultural Revolution 
Rebels, particularly as expressed in Shengwulian's Whither 
China? tract, with its celebration of the January Revolution 
takeover by workers of their workplaces, were not only still 
alive, but were to have considerable influence in the next 
major outbreak of protest and dissent involving workers, the 
Democracy Wall movement. We will also come across another of 
Wang Xizhe's convictions, the idea that 'the motive force for 
change "has always come from the lower strata . .."332, when 
we see how pressures from below in the form of the democracy 
movement and the industrial unrest which accompanied it 
compelled the post-Mao leadership to introduce democratizing 
reforms in enterprises similar to those implemented in the 
much earlier confrontation with workers of the mid-1950s.
With the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution and the 
years which followed we return to the basic themes of all the 
confrontations between workers and the Party-state in China 
thus far: the question of who holds power in the enterprise
331 Wang Xizhe, 'Strive for the class dictatorship of the 
proletariat', translated by Stanley Rosen and Ai Ping in 
Chan, Rosen and Unger (eds.) On socialist democracy and the 
Chinese legal systems The Li Yizhe debates, 155-6.
332 Chan, Rosen and Unger, On socialist democracy, 19.
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and how it is exercised, and of whether or not the workers are 
truly masters in their own enterprise. An important part of 
this is the issue of how workers are to be represented in the 
workplace and beyond, and how far they will be allowed to 
represent and defend their own interests and priorities. It 
is here that the major impact of the Cultural Revolution can 
be found, for it saw the first post-liberation instance of 
large-scale autonomous organization and political action by 
workers, and this experience had a profound effect on workers' 
later conduct and protests. The Cultural Revolution also 
highlighted the idea of the existence of a new exploiting 
class in China in the shape of the industrial and Party 
bureaucracy, and this idea came to be accepted by many workers 
during the course of the movement, even if it was not fully 
articulated at the point in 1966-7 when the momentum of the 
mass movement pushed Rebel workers into a wholesale attack on 
all cadres. It is an idea which we will certainly find to be 
important in the next section when we look at the Democracy 
Wall movement and the problems of re-establishing both 
discipline and legitimacy in enterprises, and it also played 
a major role, though 'devoid of radical rhetoric'333 in many 
cases, in the pro-democracy protests of 1989. The spark for 
the next crisis in workers' relations with Party-state 
authorities was in many cases a familiar one - disputes over 
methods of participation, the role of the official unions, 
cadre attitudes and workstyle - but workers' responses, i.e. 
autonomous industrial and other protest action, clearly bore 
the marks of the Cultural Revolution, and debates over these 
longstanding bones of contention would never be quite the same 
again because of it.
333 Unger, 'Whither China?...', Modern China 17, 1, January 
1991, 3.
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SECTION FOUR
'OTHERS ARE TOUR MASTERS': 
DISSENT, DEMOCRACY AND REFORM, 1976-1984
Introduction
The final section of this study will cover the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. In many respects the sources of conflict and 
discontent in workplaces in these years were very similar to 
those of the mid-1950s, and the solutions advanced by Party 
and enterprise authorities, including the revitalization of 
the official unions and the workers' congress, are also 
familiar to us from that period. Without attempting to push 
the analogy too far, it could also be said that the posters 
and unofficial journals of the Democracy Wall Movement of 
1978-8l1 represented an opportunity for workers' grievances 
to be aired in public, an opportunity which in the 1950s was 
provided by an unusually outspoken official press during the 
Hundred Flowers campaign. The final point of similarity 
between the two periods is the influence of events in Eastern 
Europe. The strike at the Lenin Shipyard and the rise of 
Solidarity were reported by both official and unofficial 
sources in China, and concerns about the possibility of a 
Chinese Solidarity seem to have loomed large in the thinking
1 This movement was widely referred to just as the 
Democracy Movement (eg in Robin Munro's 'China's 
Democracy Movement: A midwinter spring' (Survey 28,
2 (121) (Summer 1984)) during the 1980s. I will be 
referring to it as the Democracy Wall Movement to 
distinguish it from the spring 1989 movement. The 
term is intended to encompass the whole of the 
'unofficial publication' movement which lasted until 
April 1981, and not just the initial wall-poster 
phase of the movement in the winter of 1978-9.
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of CCP leaders from the second half of 1980.2 These concerns 
are in fact evident throughout the 1980s, and probably 
contributed to the early targeting of workers' organizations 
for suppression during the 1989 Democracy Movement.
But the very fact that unofficial journals and sources of 
information existed shows the difference between the mid-1950s 
and the post-Mao era, and this difference can be traced in 
large part to the impact of the Cultural Revolution. Young 
workers and students who had gained experience of political 
activity and challenging authority during the Cultural 
Revolution were the mainstay of the Democracy Wall Movement. 
Former Red Guards dominated the editorial boards of many 
unofficial journals3, and the concerns of the Cultural 
Revolution, such as the rise of a new bureaucratic ruling 
class in China, questions of ownership and control in 
industry, and the desirability of a Paris Commune form of 
organization, were evident in the Movement's writings.4
2 See for example Liao Gailong, 'The "1980 Reform" 
program of China', reprinted in Qishi Niandai 134 
(1.3.81), 38-48; translated in FBIS 16.3.81, Ul-19, 
especially U10-11.
3 Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall and the unofficial 
journals, 14-15; Xiao Ping, 'The rise and decline of 
China's Democracy Movement', translated in Issues 
and Studies 22, 1 (January 1986), 155. Stanley
Rosen comments on the Rebel background of many 
Guangzhou activists in 'Guangzhou's Democracy 
Movement in Cultural Revolution perspective', China 
Quarterly # (date), 4.
4 On the Paris Commune, see for example Lu Min, 'Zhubu 
feichu guanliao tizhi he jianli Bali Gongshe de 
minzhu zhidu' (Gradually do away with the 
bureaucratic system and establish the democratic 
system of the Paris Commune), Beijing zhi Chun 
(Beijing Spring) 1 (8.1.79), 17-37, and 2 (27.1.79, 
13-16, reprinted in Claude Widor (ed.) Documents on 
the Chinese Democratic Movement 1978-80: Unofficial 
magazines and wall-posters (vol.2) (hereafter 
Documents), 105-109, 202-205. An article in the 
Nanfang Ribao (10.6.79, 2-3) agreed that the Paris 
Commune form was the correct way to tackle 
bureaucratism in China. Official denials that any
329
As was mentioned in the last section, Liu Guokai and 
others identified the Cultural Revolution proper (1966-1969) 
as a time when, albeit briefly, people were actually able to 
exercise the democratic rights laid down for them in the 
constitution, speaking out against cadres and organizing 
themselves. After the subsequent period of rule by the Gang 
of Four, former Cultural Revolution activists were more 
determined than ever to achieve clear legal guarantees of 
these rights, so that they would no longer be something which 
the Party could grant or withhold according to its own 
interests. Harking back to the Li Yizhe group's poster in 
Guangzhou in 1974, the unofficial journals were full of 
discussions on socialist democracy and the legal system5, and 
demanded legal guarantees of citizens' rights, especially the 
rights of freedom of speech, publication and organization. 
Given the links between the Cultural Revolution and Democracy 
Wall in terms of both participants and issues, it is not 
surprising that the authorities condemned some of the 
Democracy Wall activists for wanting to launch a 'second 
Cultural Revolution' against the Party bureaucracy®.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, then, we find a 
political movement going on in which a minority of workers 
were actively involved, and which addressed the concerns and 
grievances of many Chinese workers in the early years of the 
reform era. All this was taking place against a background of 
widespread discontent and low morale among industrial workers 
generally. Strikes and demonstrations involving workers broke 
out in a number of cities in various parts of China, including
new bureaucratic ruling class existed in China were 
frequent during the Democracy Wall Movement: see 
Nanfang Ribao 31.5.79, 2; Hongqi 5 (1.3.81), 12-18.
5 See Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 74.
6 Hongqi 5 (1.3.81), 17.
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Guangdong7, and there were reports of attempts to form 
Independent unions in some cities.8 The authorities and the 
official press drew links between these two phenomena, 
Democracy Wall and the rising tide of industrial unrest, with 
official newspapers condemning the 'methods of a minority' who 
were resorting to strikes, demonstrations, petitions and 
speech-making in pursuit of rapid democratization or 'extreme 
democratization'.9
The Party's concerns about industrial unrest and the 
possibility of more widespread worker participation in the 
movement seem to have been a factor in its decision finally to 
suppress the movement in the early 1980s, and predictions of
7 See for example An Zhiguo, 'On the question of
disturbances created by small numbers of people',
Beijing Review 24, 15 (13.4.81), 3; China Daily
8.10.81, 3, in FBIS-CHI 9.10.81, Qly
SWB/FE/6715/BII, 5; Jeanne Wilson, '"The Polish
Lesson": China and Poland 1980-1990', Studies in 
Comparative Communism 23, 3-4 (Autumn/Winter 1990), 
260-263. A series of strikes and other 'economic 
disturbances' in Guangdong province was reported at 
the end of January 1981 (Hezhong News Agency, 
Beijing, cited in Shiyue Pinglun 71 (1982), 18).
8 Wilson, '"The Polish Lesson"', 263. To the list
compiled by Wilson of places where strikes and
demands for independent unions had occurred (Wuhan, 
Taiyuan, Anshan, Shanghai and Kunming), Shiyue 
Pinglun adds Shandong (Shiyue Pinglun 71 (1982), 
18), and a report of demonstrating workers in Lhasa 
demanding an independent trade union (47). Chen- 
chang Chiang reports demands for free unions made by 
Shanghai workers from a steel mill, a diesel engine 
plant and other enterprises early in 1981, citing 
Taiwanese sources, and also notes the Shanxi case 
and others in Chongqing, Nanchang and parts of 
Xinjiang (Chen-chang Chiang, 'The role of trade 
unions in mainland China', Issues and Studies 26, 2 
(February 1990), 92-92).
9 See for example Nan fang Ribao 31.5.79, 2; Renmin 
Ribao 8.2.80, 1.
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a 'Polish crisis' in China reinforced the decision.10 
Workers' grievances were certainly able to find expression in 
the publications of the movement and there were signs of 
workers' support for its aims11. Although there were in fact 
no direct organizational links between Democracy Wall 
activists and groups of striking workers, many activists saw 
this as a weakness of the Chinese movement and called for 
Democracy Wall to forge links both with Chinese labour en 
masse and with the international labour movement.12 Some of 
the movement's activists 'tried hard to widen its social base 
by organizing, publicizing and defending struggles for higher 
wages and better conditions in the factories.'13
Despite the lack of an organizational framework 
encompassing mass industrial unrest and the unofficial 
journals that were the mainstay of Democracy Wall, we must 
conclude that the authorities were right to fear the power of 
the two combined. Democracy Wall activists reported the 
activities of Poland's Solidarity, and explicitly drew
10 See for example '"The Polish Lesson”: China and 
Poland, 1980-1990', Studies in Comparative Communism 
23, 3-4 (Fall/Winter 1990), 259-279; and Liao
Gailong, 'The "1980 reform" program of China', 
reprinted n Qishi Niandai 134 (1.3.81), 38-48;
translated in FBIS 16.3.81, U10.
11 See Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 35-6.
12 See the comments of He Qiu as reported in Shiyue
Pinglun [October Review] 66 (1982), 3; and
Guanchajia 36 (October 1980), 14. He Qiu, a
shipyard worker and former Red Guard, was editor of 
the Guangzhou Democracy Wall journals Renmin zhi 
Sheng [People's Voice] (with Liu Guokai, among 
others) and Renmin zhi Lu (People's Road), later 
renamed Ziyou Tan (Free talks).
13 Gregor Benton (ed.) Wild lilies, poisonous weeds, 
120. The particular case to which this comment
forms part of an introduction is a strike at the
Taiyuan steel works in early 1981, which drew praise 
and support from the local unofficial journal 
Feng fan (Sailing Ship). More will be said about 
this strike later. (The Chinese text is reprinted 
in Shiyue Pinglun 51 (1981), 20.)
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parallels between the economic and political crisis which had 
given rise to the independent union and conditions in China. 
Some looked forward to a Chinese Solidarity? they were always 
looking for Chinese working-class examples of resistance to 
the rule of the 'bureaucratic privileged class', and the 
unrest of this period gave them plenty of material for their 
journals.14 Since so many activists, in Guangzhou as 
elsewhere, were workers themselves, they were able to link the 
immediate, local concerns of workers with international trends 
in the socialist camp in a way which was potentially quite 
threatening to the CCP.
At the same time as they were condemning the 'handful' 
who were stirring up discontent and protest among the workers, 
however, the Party-state authorities had their own reasons for 
wishing to tackle workers' low morale and alienation from 
management and the official unions, since an increase in 
industrial productivity and greater worker commitment to the 
success of enterprises were vital to the economic reforms then 
being launched.15 So within enterprises, considerable
14 Articles on Solidarity appeared in a number of
unofficial journals, including Qingdao's Hailanghua 
[Seaspray] 7 (26.8.80) (reprinted in Shiyue Pinglun 
60 (1981), 34), and Lilun Qi (Theoretical Banner), 
February 1981, translated in Shiyue Pinglun 53/4 
(1981), 94-5. Beijing's Siwu Luntan (April Fifth 
Forum) also produced an open letter of 
congratulation to Lech Walesa and a message of 
support for the Polish workers in September 1980 
(translated in Benton (ed.) Wild lilies, poisonous 
weeds, 86-7). Shiyue Pinglun 71 (1982), 45-49,
reports that more than ten unofficial journals 
reported the initial success of Solidarity, while 
journals in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Taiyuan also 
expressed support for Solidarity, and the latter two 
and Zeren (Duty), the organ of the National 
Federation of Unofficial Journals formed in the 
autumn of 1980, reprinted Solidarity's '21 Demands' 
and 'Charter of Rights of the Polish workers'.
15 The urban reforms are often referred to as having 
begun in 1984, when the first sets of regulations on 
many reforms were issued, but a great deal of 
discussion and experimentation went on beforehand,
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concessions were being offered in the direction of greater 
participation in management, a more powerful workers' congress 
and greater union autonomy, even while the final suppression 
of the Democracy Wall Movement was taking place.
Designed to give workers more of a stake in their 
enterprises and to restore management legitimacy after the 
upheavals of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath, 
reforms in the direction of more democratic management were 
part of the overall programme of industrial reform and had 
their own economic rationale. But they also bore the 
hallmarks of Democracy Wall, and, going further back, of the 
Li Yizhe debate on democracy and the legal system. In article 
after article on the role of the unions and the workers' 
congress, for example, the focus is on establishing a 
transparent and inviolable framework of legal rights and 
responsibilities which the politically powerful would not be 
able to flout with impunity. Official promotion of democratic 
management and workers' participation is permeated with the 
language of the democracy movement16, and the influence of 
this political movement should not be disregarded when 
considering why a reform programme was introduced which aimed 
specifically at regaining workers' allegiance to the 
enterprise and to the official unions.
beginning at the end of the 1970s, and Guangdong was 
often in the forefront of these experiments.
16 See for example Gongren Ribao 18.11.80, 2, and
7.11.81, 1; Nanfang Ribao 9.2.80, 2 and 4; Beijing 
Review 23, 52 (29.12.80), 17. Indeed, Democracy 
Wall activists complained bitterly that reformist 
cadres had already taken up and implemented many of 
their ideas as well as their discourse, arguing that 
this proved they were not dangerous dissidents, but 
patriotic socialists concerned with the fate of 
their country and putting forward suggestions for 
improvement (see the article 'Jiujing shei weifa? 
[Who are the real law-breakers?]' from Guangzhou's 
Ziyou Tan, reprinted in Shiyue Pinglun 55 (1981), 
20-21).
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In this section, then, we will first of all look at the 
Democracy Wall Movement itself with reference to workers, 
examining both the background of worker discontent and 
grievances which the movement's publications helped to expose, 
and the ideas of some of the worker-activists involved in the 
movement. We will then go on to look at proposed and actual 
reforms in the workplace in the direction of democratic 
management and a more independent union organization, relating 
these developments both to the pressure of the Democracy Wall 
Movement and to the
economic reforms. Aspects of the reforms of the 1980s, such 
as the role of the unions and the workers' congress, will be 
compared with their 1950s predecessors, and the reasons why 
they failed to live up to early expectations will be examined. 
Finally, we will try to determine to what extent these events 
of 1978-81 can be regarded as a precedent for worker 
involvement in the 1989 Democracy Movement.
Once again the focus will be on Guangzhou, despite the 
fact that the Democracy Wall Movement there is generally 
judged to have been comparatively weak in its early stages. 
It has been noted that the Guangzhou movement did not produce 
a Wei Jingsheng or a Fu Yuehua, being dominated instead by 
Marxists who pledged support to the Four Modernizations and, 
for the most part, to the CCP under Deng.17 But Guangzhou did 
have such prominent names as Wang Xizhe, He Qiu and Liu 
Guokai, and the journal Renmin zhi Sheng was widely known and 
read outside the south of China. Moreover, the latter two 
activists were both workers, and the three journals they were 
involved in producing had a largely working-class audience as 
well, which makes them highly relevant to this study. 
Guangzhou has also been in the forefront of the economic 
reforms, which means that the impact of measures which have 
greatly affected workers' lives has often been felt there 
first.
17 Rosen, 'Guangzhou's Democracy Movement', 12.
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However, while continuing to focus on this city, this 
section will also draw on case studies and the work of 
Democracy Wall activists elsewhere in China. Much of the 
attention given to the movement outside China and also within 
it was focused on Beijing, and consequently the capital's 
unofficial journals, demonstrations, election campaigns etc. 
tend to dominate both the secondary literature and the primary 
material which has found its way out of the country. Although 
Guangzhou's proximity to Hong Kong meant that a great deal of 
material published in Renmin zhi Sheng, Renmin zhi Lu, and 
Zlyou Tan reappeared in various Hong Kong magazines, the 
pieces reproduced tended to be of a particular type. They 
were mostly concerned either with 'high' politics, such as 
evaluations of Mao and prescriptions of future political 
systems for China, or with the actual workings of the 
movement, such as the struggle to legalize and to gain legal 
guarantees of freedom of publication, and reports of arrests, 
trials and sentencing of activists. Much less was reprinted 
on questions of workers' low living standards, even though the 
main Guangzhou journals covered this extensively. 
Consequently evidence to support the conclusions of this 
section is drawn from cities other than Guangzhou more 
frequently than was the case in previous sections.
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Democracy Wall
Background: the 'April Fifth Movement' of 197618
The Democracy Wall Movement began in mid-November 1978 in 
Beijing with the posting of large numbers of big-character 
posters on the wall in Xidan, to the west of Tiananmen Square, 
which gave the movement its name.19 As well as posters, 
unofficial journals soon began circulating in Beijing and in
18 The demonstrations in late March and early April 
1976, which included the well-known Tiananmen 
Incident in Beijing, were referred to by many 
Democracy Wall activists as the April 5 Movement. 
This term has the merit of not implying any
geographical limitation of the movement to the 
capital alone. On the movement in other cities, see 
Philip Williams, 'Some provincial precursors of 
popular dissent movements in Beijing', China 
Infomnation 6, 1 (Slimmer 1991), 1-9; Keith Forster, 
'The 1976 Ch'ing-ming Incident in Hangchow', Issues 
and Studies 22, 4 (April 1986), 13-33; Sebastian 
Heilmann, Nanking 1976: Spontane Massenbewegung im 
Gefolge der Kulturrevolution, and 'The social
context of mobilization in China: Factions, work 
units, and activists during the April Fifth
Movement', China Information 8, 3 (Winter 1993-4), 
1-19. Williams identifies a distinct causal 
relationship between certain provincial protest 
movements and the Tiananmen Incident (8).
On the significance of the Tiananmen Incident itself 
and the relevance of feeling for or against Zhou 
Enlai, see Xiao Ping, 'The rise and decline of 
China's Democracy Movement', originally published in 
the underground journal Yecao (Weeds) in 1983, and 
translated in Issues and Studies 22, 1 (January
1986), 157-8.
19 On the development of the Democracy Wall Movement 
and the unofficial publications, see among others 
Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Nall, 1-38; Mab Huang and 
James D Seymour, 'Introduction', in Seymour (ed.) 
The fifth modernization - China's human rights 
movement, 1978-1979} Roger Garside, Coming alive: 
China after Mao; Robin Munro, 'China's Democracy 
Movement: A midwinter spring', Survey 28, 2 (Summer 
1984), 70-98; Susan Shirk, 'Going against the Tide: 
Political dissent in China', Survey 24, 1 (Winter
1979), 82-114.
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other cities all over China, including Guangzhou, Changsha, 
Wuhan, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Qingdao, Harbin, Shanghai, Nanjing, 
Guiyang and Kunming20. The first wave of posters was sparked 
off by the November 16 decision to reverse the verdict on the 
Tiananmen Incident of 1976? this followed hard upon reversals 
of verdicts on the April Fifth Movements in other cities.21 
These protests of March and April 1976 had been declared 
counter-revolutionary at the time, while the Gang of Four were 
still in power, and Mao's successor Hua Guofeng maintained 
this verdict until the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee (October-December 1978). The November 1522 
declaration that the Tiananmen Incident had in fact been a 
revolutionary act by the masses against the Gang of Four, 
together with other decisions taken at this time regarding 
economic policy and the need for reform, marked the ascendancy 
of Deng Xiaoping and the eclipse of Hua Guofeng and the 
'whateverists' in the post-Mao competition for power.
There are clearly close connections in many respects 
between the April Fifth Movement and Democracy Wall, with the 
latter originating from demands for the rehabilitation of 
those involved in the former, and with the first wave of 
posters in autumn 1978 being sparked off by the reversal of 
verdicts on 1976. The campaign for recognition of the April 
Fifth Movement as revolutionary went on throughout the two and 
a half years separating the two movements, with posters 
appearing on the anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident (April 
5) and the anniversary of Zhou Enlai's death (January 8) in
20 Chen Ruoxi provides an extensive list of unofficial 
publications, including university journals, in 
Democracy Wall, 107-115.
21 The cities were Nanjing, Hangzhou and Zhengzhou; 
Garside, Coming Alive, 200-201.
22 Announced in Renmin Ribao the following day.
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both 1977 and 1978.23 Democracy Wall was often described by 
its participants as a continuation of April Fifth24. So 
before going on to the Democracy Wall Movement itself, we must 
first look at the events of spring 1976, in which many young 
workers were also involved.
The 1976 protests, beginning in the provinces and 
culminating in the Tiananmen Incident, were sparked off by the 
death of Zhou Enlai in January of that year. Activists in a 
number of Chinese cities, who were often in touch with one 
another and aware of what was happening elsewhere in the 
country, began planning unofficial gatherings in memory of 
Zhou which were to take place on April 5 (Qing Ming, the 
traditional day for remembering the dead in China)25. The 
political overtones of tributes to Zhou were very clear, not 
least to the Gang of Four; praise for Zhou was an implicit 
attack on them and their policies. The Gang's control over 
the media, especially in Shanghai, enabled them to mount coded 
and eventually overt attacks of their own on Zhou's memory in 
the months after his death, and it was in part these attacks 
which inflamed public opinion in some cities to the point 
where open criticism of the Gang flourished in the form of 
big-character posters and speeches on the streets.
Nanjing was the scene of one of the most outspoken 
protests against the Gang beginning in mid-March 19 7626.
23 The 1976 movement began as a series of marches and 
the posting of poems and other posters in honour of 
Zhou, all of course with very clear political 
overtones of hostility to the Gang of Four.
24 See the comments by various activists in Seymour 
(ed.) The fifth modernization, 7; 77; 83; 155; 267.
25 See Williams, 'Provincial precursors', 2. In fact, 
most of the wreaths in Tiananmen Square were laid on 
April 4, which was a Sunday. It was the removal of 
these tributes from the Square which prompted the 
violent unrest of the following day.
26 Ibid., 2.
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Heilmann notes that recent Chinese accounts of the April Fifth 
Movement concur that the movement began in Nanjing and was 
then taken up in Beijing27; one of the earliest slogans to 
appear in Tiananmen Square read: 'We are determined to support 
the Nanjing people in their revolutionary struggle'28. News 
of events in Nanjing came not through the official media, but 
from informal contacts between activists and also via the 
Cultural Revolution method of painting slogans or sticking 
posters on trains, especially those going to Beijing. These 
'mobile billboards' from the movement in Nanjing first began 
arriving in Beijing on March 31, and according to Heilmann, in 
the first few days of April so many arrived that station 
workers were unable to keep up with the cleaning of them29. 
Trains similarly painted with slogans arrived in Shanghai, the 
Gang's stronghold, from Hangzhou, scene of a great deal of 
activity in 1976, and of course the location of serious
27 Heilmann, Nanking 1976, 69.
28 Louie and Louie, 'The role of Nanjing University in
the Nanjing Incident', China Quarterly 86 (June 
1981), 332-348, quoted in Williams, 'Provincial
precursors', 2. Philip Williams notes a parallel 
with the 1989 Democracy Movement, when outrage at 
the news of the massacre in Beijing spurred on the 
protests in other cities ('Provincial precursors', 
3). Rumours of the violent suppression of the 
Nanjing protests were somewhat exaggerated, but they 
did have an effect on the development of the 
movement in Beijing. (The directive circulated to 
Party committees condemning the Nanjing protests 
also had the unintended effect of publicizing the 
existence of these protests (Heilmann, Nanking 1976, 
72-3)). In contrast to the relatively mild 
aftermath of the movement in Nanjing, Chen Ruoxi 
describes the Tiananmen Incident itself as 'a 
bloodbath, with tens of thousands killed or injured, 
and thousands branded as counterrevolutionaries and 
jailed' (Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 5-6). Heilmann 
gives figures of 3-4,000 arrests out of 40-50,000 
people involved in the movement in Beijing who were 
investigated as possible 'class enemies', and of 
between 200 and 400 executed, whereas in Nanjing 
only a few dozen arrests were made (Heilmann, 
Nanking 1976, 80).
29 Heilmann, Nanking 1976, 70-2.
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industrial unrest the previous year which was put down by the 
PLA.30
Other cities in which major 'April Fifth Incidents' took 
place included Taiyuan, Zhengzhou, Wuhan and Xi'an31, and in 
most of these cases, as in the Tiananmen Incident itself, the 
backbone of the movement consisted of young workers. The 
movement in Nanjing was slightly different in this respect, as 
it originated with students but had a great deal of worker 
support. Beijing students were in some cases physically 
prevented from joining memorial or protest marches, as campus 
authorities locked the gates and patrolled the grounds during 
the 'Tiananmen Incident'.32 The young workers and students 
who did take part in the movement had in common above all 
their recent political experiences in the Cultural Revolution; 
many were also familiar with the widely-circulated Li Yizhe 
tract 'On socialist democracy and the legal system'33. Many
30 Forster, 'The 1976 Ch'ing-ming Incident in
Hangchow', 22.
31 See Heilmann, Nanking 1976, 74, 88; Forster, 'The
1976 Ch'ing-ming Incident in Hangchow', 17; 
Williams, 'Provincial precursors', 2.
32 Heilmann, Nanking 1976, 88, note 3. This is
reminiscent of tactics used to prevent students from 
joining workers' protests in Gdansk and Gdynia in 
December 1970, as noted by Roman Laba (The Roots of 
Solidarity, 30). However, the key measure there was 
not just shutting students into their classrooms, 
but the brainwave of offering them an early start to 
their Christmas holidays. In both cases there was 
probably a certain amount of student apathy at work, 
and perhaps also an awareness of the risks of
political activism.
33 Williams, 'Provincial precursors', 3; Zi Chuan, 'Li 
Yizhe yu wo', Beidou 6 (1.11.77), 41. But see also 
Rosen's comments in 'Guangzhou's Democracy Movement 
in Cultural Revolution perspective', China Quarterly 
101 (March 1988), 8. Even if the numbers who had 
actually read a copy of the poster were small, 
discussion of the case was undoubtedly widespread, 
and in Guangdong in particular, Li Yizhe members 
seem to have been allowed on occasion to use 
'struggle sessions' organized to condemn them to
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were former Red Guards (often Rebels, according to 
Heilmann34); and many went on to be active in the Democracy 
Wall Movement from 1978.
Not surprisingly, then, the April Fifth Movement shows a 
high degree of continuity with Cultural Revolution ideas and 
forms of action. But since the 1978 reversal of verdicts, the 
Tiananmen Incident in particular has been presented by the 
Deng regime as a spontaneous mass act in support of the late 
Zhou and his protege Deng, and against the Gang of Four (and 
implicitly against Mao as well); in other words, it has been 
portrayed as a popular rejection of the Cultural Revolution35. 
The posters of the April Fifth Movement clearly showed deep 
popular hostility towards the Gang of Four36 and corresponding 
respect and support for the former 'capitalist roaders', but 
as was noted in the last section, it is as well to beware of 
'two-line struggle' explanations of popular support for one 
leader or another. While those involved in these high-level 
power struggles have a vested interest in claiming the maximum 
possible mass support for themselves, the social forces which 
helped to generate mass participation in the Cultural 
Revolution and the April Fifth Movement are more complicated 
than the 'two-line struggle' model will allow.
As has already been noted, participants in the April
propagate their views further, even before their 
well-publicized official rehabilitation early in 
1979 (see Chan, Rosen and Unger, On socialist 
democracy and the Chinese legal system: The Li Yizhe 
debates, 13-14 and 109-114).
34 Heilmann, Nanking 1976, 88.
35 This of course goes back to the question of whether 
the term 'Cultural Revolution' refers to the Gang of 
Four's period in power (1969-76), or to what we have 
been referring to as the 'Cultural Revolution 
proper', the 1966-9 period when the beginnings of a 
genuine mass movement were discernible.
36 See for example Heilmann, Nanking 1976, 63 (Zhang 
Chunqiao was named on several posters in Nanjing).
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Fifth Movement, whether young workers or students, had in 
common a background of Cultural Revolution activism and had 
been influenced by the 1974 Li Yizhe poster. So we can trace 
a course of development from Red Guard activity in which Zhou 
and Deng were the capitalist roaders and therefore the enemy, 
via the Li Yizhe tract with its denunciation of the new 
bureaucratic rulers of China and 'CCP ultraleftism and 
autocratic lawlessness'37, which was aimed at the Gang of Four 
in particular, to 1976, when demonstrators attacked the Gang 
of Four, the victors in the Cultural Revolution so far as the 
high-level power struggle was concerned, and praised Zhou and 
Deng.
An explanation for this apparent 180-degree turn on the 
part of the young activists is offered by Xiao Pings
At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution the 
rebels chose Mao's temporary advocacy of rebellion 
and opposition to the bureaucracy rather than Chou's 
royalism and the status quo. In April 1976, 
comparing the Gang of Four's extreme leftism and 
autocracy with Chou's, people supported and longed 
for the latter. Pro- or anti-Chou, behind their 
outward emotions, these people were all fighting 
against the autocracy of the privileged bureaucratic 
class.38
Wang Xizhe (one of the four members of the Li Yizhe group) 
made a similar point when he described the Tiananmen Incident, 
as
a spontaneous opinion poll ... an authentic people's 
election... This was the brave attempt of the 
people to recapture the Party and the state that had
37 Williams, 'Provincial precursors', 3.
38 Xiao Ping, 'Rise and decline', 162.
343
been increasingly alienated from them ... it was not 
an accident resulting from the usurpation of power 
by the Gang of Four. It was only an exposure and 
verification for society ... of our Party's 
alienation from the people.39
In other words, the people had acted against not only the Gang 
of Four but against the broader problem of their lack of 
control over the Party which ruled in their name, the lack of 
control which had left them unable to "recall' the Gang 
themselves. In doing so, the participants in the April Fifth 
Movement had issued a warning to those in the Party who did 
not support the Gang, making them fully aware of the need for 
radical change in the Party's relationship with the people 
before it was too late.
Democracy Wall
There is considerable evidence, then, that the April 
Fifth Movement was directed not just at the Gang of Four 
themselves, but more broadly at a Party elite which was a law 
unto itself, and which enjoyed not only a monopoly of 
political power but also considerable material privileges. 
Democracy Wall activists saw themselves as carrying on the 
process begun by April Fifth, described it variously as "a 
human rights movement'40 and "a revolutionary movement against 
autocracy and dictatorship'41. The violent suppression of the
39 Wang Xizhe, "Strive for the class dictatorship of 
the proletariat', translated in Chan, Rosen and 
Unger (eds.), On socialist democracy and the Chinese 
Legal System, 148.
40 Declaration of the China Human Rights League, 
Beijing, January 1979, in Seymour (ed.) The fifth 
modernization, 83.
41 As in the article "Democracy and national 
construction', from the unofficial journal Democracy 
and Modernity, and Li Jiahua's commentary on Huang
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Tiananmen Incident, in particular, was identified as evidence 
that the Chinese people still did not
enjoy 'even the most rudimentary form of democracy and human 
rights'42, thus underlining the necessity of a movement such 
as Democracy Wall, a movement which aimed at establishing 
democracy and legal protection of citizens' rights.
Human rights and democracy were not the only important 
issues discussed in the Democracy Wall Movement's writings, 
however. In fact, human rights soon proved to be a 
problematic topic, partly because it was linked in many 
people's minds with foreign influences: the recent Helsinki 
Accords, the Carter presidency, the activities of Charter 77 
in Czechoslovakia, and so on.43 For this reason, some groups 
preferred the term 'citizens' rights', emphasizing that these 
were rights already enshrined in the constitution, and 
signalling their intention to keep the movement 'domestic and 
legal, unrelated to and uninfluenced by any foreigners.'44 
Particularly after the arrests in 1979 of Fu Yuehua and Wei 
Jingsheng, two activists who had been particularly outspoken 
on the topic, 'human rights subsequently were significantly 
downplayed in the journals.'45 But legal reform, equality 
before the law, and freedom of speech, publication and 
organization continued to be a strong theme; all of these 
issues were of course vital to the unofficial journals' 
continued existence.
Xiang's poem 'No, you have not died', both
translated in ibid., 155 and 267.
42 Li Jiahua's commentary, ibid., 267.
43 See for example the interview with Xu Wenli (co­
founder, with Liu Qing, of Siwu Luntan) first
published in Le Monde 6.2.80; excerpts translated in 
Benton (ed.) Wild lilies, poisonous weeds, 51-55.
44 Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 70. Chen refers 
specifically to the April Fifth Forum group, of 
which Xu Wenli was a member.
45 Ibid., 73.
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Many other issues continued to be raised in Democracy 
Wall's unofficial journals, including subjects which were of 
great relevance to workers, such as economic conditions, 
living standards, and industrial organization and management. 
That these concerns were given so much space in many of the 
journals, including Guangzhou's Renmin zhi Sheng, shows that 
the activist minority had a great deal in common with the 
industrial workforce as a whole, which at this time was 
frequently involved in disputes and protests over these 
issues. As was the case in previous periods of unrest, many 
disputes, while often sparked off by a specific grievance over 
wages or conditions, had definite political overtones and 
tended to develop into a confrontation between the Party 
authorities on the one hand, and on the other, workers who 
felt exploited by the privileged officials who were supposed 
to be their ' humble servants', and who were now more and more 
prepared to organize themselves in defence of their rights. 
The next section deals with the various types of economic and 
political issue which most directly concerned workers in more 
detail•
Concerns of Democracy Wall
Part of the reason for the widespread opposition to the 
Gang of Four displayed through much of urban China in the 
April Fifth Movement was the state of the economy after seven 
years of their stewardship. Stagnating production and a 
prolonged wage freeze formed the economic backdrop to the 1976 
protests: in the case of Nanjing, discontent was fuelled by 
rumours from Shanghai, the main centre of influence of the 
Gang of Four, about wage rises for the workers of that city at 
a time when the Gang were still preaching the virtues of 
egalitarianism and frugality to all other workers.46 Although 
it was political issues, notably the danger of a 'left'
46 See Heilmann, Nanking 1976, 44, and 62-63.
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successor to Mao, which dominated the April Fifth protests, we 
should note that the Four Modernizations programme had already 
been announced (in 1975), and was closely associated with Zhou 
and Deng. Thus the question of the future economic direction 
of the country and the prospect for an improvement in 
standards of living were integral to the movement's concerns.
Economic problems, both macro and micro, were also a 
concern of Democracy Wall, with many contributing to the 
debate on how reform should proceed. These economic questions 
were, of course, closely bound up with the political issues of 
democracy, representation and accountability, as is shown by 
the way in which the question of economic reform was tackled 
in the unofficial journals of the Democracy Wall movement. 
This link was also acknowledged initially in Deng's programme 
of economic reforms launched late in 1978, although there were 
variations over time in the extent to which the Party 
concurred with Democracy Wall activists' assertion that 
economic development was dependent on democratization and 
effective public supervision of government.47
Workers' grievances: Living standards, pay and welfare
The economic problems which were discussed in many 
Democracy Wall publications can be divided into two broad 
categories: popular standards of living, and questions
relating to the management of work units and industrial 
organization. Taking discussions of living standards first, 
we find particular attention being paid to the problem of 
urban housing shortages. The extremely cramped living 
conditions of many households were commonly contrasted with 
the building by cadres of comparatively luxurious dwellings 
for themselves and their relatives. This shows that the issue
47 See Stanley Rosen's comments on democracy as a means 
and as an end in itself, in 'Guangzhou's Democracy 
Movement', 9-10.
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of cadre privilege had not gone away and that, as in the mid- 
1950s when workers' housing was also a controversial political 
and economic issue, it was perceived inequality and inequity 
rather than poor housing per se that was the real issue.
One difference between the Hundred Flowers period and the 
late 1970s, however, was that China's overall state of 
underdevelopment was now being called into question by young 
people who looked at what had been achieved by thirty years of 
'building socialism' and were distinctly unimpressed.40 
Unfavourable comparisons of China with the capitalist West 
seem to have been fairly common during Democracy Wall and 
later in the 1980s, although this did not mean that activists 
were uncritical of the West either. But doubts clearly 
existed about the 'superiority of socialism' and specifically 
about workers' position in society, since they were supposed 
to be 'the masters', yet in most cases had a very low standard 
of living. Questions along these lines required the 
authorities to demonstrate the advantages workers enjoyed 
under socialism, especially the right to participate in 
management and to elect democratically some of the enterprise 
leadership. These comparisons and criticisms of China from 
the point of view of workers' standard of living therefore 
helped to increase pressure for a real democratization of 
management, as well as for more obvious measures like price 
stabilization and improved welfare. More will be said about 
this later.
The inadequate living space of many workers' households 
in a Beijing textile plant was exposed in an article reprinted
48 See the reported comments of a school student in 
Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 75. Many articles 
appeared in the official press during Democracy Wall 
attempting to refute suggestions that workers were 
better off under capitalism; see for example Gongren 
Ribao 27.3.79, 1; Nanfang Ribao 9.5.79, 3; 15.5.81, 
1; 20.5.81, 1; Hongqi 4 (February 1981), 45-8;
Renmin Ribao 27.10.83, 2-4.
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in Beijing zhi Chun in June 197949, and the housing shortage 
was the topic of many other items in the same journal.50 
Qingdao's Lilun Qi claimed that since the fall of the Gang of 
Four, it had become common practice for the 'red bigwigs' to 
build luxurious properties for themselves and their families, 
even in a China where the economy was 'on the verge of 
collapse' and ordinary people were suffering from a shortage 
of housing.51 The poem by Ye Wenfu, 'General, you cannot do 
this I ', was inspired by a particular case of abuse of 
privilege to obtain luxury housing, that of a high-ranking PLA 
officer alleged to have ordered a kindergarten to be 
demolished to make way for his new mansion.52 Given that so 
many items in the unofficial journals dwelt on cadre 
privilege, corruption and 'going through the back door' (zou 
houmen), it is interesting to note that the popular appeal of 
such attacks predated Democracy Wall by some years. A 
campaign against such practices had been taken up by the 
national and regional press in January 1974 and proved 
enormously popular, but was brought to an end after only a
49 Wei Minqing, 'Tamen yaoqiu xiuxi de quanli [They
demand the right to rest]', originally published in 
Qiushi (Autumn Fruit), version in Beijing zhi Chun 
6 (17.6.79), 27-9, reprinted in Widor (ed.)
Documents, 399-403.
50 See for example the poem by 'a revolutionary 
citizen', 'Beijing baixing shao zhufang [The 
ordinary people of Beijing lack housing]', in 
Beijing zhi Chun 1 (8.1.79), reprinted in ibid., 
123; 'Zhangguan zhu loutang, xiaomin qiang zhufang] 
Bosses and officials live in storeyed houses, while 
the little people compete for any accommodation]', 
in Beijing zhi Chun 1 (10.8.79), 10, reprinted in 
ibid., 446-7.
51 'Guanliao tequan jieji tongzhi de sangzhong [Death 
knell for the rule of the bureaucratic privileged 
class]', Lilun Qi (February 1981), reprinted in 
Shiyue Pinglun 53-4 (1981), 35, and translated in 
the same issue, 94-5.
52 Originally published in Shikan (Poetry) in August 
1979, translated in Helen Siu and Zelda Stern (eds.) 
Mao's Harvest: Voices from China's new generation, 
158-165).
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month ostensibly because it was interfering with the 'pi Lin - 
pi Kong' campaign also underway at that time. Heilmann notes 
widespread displeasure at the abrupt halt called to this 
genuinely popular movement to expose and criticise cadres' 
corrupt use of connections.53
In Guangzhou, the seriousness of the problem of official 
abuse of power in the building or allocation of housing was 
confirmed by official newspaper reports on various cases which 
began to appear from late 1980.54 Corruption cases involving 
housing were often said to be a particular cause of worker 
dissatisfaction with management and the higher levels of 
bureaucracy, and (corrupt) mishandling of housing allocation 
was sometimes mentioned as the issue which sparked off a 
strike in this period of relatively frequent industrial 
unrest.55 The extent of concern about cadre abuse of power 
in the enterprise can be judged from a 1982 Nan fang Ribao 
article praising an enterprise where the workers' congress had 
been put in charge of the sensitive tasks of housing 
allocation and the recruitment of employees' offspring to 
vacancies in the plant. It is clearly implied in this account 
that this had the effect of preventing abuses of power which 
were otherwise extremely common; it was specifically noted 
that of fifty young people who had so far been given jobs, 
most were the offspring of shop-floor workers, and none were 
scions of 'leadership' families.56
The promotion of material incentives from the end of 1978 
and discussion of welfare reform also caused concern among
53 Heilmann, Nanking 1976, 32-3.
54 See for example Nan fang Ribao 9.2.80, 2 and 4;
6.4.81, 1; 5.10.81, 1; Guangzhou Ribao 21.1.84, 1; 
29.1.84, 1; 3.7.84, 1 and 2.
55 See for example Xinhua News Agency 28.4.81, in SWB~
FE 6715/BII/5; China Daily 8.10.81, 3, in FBIS
9.10.81, QI.
56 Nanfang Ribao 15.4.82, 2.
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many workers, and these concerns were reflected in the 
unofficial journals. Bonuses were a particular bone of 
contention. These payments were intended to break the 
egalitarian, 'eating from one big pot' mentality among the 
industrial workforce by rewarding workers individually for 
their performance under the principle of 'more pay for more 
work'. In fact, in the short term at least, the use of 
individual performance-related bonuses proved singularly 
unsuccessful in ending wage egalitarianism. Susan Shirk has 
noted that the awarding of bonuses by workers themselves in 
small-group 'evaluation and comparison' sessions resulted in 
a strongly egalitarian distribution of the extra money. 
Measures to combat this seem to have been easily circumvented 
by such means as informal rotation systems, with workers 
taking turns to receive the highest bonuses, or simply by 
exerting pressure on those receiving high bonuses to share 
their good fortune with their workmates in the form of gifts 
or meals57.
Despite repeated assertions in the press that 'eating 
from the same big pot' was damaging to the interests of the 
state, the enterprise and the individual alike, and that 
egalitarianism was not equivalent to socialism58, these 
attitudes seem to have persisted. It is interesting to note 
that although the low-wage policy in force from the 1950s up 
until 1978 was itself a source of discontent, with the 
Cultural Revolution-era wage freezes a particular cause of 
complaint, there seems to have been little enthusiasm for 
widening income differentials in industry, with many workers 
instead favouring a relatively egalitarian distribution of a 
bigger 'cake'. The 'them and us' hostility towards cadres
57 Shirk, 'Recent Chinese labour policies and the 
transformation of industrial organization in China', 
China Quarterly 88 (December 1981), 585.
58 See for example Nanfang Ribao 9.10.79, 1; 21.6.81, 
1; 21.8.81, 1; Guangzhou Ribao 14.5.84, 3; 26.8.84, 
1.
351
characteristic of the Cultural Revolution seems to have 
lingered on in some respects, with some workers emphasizing 
that all of them 'made a contribution to socialism' and 
'created wealth' for society (and thus should be rewarded 
equally), while the cadres who were criticized for building 
themselves luxurious villas created nothing.59
This does not seem to have been a case of the cynical or 
subversive use of the regime's own rhetoric such as we saw in 
the late 1960s, but seems to reflect a genuine sense of the 
rightful place of the working class in society. Even after 
more than ten years of reform, workers active in Beijing's 
Gongzilian (Workers' Autonomous Federation) in 1989 were still 
claiming their status as 'the rightful masters of this 
nation'60, showing the persistence of these values despite the 
vast changes that had taken place in China's economy and 
society by the end of the 1980s. Similarly, when various 
Democracy Wall publications were under pressure from the 
authorities in Guangzhou, in their defence the editorial 
boards of both Renmin zhi Sheng and Ziyou Tan repeated in 
their official statements that all, or almost all, of them 
were 'permanently employed workers'61, or 'ideologically aware
59 See for example 'Guanliao tequan jieji tongzhi de 
sangzhong [Death knell for the rule of the 
bureaucratic privileged class]', by the editorial 
committee of the Qingdao journal Lilun Qi (February 
1981), reprinted in Shiyue Pinglun 53-4 (1981), 35? 
'Zhongguo gongrenjieji de xin juexing [The new 
awakening of the Chinese working class]', in the 
Taiyuan unofficial journal Feng fan (n.d.), reprinted 
in Shiyue Pinglun 51 (1981), 11.
60 Gongzilian leaflet, quoted in Andrew Walder and Gong 
Xiaoxia, 'Workers in the Tiananmen protests: The 
politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous 
Federation', Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 
29 (January 1993), 12.
61 Statement by the editorial board of Renmin zhi Sheng 
(edited by Liu Guokai), reprinted in Shiyue Pinglun 
46 (1980), 12. All of the board were said to be 
permanent workers.
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young factory workers'62, emphasizing their status in Chinese 
society and their right, as workers, to participate in 
decision-making on the future of that society*
The phenomenon of different pay for the same work, a 
major cause of dissatisfaction in the 1950s when it led to the 
widespread adoption of the 'work according to pay' attitude 
among disgruntled workers, also gave rise to discontent in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The economic reforms, by giving 
some enterprises more autonomy to retain and dispose of some 
of their profits and set wages and bonuses as they saw fit, 
seem to have exacerbated the problem. In some cases the 
objection was to disparities in pay between workers at 
different plants, where workers whose enterprise produced a 
low-profit product would see their pay rapidly falling behind 
workers at another plant with a high value-added output63. 
In other cases, bonuses within an enterprise would depend on 
the achievement of norms set for particular work-processes, 
and it soon became apparent that some workers were unjustly 
receiving lower bonuses than their colleagues simply because 
of the specific work-process in which they were engaged, not 
because they were working less hard or contributing less64. 
Complaints about the unfair distribution of pay and bonuses 
appeared in a regular 'Workers' Forum' column in the Guangzhou 
unofficial journal Renmin zhi Sheng, as did many general items 
on local living standards, housing problems, prices and 
workers' standard of living.65
Looking ahead ten years or so, we find that 'unfair
62 Statement by the editorial board of Ziyou Tan
(edited by He Qiu), reprinted in Shiyue Pinglun 55
(1981), 21. The statement was signed by five
members identifying themselves as workers and two 
listed as students.
63 Nanfang Ribao 25.4.80, 1.
64 Nanfang Ribao 28.4.80, 1.
65 See Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 57 and 76.
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distribution' within enterprises, whether this meant a lack of 
transparency and accountability in deciding on bonuses, or
sharp disparities between the pay and bonuses of managers and
those of rank-and-file workers, continued to be a source of 
discontent within the workforce. Between 1989 and 1991, it 
was frequently cited as a cause of strikes (or 'unexpected 
events', as the ACFTU euphemistically termed them), and the 
official unions called for steps to be taken to correct it.66
In many respects early reform measures and the debate
about future changes seemed to pose a threat to workers' job
security and to the welfare benefits they had hitherto 
enjoyed. Articles in the official press suggested that far 
too much was expected of enterprises, particularly smaller 
ones, in the form of welfare services, and that the provision 
of these services was an 'irrational burden' detracting from 
the enterprise's principle economic purpose and its 
efficiency.67 Condemnations of 'eating from one big pot' were 
soon joined, too, by speculation that the 'iron rice-bowl' of 
job security might become untenable in the new economic 
circumstances. Moves in this direction were, naturally, 
extremely unpopular among workers, especially when the system 
of lifetime tenure for cadres (the 'iron armchair') was still 
in place.68 Many Democracy Wall activists saw the latter as 
a far more serious problem, an obstacle to democratic
66 See Gongren Ribao 25.7.89, in Gongren Zuzhi yu
Huodong (Workers' Organization and Activities) 4 
(1989), 44-45. Gonghui Xinxi (Union News), a
fortnightly internal bulletin of the ACFTU, contains 
brief reports on various outbreaks of industrial 
unrest in these years. Discontent and disputes due 
to unfair distribution are mentioned in the 
following issues, among others: 21 (1.11.90), 7-10; 
6 (15.3.91), 14-16.
67 Nanfang Ribao 10.1.79, 3.
68 Renmin zhi Sheng 12-13 (December 1979), quoted in 
Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 77.
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accountability in the workplace as well as in government.69
These, then, were the major economic grievances of 
workers aired in the unofficial journals of Democracy Wall. 
To the mid-1950s concerns of housing, welfare, and bonuses had 
been added a threat to job security, and also worries that 
rising incomes might be overtaken by inflation. Beijing zhi 
Chun published a list of prices of basic foodstuffs showing 
prices before and after 'adjustment' and percentage 
increases70, and in Guangzhou, Renmin zhi Sheng kept an eye 
on wage levels and prices of everyday necessities in its 
'Window on the world' section71. By the early 1980s, the view 
seems to have become widespread that many workers' standard of 
living had actually dropped since the implementation of Deng's 
reform programme at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central
69 Wang Xizhe, for example, pointed to the 'iron chair' 
as proof that a bureaucratic system existed in 
China, and called for the principles of the Paris 
Commune to be implemented, including the right to 
elect and, most importantly, to recall 
representatives (Interview with the Guangzhou 
unofficial journal Renmin zhi Lu (edited by He Qiu), 
reprinted in Shiyue Pinglun 39 (1979), 16-17). At 
a forum organized by the Guangdong Provincial 
Communist Youth League on 5 April 1979, Liu Guokai 
commented that cadres were complacent about ignoring 
the masses' views once more, now that talk of 
subjecting them to election had faded away; the 
possibility of facing democratic elections had 
improved their attitude for a time (see Qishi 
Niandai (June 1980), 54-6). In late 1980, at a time 
when official policy came closest to meeting the 
demands being put forward by Democracy Wall and by 
workers in general, Nanfang Ribao carried two 
articles on the system of lifetime tenure for 
cadres, accepting the need for reform in order to 
combat bureaucratism and recommending truly 
democratic elections as the best way of ensuring 
that cadres were responsible to the lower levels as 
well as the higher and did not become alienated from 
the masses (Nanfang Ribao 8.11.80, 2; 9.11.80, 1).
70 Beijing zhi Chun 4 (2.4.79), 26, reprinted in Widor 
(ed.) Documents, 299.
71 Quoted in Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 57.
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Committee, so much so that articles appeared in the official 
press attempting to refute this claim.
In a ' campaign to draw up detailed accounts', the 
authorities insisted that real wage increases had more than 
kept pace with rising prices (rising food prices were of 
course a knock-on effect of the agricultural reforms), and 
also pointed to some success in finding temporary work for the 
offspring of worker households, thus reducing the burden on 
the household budget.72 Whatever the truth of the matter, it 
is clear that many workers perceived their standard of living 
to have dropped, contrary to the promises made by the 
reformers in the leadership; in recent parlance, the 'feel­
good factor' was most definitely lacking. Inflation was of 
course one of the major concerns of the workers involved in 
the 1989 Democracy Movement, about which more will be said 
later. Party leaders must also have been aware of the fact 
that increases in food prices had sparked off the strikes in 
Poland both in December 1970 and in August 1980.73
In sum, then, it was not just obviously disadvantaged 
groups (such as the unemployed, rusticated youth illegally 
returned to the cities, or peasants come to the capital to 
seek redress for injustices and reduced to begging on the 
streets) who were concerned about their livelihood and had 
economic grievances for which the unofficial press of 
Democracy Wall provided an outlet. Ordinary workers' 
households were greatly concerned about present difficulties 
and threats to their livelihood in the future, and the many 
unofficial journals edited by workers (such as Renmin zhi 
Sheng and Renmin zhi Lu in Guangzhou) not surprisingly gave a 
great deal of space to their views.
72 Nanfang Ribao 3.5.82, 2.
73 Xinhua News Agency (18.12.80), in SWB/FE/66Q6/A2/1, 
reporting on Solidarity, mentions the role of meat 
price increases in sparking off the shipyard strike.
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Workers' grievances: Enterprise management
State of the unions
As was noted in the introduction to this section, there 
are many parallels to be drawn between sources of discontent 
in the mid-1950s and during the Democracy Wall Movement. This 
is particularly true if we look at the area of industrial 
organization and enterprise management. As in the Hundred 
Flowers era, the official trade unions were in crisis, with 
workers' faith in them at a very low ebb and even some 
suggestions that there was no point in their continuing to 
exist. In his address to the Ninth ACFTU Congress in October 
1978, Deng Xiaoping found it necessary to state that the 
official unions were 'no longer an unnecessary organization as 
some believed.'74 Workers described their official
representatives as 'sign-board unions'75 (i.e. unions in name 
only) who did nothing for them, did not represent their views 
(or even know what their views were), did not stand up to the 
Party Committee or management on their behalf, and did not 
even hold regular meetings in some cases.76
Given the extremely high level of dissatisfaction with 
the unions' performance, it is not surprising that there were 
a number of attempts by striking and protesting workers to 
form independent unions, especially once they had the example 
of Poland's Solidarity before them. Several outbreaks of 
industrial unrest in China in the early 1980s were reported to
74 Deng Xiaoping, 'Greeting the great task', Beijing 
Review 21, 42 (20.10.78), 7.
75 See various Xinhua News Agency reports in 
SWB/FE/6244/BII/14 (10.10.79), SWB/FE/6595/BII/l
(4.12.80).
76 See for example three articles in Gongren Ribao 
18.11.80, 2, in China Report: Economic Affairs 120
(16.3.81), 53-5.
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have culminated in a demand for free trade unions to be 
established77, including one in Taiyuan in 19 81.78 The 
dispute at the Taiyuan Iron and Steel works started as a 
protest by single workers living in at the plant (i.e. workers 
who, although married, lived away from their families in 
factory dormitories) over their living and working conditions. 
These could be construed as narrowly economic demands, but, as 
with the undeclared strike on the Guangzhou docks in 1957, for 
example, the dispute inevitably became a confrontation between 
the workers and the Party organization, with whom the real 
power in the enterprise still lay.
One of Taiyuan's unofficial journals, Feng fan, made clear 
the view within the movement that such spontaneous collective 
actions by workers signalled a challenge to the Party itself, 
since it showed that workers were aware of the need to 
organize themselves when their official representatives failed 
them:
They understand that if they want to change their 
wretched conditions, they cannot rely on any 
messiah, but must begin to organize themselves, to 
rely on their own strength, and to elect their own 
representatives to speak for them, and if at any 
time their elected representatives do not represent 
them properly, they will be recalled and another 
election held. This sort of demand on the part of 
the broad popular masses is the social basis for
77 See Wilson, 'Labor policy in China: Reform and
retrogression', Problems of Communism 39, 5
(September-October 1990), 54: Benton (ed.) Wild
lilies, poisonous weeds, 85; FBIS-CHI 29.1.81, PI,
20.2.81, HI, and 9.10.81, QI; SWB/FE/6175/B11/4-6; 
and note 8 above.
78 See Wilson, 'Labor policy in China', 54; FBIS-CHI
3.3.81, Rl. Reports on Taiyuan also appeared in, 
among others, the Washington Post (30.4.81), and the 
New York Times (5.3.81).
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China's democratic reforms.79
The journal's account also made it clear that the dispute was 
about the defence of workers' legal rights; this is a phrase 
which crops up continually in Democracy Wall writings , and it 
too gives political content to what might otherwise be classed 
as economic demands.
One of the demands of the workers concerned was to have 
their own special representatives on the workers' congress.80 
This shows that as things stood, despite two years or so of 
reform and the official promotion of the workers' congress, 
these workers still felt that it could not represent or defend 
their interests. In addition, we can see a natural 
progression from wanting separate representation on an 
officially-sanctioned body to deciding that it was necessary 
for workers to have their own, self-organized and autonomous 
unions if they were not to succumb to further exploitation and 
oppression. Fengfan explicitly linked contemporary workers' 
protests with a long line of struggles against exploitation 
going right back to the nineteenth century, and gave as the 
motive for the most recent outbreaks of unrest the following 
description of workers' situation:
Under the bureaucratic system, their glorious title 
of master bears no resemblance to their actual 
position of powerlessness; their standard of living 
bears no resemblance to that of the privileged 
bureaucrats; the improvement in their livelihood 
bears no relation to the development of the social
79 Part of Feng fan1 s account of the strike and its 
significance (The new awakening of the Chinese 
working class', in Shiyue Pinglun 51 (1981), 11) is 
translated in Benton (ed.) Wild lilies, poisonous 
weeds, 120-121. This quotation author's own
translation.
80 See Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 35-6.
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productive forces ...81
This account of the Taiyuan unrest makes no mention of 
any involvement of the official trade unions; only 'leadership 
cadres' and Party Committee members are mentioned. This 
probably indicates that workers didn't expect the official 
unions to help them in pressing what they saw as reasonable 
claims for improved conditions, but went straight to those in 
authority who did have some power in the enterprise. As in 
the 1950s, the official formula for dealing with workers' 
grievances was that if their demands were reasonable, they 
should be met; if they were justified but could not be met 
straight away, then the reasons should be explained to the 
workers concerned; and if they were not reasonable, then the 
workers should be told why they were not reasonable. But in 
this case, the reaction of enterprise leaders was immediate 
condemnation: the workers were accused of holding 'black
meetings' when they met together to discuss demands, and were 
accused of carrying out chuanlian when they visited each 
other, in an apparent attempt to paint them as Red Guard-type 
hooligans and supporters of the Gang of Four. Given that the 
approved channels for presenting demands and resolving 
disputes appeared not to be working at all, it is not 
surprising that self-organization began to occur. The backlog 
of economic grievances and widespread resentment at official 
privilege fuelled it, and Cultural Revolution experiences of 
organized action outside Party control provided a relevant 
precedent. But the influence of Solidarity, among ordinary 
workers as well as Democracy Wall activists82, was undoubtedly 
also extremely important in pushing Chinese workers to form 
their own, independent trade unions.
81 Feng fan, 'The new awakening of the Chinese working 
class', in Shiyue Pinglun 51 (1981), 11.
82 Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 35.
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Despite the reform effort of the early 1980s, the unions 
do not seem to have been able to make much progress in gaining 
workers' confidence and support. A survey conducted by the 
ACFTU in 1988 showed that less than 10% of the workers 
surveyed felt that the unions 'could speak for the workers and 
solve their problems'83. As more workers were affected by 
lay-offs from loss-making state enterprises, and as contract 
employment became more widespread, increasing insecurity, the 
unions' task became even more difficult. Internal ACFTU 
bulletins make explicit the unions' view that it was mainly 
falling standards of living and economic hardship that 
prompted industrial unrest (once the political upheaval of 
1989-91 in the socialist world had receded into the background 
in the early 1990s), and that the state-controlled unions, 
brought firmly back under Party control since their tentative 
support for the 1989 Democracy Movement, could therefore do 
very little to improve the situation, although they should try 
to help those in most need wherever possible.84
Masters and servants
Behind a large number of the criticisms raised in the 
unofficial publications and posters of Democracy Wall was one 
overriding question, a question which was at the centre of the 
three earlier confrontations between workers and the Party 
which we have examined in previous sections. This is the 
question as to whether, or to what extent, workers' 
theoretical status as masters of the enterprise and the 
leading class in society had actually been realized. It is 
this debate which is behind all arguments about the role of 
management, the enterprise Party Committee and the union, the 
powers and scope of the workers' congress, the possibility of
83 Chiang Chen-chang, 'The role of trade unions in 
mainland China', 88.
84 Gonghui Xinxi 18 (15.9.90), 8-9; 21 (1.11.90), 7-10; 
5 (1.3.91), 10-11; 6 (15.3.91), 14-16 and 21-22.
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self-management, democratic election of cadres, and the 
problems of public ownership.
The question of workers' status in the enterprise and in 
society was addressed more explicitly and more bluntly than 
ever before by Democracy Wall activists and by protesting 
workers. There are a number of reasons for this. One is the 
Cultural Revolution Rebel background of many in the movement: 
ideas of a new, exploiting ruling class emerging from China's 
post-revolution elite were not new to them. Thanks to 
discussion of the ideas of the Li Tizhe group and others, 
neither were systemic critiques of 'actually existing 
socialism' in China a completely new departure. With these 
earlier movements and ideas providing the foundations of the 
new movement, the way was open for criticism and protest to be 
taken further. There seems to have been a feeling in the late 
1970s, after Mao's death and the fall of the Gang of Four, 
that now nothing was sacred, and that there was an urgent need 
to say the previously unsayable and to expose the shortcomings 
in the way in which Chinese society and the economy were 
organized.65 Calls for a complete reassessment of the whole
85 Explicit or implied criticism of Mao was a feature 
many of Democracy Wall writings (see for example 
Wang Xizhe's 'Mao Zedong and the Cultural 
Revolution', originally published in the Guangzhou 
journal edited by Wang, Xueyou Tongxun (Learners' 
Bulletin), in November 1980, and translated in Chan, 
Rosen and Unger, On socialist democracy, 177-260). 
As is true of Democracy Wall in general, these 
attacks were initially useful to Deng Xiaoping and 
his 'reform' faction in the Party, as they 
undermined the legitimacy of Hua Guofeng, whose 
claim to lead China was based on the fact that he 
was Mao's personally anointed successor. But as the 
attacks went on , they began to eat away at the 
legitimacy of the CCP in general, and fuelled 
popular cynicism and disillusionment with socialism 
and the Party. Hence in March 1979, the 'four 
cardinal principles' of the socialist road, the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of 
the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, 
were promulgated in order to define certain limits 
which Democracy Wall activists should not cross. In 
June 1981, the question of a reassessment of Mao was
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history of CCP rule were now commonplace. With the 'Open 
Door' trade policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping, there was also 
more knowledge of the outside world, and this probably also 
contributed to a more critical attitude towards the 
achievements of the People's Republic thirty years on from 
liberation.86
Common themes in Democracy Wall writings were the lack of 
democratic rights enjoyed by workers in Chinese enterprises, 
which many writers saw as a cause of China's relatively poor 
economic performance in recent years, and the fact that, 
although 'the people' nominally owned all state-run industrial 
enterprises, in fact they had no control over their operations 
whatsoever. Instead, this control was in the hands of Party 
and management cadres. One wall-poster put up in Beijing in 
December 1978, in the early weeks of the movement, put this 
quite bluntly:
According to the concepts of Marxism-Leninism, the 
people should control the means of production. But 
ask yourselves, Chinese workers and peasants: Apart 
from the small wage which you receive each month, 
what do you control? What belongs to you? The 
answer is shameful: Others are your masters. In a 
socialist society, the product of labor should 
belong to the worker. But what do you get? Just 
enough so that you can continue to workl Higher 
salaries have not sufficed to compensate for soaring
officially settled, after much dispute within the 
Party, and the 'Decision on certain questions in 
Party history since the founding of the People's 
Republic' concluded that Mao's contributions to the 
revolution outweighed his later mistakes. This, 
however, failed to bring an end to discussion of 
Mao's status and contributions. See the discussion 
of the limits of 'de-Maoization' in Chen Ruoxi, 
Democracy Wall, 80-85.
86 See the interview with Xu Wenli cited above (note 
42), 55.
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prices, and our standard of living has not 
improved.87
Another article related the problem of actual control over the 
means of production to the dominance of the Party at all 
levels and to the system of lifetime tenure for cadres:
In our country, the means of production are not 
directly controlled by the people but are entrusted 
to people's representatives - administrative cadres 
at all levels. For this reason, the people cannot 
control the means of production unless they have 
control over the cadres. Since the 'system of 
posting according to grades' has rendered the people 
unable to supervise and control the cadres, the 
socialist economic base will be threatened if this 
old system is not gradually abolished. And, sooner 
or later, people's ownership will be turned into 
ownership by bureaucrats and emperors, and people 
will be enslaved again.88
The April Fifth Forum (a group which broadly supported the 
reformists in the Chinese leadership), like most Democracy 
Wall groups was generally in favour of the reforms then 
beginning to be implemented and supported the 'Four
87 This extract from a longer, five-page poster appears
as Document 37 in Seymour (ed.) The fifth
modernization, 161. Other extracts from the same 
poster appear as Document 28 (131), and Document 32 
(148). The poster was published in Die Welt and 
translated into English in Freedom at laaue (May- 
June 1979).
88 Lu Min, 'Zhubu feichu guanliao tizhi he jianli Bali
Gongshe shi de minzhu zhidu [Gradually do away with
the bureaucratic system and establish a Paris 
Commune-style democratic system]', Beijing zhi Chun 
1 (8.1.79), 17-37, and 2 (27.1.79), 13-16, reprinted 
in Widor (ed.) Documents, 105-109 and 202-206; 
translated in Seymour (ed.) The fifth modernization, 
72-77.
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Modernizations', but held the success of the reforms in 
industry to be conditional on democratization in enterprises. 
One of its early statements observed that in China, 'the power 
of the people is the most uneconomically utilized of all', and 
went on to describe the situation in Chinese industry thus:
If a small number of non-producers in our country 
control the production workers with regard to their 
personal files, wages and transfers, it will be 
impossible to expect the workers to surpass the 
productivity of labor attained under the capitalist 
system. It is precisely those who dislike others 
airing independent political views that are 
suppressing production workers from expressing their 
views on production, distribution and exchange. If 
this is so, laborers under socialism will only be 
expected to mind their own business as handicraft 
workers traditionally did in the past.89
Wei Jingsheng, in 'The fifth modernization', argued that 
the poor position of ordinary workers in Chinese society was 
not simply due to the backwardness of the productive forces; 
even if that were no longer the case, 'the questions of 
authority, of domination of distribution, and of
exploitation'90 would still arise. The question as to whether 
exploitation and oppression could exist under socialist public 
ownership was also specifically addressed in some of the 
unofficial journals. Hailanghua of Qingdao, noting that the 
question had hitherto been ruled out of bounds in the
'nominally socialist world', expressed the view that
89 Poster by Siwu Luntan 28.3.79, translated as April 
Fifth Forum, 'The state of the economy', in Seymour 
(ed.) The Fifth Modernization, 159-160.
90 Wei Jingsheng, 'The fifth modernization', Tanauo 
(Exploration, the journal edited by Wei), 1 
(December 1978), translated in Seymour (ed.), The 
fifth modernization, 51.
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exploitation and oppression could actually become worse under 
a system of bureaucratic, one-party rule as existed in China, 
as privilege could act as a form of capital.91
This theme within the Democracy Wall Movement provides 
evidence of a post-Cultural Revolution and post-Gang of Four 
diminution in Party legitimacy, and a corresponding increase 
in political and organizational self-confidence, most notably 
among the movement's activists, but also among workers and the 
public at large. It was specifically argued by some that 
workers (or the people in general) had now shown that they 
were ready to take over much more of the direct running of 
their enterprises and of wider economic and political systems 
as well. This they saw as the beginning of the process of the 
withering away of the Party and the state as predicted in 
Marxist theory. The negative example as to what might happen 
if the Party did not yield to popular demands in this area was 
the Soviet Union, while the positive example worthy of 
emulation was Yugoslavia, with its system of workers' self- 
management.
Wang Xizhe saw the Tiananmen Incident itself as evidence 
that a new generation of workers was ready to replace the 
Party's direct administrative leadership with its own. He 
noted that
91 Hailanghua 7 (26.8.80), reprinted in Shiyue Pinglun 
60 (1981), 34. The idea of 'privilege-capital' was 
developed by Chen Erjin in 'On proletarian- 
democratic revolution', translated and introduced by 
Robin Munro in China: Crossroads socialism, 18-19. 
Munro believes Chen Erjin to have been one of the 
editors of the Qingdao unofficial journal Lilun Qi, 
and to have written for it under the pen name of Lu 
Ji. That the article quoted above uses Chen's 
formulation of 'privilege-capital' is not surprising 
given that the two journals were produced in the 
same city, and it was common for Democracy Wall 
activists to contribute ideas and articles to 
journals other than their own. But since this 
particular article is attributed to the editorial 
board of Hailanghua, Chen may well also have been a 
member of the board at this time.
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The movement's vanguard and main force were mostly 
young workers. Isn't that like a huge signpost 
indicating that an entire generation of industrial 
workers has grown up with socialist consciousness 
and culture? When the proletarian enterprise was at 
its most dangerous moment, when the opportunistic 
politicians and theoreticians were frightened, 
trembling, and scared to talk, was it not they who 
ventured forth, defended the people's welfare, and 
expressed their great ability to manage society?92
He went on to propose a change in the old Anshan Constitution 
formula for workers' participation in management in the 
economic sphere and workers' participation in dictatorship in 
the political sphere, advocating instead
'direct democratic management by the workers.' The 
class dictatorship of the proletariat can have its 
firm material foundation only under conditions in 
which workers manage the means of production 
themselves directly and democratically. This was 
the aim of the Paris Commune, the aim of the October
92 Wang Xizhe, 'Wei wuchanjieji jiejizhuanzheng er nuli 
[Strive for the class dictatorship of the 
proletariat]', first printed in the Guangzhou 
unofficial journal Renmin zhi Sheng in September 
1979; reprinted in Hong Kong in Guanchajia 23 
(September 1979), 15; translated in Chan, Rosen and 
Unger (eds.) On socialist democracy, 154. In what 
appears to be a direct reply to an earlier draft of 
this piece, the Nanfang Ribao published an editorial 
on 5 April 1979 claiming CCP credit for the 
Tiananmen Incident, since the young workers and 
students involved had all grown up and been educated 
under CCP rule. In his final version, Wang's 
riposte to this is to point out that similar Party 
education had been provided to 'those who took part 
in the suppression of the April Fifth Movement and 
those comrades who relentlessly beat up others at 
Tiananmen' (On socialist democracy, 155; see also 
Rosen, 'Guangzhou's Democracy Movement', 17, note 
53).
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Revolution.93
The level of the industrial enterprise was seen by many 
as a suitable starting point for workers to take over direct, 
democratic management while the Party organization took a back 
seat:
It is necessary to give the workers genuine 
democratic rights and do away with the 
administrative leadership power of the basic-level 
Party organization in industrial enterprises ...
Since class struggle is withering now, the Party 
should also gradually wither away. This should 
first take place in the basic-level units of 
industrial enterprises.94
Another article by a Beijing worker argued similarly that 'if 
we want to have a system of democracy in politics, we must 
insist on a system of people's democracy in economic 
management.'95
Many writers were not only making direct connections 
between the low morale and poor performance of industrial 
workers and undemocratic organization in enterprises and in
93 Ibid., 156.
94 See for example Lu Min, 'Quxiao changkuang qiye
jiceng dang zuzhi de xingzheng lingdaoquan [Do away 
with the administrative power of the basic-level 
Party organization in industrial enterprises]', 
Beijing zhi Chun 2 (27.1.79), 17-19; reprinted in 
Widor (ed.) Documents, 171-174; translated in
Seymour (ed.) The fifth modernization, 163-167.
95 Han Zhixiong, 'Tantan jingji guanli minzhu yu 
zhengzhi minzhu [On democracy in economic management 
and political democracy]', Beijing zhi Chun 2 
(27.1.79), 1-2; reprinted in Widor (ed.) Documents, 
148-9; translated in Seymour (ed.) The fifth 
modernization, 162.
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the country as a whole, stating, for example, that the long­
term deterioration in both economic performance and the 
people's livelihood was entirely 'due to a lack of 
democracy'96. They were also critical of some of the early 
reform measures taken to remedy the acknowledged lack of 
democracy in enterprises. One article noted that there was 
little point in workers being allowed to elect the heads of 
workshops, sections, shifts and groups when the real power on 
the shop floor belonged to the enterprise Party organization: 
'therefore, this sort of partial democratic election cannot 
fundamentally arouse workers' enthusiasm for production. And 
the workers have taken a cool attitude towards this minor 
reform. '97 This dismissal of the right to elect management 
cadres at certain levels as unimportant shows the gulf between 
what some Democracy Wall activists were demanding and what was 
being offered even by the reformists in the top Party 
leadership. These cadre elections had been billed as 'an 
important right'98 of workers when promoted during 1979, and 
it was reported at the same time that the restoration of the 
workers' congress was meeting with considerable cadre 
resistance at the lower levels99, even though the powers of 
that body were quite limited at the time. So what was derided 
as not enough by some activists and workers was clearly 
already too much for the management personnel it affected.
These criticisms of how Chinese industry was run, perhaps 
more obviously a challenge to the Party than the still 
politically-charged issues of housing and living standards, 
were expressed with considerable forcefulness and articulacy
96 Ibid., 148.
97 Lu Min, 'Do away with the administrative power...', 
reprinted in Widor (ed.) Documents, 171. This fits 
in with the account of the Taiyuan dispute, in which 
the enterprise Party Committee leadership took 
charge of dealing with the protesting workers.
98 Nanfang Ribao 8.11.79, 3.
99 Ibid., 3.
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by many worker—activists who wrote for or edited unofficial 
journals. But we should not assume that such views were 
limited to this politically conscious and active minority. 
Demands for independent unions made during a number of 
disputes and strikes in 1980-1981 indicate the political 
content of industrial unrest. In one of the best-documented 
strikes of the period, the one at the Taiyuan steel works, 
striking workers
labelling themselves 'the poorest workers in the 
world', called for 'breaking down the rusted door of 
socialism', the right to decide their own fate, the 
end to dictatorship, and the overthrow of the system 
of political bureaucracy.100
Given that we know of the occurrence of many other strikes in 
this period, although in most cases detailed reports are not 
available, it is unlikely that this was the only case of 
industrial unrest where workers acting collectively put 
forward demands which went every bit as far as the criticisms 
of China's political system being articulated in the 
unofficial journals. So we can say that to some extent the 
unofficial journals were, in the words of He Qiu, 'the organs 
as well as the avant-garde of the democratic movement.'101 
They were expressing not only the conclusions of the writers 
themselves, drawn from their experiences in the Cultural 
Revolution and under the Gang of Four, but also the views of 
many in the industrial workforce who were also now going 
further than before in pinpointing what was wrong with the 
system which controlled them and how it ought to be changed. 
The question of to what extent there was active or passive 
support for Democracy Wall among workers will be dealt with in 
more detail in the next section.
100 Wilson, '"The Polish lesson"', 263.
101 Report to the first meeting of the National 
Federation of People's Publications, quoted in Chen 
Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 36.
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Workers' support for Democracy Wall
Given that the April Fifth Movement was dominated by 
young workers, and was most definitely a mass movement102, it 
seems surprising that Democracy Wall, at least in its first 
year or so, did not appear to have a comparable mass base. 
There were of course strong links between certain activists 
and groups and the constituencies of rusticated youth 
demanding a return to the cities, and peasants coming up to 
the cities to seek redress for injustices perpetrated under 
the old regime, but the statement still holds true that the 
initial phase of the movement was not a mass movement in the 
way that April Fifth was. It has been observed that 'for the 
time being, the broader social forces of April had withdrawn 
from active political roles and were ready to entrust the 
affairs of state to the new Deng government.'103 This view 
suggests that many participants in the April Fifth Movement 
felt that it had been successful in precipitating the fall of 
the Gang of Four and ensuring Deng's succession, and were 
prepared to give the new regime a chance to make good on its 
promises.
Disenchantment with political activism, in the wake of 
the Gang's insistence on 'politics in command' and enforced, 
though ritualistic, participation104 in endless meetings and
102 At least in Beijing and Nanjing; see Heilmann, 'The
social context of mobilization in China', 7.
103 Benton (ed.) Wild lilies, poisonous weeds, 5.
104 Although even such 'administered participation'
(Strand, Political participation and political
reform in post-Mao China (1985), 8) could on
occasion be transformed into spontaneous political 
activity, as in the case, recounted by Heilmann, of 
the theory group of the Beijing FTU, which although 
brought together in early 1976 to compile propaganda 
material against Deng's 'rightist revisionism',
ended up writing 'a manifesto attacking the
radicals' and defending the reputation of Zhou Enlai
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rallies, no doubt also played a part. In addition, regardless 
of the official tolerance displayed towards Democracy Wall in 
its early stages, there was still a strong awareness of the 
risks of participation in such a campaign: after all, had not 
speaking out against cadres been encouraged by the Party 
during the Hundred Flowers period, only for many to find 
themselves on the wrong side of the line later drawn between 
acceptable and unacceptable criticism? Many of the 
'rightists' sent to labour camps in 1957 and 1958 were only 
rehabilitated (often posthumously) in the late 1970s in the 
great wave of 'reversals of verdicts' which included 
participants in the April Fifth Movement and Li Yizhe, so the 
dangers of taking at face value Party assurances about the 
desirability of criticism from below would have been recently 
reinforced in people's minds.
David Strand has argued that the early focus on 
individual rehabilitation hindered the transition to a 
movement with mass participation, and that 'in its more 
obviously collective manifestations ... the movement's 
turbulence made association with it dangerous. '105 There is 
something in this, although we should remember that Democracy 
Wall was sparked off not by any individual rehabilitation, but 
by the reversal of verdict on April Fifth, an entire movement 
involving hundreds of thousands of people.106 Less open to 
dispute is the point about popular perceptions of the dangers 
of being associated with activists who were described in the 
official press as anarchists, disruptive elements, criminals,
(Heilmann, 'The social context of mobilization in 
China', 15).
105 David Strand, Political participation, 29.
106 On numbers involved, investigated afterwards, and 
arrested, see Heilmann, Nanking 1976, 80, and 'The 
social context of mobilization in China', 6-7.
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counter-revolutionaries and 'Gang of Four' types107. 
Activists did their best to argue that they fully supported 
the 'unity and stability' which the authorities said their 
publications and organizations were endangering, insisting 
that there could be no real unity and stability unless it was 
founded on democracy and a legal system.108 But they were up 
against a very effective barrage of propaganda, and in 
Guangzhou, although such open condemnation and repression was 
longer in coming than was the case further north, the charge 
of illicit contacts with foreigners, i.e. Hong Kong Chinese, 
could be added to the list.109
So there are several plausible reasons why mass support 
proved more difficult to gain and retain for Democracy Wall 
than for its predecessor, April Fifth. But Wang Xizhe 
challenged the view that all but a small minority of 
participants in the April Fifth Movement saw the removal of 
the Gang as the achievement of their aims, and so withdrew 
from political debate and action. In 'Strive for the class 
dictatorship of the proletariat', he argued that:
While the people happily celebrated the October 
victory [the arrest of the Gang], demands of two 
types simultaneously arose. A segment of the masses 
became dissatisfied because they had had none of the 
spiritual and material means to enable them to
107 See for example Nanfang Ribao 9.4.79, 1; 18.4.79, 2; 
31.5.79, 2; Renmin Ribao 8.2.80, 1; 21.2.80, 1 and 
4; Rosen, 'Guangzhou's Democracy Movement', 20; Chen 
Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 25-6. An article published 
in Nanfang Ribao when the crackdown was already well 
underway went so far as to bracket 'trouble-makers' 
who had clashed with the police with rapists and 
murderers, all of whom had to be dealt with UBing 
the 'iron fist' of dictatorship (9.2.80, 2 and 4).
108 See for example 'Democracy and the legal system are 
safeguards of stability and unity', Zeren (16.1.81), 
translated in Shiyue Pinglun 53-4 (1981), 92-3.
109 Rosen, 'Guangzhou's Democracy Movement', 24-5.
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recall the Gang of Four directly; they went a step 
further in their demands for democracy. Another 
segment of the masses seemed to feel the necessity 
of discovering anew the 'saviour of the world'.
They spread the hope: 'Let's hope that Uncle Deng
will live for a few more years'; there are even 
people who burn incense and pray for him.... these 
actions ... reveal that the people still feel 
extremely uncertain as far as controlling their own 
fate is concerned.110
Here it seems that only some of those involved in protests in 
1976 were willing to see Deng's accession to power as the end 
of the process of attacking bureaucratic rule. Wei Jingsheng 
argued in similar vein that Deng's regime had to continue to 
support the just demands of the people and to protect their 
legitimate interests if it was to keep their trust: 'Do the 
people support Deng Xiaoping as a person? No, they do not. 
Without his fight for the people's interests, he himself has 
nothing worthy of the people' s support.'111 The comments of 
both of these writers imply that the 'honeymoon' period for 
Deng's government might prove to be rather short, especially 
if Deng's apparent support for, or at least tolerance of, more 
open political debate came to an end, or if the hoped-for 
improvement in living standards failed to materialize. In the 
case of workers, it is true both that standards of living and 
working conditions for many by 1980 still left a great deal to 
be desired, and that expectations, fuelled by discussion of
110 Wang Xizhe, 'Strive for the class dictatorship of 
the proletariat', in Chan, Rosen and Unger (eds.) On 
socialist democracy and the Chinese legal system,
111 Wei Jingsheng, 'Yao minzhu haishi yao xin de ducai? 
[Do we want democracy or a new dictatorship?]', in 
Tansuo, special edition (25.3.79), reprinted in 
Shiyue Pinglun 38 (1979), 31-3); translated in
Benton (ed.) Wild lilies, poisonous weeds, 45-50, 
and also in Seymour (ed.) The fifth modernization, 
196-200. This translation from Seymour, 198.
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economic reform, radical proposals for workers' self- 
management and the publicity given to Solidarity, were 
extremely high. So clearly there was a reservoir of 
discontent and pent-up demands among workers which it would be 
relatively easy for Democracy Wall activists to tap, 
especially those who were workers themselves. A mass movement 
once again became a possibility under these conditions.
It is probably true that there was a great deal of 
passive support and sympathy for the aims of Democracy Wall, 
as a continuation of April Fifth, among the broad population, 
especially the urban population. But nevertheless, it was not 
until 1979 that some activists began to look to sent-down 
youth or petitioning peasants as a mass base112, and it was 
not until 1980, when Democracy Wall publications and 
organizations were already under considerable pressure and 
some arrests of prominent activists had already been made, 
that attempts to build up support among workers became 
significant in the movement. During the earliest weeks and 
months of the movement, some groups and individuals were 
addressing their ideas as much to the reformists in the 
leadership as to the public at large; this is particularly 
true of groups and individuals whose Party or Communist Youth 
League membership or family background gave them access to 
internal Party news sources.113 It was only later, when the
movement's continuation was gravely threatened by arrests and
changes to the constitution restricting freedom of expression, 
that it began trying 'to break out of its isolation and to 
find new allies outside the fickle elite.'114
We have already mentioned instances of unofficial
112 Benton (ed.), Wild lilies, poisonous weeds, 6.
113 See for example Chen Ruoxi's comments on the 
editorial board of Beijing zhi Chun (Democracy Wall, 
45-47).
114 Benton (ed.), Wild lilies, poisonous weeds, 11.
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journals and local activists supporting workers in disputes 
with the management or Party leadership of their enterprise, 
such as the strike at Taiyuan Iron and Steel, and the way in 
which Solidarity's initial victory in Poland was welcomed by 
Democracy Wall activists and widely publicized as an example 
for China's workers to follow. Events in Poland undoubtedly 
helped to focus the attention of many activists on the Chinese 
working class as a possible mass base. The degree of rank- 
and-file discontent with standards of living, working 
conditions and enterprise management was already well known, 
having been covered extensively in the unofficial 
journals115, and many in the movement were aware of the 
conditions which had given rise to Solidarity in Poland, and 
saw clear parallels with China.116
Two years of economic reforms, while successful in some 
respects, had given rise to some serious problems, notably 
price inflation, which added to discontent. Shortages of 
energy and raw materials were also quite severe at this
115 Although earlier in 1980, during the Beida election 
campaign, Wang Juntao had expressed the view that 
workers were 'already [the] main beneficiaries' of 
the reforms ('The wind rises from among the 
duckweed', in Benton (ed.) Wild lilies, poisonous 
weeds, 92). This is a rather one-sided view, not 
untypical among intellectuals, of the way in which 
the reforms had affected workers, concentrating on 
wage rises and bonuses and neglecting the down-side 
of housing problems, reduced security, and price 
increases.
116 For example, the article 'Death knell for the rule 
of the privileged bureaucratic class' (Qingdao, 
editorial board of Lilun Qi, February 1981, 
reprinted in Shiyue Pinglun 53-4 (1981), 35), draws 
parallels between the corruption and privilege of 
high officials in the two countries. The Party 
leadership was equally well aware of possible 
parallels: see Wilson, '"The Polish lesson"', 260- 
262.
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time117, and in these conditions, many industrial enterprises 
would have had no option but to run at reduced capacity, or 
even to suspend production altogether for a time. This 
inevitably leads to hardship for the workforce, who receive 
only their basic pay with no performance-related bonuses on 
top. We may recall how in the 1950s it was claimed that some 
workers' basic pay, without bonuses for over-fulfilment of 
norms, was not enough to live on, giving rise to great anger 
among workers when managerial incompetence led to the non­
arrival of supplies and the suspension of production, thus 
threatening their livelihood. There were similar fears again 
in 1980, by which time bonuses had become a significant 
proportion of many workers' pay-packets. Bonuses were widely 
seen as part of workers' basic income, not an optional 
extra.118
Price rises early in the reform period placed extra 
strain on workers' household budgets, and were also seen as a 
threat to workers' security. Later on, in 1989, the fear of 
inflation outstripping wage increases was a major factor 
influencing workers to support the Democracy Movement. 
Similarly, in the early 1990s economic hardship among workers 
who had been laid-off or put on short-time working was 
identified by the official unions as a major cause of 
strikes.119 Clearly there was every reason to expect that 
discontent among workers would intensify and possibly 
crystallize into collective protest under conditions like 
these in the early 1980s. From the point of view of the 
authorities, Solidarity could hardly have happened at a worse 
time, and the way in which it was publicized by a Democracy
117 See Nina Halpem, 'Learning from abroad: Chinese
views of the Bast European economic experience,
January 1977-June 1981', Modern China 11, 1 (January 
1985), 79 and 101.
118 See Shirk, 'Recent Chinese labor policies', 586.
119 See for example Gonghui Xinxi 21 (1.11.90), 7-10; 6
(15.3.91), 15-16.
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Wall Movement now beginning actively to seek mass support 
among workers made it all the more alarming.
Other developments during 1980 also contributed to a 
hardening of official attitudes towards Democracy Wall. One 
such development was the emergence of inter-provincial and 
national networks of those involved in producing unofficial 
publications, leading by September 1980 to the establishment 
of a National Association of People's Publications.120 It 
has been noted that cellular protest, that which is limited to 
members of a single work-unit (danwei), is much easier for the 
authorities to deal with than any activities which cross unit 
boundaries.121 We saw how in the early months of the 
Cultural Revolution, it was as much the organizational as the 
ideological dimension of certain Rebel groups which most 
concerned the authorities. Specifically, federations of 
school- or work-unit-based groups which crossed geographical 
or industrial boundaries were perceived as a serious threat, 
and were among the first organizations to be shut down during 
the 'February adverse current' of 1967. In later periods of 
unrest there seems to have been some concern that such 
contacts might be reactivated, or that new contacts would be 
made. For example, chuanlian (linking up with groups or 
individuals in other work units, cities or regions to 
'exchange revolutionary experiences'), a major feature of the 
Cultural Revolution in late 1966 in particular, was 
specifically prohibited during the April Fifth Movement of 
1976 on the grounds that it would bring unacceptable 
disruption to production, but it was reported to have occurred
120 Rosen, 'Guangzhou's democracy movement', 13, 26 and 
30. Translations of various articles from the
Association's organ, Zeren, can be found in Shiyue 
Pinglun 53-4 (1981), 91-93. These include the
article 'Democracy and the legal system are
safeguards of stability and unity', a scathing
response to the attack on the movement published in 
Jiefang Ribao (10.1.81).
121 Heilmann, 'The social context of mobilization in 
China', 9-10 and 18.
378
nevertheless.122
In this context, the forging of links with activists and 
groups in other areas, which the various surviving unofficial 
publications in Guangzhou had begun to do early in 1980123, 
appeared to those in positions of power to be a significant 
escalation of the protests. What was even more worrying was 
that a similar type of escalation appeared to be taking place 
among protesting workers. Back in the 1950s, most of the 
industrial disputes we examined involved workers from a single 
work-unit only, and the ad hoc organizations formed to 
coordinate activities also stayed within the bounds of a 
single unit. In the Cultural Revolution, as mentioned above, 
workers' groups joined federations which crossed work-unit, 
industrial and geographical boundaries, and these federations 
bore the brunt of more than one crackdown, being perceived as 
a particularly dangerous development. In the 1980s, many of 
the disputes on which we have information were, as in the 
1950s, limited to a single unit (although, as in Taiyuan Iron 
and Steel, this could mean the involvement of as many as three 
thousand workers).
But some groups of striking workers in the early 1980s 
were attempting to go a step further organizationally with 
calls for the establishment of independent unions along the 
lines of Poland's Solidarity. In the circumstances of the 
early 1980s, when the suppression of Democracy Wall had 
already been going on for more than a year and Party authority 
and control over information had not broken down to the extent 
it had by 1989, these attempts to form independent unions do 
not seem to have succeeded for very long. But nevertheless 
they provided a clear indication that in the future, the 
authorities would have to deal with not merely spontaneously- 
formed strike committees and the like, but with autonomous
122 Ibid., 9-10, and note 49.
123 Rosen, 'Guangzhou's Democracy Movement', 13.
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organizations of workers with ambitions to make a mark on 
China similar to that made in Poland by the striking shipyard 
workers of the Baltic coast. There were even some indications 
that the new workers1 organizations might take on an 
explicitly political role. One unofficial publication, 
Hailanghua of Qingdao, insisted that Solidarity was a workers' 
political party in all but name, and that it was only 
necessary caution which prevented the organization itself from 
admitting this; it also described the general strike and the 
organizing of autonomous unions as obviously political acts in 
their own right.124 There was also the case of three Taiyuan 
printing workers jailed in March 1981 for organizing a 'China 
Democracy Party'.125
So from the official point of view, what was occurring in 
1980 was the development of much more threatening 
organizational forms both by the activists of the Democracy 
Wall Movement and by discontented and striking workers. The 
two were perceived as linked, and Democracy Wall activists 
were in fact blamed for creating disturbances among 
workers.126 One reason for this link being made might have 
been the common attitude that whenever ordinary, uneducated 
workers started causing trouble, someone cleverer must be 
behind the scenes pulling the strings.127 The open backing 
given to striking workers by their local journals contributed 
to this connection128, and as was discussed earlier, there 
was in fact every reason to suppose that concrete
124 Hailanghua 10 (November 1981), reprinted in Shiyue 
Pinglun 61 (1982), 20.
125 As reported in Shiyue Pinglun 71 (1982), 47.
126 Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 36.
127 See Goran Leijonhufvud, Going against the tide: On 
dissent and big-character posters in China, 136.
128 In one instance of labour unrest in Wuhan, Democracy 
Wall activists were reported actually to have led a 
strike (Benton (ed.), Wild lilies, poisonous weeds, 
11).
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organizational links between the mass of workers and Democracy 
Wall activists would soon emerge, given the overlap between 
the concerns of the two group and the worker status of many 
activists.
The 1980 elections
Workers' support for the Democracy Wall Movement and its 
activists was manifested in one other way during 1980. The 
previous year, a new election law had been passed which 
provided for direct election of representatives to county- and 
township-level people's congresses, and which allowed for more 
candidates to stand than positions available, and 'a more open 
nominating process'129 in which candidates no longer had to 
have the approval of their local Party Committee130; any 
elector could stand if nominated by three others.131 Many 
Democracy Wall activists took advantage of this (temporary, as 
it proved) relaxation of the rules and stood as candidates in 
local elections in their work-units in a number of Chinese 
cities. This was far easier to do on university campuses 
where Party control was more lax and debate was seen as less 
of a serious threat.132 Workers who stood in their units 
tended to come under rather greater pressure from enterprise 
authorities, but despite these adverse conditions, a number 
did stand and won a significant amount of support from their 
fellow workers.
Of the many Democracy Wall activists and unofficial 
journal editors from the Guangzhou region, two are known to 
have stood as candidates in the 1980 elections. One of these,
129 Strand, Political participation, 41.
130 Benton (ed.), Wild lilies, poisonous weeds, 11.
131 See Munro's introduction to China: Crossroads 
socialism, 12.
132 See Strand, 'Political participation', 42.
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Fang Zhiyuan, actually stood in Beijing, in the elections at 
Beida where he had been a student since 1978.133 While there 
he acted as the Beijing liaison representative of the 
Guangzhou journal Renmin zhi sheng with which he had been 
associated at home. During the campaign Fang made the point 
that public ownership of the means of production did not equal 
socialism, but that democracy was also necessary, as both a 
means and an end. He also expressed the view that the 
Cultural Revolution had been a failed anti-bureaucratic 
revolution which the reactionary Gang of Four and Lin Biao had 
tried to use for their own ends. Both these points show the 
influence of the Li Yizhe poster of 1974, with which Fang, 
like virtually all Democracy Wall activists from Guangzhou and 
elsewhere, was familiar.134
By all accounts debate during the Beida election campaign 
was lively and often controversial, with frank discussion of 
'such sensitive topics as whether or not China was really a 
socialist society, whether it sustained a bureaucratic stratum 
that may already have become a new ruling class, and whether 
or not China had essentially the same political nature as the 
Soviet Union. '135 Again, the nature of this debate shows 
quite clearly the Cultural Revolution and early 1970s heritage 
of Democracy Wall. Another Guangdong candidate in the local 
elections was Zhong Yueqiu of Shaoguan (north of Guangzhou 
near the border with Hunan province).136 Zhong was a worker 
in a smelting plant in Shaoguan, and was the editor of two
133 Munro, 'China's Democracy Movement', 79.
134 On Fang Zhiyuan, see ibid., 79, and 'The wind rises 
from among the duckweed', first published in the 
Beijing University journal Sixu (Train of Thought) 
1, and translated in Benton (ed.) Wild lilies, 
poisonous weeds, 91-93.
135 Munro, 'China's Democracy Movement', 79.
136 On Zhong Yueqiu, see Munro's introduction to Chen 
Erjin's China: Crossroads socialism, 12; Chen Ruoxi, 
Democracy Wall, 26 and 30.
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local unofficial journals, Shu sheng (Voice of the Common 
People) and Beijiang (North River). Unfortunately, given the 
metropolitan bias of much reporting on the movement, and the 
fact that independent election candidates stood a much better 
chance of being able to publicize their views and mount a real 
campaign on a university campus rather than in a factory, very 
little is known about Zhong's election activities.137
One of the best-known cases of worker-activists standing 
in local elections during 1980 was the candidacy of Fu Shengi 
in Shanghai.138 The first instance of individuals involved 
in Democracy Wall putting themselves up for election seems to 
have occurred in Shanghai in April 1980 at Fudan University 
and Shanghai Teacher Training College, where a number of 
students stood for election. This new departure for the 
movement was reported in the Guangzhou journal Renmin zhi 
Sheng, and when later in the month Fu decided to stand for 
election in his work unit, he distributed a copy of the 
Guangzhou article along with a statement of his intention to
137 Chen Ruoxi reports that later in 1980, Zhong 
attempted to travel to a meeting arranged in 
Guangzhou which was intended to bring together the 
editors of those unofficial journals still 
publishing. The meeting, in late August, was 
prompted by the imprisonment in July of Liu Qing for 
publishing Wei Jingsheng's statement in his own 
defence at his trial. The meeting never occurred, 
as its organizer. He Qiu, was arrested by the 
Guangzhou authorities, and Zhong Yueqiu was 
reportedly turned back at the railway station. A 
national association was successfully formed in 
September, but the linking up was done through 
correspondence rather than face-to-face meeting 
(Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 30).
138 Fu Shenqi was arrested during the final crackdown on 
Democracy Wall in the spring of 1981. After his 
release, he appears to have continued to be 
politically active in recent movements. At the time 
of writing, he was serving a three-year prison 
sentence for protesting about the arrest of 
independent labour activists in Shanghai, and for 
speaking to foreign reporters about various cases 
(Guardian 21.2.94, 14).
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be a candidate in the election.139 He was already well known 
in the movement in Shanghai as the editor of Minzhu zhi Sheng 
(Voice of Democracy) ; later on, he was active in the National 
Federation of People's Publications, and edited the 
Federation's journal Zeren for a time.140
Fu's candidacy was strongly opposed by the enterprise 
Party Committee at the engine factory where he worked. 
Although he went through the required legal procedures in 
registering himself as a candidate, he eventually had to stand 
as an unofficial candidate after the leadership refused to 
recognize his nomination. His complaint to his local Election 
Committee about this and other instances of interference in 
his campaign resulted in the Committee branding him a counter­
revolutionary and anti-socialist element.141 Nevertheless, 
he was still able to publish a number of statements during his 
campaign142, and the day before the election he addressed 500 
of his fellow workers, pointing out that China's problems did 
not just stem from the acts of a few villains like Lin Biao 
and the Gang of Four, but were systemic, having their roots in 
China's development of over-centralized government and 
organization modelled on that of the Soviet Union. 'The 
solution lay in a thoroughgoing political reform which would 
transfer the fate of the country from the hands of a 
privileged minority into the hands of the "legalized popular 
will".'143 Fu's campaign gained a great deal of support from 
workers in the plant, despite some rather heavy-handed tactics
139 Munro, 'China's Democracy Movement', 76-77.
140 Ibid., 77-78; Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 27, 32, 
54-56.
141 Ibid., 27; Munro, 'China's Democracy Movement', 77- 
78.
142 Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 27.
143 Fu's statement was reported in Guanchajia (September 
1980), 29; quoted in Munro, 'China's Democracy 
Movement', 77.
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on the part of the enterprise Party Committee, which shortly 
before the election even threatened workers with loss of 
bonuses and losing promotion if they voted for Fu. He came 
second in the first round of voting, but was denied the chance 
to clinch the second of two seats in a run-off election when, 
contrary to the newly passed Election Law, the authorities 
simply appointed a candidate to the second post.144
There were also cases of workers standing for election in 
Beijing, and as elsewhere, they and their supporters in the 
workforce were subjected to considerable pressure and 
harassment on the part of enterprise authorities. This point 
about interference in elections by basic-level cadres is an 
important one, since this seems to have been one of the main 
reasons why cadre elections within enterprises failed to live 
up to the original promise of real grassroots democracy in 
electing and recalling at least some levels of management. 
More will be said about this later in the context of the 
economic reforms and the promotion of democratic management 
and the workers' congress.
The election campaigns of two Beijing workers. He Defu 
and Gong Ping, were reported in Zeren, and showed the sort of 
problems which commonly arose when workers defied enterprise 
authorities, even when they had the law on their side. He, a 
worker at the Organic Chemical Factory, and Gong, an oxygen 
factory worker, prepared a joint manifesto which was fairly 
typical of the concerns and arguments of Democracy Wall:
The Chinese people suffered for ten long years from 
the ravages of the Cultural Revolution. This was 
clear proof that because the people did not rule the 
country or control their own destinies, power fell 
into the hands of a small minority whose mistakes 
have cost us dear.... At present the position of
144 Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 27.
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master and servant are reversed in China. But the 
people strongly want those that they elect truly to 
represent them. The role of the people's 
representatives is to defend and fight for the 
people's basic interests, and to supervise the 
policies and measures of the ruling party.... We 
view this election as a test of the ruling party. 
Does it believe in the people and stand together 
with the people? Or does it stand against the 
people?145
Their election platform also called for improved standards of 
living to be made a national priority, and for this commitment 
to be enshrined in the constitution and included in a wide- 
ranging programme of socialist modernization.146 He Defu 
came a creditable third in the elections, while Gong Ping came 
fourth in his factory. In his case, however, there was overt 
interference in the campaign from leading cadres, who 'held 
"individual discussions" and "greeting sessions" with each 
voter, so there were many abstentions. '147 This indicates
that the favoured 1950s method for dealing with trouble­
makers , 'one-to-one chats', dubbed by discontented workers
'one-to-one threats', was still being practised where workers'
145 Zheng Xing, 'The election movement is in the
ascendant', Zeren 3 (14.1.81), translated and
abridged in Benton (ed.) Wild lilies,poisonous 
weeds, 101-102. Reference is also made to He Defu 
and Gong Ping in 'Zhongguo gongren yundong de lishi 
huigu [A review of the history of the Chinese 
workers' movement]', Shiyue Pinglun 71 (1982), 18- 
19. This article includes quotations from the two 
workers' manifesto in the original Chinese. Their 
campaign is also mentioned in Munro's introduction 
to China: Crossroads socialism, where the two are 
described as both working at the chemical plant and 
being editors of the unofficial journal Beijing 
Qingnian (Beijing Youth) (Chen Erjin, China:
Crossroads socialism, 12). The Zeren account only 
lists He as an editor of this journal.
146 Benton (ed.). Wild lilies, poisonous weeds, 102.
147 Ibid., 102.
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demands for democracy clashed with cadres' desire to maintain 
their position and quell shop-floor opposition.
In their manifesto, He and Gong noted the general belief 
in the factory that 'elections are a mere formality and that 
the representatives will have been secretly chosen in 
advance', commenting that 'we believe that this was true of 
previous elections. But now we must resolve that from now on 
things will be different.'148 The previous year, shortly 
before the passing of the new Election Law, an article 
produced as part of the official reform campaign for limited 
democratization had made very similar observations, 
acknowledging that worker scepticism about democratic 
elections was understandable given that
[I]n previous elections - for positions like 
people's congress deputies and various kinds of 
workers' representatives - a list of candidates had 
been announced by the factory Communist Party 
committee.... This was often done without the 
democratic consultation that was supposed to take 
place first, and voting was a mere formality.149
Other instances of experimental elections were reported where 
workers were similarly suspicious of procedures, holding back 
from participation and saying, 'We'd rather wait and see if 
the election is going to be carried out in a democratic way or 
not!'150 Given these well-founded doubts about the integrity 
of
both internal enterprise elections and external elections to 
local people's congresses, as well as the sometimes explicit
148 Ibid., 102.
149 Zhi Exiang, 'The election for shop-heads', China 
Reconstructs 28, 5 (May 1979), 6.
150 Tian Sansong, 'Democracy in factories', Beijing 
Review 23, 35 (1.9.80), 24.
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threat: of reprisals, it is all the more significant that 
various worker-activists came so close to winning elections 
during 1980.151 Financial as well as electoral support was 
also forthcoming from workers in some cases, as in Changsha, 
where a large amount of money collected by workers funded the 
campaign of a student candidate who was struggling to keep 
going in the face of official harassment and opposition.152 
Changsha workers were also reported to have posted big- 
character posters outside the premises of the local Party 
Committee in support of student activities.153
But this opportunity for Democracy Wall activists to go 
out and seek mass support for their views was short-lived. As 
has been mentioned in several of the cases discussed above, 
local authorities were in a position to disrupt the elections 
and to prevent the election of candidates considered a threat, 
and the legal provisions which should have protected the right 
of such candidates to campaign freely proved to be inadequate. 
The next round of local people's congress elections, in 1984, 
were held 'in a far more controlled atmosphere'154. However, 
when local elections were held again in 1986 (a few months 
before the pro-democracy protests of the winter of 1986-7 
originating in Hefei, which the conduct of the elections 
helped to generate) a certain amount of passive resistance to 
compulsory voting was noted by the former 'rightist' and 
veteran of many labellings and prison sentences, the Shanghai 
writer Wang Ruowang. He reported that in one Shanghai 
district, the first round of the elections was declared void 
because of the high number of invalid ballot papers. One of 
the ways in which ballot papers were spoiled was by writing in
151 Some democracy movement candidates actually did win 
elections, according to Munro (Chen Erjin, China: 
Crossroads socialism, 12).
152 Benton (ed.) Wild lilies, poisonous weeds, 11.
153 Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 35.
154 Strand, 'Political participation', 42.
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such names as Hickey Mouse and Donald Duck, or the names of 
characters from popular Chinese novels. Sometimes the names 
written in were more obviously politicals 'At a Mechanical 
Technical School, the invalid ballots contained the names of 
Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang. In other districts, 
people wrote words which expressed their dissatisfaction 
openly.' Rather than dispersing after casting their votes, 
people stayed to hear the results, and reportedly responded 
with applause and laughter when the names of Fang Lizhi, 
Mickey Mouse et al were read out. In some factories, however, 
things were rather more serious, and workers in one plant were 
forced to vote or have a fine deducted from their wages.155
The end of Democracy Wall
The suppression of Democracy Wall was a gradual process 
which began as early as January 1979 and lasted, with greater 
or lesser severity, for more than two years. January 1979 saw 
the arrest of Fu Yuehua, and by March the Chinese press was 
carrying articles denying that the 'foreign' type of human 
rights protection had anything to offer to a socialist country 
like China, and attacking a minority who were campaigning for 
'extreme democratization' and 'bourgeois democracy'.156 Wei 
Jingsheng's arrest on 29 March followed his publication of the 
essay 'Do we want democracy or a new dictatorship?', in which 
the measures employed by Deng's regime in dealing with popular 
protest and political activity were likened to 'the customary 
methods of fascist dictators old and new'.157 In a speech on
155 Wang Ruowang, 'Some interesting things which took 
place at the recent election of deputies to the
people's congresses'. Pa Shing Semimonthly 148
(16.7.87), translated in Democracy Wall 3 (n.d.).
156 See for example Gongren Ribao 22.3.79, 1.
157 Wei Jingsheng, 'Do we want democracy or a new
dictatorship?, special issue of Tanauo (25.3.79), 
reprinted in Shiyue Pinglun 38 (1979), 32.
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30 March, Deng set out the limits of free debate in the shape 
of the four cardinal principles, 'Party leadership, the 
socialist path, the dictatorship of the proletariat (now 
termed "the people's democratic dictatorship”), and Marxism- 
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought'158. New regulations restricting 
the places where posters could be posted were announced on 1 
April, although the original 'Democracy Wall' at Xidan in 
Beijing was not closed down until December 1979.
Over the next eighteen months publishers of and 
contributors to unofficial journals were subject to more or 
less constant pressure from the authorities to cease their 
activities. The 'four big freedoms' (the freedom to speak out 
freely, air views fully, hold great debates and write big- 
character posters) were removed from the constitution in 
September 1980159. In response to efforts to closed down 
unregistered unofficial journals, many groups and individuals 
switched to publishing in correspondence form, with journals 
being circulated to subscribers only rather than being on 
public sale, in an attempt to evade closure. 1980 also saw 
the beginnings of a national organization linking the 
surviving journals and activists, as mentioned above. In 
December 1980, in the wake of Solidarity and its impact on 
China, Democracy Wall activists were officially branded 
counter-revolutionaries who were stirring up social unrest and 
trying to wreck the economic reforms. A mass campaign against 
the 'two illegals' (illegal publications and organizations) 
was launched in all work units with the promulgation of CCP 
Document No.9 in February 1981, and this heralded the final 
round of arrests and closures of unofficial journals, with the 
last issue of Zeren, published in June 1981, being the last 
such publication to find its way out to Hong Kong.160
158 Munro, 'China's Democracy Movement', 75.
159 Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall, 27.*
160 Ibid., 36-38.
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In Guangzhou, as was mentioned earlier, the pressure on 
the movement was initially somewhat more subtle than was the 
case in most other cities, which is why the south became the 
centre of the movement from about the middle of 1980. In its 
early stages, the city was even described by some as a 
'liberated area' for the democracy movement, and Wang Xizhe 
confirmed that this was an accurate description as of autumn 
19 7 9.161 There are a number of explanations for this 
relative tolerance of the movement in Guangzhou. One reason 
might be the city's proximity to Hong Kong, which meant that 
news of a harshly repressive reaction would quickly find its 
way to the outside world, harming the country's image at a 
time when the 'Open Door' policy of attracting foreign 
technology and investment was just getting of the ground. In 
addition, the movement could be useful to the authorities as 
a testing-ground for new ideas; we have already noted the 
protests of activists at being labelled anti-Party, when so 
many ideas first aired in the unofficial journals had actually 
been taken up by the CCP later on.162 There is also the 
point that the movement seems to have been comparatively weak 
initially and to have developed more slowly in Guangzhou than 
in other cities163, and thus it probably seemed a less 
serious threat.
Stanley Rosen has pointed out that student journal 
editors were more susceptible to official pressure to stop 
publishing, since their activities were a heavy drain on both 
their finances and their study time, and since they were aware 
that obstinacy in the face of official disapproval might
161 Interview with Wang Xizhe first published in Le 
Monde in October 1979; reprinted in the Monthly 
Bulletin of the Chinese Democratic Movement, 1, 8 
(November 1981), and in Shiyue Pinglun 27 (1981), 
11.
162 Rosen, 'Guangzhou's Democracy Movement', cites both 
of these reasons (2-3).
163 See the Wang Xizhe interview, Shiyue Pinglun 57 
(1981), 11-12.
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affect their employment assignments after graduation. The 
student-edited journal Weilai (Future) was the first to cease 
publication voluntarily in Guangzhou, after provincial First 
Secretary Xi Zhongxun suggested that it was unhelpful of the 
journal to dwell on the admittedly important issue of the 
masses' low standard of living at a time when the CCP was 
already working hard to solve the problem, undoing the damage 
of previous errors committed by the likes of the Gang of 
Four.164 Workers such as He Qiu and Liu Guokai were less 
likely to respond in the desired way to being leaned on in 
this fashion, although as Rosen notes, for this very reason 
they were sometimes singled out for different treatment.165
In 1980, as in 1989, activists came up against the 
problem of registering a publication or an organization with 
the authorities in order to keep their activities legal. The 
Guangzhou journal Renmin zhi Sheng suspended publication in 
the spring of 1980 after being told by the Propaganda 
Department of the provincial Party Committee that the journal 
had to comply with the 1952 'Temporary (sic) Law on the 
Registration of Publications', since this law was actually 
still in force. Both Renmin zhi Sheng and its offshoot Renmin 
zhi Lu protested that they had tried much earlier to register 
with the authorities, but to no avail, and that it was 
unreasonable to expect them to comply with such an out-of-date 
law. The particular measure to which they objected was that 
the publications had to obtain the legal guarantee of two 
privately-owned shops before they could be registered. This 
might not have been a particularly onerous requirement in 
1952, but in 1980, as the editorial board of Renmin zhi sheng 
pointed out, 'since the [socialist] transformation of commerce 
was completed as early as 1956, after which private shops 
ceased to exist, it is now a complete impossibility for us to
164 Rosen, 'Guangzhou's Democracy Movement', 16.
165 Ibid., 18.
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go out and obtain the guarantee of two shop-owners.'166 
Similarly, in May 1989 Beijing's Gongzilian was refused 
registration by the Public Security Bureau when it tried to 
achieve legal status, and then condemned as an illegal 
organization.167
Spring 1981 saw a campaign in the official press to 
refute the main arguments of Democracy Wall, and to prepare 
the way for the CCP's definitive verdict on the Cultural 
Revolution and on Mao's leadership. A series of articles 
denied that any bureaucratic class or privileged stratum 
existed in China, and accused those who claimed to be 
attacking this new class of Cultural Revolution-style 
anarchism and of attempting to overthrow the Party and the 
socialist system. It was denied that the Party or the state 
appropriated the fruits of others' labour in an exploitative 
way, and, in the CCP's defence, its consistent opposition to 
bureaucratism and its many campaigns to eradicate the problem 
were highlighted, without, however, any reference to the very 
limited progress which such major campaigns as the Three Anti 
had actually made.168 The document containing the official 
appraisal of Mao and the Cultural Revolution, the 'Decision on 
certain questions in Party history' adopted by the Sixth 
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee on 29 June 1981, had 
been under discussion for a year before it was finalized and 
had gone through numerous revisions, mainly, it seems, to make
166 'Fanminzhu niliu xia de kongsu [Condemned under the
anti-democratic adverse current]', reprinted in 
Shiyue Pinglun 46 (1980), 12. See also Rosen,
'Guangzhou's Democracy Movement', 18-19.
167 Walder and Gong, 'Workers in the Tiananmen 
protests', 7.
168 See for example Jiefangjun Bao 9.2.81, in FBIS
10.2.81, Ll-3; 'Ping suowei fandui guanliaozhuyizhe 
jieji [Criticize the so-called opposition to the 
bureaucratic class]', Hongqi 1.3.81, 12-18, in FBIS
31.3.81, Ll-8? Nanfang Ribao 2.4.81, 1 and 3.
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it less critical of Mao.169 Its formal adoption, and the 
show trial of the Gang of Four which ended early in 1981, 
marked a turning point in the high-level power struggle 
following Mao's death which was significant for the Democracy 
Wall Movement.170 The movement no longer served any useful 
purpose for Deng and his supporters in the top leadership once 
these questions had been decided in their favour, and so the 
final round of arrests could begin.
Given this context, the trial of the Gang and the verdict 
that the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao had been an 
unqualified disaster for China, it should not surprise us to 
find Democracy Wall activists being linked with Lin Biao and 
the Gang of Four, and activists' attacks on bureaucratism and 
privilege being denounced as calls for a 'second Cultural 
Revolution'.171 Once again, former Rebels were 'turned ... 
from victims of Lin Biao, Mao and the Gang of Four into the 
Gang's so-called running dogs', ignoring the fact that 'the 
rank and file members of the Rebel Faction had no connection 
with the Gang of Four or its clique. In fact, former Rebels 
like the Li Tizhe group took dangerous risks by criticizing 
the Gang's radical policies.'172 What is perhaps more 
surprising is to find the same line being taken eight years 
later against worker-activists in the 1989 Democracy Movement, 
when members of Gongzilian and other workers' groups were
169 Roderick MacFarquhar argues that Deng's main concern 
was that his important PLA constituency would be 
hostile to a decision which dwelt too much on Mao's 
faults and mistakes (The politics of China, 1949- 
1989t 329-330).
170 Gregor Benton has pointed out the significance of 
the Gang's trial in this context in his introduction 
to Wild lilies, poisonous weeds, 12-13.
171 Jiefangjun Bao 9.2.81, in FBIS 10.2.81, Ll-3; Hongqi
1.3.81, 12-18, in FBIS 31.3.81, Ll-8.
172 Anita Chan, 'Dispelling misconceptions about the Red 
Guard movement', Journal of Contemporary China 1, 1 
(September 1992), 72-73.
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compared to the Gang of Four173, and were actually labelled 
' "sinister remnants of the Gang of Four"' by the ACFTU174.
The April Fifth Movement, Democracy Wall, and mass protests 
Cone lus ions
Given what we know about the origins and course of the 
1989 Democracy Movement, hindsight poses the question of why 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the politically active 
minority failed to link up with the dissatisfied (urban) 
majority to form a powerful mass movement. The answer seems 
to lie in the exact political context and sequence of events 
between 1976 and 1981, where there seems to have been a 
chronological mismatch between spontaneous mass political 
activity and a sustained campaign of criticism of, and 
sometimes opposition to, CCP rule. The April Fifth movement, 
as has already been observed, could be counted a genuine mass 
movement, at least in the several cities where very large 
numbers were involved in street protests and 
demonstrations.175 But following the Tiananmen Incident the 
movement was suppressed, and in Beijing in particular this 
involved a large number of arrests and executions. Despite 
signs of continued support for the views expressed in the 
movement (for example, the widespread popular refusal to hand
173 See for example the articles in Gongren Ribao
28.6.89, 3.
174 Quoted in Lu Min (ed.), Gongren qilaile, 16 (16).
Since there are both English and Chinese versions of 
this book available, I will henceforth quote from 
the Chinese version, but will also give in brackets 
the equivalent page reference for the English
translation (titled A moment of truth).
175 Heilmann lists Hangzhou, Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Luoyang,
and Taiyuan as places where participants numbered in 
the tens of thousands, but points out that only 21 
work units were said to have been active in the 
Kaifeng protests, compared with two thousand in 
Beijing and more than a thousand in Nanjing ('The 
social context of mobilization in China', 7.
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over copies of posters etc. as evidence after the suppression 
of the movement, and the clandestine and then open circulation 
of material from the movement176), there was not time for 
autonomous organizations to emerge as they did in 1989.
Once the Gang had been deposed in October 1976, other 
factors inhibiting political activism came into play. As was 
discussed earlier, there was a disenchantment with politics 
among those who had been subjected to endless meetings and 
newspaper editorials full of mind-numbing jargon in the mid- 
1970s, as well as a feeling among some that with the Gang 
under arrest, the movement had already achieved its main goal. 
Many people were prepared to put their trust in the Deng 
regime and to allow it a chance to improve living standards, 
as had been promised; and despite the problems of price 
inflation and reform threats to job security, many people did 
begin to experience an improvement in their standard of living 
during the early 1980s. In addition, there was still a 
considerable amount of risk attached to associating oneself 
with a non-Party political campaign. Although the late 1970s 
saw the rehabilitation of large numbers of those who had 
fallen victim to earlier purges and mass campaigns, this did 
not mean that the traffic was all one-way in the Chinese penal 
system. In fact, the Li Yizhe group in Guangzhou were among 
those arrested after the Gang's fall, during a period of 
'increased suppression of political dissidents'177. So the 
Democracy Wall activists would have to deal with a legacy of 
fear of, as well as cynicism about, political participation 
when they came to see the necessity of garnering mass support.
By 1980, however, there were a number of factors which 
could have worked in favour of the Democracy Wall activists as 
they began actively seeking popular backing. There were the
176 Heilmann, Nanking 1976, 84-85.
177 Rosen, 'Guangzhou's Democracy Movement', 6. See 
also Mab Huang and James Seymour's introduction to 
The fifth modernization, 8.
396
local elections in which a number of activists were able to 
stand, gaining a great deal of publicity for the movement and 
enjoying some electoral success despite official harassment 
and intimidation of them and their supporters. There was also 
a groundswell of industrial unrest, and in some cases striking 
or protesting workers were already making political demands. 
The background of discontent among workers made them a natural 
ally of the young worker-activists of the unofficial 
publications movement, and this became all the more obvious to 
both sides once the example of Solidarity in Poland began to 
be widely publicized in China.
But conversely, it was probably organizational 
developments and the danger of the political movement linking 
up with protesting workers that prompted the final suppression 
of Democracy Wall early in 1981; the example of Poland was not 
lost on the authorities, either. In the months after 
Democracy Wall had come to an end, workers were to some extent 
temporarily bought off, as the economic problems of the early 
reform period seemed to ease and industrial incomes generally 
rose. But underlying grievances about security, distribution, 
representation and democratic management were still present, 
ready to come to the fore again as the economic situation 
worsened and Party legitimacy waned further towards the end of 
the 1980s. This accounts for the rapid emergence of 
politicized, autonomous workers' organizations during the 1989 
Democracy Movement.
So although there was no Chinese Solidarity in the early 
1980s, and although Democracy Wall was eventually suppressed, 
the underlying problems in the relationship between worker 
'masters' and their 'humble servants' in Party and 
administrative posts had not been resolved. Thus in the early 
1980s, if the economic reforms were to be successful, the 
manifest alienation of so many workers from the management and 
Party leadership of their enterprises had to be tackled, and 
if the 1980-1981 outbreaks of union self-organization a la
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Solidarity were not to be repeated, measures had to be adopted 
to revitalize workers' participation in management, to 
relegitimi ze the official unions as representatives and 
defenders of workers' interests and channels for dealing with 
grievances, and to give the 'masters of the enterprise' a real 
stake in their workplaces.
This was what the reforms of the late 1970s and early 
1980s set out to do, and the language in which the reforms 
were discussed, as well as the actual measures proposed, shows 
quite clearly that some sort of dialogue was going on between 
Democracy Wall and those officials who favoured reform. Some 
of the early proposals for reforming industrial organization, 
especially those concerned with the role of the workers' 
congress, were quite radical, and the next section will 
demonstrate that this would not have been the case without the 
very strong influence both of Democracy Wall, and of 
protesting workers who had shown themselves to be prepared/ in 
the face of management intransigence, to go outside authorized 
channels in order to press demands they considered to be 
legitimate.
Democratic management and the economic reforms
That there was, at least in the early stages, a 
considerable degree of overlap between the demands of the 
Democracy Wall mainstream and the proposals of the 
'reformists' in the Party and government is shown by some of 
the earliest statements on the purpose and nature of the 
reforms in enterprise management. In the same speech in which 
he had insisted that the official unions still had a role to 
play, Deng also called for democratic management as an 
essential part of the successful implementation of reform. 
Democratization of management was to be achieved by means of 
the revitalized workers' congress (usually with the trade 
union committee as its working body), which in addition to its
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usual remit of supervision, discussion and criticism would 
also organise the election of workshop, section and group 
leaders within the enterprise. Addressing some of the main 
concerns of Democracy Wall activists, Deng argued that an 
extension of the role of the workers' congress was needed in 
order to tackle the 'overconcentration of power within the 
Party and the state and the undesirable consequences stemming 
from this (such as bureaucratism, organizational rigidity, 
paternalism, extensive privileges, and the life-tenure [cadre] 
employment system.'178
Similarly, the Democracy Wall debate on the realities of 
public ownership in China had its counterpart in official 
circles. We have already seen claims in some unofficial 
journals that 'ownership by the whole people' had over time 
turned into control, if not actual ownership, of the means of 
production by a minority of cadres, who thus came to be living 
on the fruits of others' labour. But it is perhaps more 
surprising to come across this type of argument in the pages 
of the English-language Party-controlled periodical Beijing 
Reviewt
In some places and units where democratic life is 
lacking and a patriarchal system is in effect, the 
rights to manage an enterprise and to distribute its 
products are in fact in the hands of the Party 
secretary and the factory director....[Workers' 
congresses] are nothing but rubber-stamp 
organizations without real power... .socialist public 
ownership is, to say the least, far from complete or 
even devoid of content.179
The date of this article, December 1980, is significant, as
178 Peter Nan-shong Lee, Industrial management and 
economic reform, 138.
179 Beijing Review 23, 52 (29.12.80), 16.
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this places it at the height of the official panic about 
Solidarity and Chinese protest and industrial unrest, about 
which more will be said below.
The extent to which management democratization was an end 
in itself in the post-Mao period, or merely instrumental in 
the overall reform programme, is open to debate. Many see 
promotion of the workers' congress as simply a means to an 
end, necessary for the support one of the main policies of 
that programme: increased enterprise autonomy. If
decentralization of some powers to the enterprise was to be 
successful, it was essential to have technically competent 
management who enjoyed a certain amount of support and 
legitimacy in the workplace. Put at its simplest, it was 
thought that giving enterprises, for example, more scope for 
retaining profits to be distributed in the form of bonuses for 
productivity and fulfilment of quotas would give workers an 
incentive to elect the most competent personnel to run the 
enterprise, since inefficient management would have a direct 
and adverse effect on workers' pockets. This view sees the 
workers' congress as a by-product of the reform process mainly 
used 'to buttress enterprise autonomy'180.
In a slightly broader sense, there was a concern that the 
extent of worker alienation from both management and the 
official unions could not but have an effect on efficiency and 
productivity, making enterprise democratization a vital part 
of the reform effort. Furthermore, if we take into account 
the impact of Democracy Wall, the possibility emerges that 
democratization, in the workplace and elsewhere, was important 
in itself as a means of diverting popular demands for 
democratic participation back into officially-sanctioned 
channels, as well as being a prop of the reforms. What gave 
impetus to enterprise democratization, in this view, were
180 Hong and Lansbury, 'The workers' congress in Chinese 
enterprises,' in Warner (ed.) Management Reforms in 
China, 152.
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'reasons of management effectiveness and others relating to 
pressures for democracy • •. including the unofficial 
"democracy movementM'181. Besides accepting the enterprise 
autonomy argument, Peter Nan-shong Lee goes further in 
crediting Deng with the promotion of industrial democracy in 
a different (institutional rather than mobilizational) form 
from that practised by Mao, but stemming from the same 'deep 
intellectual roots in Marxism.'182 However, if industrial 
democracy was in fact desirable in itself to the top 
leadership, it was certainly a subordinate goal to that of 
improving economic performance and maintaining 'unity and 
stability'. Otherwise, it is difficult to see why a new era 
of democratic management in Chinese enterprises did not in 
fact emerge during the reforms of the early 1980s.
The workers' congress
The workers' congress is an interesting case in point for 
the purposes of this study for two main reasons. Firstly, it 
shows the extent to which the reforms of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s harked back to the 1950s and early 1960s for their 
inspiration, reinforcing the parallel between the two periods 
noted in the introduction to this section. Secondly, the 
influence on the Chinese reforms of the changing nature of the 
Democracy Wall Movement and of events in Eastern Europe 
emerges very clearly from an examination of various statements 
on the purpose and powers of the workers' congress between 
1979 and 1981. In the process of developing a workers' 
congress for the post-Mao era, a process which began with
181 Lockett, 'Enterprise Management - Moves Towards 
Democracy?', 232.
182 Peter Nan-shong Lee, Industrial management and 
economic reform, 140. For an alternative view on 
Deng's acquaintance with the intellectual roots of 
Marxism, see Meisner, 'Marx, Mao, and Deng on the 
division of labor in history', in Meisner and Dirlik 
(eds.) Marxism and the Chinese experience, 107.
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experimentation with radical reforms but ended in a return to 
the formalism and disillusionment of the mid-1950s, we can see 
how the demands of Democracy Wall activists and some workers 
gradually diverged from what enterprise and Party leaders were 
prepared to concede, until the gulf between them became 
unbridgeable. This of course ultimately led workers to look 
for other ways of asserting their right to a greater degree of 
control over their working lives, in the shape of autonomous 
organizations with a political as well as an industrial remit.
The workers' congress began to be promoted again from 
1978, but the Provisional Regulations governing its operations 
were not published until July 1981, and were not made 
permanent until 1984. This left a relatively long period of 
time when practice varied widely in different enterprises and 
in different parts of the country. There was a great deal of 
experimentation, and much discussion in the national, local 
and specialist trade union press of how the pitfalls of the 
workers' congress system of the 1950s might be avoided this 
time around. At times proposals were made which, if 
implemented, would have made the workers' congress a genuinely 
powerful body in the enterprise, not just within its 
traditional remit of welfare and bonuses but in the making of 
all major decisions. Such proposals 'gave rise to some 
speculation that China was about to embark on a more active 
form of worker participation than had occurred in the 
past.'183 But it should be noted that this speculation was 
limited to outside observers, while workers, and also many 
trade union cadres, were initially quite suspicious of the 
proposals and doubted that they could be made to work in their 
own enterprises, suspicions that were not entirely groundless 
in view of the ineffectiveness of past attempts to promote 
participation and democratization.
183 Henley and Nyaw, 'The development of work incentives 
in Chinese industrial enterprises - material versus 
non-material incentives', in Warner (ed.) Management 
Reforms In China, 144.
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Official interest in applying the Yugoslavian example of 
decentralized workers' self-management was taken by some 
outside observers as a sign that the Chinese authorities' 
commitment to the democratization of management might be 
genuine. As was mentioned above, many Democracy Wall 
activists such as Wang Xizhe spoke approvingly of the Yugoslav 
system184 (apparently unaware of its actual limitations), and 
some official sources disseminated a similarly rosy view of 
the self-management system. But Nina Halpem has identified 
Chinese praise for this and other aspects of East European 
practice as being prompted primarily not by any perceived 
appropriateness of Yugoslavia as a model for China, but by 
foreign policy concerns (this was also the case with 
Romania).185 Thus articles on the Yugoslav economy seem 
mainly to have been intended to provide evidence (from a 
partial, overly positive picture) of the likely success of 
policies the Chinese leadership had already put into practice, 
or had decided to adopt. It seems likely, then, that 
favourable references to Yugoslav-style 'workers' self­
management' were merely being used to bolster official 
promotion of the workers' congress in China, and did not 
necessarily imply any radical departure from past Chinese 
practice.
Looking at articles on enterprise reform and 
democratization, and particularly at those on the workers' 
congress, from the period 1979 to 1981, it is hard to avoid 
the conclusion that the demands of Democracy Wall and the 
emergence of Solidarity had a major impact on policy in the
184 See for example Guanchajia 23 (September 1979), 4-6. 
See also Han Zhixiong, 'On democracy in economic 
management and political democracy', Beijing zhi 
Chun 2 (27.1.79) 1-2, translated and abridged in 
Seymour (ed.) The fifth modernization, 162.
185 Halpem, 'Learning from abroad: Chinese views of the 
East European economic experience, January 1977-June 
1981', Modern China 11, 1 (January 1985), 77-109, 
especially pages 98-101.
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second half of 1980. The change in the tone and content of 
the discussion from about September 1980 is quite striking, 
and the most likely explanation for this change is that it was 
part of the official reaction both to the rise of Solidarity 
and to the welcome it received from Democracy Wall activists 
and restive workers in China.
This is not to say that there was no impulse for reform 
and democratization from the top leadership prior to the 
appearance of Solidarity in Poland. There was; as was noted 
above, as early as 1978 in his speech to the Ninth ACFTU 
Congress, Deng had called for all enterprises to be 
democratically managed (though still under unified Party 
leadership). The need to extend the powers of the workers' 
congress was discussed in a Remain Ribao article in March 
1980; the article also suggested that elections for factory 
directors were a necessary reform.186 Further evidence is 
provided by Liao Gailong's report on 'The "1980 Reform" 
Programme of China'187, which discusses democratization and 
trade union reform at length. The editorial note accompanying 
the version of the report printed in Qishi Niandai reveals 
that much of the content of the report had already been 
discussed by the Party centre in July, and had been set out in 
a speech by Deng Xiaoping at a Politburo meeting on 18 August 
1980, four days after the sit-in at the Lenin Shipyard began 
and on the day when the strike was first reported in the 
Chinese press. However, the final October version of Liao's 
report makes specific reference to the 'Polish crisis', 
suggesting that the Chinese working class, too, was likely to 
'rise in rebellion' unless workers were 'allowed to enjoy 
freedom and democracy in electing their own trade union 
leaders' who would provide genuine representation of workers'
186 Renmin Ribao 6.3.80; excerpts translated in SWB-FR 
6403/BII (24.4.80), 6-8.
187 Qishi Niandai 134 (1.3.81), translated in FBIS
16.3.81, Ul-2.
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interests.188
This explicit later reference to events in Poland 
supports the view that pressure for real concessions on 
enterprise democratization and worker representation in China 
greatly intensified as the nature and dimensions of the Polish 
uprising became clear, although support for reforms in this 
direction had existed in the top Party leadership before 
August 1980. As the culmination of the decision-making 
process, the establishment of workers' congresses in all 
enterprises and the promotion of democratic management was 
endorsed at the Third Plenum of the Fifth National People's 
Congress in September 1980, and several articles on the 
workers' congress in subsequent months made reference to this 
decision189. But even a high-level decision such as this 
does not fully account for the appearance in the official 
press of articles linking enterprise democracy through the 
workers' congress with wider socialist democracy190, and 
calling for workers to exercise real power in the enterprise 
as a prerequisite to taking over the management of state 
political, social and economic affairs.191
This promotion of greater democratic rights for workers, 
for a short time, went far beyond anything which had been 
proposed even at the height of the Hundred Flowers period; it
was unprecedented in the history of the People's Republic.
This quite sudden departure from previous language and 
practice cannot have been simply another part of the programme 
being promoted by the reformists within the Party apparatus. 
It occurred at a time when the Party was greatly concerned 
about the activities of Democracy Wall activists, especially
188 Ibid., Ull.
189 See for example Gongren Ribao 21.10.80, 1; Nanfang 
Ribao 22.10.80, 3.
190 Nanfang Ribao 22.10.80, 3; 29.11.80, 2.
191 Gongren Ribao 21.10.80, 1.
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those who had stood in local people's congress elections, and 
was within months of the final suppression of that movement, 
the trial of the Gang of Four, and the final Party verdict on 
Mao's historical legacy; the Party was voicing concerns about 
'extreme democratization' and the threat this posed to hard- 
won unity and stability. In other words, this was not a time 
when radical new policy initiatives in the direction of 
greater democracy in enterprises would normally have been on 
the agenda. So the explanation for this sudden display of 
commitment to workers' role as masters of the enterprise and 
the state must lie in external pressures on the authorities, 
namely Democracy Wall and Solidarity.
The shift in attitudes regarding democratic management 
and workers' proper role can be discerned in Nan fang Ribao'b 
coverage of the enterprise reform debate. Up until September 
1980, articles on economic reform had all focused on 
enterprise autonomy and ways of loosening the bureaucratic 
controls on factory directors. Guangdong was of course in the 
vanguard of the early economic reforms, and the many articles 
centred on efficiency, decentralization, contracting out, 
management's right to manage etc. were in keeping with the 
region's reputation for placing enthusiasm for rapid economic 
reform above political dogma about the nature of the socialist 
enterprise. Typical of the tone of pre-Solidarity reports on 
enterprise reform are a number of pieces from the spring and 
early summer of 1980 which were mainly concerned with such 
subjects as increasing enterprise profit through greater 
autonomy, competition between enterprises, and the use of 
individual economic incentives to motivate workers.192
But the tone and content of articles on enterprise reform 
changes quite abruptly after the month of August. As was 
noted above, moves were afoot at the Party centre for 
democratization in any case, but it is hard to believe that
192 See for example Nanfang Ribao 21.3.80, 1; 25.4.80, 
1; 21.5.80, 2; and 28.6.80, 1, 4.
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the radicalism and forthright language of some of the 
proposals that were made in the autumn and winter of 1980 
represented a spontaneous restatement of commitment to 
workers' role as masters of the enterprise, rather than being 
prompted by fear of Democracy Wall linking up with large 
numbers of disgruntled workers to create a 'Polish crisis' in 
China. In the first half of the year, Nanfang Ribao had 
hardly mentioned workers in its discussions of economic 
reform; the few references to workers mainly concerned the 
claimed success of the system of individual bonuses in 
motivating workers to work harder. But in the autumn and 
winter, a number of articles appeared stressing that all power 
devolved to the lower level had to be in the hands of the 
workers, who should run factories, and in time the state 
itself, themselves. A different attitude towards workers is 
apparent, too: references to indiscipline and the lingering 
influence of the Gang of Four disappeared (temporarily), and 
workers were portrayed instead as reasonable and responsible 
people who could be trusted with power. By the end of 
November, Nanfang Ribao was posing the question, 'To whom does 
power in the enterprise belong?', and answering itself, 'In a 
socialist society, it should undoubtedly belong to the broad 
mass of workers and staff.' The same article went on to 
describe the workers' congress as a mere 'democratic ornament' 
in the past, ignored or treated as a rubber stamp by the Party 
Committee and management, and noted that the proper 
relationship between 'humble servants' (cadres) and 'masters' 
(workers) had for a long time been transposed.193 Much of 
this line of argument could have been lifted straight out of 
one of Guangzhou's unofficial publications of the time.
It is very noticeable that in this period, official 
sources to a large extent admitted the shortcomings of the 
workers' congress as it had previously been constituted in 
enterprises, noting that recent experiments had finally given
193 Nanfang Ribao 29.11.80, 2.
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democratic management 'genuine content'194. The influence of 
Democracy Wall, the extent to which official sources accepted 
its arguments and its agenda, is apparent in praise for 
experimental enterprises where workers, through the workers' 
congress, now had 'a genuine right to speak ... the right to 
be consulted and to decide on important matters ... [and] the 
right to distribute a part of the fruits of their own labour.' 
The same article reported that these enterprises had turned 
over some of the work of recruitment and allocation of jobs 
within the enterprise to the workers' congress, to make it 
more difficult for cadres to make 'back-door' appointments and 
practise favouritism195. This is another example of the 
reforms addressing specific grievances aired in the unofficial 
Democracy Wall journals.
Various measures were proposed, and in some cases tried 
out, for preventing the new, 1980s system of democratic 
management based on the workers' congress from degenerating 
into formalism as it had in the past. Gongren Ribao, not 
surprisingly, was the most outspoken about past problems, 
calling for China's enterprises to be made socialist in fact 
as well as in name, and arguing that public ownership was only 
a necessary condition for workers' becoming the masters of the 
enterprise, not a sufficient one. Exactly the same argument 
was of course used by the Qingdao unofficial journal 
Hailanghua in August 1980196, showing again the way in which 
quite radical ideas first expressed in Democracy Wall 
writings, and condemned by the authorities, could later on 
crop up as acceptable components of reform policy.
194 Nanfang Ribao 5.10.80, 1. An article published the 
following month makes very similar points about how 
the workers' congress should exercise any powers 
devolved to the enterprise from higher levels, in 
contrast to its rubber-stamp role in the past 
(Nanfang Ribao 23.11.80, 1).
195 Nanfang Ribao 5.10.80, 1.
196 Hailanghua 1 (26.8.80), reprinted in Shiyue Pinglun 
60 (1981), 34.
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The workers' congress in the 1980s
Given the similarities between the two periods (workers' 
alienation from official unions, increasing dissent in the 
form of stoppages and strikes and concern over the lack of 
democracy and participation within enterprises), it should 
come as no surprise that when management democratization 
returned to the agenda in the 1980s, 'the approach adopted was 
to a large degree a return to the policies of the mid- 
1950s'197. One article in 1980 actually used the same form 
of words as Lai Ruoyu had in 1956, asserting that 'democratic 
management is one of the signs that distinguishes socialist 
enterprises from capitalist enterprises. '198 Yet, as was 
mentioned earlier, there was an awareness that the 1950s 
system of workers' congresses had failed to establish 
institutional safeguards of workers' right to participate in 
management which could not easily be circumvented by cadres. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, then, a number of proposals 
were made, many by the official trade unions, which were 
intended to make the workers' congress a body with real 
authority in the enterprise.
In an attempt to ensure that workers' congresses were not 
once again dominated by cadres and more skilled workers, it 
was stipulated that 60% of congress representatives should be 
shop-floor workers199 rather than cadres, technicians or 
union representatives. In one experimental enterprise, the 
Guangzhou No.l Cotton Mill, rank-and-file workers were also 
reported to constitute 60% of the congress's standing body, 
the presidium. Since it was this body which was responsible
197 Lockett, 'Enterprise management - Moves towards 
democracy?•, 233.
198 Renmin Ribao 6.3.80, excerpts translated in SWB/FE 
6403/B2 (24.4.80), 7.
199 Beijing Review 23, 35 (1.9.80), 22.
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for overseeing the implementation of congress decisions, and 
for taking decisions when the congress was not in session, 
ensuring a shop-floor majority on the presidium could be said 
to be even more important than making sure that a majority of 
congress representatives were workers. In the past, it was 
reported, workers had constituted only 10% of the presidium, 
and so could easily have been overruled by the body's cadre 
members.200 The report on this enterprise took a similar 
line to many others at the time in criticizing the efficacy of 
the workers' congress in the past. Before the reforms, the 
workers' congress was said to have met only twice a year, and 
to have been nothing more than a forum where the factory 
director made a report, the Party Secretary gave instructions, 
and the workers pledged their support.201 This description 
of the role of the workers' congress is of course familiar to 
us from press reports of the mid-1950s and 1960s.
When the Temporary Regulations for workers' congresses 
were published in mid-1981, it was stipulated that ordinary 
workers should form a majority of the congress and of its 
standing body. However, this was a much less significant 
concession than it might seem, because in the Temporary 
Regulations, almost all of the new powers experimentally 
granted to the workers' congress were downgraded from the 
power to take decisions itself to the right to be consulted 
over decisions and to ratify some of them.202 It must be 
remembered that the Guangzhou Mo.l Cotton Mill was an 
experimental enterprise, and that most of the city's 
enterprises would not have introduced the 60% rule in any 
case. In addition, even in this plant which was being allowed 
to go much further than others in experiments with management 
democratization, no cadre elections had been held, even though 
the right to elect and recall cadres was supposed to be one of
200 Nanfang Ribao 23.11.80, 1.
201 Nanfang Ribao 23.11.80, 1.
202 Renmin Ribao 20.7.81, 1.
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the most important innovations of the 1980s. More will be 
said about the importance of cadre elections later.
There were also proposals to make the congress the 
policy-making body of the enterprise while the Party Committee 
concentrated on wider issues of ideology and political 
education203. The Party Committee of the Foshan No. 5 
Plastics Plant was criticized in the autumn of 1980 for going 
beyond its proper role of ideological and political leadership 
and for trying to limit the workers' congress to discussion 
and implementation of decisions after they had been taken by 
the enterprise leadership.204 The leadership was rebuked for 
having refused workers permission even to convene the workers' 
congress to discuss a possible merger with another enterprise, 
and was reminded that the Party was not an administrative 
organ, and that the authoritative structure within the scope 
of enterprise autonomy was the workers' congress.205 It was 
also reported from another Guangdong enterprise that the Party 
Committee there was passing important matters over to the 
workers' congress for discussion and decision, including 
production and financial plans, the use of retained profits to 
construct workers' housing, the recruitment of new employees 
by public examinations, and the establishment, amendment and 
removal of regulations and systems. It was emphasized that 
workers' congress must be involved in implementing the 
increased powers available under enterprise autonomy, and that 
there was no contradiction between this and the Party's 
leading political role.206
In some experimental enterprises new standing 
organizations were set up with the remit of ensuring the
203 Lockett, 'Enterprise management - Moves towards 
democracy?', 246.
204 Nanfang Ribao 29.11.80, 2.
205 Nanfang Ribao 29.11.80, 2.
206 Nanfang Ribao 8.11.80, 1.
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timely implementation by cadres of decisions of the workers' 
congress. These bodies were given the powers to enforce cadre 
compliance with congress decisions, and it was further stated 
that no regulation or system set up by decision of the 
workers' congress could be overturned except by another 
congress resolution, in contrast to past practice.207 In 
addition to various groups set up expressly to oversee 
implementation of congress decisions, the enterprise trade 
union still played a part, and the workers' congress was also 
convened more often than in the past, twice a quarter in the 
case of one experimental enterprise.206 However, as was the 
case with the built-in workers' majority on the congress 
presidium, these innovations became much less significant once 
the Temporary Regulations reduced the congress's powers to the 
right to be consulted about important decisions in the 
enterprise. Ultimately the workers' congress was left with 
the power of decision only within its traditional remit of 
safety, welfare and some decisions on pay and bonuses. This 
meant that its power to exert influence within the enterprise 
was not significantly greater than it had been in the 1950s. 
It seems that in spite of some early over-optimistic 
assessments of its significance, the best that can be said of 
the 1980s version of the workers' congress is that could 
provide
a consultative forum that imposes limited 
obligations on top management. Like most 
representative bodies in capitalist economies, 
congresses tend to be dominated by more skilled 
workers and supervisors... .since the Party secretary 
is the final arbiter in disputes with management,
207 Nanfang Ribao 29.11.80, 2; 8.11.80, 1.
208 Nanfang Ribao 29.11.80, 2.
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his influence tends to be pervasive.209
Some observers considered that workers' congresses could 
still offer 'some scope for meaningful participation beyond 
the mere "formalism" of the past'210, but in many enterprises 
this was not the case, and possibilities for genuine 
participation still depended on the attitudes of management 
rather than on the institutionalization of workers' rights. 
As in the 1950s, the one management reform measure on which 
all others ultimately depended for their efficacy was the 
holding of direct elections in enterprises, elections not only 
of workers' congress and trade union representatives, but also 
of group, section and workshop heads, and even of factory 
directors. Unless workers could affect the career prospects 
of their managers in some way they would be unable to exert 
any real authority in the workplace. Cadres with life tenure 
and no threat of losing their position in an election would be 
able to go on disregarding the proceedings of bodies like the 
workers' congress, so that the organization's reputation among 
the workers would become tarnished and they too would cease to 
expect anything of it. This was the chain of events in the 
1950s; the next section will look in detail at the theory and 
practice of workplace elections in the 1980s, identifying the 
reasons why a similar programme of democratization fared 
little better in this later period.
Enterprise elections
The importance of making cadres accountable to the people 
through some form of election was stressed in the writings and
209 Henley and Nyaw, 'The development of work incentives 
in Chinese industrial enterprises - material versus 
non-material incentives,' in Warner (ed.) Management 
Reforms In China, 144.
210 Ibid., 144.
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public statements of a number of Guangzhou Democracy Wall 
activists. For example, at an official forum sponsored by the 
provincial Communist Youth League, Li Kin211 noted that 
cadres' attitudes towards the rank and file had changed for 
the better when they were facing re-election, but that now 
that elections were no longer on the agenda, attitudes had 
changed back. This insistence on the need for democratic 
elections was part and parcel of the campaign to replace 
arbitrary personal rule by individuals with democracy and a 
transparent and impartial legal system; it was integral to the 
concerns of Democracy Wall.
Democratic elections were another point on which there 
was some agreement between the movement's activists and Party 
reformers. Enterprise elections for cadres below the level of 
the factory director, as was mentioned earlier, had been 
promoted since the beginning of the reforms in 1978, with 
mixed results. But in the second half of 1980 the importance 
of democratic elections as a check on cadre bureaucratism and 
misuse of power began to be stressed very heavily212. It was 
also acknowledged in the national press that 'the very urgent 
demand of the working masses for the power to elect and recall 
leading cadres including factory directors and managers has 
basically not been realized. '213 As is often the case when 
discussing the post-Mao reforms, there is a mixture of motives 
governing policy choices here which needs to be borne in mind. 
There is also the usual caveat that what was in the press, or 
in official guidelines and circulars, was not necessarily what 
was happening on the ground, and that in any case there was 
scope for considerable variation in actual practice during the 
period when regulations were still being tested out and had
211 Of the Guangzhou-based literary journal Langhua 
(Waves).
212 See fro Example Nanfang Ribao 9.10.80, 1; 8.11.80, 
2.
213 Renmin Ribao 5.10.80, quoted in Shiyue Pinglun 56 
(1981), 50.
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not yet been made permanent.
Having said that, the influence of political movements 
inside and outside China is discernible in the changing 
attitudes of workers and the authorities towards cadre 
elections. Cadre elections were not made a plank of the 
enterprise reform programme solely because the Party was 
ideologically committed to the democratization of management. 
As was mentioned above, there were also reasons of economic 
efficiency to be considered. The linking of workers' bonuses 
to enterprise performance was supposed to ensure that workers 
would be strongly motivated to elect competent managers; in 
this way, cadre elections could serve as a way of bringing in 
younger, better-educated and more competent managers to 
replace the 'dead wood' of ex-army or ex-rural cadres of an 
older generation who owed their positions more to their 
political standing than to any expertise in industrial 
management.214 Reform of the system of lifetime cadre 
employment (the ' iron armchair') thus could be underpinned by 
democratic elections.
But in addition to these efficiency considerations, the 
combined impact of Democracy Wall, Solidarity, and industrial 
unrest in China helped to create pressure for democratic 
elections. As had happened on other issues, what had been 
written in unofficial journals up to a year before in the 
second half of 1980 found its way into the state-controlled 
press in only slightly milder language. Wang Xizhe, defending 
his right to talk about the problem of China's bureaucratic 
(and, in his view, un-Marxist) system of government, had noted 
that no matter how bad the relations between cadres and the 
masses, cadres were still sure of a job for life and could
214 Lockett considers efficiency considerations to have 
been decisive in prompting the Party to opt for 
systematic elections of cadres below factory 
director level, rather than pressures from below or 
motivational concerns (Lockett, 'Enterprise 
management: Moves towards democracy?', 234-5).
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only ever go up the career ladder, not down.215 In November 
1980, Nanfang Ribao concurred that bureaucratism was generated 
by the cadre system in which officials were only responsible 
to those above them, and not to their 'masters' below, and 
that democratic elections would allow the masses finally to 
make some progress in ending bureaucratism and autocracy. 
Unlike Wang, the paper didn't invoke the Paris Commune as its 
ideal, but it did state that China's democratic systems at all 
levels were fundamentally unsound, with a resolution of the 
National People's Congress having less influence than a few
words from a top cadre, making China in some respects even
_The authors of the Li 
less democratic than capitalist nations .Zieyizhe tract had ot
course been imprisoned for saying as much in 1974, an irony
which was not lost on Wang.
When considering the pressure from workers for the right 
to elect cadres and to have genuine representation in the 
workplace, the influence of Solidarity should not be 
overlooked either. Solidarity's demands, the first of which 
was the right to elect independent trade unions, had been 
published in full in a number of unofficial journals217, and 
were also reported in the official press in August 1980. As 
was noted earlier, striking Chinese workers in the winter of 
1980-1 made demands ranging from special representation on the 
workers' congress to the right to form independent unions, 
clearly influenced by Solidarity. The demand for cadre 
elections is also related to the question of representation 
and gaining a proper voice for workers in enterprise 
management; therefore, it seems likely that reports of Polish
215 First published in Renmin zhi Sheng 8, this 
interview was reprinted in Shiyue Pinglun 39 (1979), 
16-17.
216 Nanfang Ribao 8.11.80, 2.
217 According to Shiyue Pinglun 71 (1982), 45-49,
unofficial journals in Guangzhou and Taiyuan and 
Zeren reprinted Solidarity's "21 Demands' and 
"Charter of Rights of the Polish workers'.
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workers' demands also intensified pressure from below for 
Chinese workers to be allowed a much greater degree of 
influence over their managers. Liao Gailong's report which 
stressed the importance of democratic elections for union 
representatives in China if a 'Polish crisis' was to be 
avoided also emphasized the need to allow workers to recommend 
the removal of incompetent managers, and in time to elect 
enterprise personnel.218
Scope and conduct of cadre elections
Despite the election of cadres, including factory 
directors, being acknowledged as an 'urgent demand' of 
workers, and despite the Party's apparent acceptance of the 
case for democratic accountability of management through 
workplace elections, little progress was ultimately made in 
setting up a system of regular enterprise elections. It will 
be remembered that proposals put forward by Lai Ruoyu back in 
the mid-1950s had included provisions for the election of 
cadres up to and including factory directors, but that this 
had been one of the first management democratization measures 
to be ruled out of bounds, the argument being that factory 
directors had to be appointed by the state rather than being 
elected by the workers' congress since they represented the 
interests of the whole people, and not just those of the 
workforce of the particular enterprise. Similarly, although 
the election of factory directors had received a certain 
amount of official support during the years of 
experimentation, there was no mention of this when the 
Temporary Regulations on the Congress of Workers and Staff 
Members in State Enterprises were promulgated in July 1981. 
The regulations only provided for the election by the workers' 
congress of 'leading administrative personnel', while the
218 Liao Gailong, 'The "1980 Reform" Programme of 
China', Qishi Niandai 134 (1.3.81), translated in 
FBIS 16.3.81, U13.
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congress was also charged with 'upholding the authority of the 
factory director', who had only to accept that body's 
'inspection and supervision'.219
So even before the regulations governing the new system 
of democratic management were finalized, this measure, which 
would have taken workers' power in the enterprise an important 
step further than it had ever been before, had apparently been 
dropped. The election of factory directors was still 
discussed as a desirable future development220, and elections 
were actually held in some enterprises, reportedly with good 
results221. But it does not seem to have become common 
practise. Trials of factory director elections in Shenzhen 
were reported in 1984222, but it was also proposed in that 
year that factory directors, appointed by the state, should 
have the right to make their own cadre appointments within the 
enterprise and could transfer cadres who had been elected to 
their posts223, so it seems that although experimentation was 
continuing, not all of it was in the direction of more 
widespread election of top management.
On the whole it seems that to date, workers' congresses 
and similar bodies only have the power to make proposals and
219 Renmin Ribao 20.7.81, 1.
220 See fro example Nanfang Ribao 26.10.81, 1.
221 Nanfang Ribao 15.4.82, 2.
222 Guangzhou Ribao 11.4.84, 1; and 27.6.84, 1. The 
results of such elections had to be ratified by the 
higher level, but it was said that the results 
should be allowed to stand except where one of the 
'three types of people' had been elected. The 
campaign against the 'three types' (people who had 
illegitimately risen to power, had engaged in 
factional struggle, or had been involved in 
'beating, smashing and looting' during the Cultural 
Revolution) began in 1983 as part of a movement to 
negate completely the Cultural Revolution; see Chan, 
'Dispelling misconceptions', 82.
223 Guangzhou Ribao 8.6.84, 1; 27.6.84, 1; 29.12.84, 1.
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recommendations to the higher levels regarding the appointment 
or dismissal of top managers. There was a case in Dalian in 
1991 where the workers' congress voted to recommend the 
removal of a factory director who was accused of a variety of 
offences, including personal corruption, nepotism in housing 
and job allocation, unreasonable lowering of piece-rates so as 
to intensify work for production workers and reduce their 
incomes, practising de facto one-man management, ignoring the 
workers' congress and workers' democratic rights, and cursing 
and arbitrarily punishing workers (a list of misdemeanours 
with which workers involved in the strikes of 1956 and 1957 
would have been all too familiar). Some workers were 
apparently not satisfied with the near two-thirds majority for 
recommending recall, and went out on strike to press their 
demand for the director's removal. The strike was short­
lived, and the dispute was resolved with the help of the 
district trade union which urged workers to use the proper 
legal channels in future rather than strikes; the proper 
channels were the local government and Party Committee, who 
were to study the case and take appropriate action.224 This 
now seems to be the limit of workers' power to affect 
appointments at the level of factory director.
At other levels of management, however, cadres were to 
face election either by the whole workforce or by the workers' 
congress. We noted earlier that elections for heads of 
groups, sections, and workshops initially aroused little 
enthusiasm among workers who were aware that the real power in 
the enterprise lay with the Party Committee and the director. 
There was widespread scepticism, too, as to how free and 
democratic elections would be, and given the experiences with 
elections for enterprise cadres and union representatives in 
the 1950s discussed in section two, this scepticism was not 
without justification. There appears sometimes to have been 
a degree of self-censorship in the nomination process, whereby
224 Gonghui Xinxi 8 (15.4.91), 22-3.
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workers would refrain from nominating anyone who, for reasons 
of family background or previous political problems, might not 
be approved by the higher levels (all appointments were 
subject to such approval), and if nominated, such people might 
seek to withdraw from the ballot.225 Not all enterprises 
were deemed to have the appropriate conditions for holding 
elections, and in some cases 'the government advocated the use 
of opinion polls at regular intervals to provide workers with 
a means of examining and evaluating the work of the leading 
cadres in the enterprise', where elections were 'not 
feasible'226. In recent years the contracting-out of 
enterprise management has further complicated matters, and 
annual democratic evaluation of leading cadres in these 
enterprises has been recommended, while elections can still 
take place in collective enterprises.227
Election procedure was not standardized in the early 
years of the reforms, and still seems to vary somewhat between 
cities and between different types of enterprise. In the 
early 1980s, some enterprises voted by a show of hands while 
others held secret ballots, and some held 'primaries' as part 
of the nomination process. In most cases the list of 
candidates arrived at by a process of open nomination, group 
discussion and gradual elimination contained the same number 
of people as there were posts to be filled; only in 
exceptional circumstance, such as when two or more candidates 
had almost equal support, would the final slate have more 
candidates than posts.228
There was no reason why cadres should not be re-elected 
to their posts in these elections, and indeed they very often
225 China Reconstructs 28, 5 (May 1979), 7-8.
226 Tung, Chinese industrial society after Mao, 165.
227 Gonghui Xinxi 1 (1.4.91), 9.
228 China Reconstructs 28, 5 (May 1979), 7-8.
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were, especially in the case of technical staff who were 
generally better qualified for their position than anyone else 
in the enterprise who might challenge them. But it is easy to 
see why cadres 'accustomed to issuing administrative orders' 
might 'worry about their prestige if they are subject to the 
supervision of the masses'229, and might see elections as a 
threat and do their best to obstruct them. Overt attempts to 
manipulate elections, for example by numbering ballot papers 
so that workers voting against a cadre could be identified, or 
by threatening reprisals against opponents, were 'by no means 
unknown'230, but the influence of leading management and 
Party cadres often did not even need to be exercised in such 
an obvious way. It is possible that workers' doubts about the 
fairness of elections may have made them less than 
enthusiastic about active participation, leaving cadres to 
dominate the process, so that workers' views were not in fact 
reflected in the results. Cadres could also find legitimate 
reasons for opposition to elections: 'Objections to control 
from below' could be couched in terms of 'the supposed need 
for secrecy in management work and the possibility that the 
workforce will not make the Mright" choice', and 'the legacy 
of the Cultural Revolution in the area of work discipline'231 
could also be used as an excuse for opposing elections in case 
'production order' was disturbed as a result. Again, these 
arguments are familiar to us from the 1950s.
Cadre resistance
The main obstacle to increasing the powers of the
workers' congress and to the institution of regular cadre 
elections in enterprises seems to have been resistance from
229 Beijing Review 23, 35 (1.9.80), 23.
230 Lockett, 'Enterprise management - Moves towards
democracy?•, 237.
231 Ibid., 238.
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cadres. We have just seen that interference in election 
procedures was not unusual, and also that cadres elected by 
the workforce could be transferred without notice or 
consultation by the factory director or the higher levels. 
Accounts of cadre resistance hampering management 
democratization and the work of the workers' congress 
accompanied the reforms throughout, but were especially 
frequent during 1981. This raises the possibility that the 
quite radical proposals of the previous few months, during 
which time it had been stated categorically that enterprise 
autonomy meant giving more powers to workers, not to cadres, 
had generated a backlash among management and Party 
officials.232
It is also noticeable that the most outspoken support for 
a powerful workers' congress and for cadre elections came from 
the labour movement press, namely Gongren Ribao. It was 
Gongren Ribao which, in a seminal article on the workers' 
congress system in October 1980, had adopted the language of 
Democracy Wall in describing how in the past, the role of the 
workers' congress had been limited to consultation and 
discussion, and how workers had had no systemic or legal 
guarantees of their right to participate. The paper insisted 
that in future, the exact powers of the workers' congress must 
be clearly defined and protected in law, so that the 
congress's decisions no longer depended on 'the quality of a 
few top cadres', and that laws and regulations must be 
established governing the election and recall of congress 
representatives and presidium members to avoid the congress's 
powers ending up in the hands of a minority.233 In late 1981 
the paper was still insisting on the 'innumerable advantages'
232 Reports of cadre resistance can be found in Nanfang 
Ribao 8.11.79, 3; Renmin Ribao 6.3.80, 1; Nanfang 
Ribao 22.10.80, 3; 29.11.80, 2; Gongren Ribao
18.2.81, 1; 7.11.81. 1; Nanfang Ribao 26.10.81, 1; 
Renmin Ribao 10.6.81, 1; 27.10.83, 2-4.
233 Gongren Ribao 21.10.80, 1.
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of the workers' congress, which it saw as the way to establish 
'democracy and a legal system' within enterprises234, but it 
is possible that support for management democratization was 
less strong in other quarters.
Reports on progress in setting up and running workers' 
congresses during 1981 revealed that although a majority of 
enterprises had set up a workers' congress (90% of large and 
medium enterprises in major cities had them by June 1981), 
only about 25% of workers' congresses were running well. 60% 
were said to be operating more or less satisfactorily, while 
15% were performing poorly and had already degenerated into 
formalism.235 Vice-Premier Wan Li urged all cadres, as 
communists, not to be afraid of the masses and to be willing 
to hand over powers to the workers' congress, and it was re­
stated that the workers' congress did not represent a negation 
of centralism and was not tantamount to anarchism. Cadres 
were assured that the powers of the workers' congress were 
limited to consultation on matters not affecting workers' 
direct personal interests, and that cadre elections would only 
be introduced gradually.236 But despite these assurances, 
cadre support for democratization and the workers' congress 
system does not seem to have been forthcoming. Nanfang Ribao 
identified the main misgivings in enterprises about the 
workers' congress as the 'four afraids': the Party Secretary 
was afraid that the workers' congress would go on for far too 
long; the factory director was afraid that it would 'refuse to 
leave the stage' and would try to take over his role; the 
union chair was afraid that it would deadlock relations
234 Gongren Ribao 7.11.81, 1.
235 These figures were cited at a conference on 
democratic management reported in Renmin Ribao 
(10.6.81, 1) and Nanfang Ribao (10.6.81, 3).
236 Renmin Ribao 10.6.81, 1. This limitation on its 
role was confirmed when the Temporary Regulations 
governing the workers' congress were published the 
following month.
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between management and workers; and the workers and staff 
themselves were afraid of being made to 'wear small shoes', 
i.e. they were afraid of management reprisals if they 
exercised their democratic rights through the workers' 
congress.
The situation in Guangdong was acknowledged to be even 
worse than elsewhere. It was reported towards the end of 1981 
that many large and medium-sized enterprises had still not set 
up a workers' congress, and that even in those enterprises 
experimenting with increased autonomy, where the reforms had 
gone furthest, few workers' congresses were running well after 
their establishment.237 An evaluation of the reforms in 
Guangdong published a decade later painted a similar picture, 
observing that democratic management and the role of the 
workers' congress had been neglected in the province, 
weakening workers' sense of being masters and leading to a 
pervasive 'wage-labourer' mentality among workers who felt 
that they were 'working for the factory director'.238
The reasons for Guangdong's poor performance in this 
respect seem to lie in the province's otherwise rapid reforms, 
which resulted in greatly increased powers, under enterprise 
autonomy, for the factory director. In theory the 'factory 
director responsibility system' should be integrated with 
democratic management and participation in management by 
workers and staff, but in practice, the result is often 
similar to the one-man management of the past. Many 
references to this problem can be found in the trade union and 
general press of the late 1980s and early 1990s in China. The 
'hired hand' and 'work according to pay' mentality among 
workers is frequently noted as a problem in these years, and 
the difficulty of preserving workers' democratic rights under
237 Nanfang Ribao 26.10.81, 1.
238 See Wang Zhuo et al. (eds.), Guangdong gaige kaifang 
pingshuo (An evaluation of reform and the open door 
in Guangdong), 265-266.
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the factory director responsibility system is also discussed, 
as is the re-appearance of 'one-man management' by factory 
directors who regularly by-pass or fail to convene the 
workers' congress239.
The potential contradiction between increased autonomy 
for factory directors and management democratization was 
recognized at an early stage; in fact, the factory director 
responsibility system was seen by some as making the role of 
the workers' congress more important than ever if the danger 
of a return to one-man management was to be averted. Zhao 
Ziyang reminded state enterprises of the importance of 
guaranteeing workers' right to participate in management once 
all powers to direct production and to manage the enterprise 
had been entrusted by the state to the factory director.240 
But despite this awareness of the potential problem, it does 
not seem to have been possible to protect workers' existing, 
quite limited rights to participate in management alongside 
the other planks of the management reforms. This again casts 
doubt on the claim that management democratization and the 
promotion of the workers' congress was anything other than 
instrumental in the reform programme. By the early 1990s, 
workers generally seem to have felt that the economic reforms 
had weakened their role as masters and democratic management, 
even those these were now enshrined in law in the Enterprise 
Law. A reflection of the way in which power shifted within 
the enterprise during the 1980s but still remained out of the
239 See fro example Gonghui Xinxi 3 (1.2.91), 18-19.
240 Guangzhou Ribao 16.5.84, 1. See also Guangzhou
Ribao 26.8.84, 1; 19.10.84, 1. A 1986 Xinhua News 
Agency report also referred to the question of 
factory directors' powers and democratic management, 
citing a Shanghai enterprise where workers evaluated 
the director once a year (and other cadres twice a 
year). The factory director would be called upon to 
resign by the workers' congress if a majority of 
workers evaluated him unfavourably, but the congress 
had no power of direct dismissal (Xinhua News 
Agency, Beijing, 6.9.86, translated in FBIS-CHI 
8.9.86, 02-03).
425
hands of rank-and-file workers was the comment that 'in the 
past, trade union cadres took orders from the party 
secretaries and now they take orders from the factory 
managers. '241
The trade unions
It was stated at the beginning of this section that one 
respect in which the late 1970s and early 1980s resembled the 
Hundred Flowers era of the 1950s was that the official unions 
were in crisis, with workers' confidence in them virtually 
non-existent and serious doubts being expressed as to whether 
they could play any useful role. It is a measure of the 
extent of the unions' crisis that they have not loomed as 
large in this discussion of the early reform period as they 
did in the mid-1950s. Many discussions of democratic 
management, even in Gongren Ribao, make no mention whatsoever 
of a role for the trade unions. There were proposals that the 
unions should again serve as the standing body of the workers' 
congress, but as was mentioned earlier, in many enterprises 
bodies to oversee the implementation of congress resolutions 
were set up quite separately from the official unions.
As with the revamped workers' congress, some of the 
unions' earlier problems were more openly acknowledged in the 
post-Mao period than they had been before, and the unions did 
gain a greater degree of independence of action from the Party 
for a time, at least in theory. As part of the general 
process of reassessing the PRC's history and politics right 
back to 1949, it was admitted that 'left' errors had been made 
with regard to trade unions as early as the 1950s. Li Lisan 
and Lai Ruoyu were both posthumously rehabilitated in 1980 and 
1979 respectively, and it was stated the accusations against
241 Chiang Chen-chang, 'The role of the trade unions in 
mainland China', Issues and Studies 26, 2 (February 
1990), 86.
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them of syndicalism and economism had been 'erroneous and 
groundless'242 . However, in the early stages of the post-Mao 
period, the unions' role was not defined in a way which was 
strikingly different from that of the 1950s. Mobilizing 
workers for production and for the realization of the four 
modernizations was still regularly cited as the unions' core 
task243, with tasks such as labour protection, education, 
improving skill levels, and safeguarding workers' democratic 
rights coming further down the list. When in the spring of 
1979 in Guangzhou, around the time of the anniversary of the 
April Fifth Movement, there was a certain amount of unrest 
connected with Democracy Wall, the unions were called upon by 
the city authorities to guide workers in the 'correct' 
exercise of their democratic rights, oppose extreme 
democratization and individualism, and lead the workers to 
combat the 'small minority' of criminals who were 'destroying 
social order and production order'. So it would seem that the 
unions were still being cast in the role of controllers, 
mobilizers and educators of workers, rather than 
representatives of their special interests.
However, particularly after the advent of Solidarity, 
more emphasis was given to unions' duty to protect the 
legitimate interests and democratic rights of workers first 
and foremost, while still also bearing in mind the interests 
of the enterprise and of the state. Unions were said to have 
swapped 'fear' for 'daring' in representing workers' views to 
the enterprise Party Committee244. From the end of 1979, a
242 See Ni Zhifu's report to the 3rd Enlarged Session of 
the 9th ACFTU Executive Committee, Gongren Ribao
13.10.81, 1. Former Gongren Ribao editor Chen 
Yongwen was also rehabilitated in 1979 (Nanfang 
Ribao 8.11.79, 3).
243 Nanfang Ribao 3.3.79, 1? 8.11.79, 3; 16.4.81, 3? 
Renmin Ribao 19.10.83, 1.
244 Although in this case in Henan, it took some effort 
on the part of union cadres to find out what 
workers' grievances were, since workers were
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concerted effort began to recover the confidence of workers in 
grass-roots union organizations, and some within the unions 
admitted that their difficulty in asserting operational 
independence from the Party in the past had in part been their 
own fault: 'Unions not representing the interests of the
workers are bound to be weak. '245 As was mentioned earlier, 
the unions' very existence had been questioned in the late 
1970s by some who saw no meaningful role for them, and union 
officials and activists seem to have been aware that if the 
unions lacked the confidence of their members, there was 
indeed 'no meaning to their existence'. An article in Gongren 
Ribao summed up what had happened to the official unions since 
the Hundred Flowers thus: 'Since 1957, many union
organizations have gradually lost their original prestige and 
role, falling back on a role of education, the organization of 
labour emulation campaigns, and some redundant work of the 
Party and the government.' According to another piece in the 
same issue, the trade unions had shown 'very little interest 
in the immediate interests of the workers', and consequently 
workers 'have never taken seriously the things the unions 
did. '246
In response to workers' criticisms of unrepresentative 
'signboard' unions, basic-level union cadres were criticized 
for tending to pit their duty to the Party against their duty 
to workers, and were reminded that the unions were to be the 
workers' own, trusted organization, and one which had every 
right to speak out on its members' behalf when orders from 
above conflicted with workers' wishes or interests247. But
unwilling to talk frankly their union 
representatives in the presence of the workshop 
leadership (Gongren Ribao 23.3.79, 1).
245 Gongren Ribao 18.11.80, 2.
246 Gongren Ribao 18.11.80, translated in CREA 120 
(16.3.81), 53.
247 Gongren Ribao 9.10.79, translated in 
SWB/FE/6244/BII/14.
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although at least some in the union hierarchy seem to have 
been sincere in this effort, overall only changes in emphasis 
were being made with regard to the unions' role; they were not 
being given free rein to stand on the side of the workers and 
represent their interests first and foremost. The reforms are 
perhaps best characterized as ' attempts to make the unions 
appear more independent of the Party. '248
The influence of Solidarity and Democracy Wall can be 
seen as we trace the development of the unions' vnew line' 
from 1978 through to the early 1980s. The labour movement 
press exhibited much greater concern about the extent to which 
workers had become alienated from their unions in the autumn 
of 1980 than it had done previously, and the language in which 
this concern was expressed carried clear echoes of Democracy 
Wall. In November of 1980 Gongren Ribao ran a number of 
articles on this subject, one of which insisted that the 
unions' 'fundamental objective.... is to protect the legal 
rights and interests of all workers, for which the union 
cadres should be responsible first.'249 The two points to 
note here are firstly, that cadres' duty to workers is 
explicitly put before their duty to other authorities in the 
enterprise and beyond; and secondly, the reference to legal 
rights. In terms strongly reminiscent of Li Yizhe's and 
Democracy Wall's demand for a socialist legal system 
institutionalizing protection for citizens' rights, the unions 
now called for 'the necessary protection of law and support 
from the government', and demanded that the relationships 
between the unions and the workers' congress, administrative 
and Party organizations 'should be clearly defined in the law 
or by the institutions.'250
248 Saich, 'Workers in the workers' state: urban workers 
in the PRC,' in Goodman (ed.) Groups and politics in 
the People's Republic of China, 164 (emphasis 
added).
249 Gongren Ribao 18.11.80, 2, in CREA 120 (16.3.81) 55.
250 Ibid., 55.
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Liao Gailong's report, also dating from the autumn of 
1980, was very clear about the likelihood of a 'Polish crisis' 
in China if the official unions were not revitalized, made 
more democratic, and freed from arbitrary Party interference, 
citing Lenin on the necessity of trade union representation 
even under socialism.251 The problem of the unions' own 
internal lack of democracy was brought up by others as well, 
and the importance of workers being able to elect their own 
union representatives was stressed. Mention was also made of 
cases where democratically-elected union representatives were 
arbitrarily moved from their posts by Party officials without 
consultation.252 All this discussion was of course taking 
place against the background of Democracy Wall's praise for 
Solidarity coupled with industrial unrest and sporadic self­
organization among Chinese workers; by the middle of 1981, 
once this stimulus to reform had receded in importance, the 
more outspoken statements in support of a greater degree of 
union independence were no longer heard. At the 10th ACFTU 
congress in October 1983, Ni Zhifu's address included among 
the unions' core tasks speaking and acting for the workers and 
protecting their lawful interests, and called for closer 
relations between unions and masses, but paid more attention 
to the unions' role in improving economic results, and in 
educating workers in patriotism, collectivism, socialism, and 
communist ideals, morality and culture, a very conventional 
pre-1978 view of what the unions should regard as their main 
tasks.
One way of assessing the extent to which unions gained a 
greater ability to represent workers as a result of the post- 
Mao reforms is to look at comments on union prestige and 
effectiveness later in the 1980s. These reports give the
251 Liao Gailong, 'The "1980 Reform" Programme of 
China', Qishi Nlandai 134 (1.3.81), translated in 
FBIS 16.3.81, U10.
252 Xinhua News Agency 4.12.80, translated in 
SFireAFtf/6595/BII/l.
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impression that little had changed with regard to the unions' 
main problems. In mid-1984 the Guangzhou Municipal Federation 
of Trade Unions, responding to an ACFTU call to basic-level 
union organizations to make themselves the 'family and friend' 
of the workers, reported that a large proportion of enterprise 
union branches in the city were failing to live up to this 
ideal, and needed to rectify their organization and forge 
close ties with workers as quickly as possible, speaking out 
on workers' behalf, acting to solve their problems, and thus 
gaining their trust.253
In 1987 a case in Qingdao, reported in the national 
press, painted a familiar picture of an enterprise trade union 
organization which was not even capable of protecting its own. 
A worker in a pressure-gauge factory was forced off the 
workers' congress, despite being democratically elected, after 
making criticisms of the enterprise leadership for falsifying 
production figures and applying rules on compensation for 
medical expenses too rigidly and simplistically. A dispute 
over the medical bills of a worker who had subsequently died 
seems to have raised the emotional temperature of the 
confrontation. The removal of this worker representative from 
his production post was ordered by the head of the enterprise 
trade union in violation of proper procedures, and he was left 
'awaiting re-assignment' on living expenses of one yuan per 
day. The ACFTU commented that when a union failed to uphold 
workers' democratic rights and the democratic management role 
of the workers' congress, it not only lost workers' 
confidence, but came to be opposed to the workers, and that 
such a union was worthless.254 It was also reported later in 
the year that there had been a growing tendency over the past 
two years for Party and enterprise officials to carry out 
attacks and reprisals against union officials and workers' 
congress representatives who had the courage to stand up to
253 Guangzhou Ribao 28.5.84, 1.
254 See the three reports in Gongren Ribao 15.6.87, 1.
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them and to defend workers' legitimate rights. Continued 
worker alienation from the official unions was observed, and 
the unions were criticized for holding themselves responsible 
to the higher levels but not to the members they were supposed 
to serve.255
Perhaps even more damning was the verdict of a survey 
undertaken by the ACFTU itself in spring 1988, already 
referred to above. Less than 10% of respondents in the survey 
considered that trade unions could 'speak for workers and 
solve their problems', while 25% said unions had 'only 
collected dues and conducted recreational activities'. When 
asked whether their enterprise trade union could be called the 
'family' or 'friend' of the workers, less than 20% replied in 
the affirmative while nearly 55% answered 'no' or 'not 
really'. 30% thought workers' congresses were effective or 
very effective, but 70% said they were only occasionally 
effective or did their duties in form only. The only 
difference noted by workers was, as mentioned above, that 
union cadres were now ordered about by factory directors 
rather than Party secretaries. Workers said that in general 
they did not turn to the trade union for help with their 
problems.256
This demonstrates that the early 1980s efforts to breathe 
new life into the old participatory and representative 
structures set up for the workers by higher authorities, 
including the enterprise trade union and the workers' 
congress, whatever the motives for introducing them, had made 
no very noticeable or lasting difference to enterprise 
democracy, and had not tackled the key problem of worker 
alienation from existing structures of representation and
255 Gongren Ribao 9.8.87, 1; 11.8.87, 1 and 2.
256 Chiang Chen-chang, 'The role of trade unions in
mainland China,' Issues and Studies 26, 2
(Feb.1990), 85-86. Survey taken from Liaowang
Zhoukan 17, 17, (25.4.88).
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authority. These efforts also manifestly failed to divert 
workers from responding to the worsening economic situation in 
the cities with strikes and stoppages in 1987 and 1988, and 
from taking part in the Democracy Movement of 1989. In this 
latter movement workers formed independent unions on a wider 
scale and with more publicity than ever before, the stated 
aims of these autonomous organizations being to address 
political and economic demands, 'based on the wishes of the 
majority of the workers' and 'to monitor the legal 
representatives of all state and collective enterprises, 
guaranteeing that the workers become the real masters of the 
enterprise. ' 257 The ACFTU' s tentative support for the 
democracy movement resulted in a stern re-statement of the 
unions' proper role by the Party the following year. This 
description of the unions' duty to take into account state, 
enterprise and long-term interests and to persuade workers to 
do the same, could have been lifted straight out of the press 
of the period of the anti-rightist campaign. It certainly 
offered no solution to the perennial problem of the unions' 
having to serve two masters, one far more powerful than the 
other, and having responsibility in the enterprise without 
authority.
Conclusions
So in the late 1970s and early 1980s, no way was found to 
go beyond the 1950s formulations of workers' democratic rights 
within the enterprise or in wider society. This was in spite 
of some very radical proposals made under the pressure of 
Solidarity's rise in Poland and the possibility of similar 
events in China if Democracy Wall was ever to form 
organizational links with the many restive workers involved in 
protests and strikes at this time. However, despite the 
successful repression of unrest in China by the middle of
257 'Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation Provisional 
Memorandum', Democracy Wall 11, n.d.
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1981, none of the fundamental problems behind it were actually 
resolved. The official unions proved unable to gain workers' 
respect or allegiance during the 1980s, and a precedent had 
been set for workers in China to form their own independent 
unions to represent their interests, again under the influence 
of Solidarity. In some cases the political nature of these 
workers' organizations was explicitly discussed, so it is not 
all that surprising to find Beijing's Gongzilian formulating 
a political role for themselves in May 1989s
In the entire people's patriotic democratic 
movement, led by the students in mid-April, the 
majority of the Chinese workers have demonstrated a 
strong wish to take part in politics. At the same 
time, they also realize that there is not yet an
organization which can truly represent the wishes
expressed by the working masses. Therefore, we 
recognize that there is a need to set up an 
autonomous organization which will speak for the 
workers and which will organize the realization of 
workers' participation and consultation in political 
affairs.258
Workers' unrest in this period definitely constituted a 
more serious problem for the Party than it had done in the
1950s, both organizationally and in terms of ideas. The
issues behind the widespread discontent are very familiar to 
us from earlier confrontations: cadre privilege and
corruption; the inadequate standards of living, in comparison, 
of those who actually do the work; the failure of the official 
unions to stand up for workers' rights and interests; the lack 
of effective institutions guaranteeing workers' right to 
participate in enterprise management; the arbitrary exercise 
of power by Party and management officials who are not
258 Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation Provisional 
Memorandum, translated in Democracy Wall 11 (n.d.).
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democratically accountable to their 'masters'; and the 
tendency for the Party elite to form themselves into a new 
ruling class, one whose status was tending to become 
hereditary, and one which had gained control, if not ownership 
as this was traditionally understood, of the means of 
production, and thus lived off the labour of others in an 
exploitative way.
But this time around the protests gained an extra edge, 
for two main reasons. One was that both Democracy Wall 
activists and many of the young workers involved in industrial 
unrest had in common their experiences in the Cultural 
Revolution. They had stood up to, criticized, and sometimes 
overthrown, cadres in their units before, and they both took 
a far more critical attitude towards the Party in the 
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and expressed their views 
more forcefully than before. As important was the fact that 
so many young Chinese had gained experience during the 
Cultural Revolution of forming autonomous political 
organizations and actually exercising the rights of free 
speech etc. which had long existed only on paper in the 
Chinese constitution. The other important factor, as it had 
been back in the 1950s, was the feeling that events in China 
were part of a broader trend in the socialist world. The rise 
of Solidarity as a powerful, non-state organization of the 
working class both inspired and legitimated the efforts of 
those in China who had come to similar conclusions about the 
defects of their systems of management and government. It 
seems also to have played a role in Chinese workers' decisions 
in some cases to form independent unions during strikes, 
although this was not unprecedented before 1980.259
259 Chen-chang Chiang notes that 'As early as 1975, 
workers went on strike in Hangzhou, Zhejiang, and 
the province became a center of the workers' 
movement in mainland China. Since then, workers 
there have formed many secret trade unions.' He 
cites the Taiwanese Chinese Communist Affairs 
Monthly as his source (Chen-chang Chiang, 'The role 
of trade unions in mainland China', 93).
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At the risk of falling into the trap of imposing a 
'Tiananmen teleology' on every trend and event of the previous 
fifteen years, the question must be raised as to why workers' 
discontent and unrest in the late 1970s and early 1980s did 
not develop into the sort of organized activities seen in the 
spring of 1989, notably the forming of Workers' Autonomous 
Federations (WAFs) in many Chinese cities. There is something 
in the arguments that for many of those who had taken to the 
streets to oppose the Gang of Four, there was a willingness to 
allow the Deng regime a chance to fulfil its promises of 
improved livelihood and democratization, and a corresponding 
reluctance to involve themselves in any mass political 
activity against the new government. Such activity also still 
carried clear risks for participants; and a general 
disenchantment with politics also played a part. Thus a 
movement which had cadre corruption and privilege as one of 
its main concerns was not able to attract a mass following as 
it did in 1989 (and as a state-sponsored campaign along the 
same lines had back in 1974). The Party's efforts to portray 
Democracy Wall activists as dangerous dissidents, anarchists, 
counter-revolutionaries and criminals also seem to have been 
fairly successful. Even if the population at large didn't 
believe all of these charges, the regime had still sent a 
signal of how it saw the activists, making clear to everyone 
the likely consequences of getting involved with such enemies 
of the state. The years 1978 to 1981 can be seen as offering 
a precedent for 1989 in some respects, however, since despite 
the failure of Democracy Wall to turn itself into a broad- 
based mass movement, some independent unions were formed, and 
towards the end of the movement, the mass of discontented 
workers and the minority of outspoken activists did begin to 
see the value of linking up.
To a certain extent what may have saved the authorities 
in the early 1980s from the emergence all over China of 
independent workers' organizations, linked with the dissident 
activists involved in the unofficial publications movement,
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was the economic reforms. As was mentioned earlier, workers 
were by no means automatic beneficiaries of the reform 
programme in every respect. Several measures, notably 
contract employment, ending the 'iron rice-bowl', and 
managers' rights to hire and fire under enterprise autonomy, 
had the effect of undermining job security. Inflation, a 
product of the early years of reform, also hit many workers' 
standards of living, and sharply differentiated individual 
bonuses were resisted by a workforce which still exhibited a 
strong attachment to egalitarianism in distribution. But the 
reforms did still offer many workers a chance to increase 
their income through the distribution of retained profits as 
bonuses, and many did begin to experience a higher standard of 
living through the first half of the 1980s. The picture later 
on in the decade is somewhat different, however, and the 
change is a significant one with regard to workers' attitudes 
towards management and the ruling Party. This will be 
discussed further in the conclusion.
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CONCLUSIONS
The first four confrontations and 1989
The aim of this study has been to examine the first four 
major confrontations between industrial workers and the Party 
in order to ascertain whether any of these conflicts can be 
considered as a precedent for workers' activities during the 
1989 Democracy Movement, activities which have often been 
described as unprecedented. In doing this, it has also been 
our intention to try to uncover some of the 'hidden history of 
workers' resistance'1 which has hitherto been obscured by the 
perception of movements such as the Hundred Flowers and the 
Cultural Revolution as primarily the concern of intellectuals. 
It is hoped that the preceding sections have helped to dispel 
the misconception that workers' involvement in this type of 
movement has always been opportunistic and motivated by narrow 
economic concerns. The political overtones of many disputes 
originally sparked off by economic grievances has thus been a 
recurring theme.
The focus on a somewhat neglected group can also result 
in new insights into the periods of unrest and confrontation 
examined. A good example of this emerges in the last section. 
Looking at the early 1980s, it would be difficult to 
understand why the authorities thought it necessary to launch 
a final campaign to discredit and suppress Democracy Wall in 
1981, when most observers agreed that readership of unofficial 
journals was falling and the movement seemed to be running out 
of steam in any case, unless one was aware of the industrial 
unrest going on at that time which gave rise to the fear that 
the remaining activists, many of them workers, might link up
1 Perry, 'Shanghai's strike wave of 1957', 4.
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with discontented sections of the workforce and start a mass 
movement. The real threat the movement still posed is only 
apparent when the importance of workers' activities is 
properly acknowledged. Another example of the benefits of 
this perspective is that by looking primarily at workers' 
grievances and demands and at the issues which concerned them, 
it is possible to detect a considerable degree of continuity 
between all five of the post-1949 confrontations. The extent 
to which the 1989 Democracy Movement was concerned with the 
same issues as not only the earlier Democracy Wall Movement, 
but also the Cultural Revolution, has been recognized by some, 
notably Jack Gray and Jonathan Unger2, but the concentration 
on workers' activities helps to bring it into sharper focus.
Looking at the issues which most concerned workers in the 
1989 protests, the links with earlier outbreaks of protest are 
easily discernible. The widespread resentment at cadre 
lifestyles and corruption so evident in the movement's 
documents was the 1980s version of a perennial theme in 
workers' discontent; this time around, it was of course 
intensified by the new threats to workers' security of 
inflation and the undermining of job security under the 
economic reforms. Andrew Walder makes a point familiar to us 
from the confrontation of the mid-1950s when he observes that 
in 1989, 'Inflation and corruption appear to have fuelled 
public protest primarily by enhancing the workers' sense of
2 See Unger's comment that Shengwulian's denunciation of 
the 'red capitalist class' was 'a similar view of the 
polity [to that which] devoid of radical rhetoric, 
brought a million people into Tiananmen in 1989' 
(Unger, 'Whither China?', 3). Jack Gray also noted 
recently that 'The issues against which the Red Guards 
rebelled in 1966 were the same as those which brought 
China's students to Tiananmen in 1989; the language 
differed, but the content was the same - corrupt 
privilege and the abuse of power' (Gray, reviewing 
Rafe de Crespigny's China This Century in the China 
Quarterly 140 (December 1994), 1157).
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powerlessness and resentment at official privilege'.3 Once 
again, it was not absolute deprivation which generated anger 
so much as workers' inability to remedy the blatant unfairness 
of a society in which, as a leaflet written by a worker in 
1989 put its
the words "owned by the people" actually mean "owned 
by a small group of the bourgeoisie". That group 
calls us the "masters of the country", yet we live 
in overcrowded conditions from generation to 
generation. On the other hand, those "civil 
servant" build villas, and have police escorts for 
their luxury cars - while we 'masters' travel on 
crowded buses.4
It is very noticeable that although some of the ideological 
heat had gone out of the language of the 1989 protests (no 
references to 'red capitalists' or anything similar), 
nevertheless, workers at least were still identifying their 
leaders as an exploitative minority which lived off others' 
labour; and the document quoted above actually used the term 
'bourgeoisie' with reference to privileged officials. This 
analysis of the power relations between workers and the Party 
can be traced back through Democracy Wall, April Fifth, the Li 
Yizhe poster, and the Cultural Revolution, all the way back to 
the Hundred Flowers period when it was first suggested that 
officials might constitute 'a privileged class standing above 
the people'5.
3 Walder, 'The political sociology of the Beijing
upheaval of 1989', Problems of Communism 38, 5
(September«0ctober 1989), 34).
4 'Letter to the students' (signed 'A Worker'),
translated in Mok and Harrison (eds.), Voices from 
Tiananmen Square, 109.
5 Fu Rong, 'My understanding of the contradictions among
the people under the socialist system', Xuexi 24 
(18.12.57), in ECMM 123 (17.3.58), 20.
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One other similarity between 1989 and earlier 
confrontations was that in the Democracy Movement, workers 
asserted their right, even their duty, as the most advanced 
class in society, to get involved in politics. Recalling the 
words of the Communist Party Manifesto of 1848, the Beijing 
Workers' Autonomous Federation (Gongzilian) gave this 
statement of its purpose:
The working class is the most advanced class and we, 
in the Democratic Movement, should be prepared to 
demonstrate its great power.
The People's Republic of China is supposedly led by 
the working class, and we have every right to drive 
out the dictators...
To bring down dictatorship and totalitarianism and 
promote democracy in China is our undeniable 
responsibility.
In the Democracy Movement, "we have nothing to lose 
but our chains, and a world to win."6
Another independent Beijing union also drew on a long history 
of political protest in China when it stated that 'the words 
on our standard are: science, democracy, freedom, human
rights, laws and institutions!'7, recalling not only April 
Fifth, but also May Fourth. Not only did workers appear to 
take for granted their right to hold the Party to account, 
showing again that it is unwise to tell any social group year 
after year that it is the rightful leader of society, and yet 
expect that group to remain passive when its rights and 
interests are obviously infringed upon. They were also far 
more forthright than many of the student protestors, at least 
in the movement's early stages, in striking directly at the 
relationship between 'rulers and ruled' in Chinese society as
6 'Declaration of the BWAF Preparatory Committee on 
behalf of the workers', translated in Mok Chiu Yu and j 
Harrison (eds.), Voices from Tiananmen
7 'Letter to compatriots of the nation (Beijing Workers' 
Union), translated in ibid., 108.
the root of the country's problems:
At a time when many students and intellectuals were 
seeking to strengthen the hand of the moderate and 
reformist elements within the Party, gongzilian 
articulated a fundamentally different definition of 
'the movement'. Even before martial law, gongzilian 
targeted the system.8
This contrast also helped to create friction between workers 
and students, particularly as the workers often felt that the 
student section of the movement was more interested in 
emulating the Party leadership, with its elitism, corruption 
and concern for status, than they were in overthrowing it and 
establishing an entirely new system.9
A final point of similarity between 1989 and earlier 
confrontations was the way in which workers were aware of 
events in Eastern Europe. After a resurgence of industrial 
unrest the previous summer, Solidarity had re-emerged as a 
major political force in Poland, and, having entered into 
negotiations with the government in February, had its legal 
status restored on 17 April 1989.10 One of the activists 
involved in setting up Guangzhou's Gongzilian reported that
the Solidarnosc union in Poland inspired us a lot. 
Although Poland had a socialist system, the workers 
there set up Solidarnosc in the eighties. After
8 Walder and Gong, 'Workers in the Tiananmen protests', 
7.
9 See the comments of worker-activists as reported in 
ibid., 26-27.
10 Paul Lewis, Central Europe since 1945, 237-238.
Solidarity candidates of course did very well in the 
subsequent Polish elections in June 1989, events also 
of great relevance to Chinese pro-democracy activists 
who had already had some propaganda successes using 
the election method in 1980 and 1986.
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many years of hard work and struggle, they managed 
to gain legitimacy. We wondered whether we could 
borrow the experience of Solidarnosc in Poland to 
form an independent political force outside the 
Communist Party.11
As had been the case in all four previous confrontations, 
the specific economic circumstances and the background of 
workers' everyday lives also played a part in generating 
support for the protest movement of 1989. The most important 
aspect of this background was the impact which the economic 
reforms had had on workers during the second half of the 
1980s. One possible explanation for the very rapid emergence 
of autonomous workers' organizations in the spring of 1989 was 
the extent of discontent with what many perceived as a 
worsening of workers' situation under the reforms. It was 
noted in section four that to a certain extent, restive 
workers were successfully 'bought off' by rising incomes in 
the early stages of the reforms, although even then concerns 
about rising prices and decreased job security were also very 
evident, and it seemed clear that the Party was only being 
allowed a limited chance to make good on its promises. If 
improvements failed to materialize, then the unrest and self­
organization that we noted in 1980 and 1981 might very quickly 
return in China.
What seems to have happened in the second half of the 
decade, and particularly after 1987, is that rising 
expectations of improved living standards came into conflict 
with a perceived worsening of most working-class households'
11 Interview with Guangzhou Gongzilian activist no.4 in 
Gongren Qilaile, 90 (79-80). This activist had
followed the vicissitudes of Solidarity's developments 
since the early 1980s. At least one of the 
independent unions formed during the 1989 movement, in 
Nanchang, actually called itself 'Solidarity' (Chen- 
chang Chiang, 'the role of trade unions in mainland 
China', 97).
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economic circumstances. Whether or not this perception was 
borne out by the facts is not really the point; it is the 
perception, almost universal, of promises broken and hopes 
betrayed which was important in generating support for the 
Democracy Movement.12 Two other points should be made before 
we look in detail at the impact of the reforms on workers. 
One is that workers' reform-related grievances in most cases 
still exist today, and in some respects have intensified since 
1989, and these grievances are still regularly the cause of 
industrial disputes. In other words, the background for 
widespread worker involvement in an anti-government movement 
is still there.
The second point is that it was not only the issues most 
often mentioned - inflation, reduced job security and the 
decline in real incomes - which concerned workers in the late 
1980s and after. In the previous section we found being 
reported in the unofficial journals of Democracy Wall not only 
workers' dissatisfaction over pay and living conditions, but 
also complaints about the lack of democracy in enterprise 
management and about wider issues of industrial organization. 
This was also the case later in the reform periods the 
mentality of 'work according to pay', the problem of workers' 
exclusion from participation in management, criticisms of one- 
man management and the powerlessness of the workers' congress, 
in sum, the failure of workers' actual position at work and in 
society to match their theoretical 'masters' status, were 
also very important factors in creating the widespread 
alienation from management and the regime which 1989 made so 
obvious, and which, according to the analysis of the official 
trade unions, has not gone away in subsequent years.
12 See the discussion in Walder, 'Workers, managers and 
the states The reform era and the political crisis of 
1989', China Quarterly 127 (September 1991), 470-473. 
Most of his data comes from a study of Tianjin, but as 
he points out, there is no reason to suppose that the 
situation there was atypical of urban China as a 
whole.
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Effects of the economic reforms
As was mentioned above, it is often argued that it was 
the impact of continuing economic reforms which made the 
difference between the limited response by workers to 
Democracy Wall (and their lack of response to the 1986-7 
student demonstrations), and their widespread and active 
support for the 1989 protest movement. In a survey of the 
reform period, the Hong Kong periodical Minghao Yuekan located 
a crucial change in the public mood on reform taking place 
from early in 1987, and passing through several distinct 
stages until by the spring of 1989, widespread distrust of the 
government and pessimism about living standards, together with 
disgust at official corruption, formed the basis of widespread 
urban support for the Democracy Movement.13 There are several 
points to note with reference to public responses to reform. 
Firstly, we should bear in mind that before 1987, urban 
incomes had on the whole been rising, and that hopes were high 
that the success of contract responsibility in the countryside 
could be repeated in urban areas, resulting in a similarly 
striking improvement in living standards.14 Ironic echoes of 
the high expectations generated in the cities by the successes 
of land reform in the late 1940s can be detected here. By 
1987 many urban citizens had come to regard rising incomes as 
synonymous with reform, and this posed problems for the regime 
when the increases faltered and in some cases went into 
reverse. When further price reforms were carried out in 1988 
without the cushion of rising urban wages, panic-buying and 
runs on the banks resulted.15
The same article noted that in two 1987 surveys of public
13 'Xiwang de pomie [The shattering of hopes]', Minghao 
Yuekan (October 1991), 24-28.
14 Ibid., 24.
15 Ibid., 27.
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opinion, security was rated more important than increased 
individual income by most respondents16. 1987 was also the 
year in which the reforms began to dismantle the system of 
socialist welfare provision set up in the 1950s, with reforms 
being implemented in the areas of housing, medical care, and 
employment (specifically the promotion of insecure, contract 
employment, which implied an acceptance, for the first time 
since 1949, of the existence of urban unemployment as a 
permanent feature of the economy). We noted in the previous 
section how workers in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
perceived a possible threat to their interests and security in 
the calls to 'smash the iron rice-bowl', and now this threat 
seemed to be materializing. At the same time, the development 
of a 'tight money' policy through 1988 meant that by early 
1989, as many as two-thirds of urban factories were running at 
less than full capacity, and that as a consequence, workers on 
short-time working, often a two- or three-day week, were not 
receiving their full salary, still less their usual bonuses 
for meeting production quotas. Many were only on 70% of their 
usual pay17, and in the context of further price reform and 
the highest inflation rates of the reform period so far, this 
was a major cause for complaint among workers. It is
generally agreed that, mainly as a result of very high 
inflation, but also influenced by the prevalence of short-time 
working and suspension of bonuses, real urban industrial 
incomes actually fell slightly between the end of 1986 and the 
end of 198818.
16 Ibid., 26.
17 See Willy Wo-lap Lam's article in the South China 
Morning Post (9.3.90), reproduced in FBJS-CHJ-90-047
(9.3.90), 26-27.
18 Walder, 'Workers, managers and the state', 471; 
Minghao Yuekanr s analysis was that 20% of urban 
residents experienced this drop in income, by 
sometimes as much as 30%, and that the fall mainly 
affected the lower-income stratum of society ('The 
shattering of hopes', 26).
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Walder has argued that the main reasons for the 
nationwide appearance of autonomous unions in 1989, a 
development which had not happened as a result of any previous 
protest movements or unrest in urban China, were the specific 
impact of certain reform measures in the late 1980s (broadly 
as outlined above), and the temporary suspension of the normal 
means by which such unrest is usually suppressed; 'the 
division of the leadership and the temporary paralysis of its 
formidable apparatus of repression'.19 This is fine as far 
as it goes; it is clearly in keeping with the conclusions of 
the previous section, that workers were in part bought off by 
the reforms as Democracy Wall was being suppressed, and that 
incidents such as the formation of independent unions quickly 
attracted suppression by the authorities. But this view tends 
to down-play the extent to which previous bouts of unrest and 
self-organization do in fact offer a precedent for 1989. It 
is usually said that the independent unions formed in the 
early 1980s were scattered and sporadic, but in fact, we have 
reports of independent unions being demanded or actually 
formed in at least half-a-dozen Chinese cities and provinces. 
It is entirely possible that there were more examples of which 
the outside world was not aware; there were certainly strikes 
in most urban areas at this time. This is to say nothing of 
earlier examples of self-organization such as the Pingnanhui 
(grievance-redressing societies) of the Hundred Flowers 
period20, or of the many workers' organizations formed during 
the Cultural Revolution.
Similarly, since the middle of 1989 industrial unrest has 
continued in China, and so have attempts to form independent 
unions.
In 1991 the Ministry of State Security was said to be
investigating no less 
organizations in Beijing
14 underground workers' 
organizations each with a
19 Walder, 'Workers, managers and the state', 492.
20 Perry, 'Shanghai's strike wave of 1957', 11.
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membership of between 20 and 300 workers.21 According to 
Willy Wo-lap Lam's recent account, two of these organizations 
modelled themselves explicitly on Solidarity, and 'vowed to 
form an alternative, workers-based party that championed "real 
democracy".' These groups were also putting out unofficial 
publications.22 Many more examples could be given; reports 
cite independent union activity in Luoyang and Zhuzhou in 
199023, for example. One former Beijing Gongzilian member 
stated in 1993 that workers involved in the protests had 
continued to meet secretly after the crackdown, and that 
underground activities were 'well-organized'.24 During 1994, 
attempts to register an independent union were reported25. 
In fact, this incident was not merely another attempt to start 
an independent union. In March 1994 a 'League for the 
Protection of Working People in China' (Laomeng) was 
established. Zhou Guoqiang, Yuan Hongbing and Wang Jiaqi, who 
were involved in the activity surrounding the formation of 
Laomeng, were arrested in March 1994 in connection with their 
efforts to organize a petition to the National People's 
Congress demanding that the right to strike be restored to the 
Chinese constitution and that workers and peasants be allowed 
to form independent unions.26
All this activity has gone on despite the state's 
apparatus of repression no longer being 'paralysed' (the
21 See Willy Wo-lap Lam, China after Deng Xiaoping, 273.
22 Ibid., 274.
23 South China Morning Post (9.3.90), in FJ3JS-CHI-90-047
(9.3.90), 26.
24 South China Morning Post 25.2.93, 10.
25 Guardian 11-12.3.94, 15.
26 See Lam, China after Deng Xiaoping, 277} Human Rights
Watch Asia 6, 2 (11.3.94), 1-2. Zhou was a founder 
member of Beijing Gongzilian, and, with Wang, had 
acted on behalf of exiled Gongzilian leader Han
Dongfang in his efforts to get back into China (Human
Rights Watch Asia, 2).
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prolonged succession crisis cannot be compared to the 
divisions in the leadership during spring 1989). Again, 
Walder has argued that in enterprises, the Party is able under 
normal circumstances to prevent unofficial self-organization 
by workers and to stop organized protest or opposition among 
workers before it starts.27 But in fact, given the evidence 
produced in this study showing how common such activities in 
factories were in the four periods of confrontation being 
examined, the phrase 'normal circumstances' becomes almost 
meaningless. What views such as Walder's lack is an 
appreciation of the extent to which precedents for workers' 
activities in 1989 did exist. Having initially been quite 
dismissive of the significance of the Workers' Autonomous 
Federations in the immediate aftermath of June 4, many 
commentators have since acknowledged their importance as a 
sign of independent political, as well as industrial, activity 
by workers. But, with the exception of Elizabeth Perry's 
recent article on the Hundred Flowers in Shanghai, they have 
yet to apply this new insight back to other outbreaks of 
protest by workers, and consequently the magnitude and 
significance of earlier confrontations between workers and the 
Party is still underestimated. 1989 is still described as a 
'turning point'28 or a 'new species of political protest'29, 
and, extensive though the movement was nationally, well- 
supported by the urban citizenry and the centre of overseas 
attention, it was not completely removed form all previous 
outbreaks of protest, particularly with reference to workers' 
activities.
Similarly, the early view that workers in 1989 were
27 Walder, Communist Neo-traditionalism, 18-19.
28 Wang Shaoguang, 'Deng Xiaoping's reform and the
Chinese workers' participation in the protest movement 
of 1989', Research in Political Economy, 13, quoted in 
Perry, 'Shanghai's strike wave of 1957', 3.
29 Walder and Gong, 'Workers in the Tiananmen protests', 
3-4.
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primarily motivated by economic grievances and 'bread-and- 
butter issues' has been modified to admit of more political 
content to workers' activities, but again, this change of view 
has not been tested retrospectively with reference to earlier 
instances of workers' involvement in protest movements. It is 
hoped that this study has provided considerable evidence for 
the political content of many workers' protests, even where 
these were sparked off by specific economic grievances. One 
clue to the political nature of workers' activities is that 
they have so often coincided with major upheavals elsewhere in 
the socialist world: Poland and Hungary in 1956-7, and
Solidarity in 1980 and again in 1988-9. Internal union 
documents suggest that the international political upheavals 
beginning in 1989 were the major cause of strikes, stoppages 
and petitions among Chinese workers through 1989 and 1990, 
only in 1991 giving way to economic issues at the enterprise 
level as the main 'hot-spot' on which unrest was focused. It 
was admitted that the suppression of the Democracy Movement 
and the subsequent East European revolutions had had great 
repercussions among China's workers and had shaken the faith 
of some of them in the socialist system.30
This brings us to the crux of the issue as to whether, 
and how, 1989 differed from earlier outbreaks of protest. If 
the 1989 Democracy Movement, with reference to workers, is 
properly located as the fifth in a series of worker-Party 
confrontations, then by examining the issues on which workers' 
discontent was focused in previous outbreaks we can determine 
how closely 1989 resembled them, and to what extent it 
represented a significant escalation of conflict. What was at 
the heart of all four bouts of unrest with which this study 
has been concerned was the fact that reality did not match up 
to workers' declared status as masters, the democratic rights 
in the enterprise and in wider society which they enjoyed on 
paper, and their avowed leading political role. Under the
30 Gonghui Xinxi 8 (15.4.91), 28.
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socialist system they were deprived of the old weapons of 
union organization and strikes with which they had previously 
defended their rights, but the new, Party-controlled unions 
and the institutions of democratic management which were 
supposed to replace these were never able to play their 
intended role, being easily circumvented by impatient or 
autocratic cadres, and soon falling into disrepute with 
workers because of their ineffectiveness. In an industrial 
system where productivity gains depended to such a great 
extent on increased inputs and intensification of labour, 
workers in some cases came to feel that they were even worse 
off under this type of 'socialism' than they had been working 
for private bosses. Some even argued that the new 'red 
capitalists', who monopolized the means of production through 
political power rather than economically, were worse than the 
old ones which they had replaced, since their control over 
workers' lives was more complete.
This gives an indication of why workers' activities in 
1989 emerged so quickly throughout the country in an organized 
form and were such a significant part of the movement. Since 
1949, workers had on more than one occasion come to doubt the 
validity of official arguments that independent unions and the 
strike weapon were unnecessary under socialism. But by the 
end of the 1980s, it really was no longer possible to deploy 
this argument, since it was obvious to every citizen that 
'socialism with Chinese characteristics', or the socialist 
market economy, was rather more market than socialist in some 
respects. The government could no longer claim that workers 
had no need for their own unions because it already protected 
their interests, while at the same time undermining welfare 
provisions and security of employment and throwing workers on 
the mercy of the market. Increased enterprise autonomy also 
meant a weakening of direct state control over enterprise 
management, with contract management a case in point. As the 
second round of contracts was being negotiated in 1990, 
concerns were expressed that workers saw the contract
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management as the 'owner' of the enterprise, and felt that 
this reform left no room for democratic management. The 
official trade unions pushed for regular democratic evaluation 
of managers by workers and for the participation of workers' 
congress representatives in awarding contracts and evaluating 
management.31 But the problems posed by the changing nature 
of state enterprise management tended to reinforce workers' 
feeling that their supposed democratic rights in the 
enterprise were a fiction.
Laomeng's petition to the NPC makes the point about the 
changing forms of ownership and control in the Chinese economy 
very clearly. Making the case for including the right to 
strike in the Chinese constitution, and referring specifically 
to the state and collective sector as well as to other forms 
of ownership, Laomeng put forward the following argument:
At the present time, China is in a difficult process 
of evolving from a planned economy into a market 
economy. Individual ownership by private citizens, 
enterprises owned by foreign capital and joint 
ventures will constitute an ever-growing proportion 
in the system of multiple forms of ownership. The 
mechanism of operation of the state and collective 
enterprises will also undergo significant changes.
Confronted with capitalist owners and their 
managers, workers and employees can only protect 
their own interests by invoking the specific rights 
of citizens bestowed upon them by law. Absolute 
power corrupts absolutely. Unrestrained wealth will 
also alienate into a source of social injustice.
And the citizens' rights - the right to strike 
included - constitute a basic factor restraining the 
unjust use of wealth. Once the working people lose 
these rights, their fate is dominated by the
31 See for example Gonghui Xinxi 21 (1.11.90), 22-25; 3
(1.2.91), 18-19; 7 (1.4.91), 9.
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capitalist owners and their managers. It will be 
difficult for them to safeguard their rights and 
interests effectively by legal means. The use of 
capital will be unrestricted. Under these
circumstances, violations of the rights and 
interests of the working people will become 
unavoidable, and conditions will worsen. Society 
will be tragically split into violent non-legal 
conflicts.
In order to maintain stable development of society, 
we therefore put forward the following proposal:
Adopt a constitutional amendment to amend Article 35 
of the Constitution as follows: "Citizens of the
People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, 
of the press, of assembly, of association, of 
procession, of demonstration, and of strike."32
Workers' complaints about enterprise organization and 
management conduct in the early 1990s often bear a striking 
resemblance to those first voiced in the 1950s. After 1989 we 
still find reports of workers being excluded from 
participation in management because managers thought they 
weren't capable of effective participation. Where this 
happened, the official unions responded in terms which could 
have been lifted straight out of a summer 1950 report on 
democratic management, re-stating the argument that workers 
would only learn to participate effectively in management if 
they were actually allowed to participate, and that although 
they might not know about all sections of the enterprise and 
its activities, they did have expertise in specific areas and 
practical knowledge, and collectively they were extremely 
important to the successful functioning of the enterprise. 
Clearly the case for democratic management was having to be 
made all over again, and this time managers grown accustomed
32 Human Rights Watch Asia 6, 2 (11.3.94), 7.
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in the reform period to asserting their right to manage seem 
to have been even less receptive to it than their 1950s 
counterparts, who at least were obliged to pay lip-service to 
democratic ideals on ideological grounds.33 References abound 
also to one-man management and to the difficulties workers 
faced in exercising their democratic rights under the factory 
director responsibility system; to the prevalence of the 
'hired hand' and 'work according to pay' mentality among 
workers; and to widespread worker discontent over unfair 
distribution, with particular reference to undemocratic or 
corrupt wage and bonus decisions being taken by managers 
without consulting the workers' congress, in contravention of 
the Enterprise Law.34
Not only had the complaints of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s not gone away, but workers even seem to have felt 
that the reforms had actually weakened their position further, 
despite the fact that their status as masters of the 
enterprise and provisions for democratic management were now 
laid down in the Enterprise Law and other legislation. One 
reason for this was that the reform of industrial management 
had given so much power to the factory director (as opposed to 
the Party secretary), while the official unions were as 
ineffectual as ever in enforcing workers' rights. During 1990 
the unions, who had offered tentative support to the Democracy 
Movement but were subsequently brought back under tighter 
Party control, complained that they were being treated as a 
work department of the Party Committee in enterprises, and 
that they were thus unable to do much more than make 
sympathetic noises when workers brought them their problems. 
Consequently, they reported, the workers whose interests they
33 Comments on this kind of management attitude and
conduct can be found in Gongren Ribao 25.7.89, 3;
8.8.89, 3; 22.8.89, 2; Gonghui Xinxi 2 (15.1.91), 30; 
3 (1.2.91), 18-19; and 8 (15.4.91), 7-8.
34 See Gongren Ribao 25.7.89, 3 (2 articles); 8.8.89, 3;
Gonghui Xinxi 18 (15.9.90), 8-9; 2 (15.1.91), 30; 3
(1.2.91), 18-19; and 8 (15.4.91), 7-8.
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were unable to protect tended to reject the Party's slogan of 
'relying on the working class' as mere words.35
It has been noted that immediately after the 1989 
Democracy Movement, the Party ' tried to win the workers' 
loyalty by apparently re-establishing their position as the 
"premier" class in China'36, and stressed that the working 
class had in fact remained loyal during the upheaval and had 
helped to restore stability subsequently, a view of events 
which does not tally with the reality of Chinese workers' 
involvement in the protests. But it seems that in spite of 
the Party's efforts, workers remained distinctly unimpressed 
with rhetoric about their leading position as long as they had 
no effective union representation and no say in management. 
On top of this, many state enterprises in particular were 
running at reduced capacity in the early 1990s, resulting in 
lay-offs and pay cuts for workers, so the economic benefits of 
reform were also in doubt by this point. The economic 
difficulties of state workers mean that they are now a 
relatively disadvantaged group within the workforce as a 
whole, and consequently they have been more prominent in 
recent unrest than they were in the mid-1950s or the Cultural 
Revolution.
So the issues behind workers' protests in 1989 and since 
can in most cases be traced back to earlier confrontations 
between workers and the Party, with some grievances going 
right back to the early post-liberation period. However, 1989 
can be seen as an escalation in workers' anti-Party and anti­
government protests in some respects, because the Workers' 
Autonomous Federations and other independent unions of 1989 
were not confined to a single enterprise or work unit; existed 
in every major Chinese city and in some smaller ones as well; 
often had quite large registered memberships; and played a
35 Gonghui Xinxi 18 (15.9.90), 8-9.
36 Lam, China after Deng Xiaoping, 273.
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prominent public role, carrying their banners in mass 
demonstrations that were seen by millions. Earlier 
escalations in protests and organizational developments have 
already been noted from one major period of confrontation to 
the next: for example, the Pingnanhui of the 1950s were
confined to a single enterprise, while during the Cultural 
Revolution large-scale workers' organizations were formed 
crossing industrial and geographical boundaries, providing a 
precedent of national networks which was then used by worker- 
activists in the Democracy Wall Movement. Similarly, the 
official unions were cast aside in the mid-1950s, attacked and 
temporarily removed from the scene during the Cultural 
Revolution, and replaced with workers' own organizations 
during the Democracy Wall Movement and again in 1989.
The Workers' Autonomous Federations were very explicit about 
their political role, but then, some of the unofficial 
journals' comments on the prospects for a Chinese Solidarity 
in the early 1980s had also demonstrated an awareness that any 
independent workers' organization in China would be a 
political organization, a quasi-political party.
It is also possible that because of a lack of detailed 
information we have underestimated the number and spread of 
earlier independent unions. However, on the whole 1989 does 
seem to have constituted an escalation in workers' protests, 
because independent unions were so widespread and were given 
so much attention. Of course, the very fact that an outbreak 
of opposition is not the first of its kind can lead to an 
escalation of protests, as an awareness exists that issues 
have been raised and concessions demanded before, but to no 
avail. It is true that by the end of the 1980s, Party 
prestige was at an all-time low, and that this had something 
to do with the scale of the protests and the rapidity of the 
development of a mass movement. But despite these features of 
the 1989 movement, workers were moved to protest then over 
essentially the same issues as in the four previous 
confrontations, and so the degree of continuity between these 
confrontations, and therefore the existence of some sort of
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precedent for workers' activities in 1989, should not be 
forgotten.
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